Time-varying integration,interdependence and contagion

Bekaert et al. (2005) define contagion as “correlation over and above what one would expect from economic fundamentals”. Based on a two-factor asset pricing specification to model fundamentally-driven linkages between markets, they define contagion as correlation among the model residuals, and develop a corresponding test procedure. In this paper, we investigate to what extent conclusions from this contagion test depend upon the specification of the time-varying factor exposures. We develop a two-factor model with global and regional market shocks as factors. We make the global and regional market exposures conditional upon both a latent regime variable and three structural instruments, and find that, for a set of 14 European countries, this model outperforms more restricted versions. The structurally-driven increase in global (regional) market exposures and correlations suggest that market integration has increased substantially over the last three decades. Using our optimal model, we do not find evidence that further integration has come at the cost of contagion. We do find evidence for contagion, however, when more restricted versions of the factor specifications are used. We conclude that the specification of the global and regional market exposures is an important issue in any test for contagion.     

Regionality revisited: An examination of the direction of spread of currency crises

What determines the direction of spread of currency crises? We examine data on waves of currency crises in 1992, 1994, 1997, and 1998 to evaluate several hypotheses on the determinants of contagion. We simultaneously consider trade competition, financial links, and institutional similarity to the “ground zero” country as potential drivers of contagion. To overcome data limitations and account for model uncertainty, we utilize Bayesian methodologies hitherto unused in the empirical literature on contagion. In particular, we use the Bayesian averaging of binary models that allows us to take into account the uncertainty regarding the appropriate set of regressors.We find that institutional similarity to the ground zero country plays an important role in determining the direction of contagion in all the emerging market currency crises in our dataset. We thus provide persuasive evidence in favour of the “wake-up call” hypothesis for financial contagion. Trade and financial links may also play a role in determining the direction of contagion, but their importance varies amongst the crisis periods.     

On measuring synchronization of bulls and bears: The case of East Asia

This paper implements estimation and testing procedures for comovements of stock market “cycles” or “phases” in Asia. We extend the Harding and Pagan [Harding, D., Pagan, A.P., 2006. Synchronization of cycles. Journal of Econometrics 132 (1), 59–79] test for strong multivariate nonsynchronization (SMNS) between business cycles to a test that allows for an imperfect degree of multivariate synchronization between stock market cycles. Moreover, we propose a test for endogenously determining structural change in the bivariate and multivariate synchronization indices. Upon applying the technique to five Asian stock markets we find a significant increase in the cross country comovements of Asian bullish and bearish periods in 1997. A power study of the stability test suggests that the detected increase in comovement is more of a sudden nature (i.e. contagion or “Asian Flu”) instead of gradual (i.e. financial integration). It is furthermore argued that stock market cycles and their propensity toward (increased) synchronization contain useful information for both investors, policy makers and financial regulators.     

Financial contagion in the laboratory: The cross-market rebalancing channel

We present the results of the first experimental study of financial markets contagion. We develop a model of financial contagion amenable to be tested in the laboratory. In the model, contagion happens because of cross-market rebalancing, a channel for transmission of shocks across markets first studied by Kodres and Pritsker (2002). Theory predicts that, because of portfolio rebalancing, a negative shock in one market transmits itself to the others, as investors adjust their portfolio allocations. The theory is supported by the experimental results. The price observed in the laboratory is close to that predicted by theory, and strong contagion effects are observed. The results are robust across different market structures. Moreover, as theory predicts, lower asymmetric information in a (“developed”) financial market increases the contagion effects in (“emerging”) markets.     

Measuring financial market integration over the long run: Is there a U-shape?

Using long time series for sovereign bond markets of fifteen industrialized economies from 1875 to 2009, I find that financial market integration by the end of the 20th century was higher than in earlier periods and exhibited a J-shaped trend with a trough in the 1920s. The main reason for the higher financial integration seen today is the recent extensive globalization. Around the turn of the 20th century, countries frequently drifted apart. Conversely, in recent years, the bond markets of most countries have moved together. Both policy variables and the global market environment play a role in explaining the time variation in integration, while “unexplained” changes in the overall level of country risk are also empirically important. My methodology, based on principal components analysis, is immune to outliers and accounts for global and country-specific shocks and, hence, can capture trends in financial integration more accurately than standard techniques such as simple correlations.     

