Mundell's Opinion on China's Exchange Rate

The Nobel laureate for economics Robert Mundell addressed his opinion on China’s exchange rate system and foreign trade on Feb.13, 2006. He thought that a big change of China’s exchange rate will result in some bad effects and even cause a financial cri…     

PBOC to Relax Rules on Foreigners

China will press ahead with its opening-up and relax restrictions on foreign investors in the financial services sector,the People's Bank of China said on October 30.. It“will,in a modest manner,allow foreign investors     

Potental Pressure on China WVAS Sector

It is reported that the China Mobile will release new regulations, which will be the potential for more regulatory pressure on China WVAS Sector.     

Thoughts on the Teaching Quality Assessment Based on Expected Learning Achievement and Its Track Exploration

在高等院校不断扩大招生规模的背景之下,高等职业院校的教学质量问题日趋突显,并将直接对高等职业教育的发展产生影响。尤其是在严峻的大学生就业形势之下,高等职业院校如何能够培养出受社会、行业、企业欢迎的劳动者,这是非常值得研究的问题。因此,为了准确地评估教学质量,有效地进行教学改革,就必须要思考新的教学质量评估理念并探索行之有效的教学质量评估路径。本文从预期学习成果的视角对教学质量评估的理念与路径进行了探讨,以期对教学质量的提高有所帮助。     

Intime Goes Public on Hong Kong

Intime Department Store （Group） listed on Hong Kong Stock Exchange since Mar. 20th. Intime offered 450 million shares at the price of HK$ 5.39, and raised HK$ 2.43 billion or $310 million. According to Intime＇s saying, 40% of funding will be used to expand its operation and stores.     

PBOC to Relax Rules on Foreigners

China will press ahead with its opening-up and relax restrictions on foreign investors in the financialservices sector, the People＇s Bank of China said on October 30..     

Reducing added tax on some resource products

The Ministry of Finance and the State Administration of Taxation gave a notice to specify the added tax policies for the comprehensive utilization of some resources and other products, which would be implemented from January 1, 2004.     

Do mortgage rates vary based on household default characteristics? Evidence on rate sorting and credit rationing

Credit screening models suggest that lenders vary loan rates and debt ceilings across applicants on the basis of credit risk. We argue that regulatory constraints such as Fair Lending Laws may preclude rate sorting while increasing lender use of debt ceilings to adjust for applicant credit risk. Using household data from the 1983 SCF, we find that mortgage rates do not vary with applicant credit risk whereas related studies find that debt ceilings vary with borrower risk attributes. Together, these findings support arguments that regulatory constraints reduce rate sorting while increasing the use of non-price terms in the mortgage contract.     

WTO members resume negotiations on Doha Round

World Trade Organization(WTO)members resumed intensive negotiations recently on the long-stalled Doha Round of global trade talks,trying to narrow their differences in the next few weeks.The negotiations will be focused on agriculture     

Lehman Brothers Closes on $3.3B

News on 14th June, Lehman Brothers raised its new global buyouts fund, Lehman Brothers Merchant Banking Partners IV （Fund IV） at $3.3 billion, which focuses on small-and meddle-sized companyinvestment opportunities in Europe, America, and Asia.     

Board and Monitoring Committee Independence

This study focuses on the composition of boards of directors and their monitoring committees (audit and compensation) for large Australian companies. For firms whose boards use a committee structure, much of the monitoring responsibility of the board is expected to rest with the independent committee members. We document a positive association between the proportion of independent directors on the full board and its monitoring committees, and a greater proportion of independent directors on both audit and compensation committees than the full board. Our hypotheses tests involve an examination of the impact of other mechanisms used to control agency conflicts on full board and committee independence, and the association between this independence and firm value. We find that full board independence is associated with low management ownership and an absence of substantial shareholders. Audit committee independence is associated with reduced monitoring by debtholders when leverage is low. While we predict a positive relationship between board and monitoring committee independence and firm value, our results do not support this conjecture.     

Audit committee financial expertise,corporate governance,and the voluntary switch from auditor-provided to non-auditor-provided tax services

A prime objective of the SOX is to safeguard auditor independence. We investigate the relation between audit committee quality, corporate governance, and audit committees' decision to switch from permissible auditor-provided tax services. We find that firms with more independent boards, audit committees with greater accounting financial expertise, higher stock ownership by directors and institutions, that separate the CEO and Chairman of the board positions, and with higher tax to audit fee ratios are more likely to switch to a non-auditor provider. Further, we document that firms are more likely to switch prior to issuing equity. We find no evidence that broad financial expertise on audit committees is related to the switch decision, suggesting that the SEC's initial narrow definition of expertise is more consistent with the objective of the SOX. Overall, our results suggest that accounting financial expertise and strong corporate governance contribute to enhanced audit committee monitoring of auditor independence.     

审计委员会制度与中国上市公司治理创新

本文研究中国上市公司现行治理结构中的企业会计事务控制权安排及其缺陷,并提出改进措施。我们研究发现,在中国上市公司现行治理结构中,企业经理人不仅拥有企业内部会计事务的积极权力,而且实质拥有企业外部会计事务的积极权力,其中的作为董事会下设专门委员会的审计委员会不是我们所设计的本原性质的审计委员会,而是接近于美国现行公司治理结构中的审计委员会。这一安排不符合关于现代企业会计事务控制权安排的分权制衡原则,难以保证注册会计师审计的独立性。我们在分析中国上市公司治理中的监事会监督为什么会流于形式的基础上,提出应进行中国上市公司治理的创新,即取消监事会(制度),设立独立于董事会与之平行的符合本原性质的审计委员会,或将监事会改造为符合我们界定的本原性质的审计委员会。     

Earnings management and corporate governance: the role of the board and the audit committee

We examine the role of the board of directors, the audit committee, and the executive committee in preventing earnings management. Supporting an SEC Panel Report's conclusion that audit committee members need financial sophistication, we show that the composition of a board in general and of an audit committee more specifically, is related to the likelihood that a firm will engage in earnings management. Board and audit committee members with corporate or financial backgrounds are associated with firms that have smaller discretionary current accruals. Board and audit committee meeting frequency is also associated with reduced levels of discretionary current accruals. We conclude that board and audit committee activity and their members' financial sophistication may be important factors in constraining the propensity of managers to engage in earnings management.     