Big business stability and economic growth: Is what's good for General Motors good for America?

What is good for a country may not be good for its big businesses, at least recently. More turnover in top businesses correlates with faster per capita gross domestic product, productivity, and capital growth; supporting Schumpeter's [1942. Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, third ed., Harper & Bros., New York, NY] theory of “creative destruction”—innovative firms blooming as stagnant ones wither. These correlations are greater in more developed economies, supporting Aghion and Howitt's [1992. A model of growth through creative destruction. Econometrica 60, 323–351] thesis that creative destruction matters more to economies nearer the technological frontier. More big business turnover also correlates with smaller government, common law, less bank-dependence, stronger shareholder rights, and greater openness.     

Why hasn’t tax competition triggered a race to the bottom? Some quantitative lessons from the EU

The integration of European financial markets in the early 1980s created an environment of near-perfect capital mobility across countries that had harmonized indirect taxes but maintained large differences in factor taxes. The years that followed witnessed several rounds of competition in capital taxes with puzzling results. Instead of the dreaded “race to the bottom” in capital taxes, the UK lowered its capital tax to a rate closer to those of France, Germany and Italy, while capital taxes changed slightly in these countries. The UK increased its labor tax marginally, but the other countries increased theirs sharply. This paper shows that these results are consistent with the quantitative predictions of a dynamic, Neoclassical general equilibrium model of tax competition that incorporates the key international externalities of tax policy operating via relative prices, wealth distribution and fiscal solvency. Tax competition is modeled as a one-shot game over time-invariant capital taxes with dynamic payoffs relative to a status quo calibrated to European data. The calibration is preceded by an empirical analysis that shows that the relationship linking taxes to labor supply and the investment rate in the model are in line with empirical evidence and that domestic taxes seem to respond to foreign taxes. The solutions of the games show that when countries compete over capital taxes adjusting labor taxes to maintain fiscal solvency, there is no race to the bottom and the Nash equilibrium is close to observed taxes. In contrast, if consumption taxes adjust to maintain fiscal solvency, competition over capital taxes triggers a “race to the bottom,” but this outcome entails large welfare gains. Surprisingly, the gains from coordination are small in all of these experiments.     

Returns,Volatilities, and Correlations Across Mature,Regional, and Frontier Markets: Evidence from South Asia

We investigate returns, volatilities, and correlations across mature, dominant regional, and frontier equity markets. Standard & Poor's 500 is chosen as a mature equity market; India is chosen as a dominant regional market; and Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka are chosen as frontier markets. Our empirical tests show that the frontier markets remain fundamentally decoupled from the mature markets during normal market periods. During turbulent times, the contagion effects from the mature to the frontier markets become more pronounced. The results suggest that the dominant regional market plays a key role in disseminating shocks across the frontier markets during normal periods; during the turbulent recent financial crisis period, a similar contagion is not observed.     

Are stock market crises contagious? The role of crisis definitions

Financial contagion studies generally examine whether co-movement between markets increases during a crisis. We use a flexible co-movement measure to examine how conclusions of such analyses depend on the sample chosen as the ‘crisis’. To this end, we analyse stock market co-movement during the 1997 Asian crisis and the 2007 global financial crisis for all possible source countries and for all possible time periods or extreme return quantiles. This way we account for the main crisis dating approaches adopted in the literature. Our results suggest there is no clear relationship between excess co-movement and commonly used crisis samples.     

‘Slow-burn’ spillover and ‘fast and furious’ contagion: a study of international stock markets

‘Fast and furious’ contagion across capital markets is an important phenomenon in an increasingly integrated financial world. Different from ‘slow-burn’ spillover or interdependence among these markets, ‘fast and furious’ contagion can occur instantly. To investigate this kind of contagion from the US, Japan and Hong Kong to other Asian economies, we design a research strategy to capture fundamental interdependence, or ‘slow-burn’ spillover, among these stock markets as well as short-term departures from this interdependence. Based on these departures, we propose a new contagion measure which reveals how one market responds over time to a shock in another market. We also propose international portfolio analysis for contagion via variance decomposition from the portfolio manager’s perspective. Using this research strategy, we find that the US stock market was cointegrated with the Asian stock markets during four specific periods from 3 July 1997 to 30 April 2014. Beyond this fundamental interdependence, the shocks from both Japan and Hong Kong have significant ‘fast and furious’ contagion effects on other Asian stock markets during the US subprime crisis, but the shocks from the US have no such effects.     

Locals, foreigners, and multi-market trading of equities: Intraday evidence from Thailand

We study stock market orders and trades in a developing country, Thailand, where foreign ownership limits partially segment local and foreign investors into two distinct markets. Some foreigners forgo voting rights and distributions to trade on the “local board”, while some locals forgo such benefits and pay a price premium to trade on the “foreign board”. Regardless of nationality, these cross-market traders typically submit orders when liquidity is high, fill orders at relatively beneficial prices, exploit patterns in stock prices across markets, display profitable holding-period returns, and enhance price discovery. This suggests that skilled, informed trading that affects market quality does not depend on trader nationality.     

The subprime credit crisis and contagion in financial markets

I conduct an empirical investigation into the pricing of subprime asset-backed collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) and their contagion effects on other markets. Using data for the ABX subprime indexes, I find strong evidence of contagion in the financial markets. The results support the hypothesis that financial contagion was propagated primarily through liquidity and risk-premium channels, rather than through a correlated-information channel. Surprisingly, ABX index returns forecast stock returns and Treasury and corporate bond yield changes by as much as three weeks ahead during the subprime crisis. This challenges the popular view that the market prices of these “toxic assets” were unreliable; the results suggest that significant price discovery did in fact occur in the subprime market during the crisis.     

Asset market linkages: Evidence from financial, commodity and real estate assets

We use a general Markov switching model to examine the relationships between returns over three different asset classes: financial assets (US stocks and Treasury bonds), commodities (oil and gold) and real estate assets (US Case-Shiller index). We confirm the existence of two distinct regimes: a “tranquil” regime with periods of economic expansion and a “crisis” regime with periods of economic decline. The tranquil regime is characterized by lower volatility and significantly positive stock returns. During these periods, there is also evidence of a flight from quality - from gold to stocks. By contrast, the crisis regime is characterized by higher volatility and sharply negative stock returns, along with evidence of contagion between stocks, oil and real estate. Furthermore, during these periods, there is strong evidence of a flight to quality - from stocks to Treasury bonds.     

Exchange market pressure and absorption by international reserves: Emerging markets and fear of reserve loss during the 2008–2009 crisis

This paper evaluates how the global financial crisis emanating from the U.S. was transmitted to emerging markets. Our focus is on the extent that the crisis caused external market pressures (EMP), and whether the absorption of the shock was mainly through exchange rate depreciation or the loss of international reserves. Controlling for variety of factors associated with EMP, we find clear evidence that emerging markets with higher total foreign liabilities, including short- and long-term debt, equities, FDI and derivative products—had greater exposure and were much more vulnerable to the financial crisis. Countries with large balance sheet exposure – high external portfolio liabilities exceeding international reserves—absorbed the global shock by allowing greater exchange rate depreciation and comparatively less reserve loss. Despite the remarkable buildup of international reserves by emerging markets during the period prior to the financial crisis, countries relied primarily on exchange rate deprecation rather than reserve loss to absorb most of the exchange market pressure shock. This could reflect a deliberate choice (“fear of reserve loss”) or market actions that caused very rapid exchange rate adjustment, especially in emerging markets with open capital markets, overwhelming policy actions.     

Unobservable shocks as carriers of contagion

We propose an identified structural GARCH model to disentangle the dynamics of financial market crises. We distinguish between the hypersensitivity of a domestic market in crisis to news from foreign non-crisis markets, and the contagion imported to a tranquil domestic market from foreign crises. The model also enables us to connect unobserved structural shocks with their source markets using variance decompositions and to compare the size and dynamics of impulses during crises periods with tranquil period impulses. To illustrate, we apply the method to data from the 1997–1998 Asian financial crisis which consists of a complicated set of interacting crises. We find significant hypersensitivity and contagion between these markets but also show that links may strengthen or weaken. Impulse response functions for an equally-weighted equity portfolio show the increasing dominance of Korean and Hong Kong shocks during the crises and covariance responses demonstrate multiple layers of contagion effects.     