How does the executive pay gap influence audit fees? The roles of R&D investment and institutional ownership

Using a sample of US firms from 2003–2014, this study examines how the executive pay gap affects audit fees for firms with different levels of R&D investment and institutional ownership. Consistent with managerial power theory, we find that the executive pay gap is positively associated with audit fees, and that the positive association is attenuated by intense R&D investment and higher institutional ownership. We also find that the executive pay gap more strongly affects audit fees after the passage of the 2010 Dodd–Frank Act and the PCAOB's 2012 call to identify the audit risk related to executive incentive compensation. Additional analyses show that the moderating effects of R&D investment and institutional ownership on the pay gap–audit fees association are not conditional on auditor tenure, but the moderating effect of institutional ownership is stronger for firms hiring specialist auditors. Collectively, our findings suggest that auditors consider the business context, such as innovation initiative and external monitoring, when assessing audit risk related to the executive pay gap.     

Board composition, regulatory regime and voluntary disclosure

This study, which examines the association between board monitoring and the level of voluntary disclosure, finds new evidence that firms with a higher proportion of independent directors on the board are associated with higher levels of voluntary disclosure. Although board size and CEO duality are not associated with voluntary disclosure, boards with a majority of independent directors have significantly higher levels of voluntary disclosure than firms with balanced boards. Notably, we find that the presence of an external governance mechanism, the regulatory environment, enhances the strength of the association between the proportion of independent directors and the level of voluntary disclosure. This association is some two to three times greater under a “disclosure-based” regulatory regime than under a “merit-based” regulatory regime.     

The association between audit committees,compensation incentives,and corporate audit fees

This study uses audit fee data from the 2001–2003 reporting periods to examine the relationship between measures of audit committee effectiveness and compensation incentives with corporate audit fees. Our results suggest that audit committee size, committee member expertise, and committee member independence are positively associated to audit fee levels, consistent with the notion that audit committees serve as a complement to external auditors in monitoring management. In contrast, CEO long-term pay and insider ownership are inversely related to audit fee levels, substituting for external audit effort in motivating management. Notwithstanding results on the full sample of firm-years, we uncover significant differences in the determinants of audit fees between the years examined. An important implication of these results is that explaining the intra-firm variation in audit fees over time is clearly necessary in order to understand the antecedents and consequences of audit fees.

The empirical relationship between ownership characteristics and audit fees

The present study examines the empirical relationship between ownership characteristics and audit fees. The basic premise is that the level of ownership sophistication and the extent to which ownership is large and substantial impact the effectiveness of stockholder monitoring on corporate affairs including the financial reporting process. Furthermore, high managerial ownership firms may experience a decline in agency problems in financial reporting due to a decrease in managerial propensity to misreport financial results. By employing a cross-sectional least squares regression analysis for a sample of 358 New York Stock Exchange-listed firms audited by the Big Five auditors, we find evidence of a significantly positive relationship between diffused institutional stock ownership (i.e., having less than 5% individual shareholding) and audit fees, and a significantly negative relationship between institutional blockholder ownership (i.e., having 5% or more individual shareholding) and audit fees. Finally, we document that managerial stock ownership is negatively associated with audit fees. We do not, however, find evidence of any relationship between noninstitutional blockholder ownership (with at least 5% individual stock ownership) and audit fees. The study's main results hold in various specification tests including when the effects of board-related and audit committee variables are factored in the analysis. Based on the observed relationship between the ownership variables and audit fees, we suggest that the ownership characteristics of a firm as a part of its governance mechanism constitute an important determinant of audit fees.

The impact of board of director oversight characteristics on corporate tax aggressiveness: An empirical analysis

This paper examines the impact of board of director oversight characteristics on corporate tax aggressiveness. Based on a 812 firm-year dataset of 203 publicly-listed Australian firms over the 2006–2009 period, our regression results show that if a firm has established an effective risk management system and internal controls, engages a big-4 auditor, its external auditor’s services involve proportionally fewer non-audit services than audit services and the more independent is its internal audit committee, it is less likely to be tax aggressive. Our additional regression results also indicate that the interaction effect between board of director composition (i.e., a higher ratio of independent directors on the board) and the establishment of an effective risk management system and internal controls jointly reduce tax aggressiveness.     

The determinants of thinly capitalized tax avoidance structures: Evidence from Australian firms

This paper examines the determinants of thinly capitalized structures of publicly-listed Australian firms. Based on a hand-collected sample of 203 publicly-listed Australian firms over the 2006–2009 period (812 firm-years), our regression results indicate that the thin capitalization position of firms is significantly and positively associated with multinationality, tax haven utilization, withholding taxes and tax uncertainty. Multinationality and the use of tax havens are, in particular, strongly associated with thin capitalization. Our additional regression results provide evidence that shows that corporate governance monitoring mechanisms relating to board of director independence, institutional ownership and big-4 auditor utilization are significantly negatively associated with firms adopting thinly capitalized tax avoidance structures.