The relationship between banking market competition and risk-taking: Do size and capitalization matter?

This paper addresses the effects of bank competition on the risk-taking behaviors of banks in 10 Latin American countries between 2003 and 2008. We conduct our empirical approach in two steps. First, we estimate the Boone indicator, which is a measure of competition. We then regress this measure and other explanatory variables on the banking “stability inefficiency” derived simultaneously from the estimation of a stability stochastic frontier. Unlike previous findings, this paper concludes that competition affects risk-taking behavior in a non-linear way as both high and low competition levels enhance financial stability, while we find the opposite effect for average competition. In addition, bank size and capitalization are essential factors in explaining this relationship. On the one hand, the larger a bank is, the more it benefits from competition. On the other hand, a greater capital ratio is advantageous for banks that operate in collusive markets, while capitalization only enhances the stability of larger banks under high and average competition. These results are of extreme importance when considering bank regulations, especially in light of the recent turmoil in the global financial markets.     

Bank/sovereign risk spillovers in the European debt crisis

This paper investigates contagion between bank and sovereign default risk in Europe over the period 2007–2012. We define contagion as excess correlation, i.e. correlation between banks and sovereigns over and above what is explained by common factors, using CDS spreads at the bank and at the sovereign level. Moreover, we investigate the determinants of contagion by analyzing bank-specific as well as country-specific variables and their interaction. Using the EBA’s disclosure of sovereign exposures of banks, we provide empirical evidence that three contagion channels are at work: a guarantee channel, an asset holdings channel and a collateral channel. We find that banks with a weak capital buffer, a weak funding structure and less traditional banking activities are particularly vulnerable to risk spillovers. At the country level, the debt ratio is the most important driver of contagion. Furthermore, the impact of government interventions on contagion depends on the type of intervention, with outright capital injections being the most effective measure in reducing spillover intensity.     

United States current account deficits: A stochastic optimal control analysis

The “Pessimists” and the “Optimists” disagree whether the US external deficits and the associated buildup of US net foreign liabilities are problems that require urgent attention. A warning signal should be that the debt ratio deviates significantly from the optimal ratio. The optimal debt ratio or debt burden should take into account the vulnerability of consumption to shocks from the productivity of capital, the interest rate and exchange rate. The optimal debt ratio is derived from inter-temporal optimization using Dynamic Programming, because the shocks are unpredictable, and it is essential to have a feedback control mechanism. The optimal ratio depends upon the risk adjusted net return and risk aversion both at home and abroad. On the basis of alternative estimates, we conclude that the Pessimists’ fears are justified on the basis of trends. The trend of the actual debt ratio is higher than that of the optimal ratio. The Optimists are correct that the current debt ratio is not a menace, because the current level of the debt ratio is not above the corresponding level of the optimum ratio.     

Specialists as risk managers: The competition between intermediated and non-intermediated markets

We develop a model that analyzes competition between a non-intermediated market (such as an electronic communications network) and an intermediated market (such as via the market specialist’s structure within the NYSE) when both markets are allowed to trade the same securities. Specialists are viewed as providers of a “volatility dampening” service, a mechanism for reducing round-trip trading costs, as well as an “order execution risk management” service. The economic value of these three specialist services is determined by five key factors (the difference in spreads between the two financial market types, investors’ holding periods, the specialist’s quoted spread in relation to the asset’s price, the relative probability of executing an order in the intermediated market, and the short-term risk-free rate).     

On the empirics of international smoothing

By fully exploiting the statistical properties of panel data, this paper improves upon existing methodologies to estimate consumption smoothing at least in three respects. First, we model explicitly incomplete risksharing as well as incomplete intertemporal smoothing, and couch the two mechanisms in a unified framework. Second, we fully exploit simple panel data analysis in order to measure degrees of both risksharing and intertemporal smoothing taking place in a given set of economic regions. In particular, we are able to measure not only the smoothing of idiosyncratic shocks, but also the dependence on aggregate (non-diversifiable) shocks. Third, we distinguish neatly between the effects of temporary vs. permanent shocks. This can be done by taking advantage of the complementarity between the “within” estimator and the “between” estimator in a panel regression.