Biomarker of Quality? Venture‐backed Biotech IPOs and Insider Participation

Corporate financial managers of biotech firms need long‐term financing to reach key milestones, and that requires a long‐ term capital structure. They must balance a mix of investors with different objectives and different investment horizons that includes traditional venture capitalists and also hedge funds and mutual funds. This study helps practitioners understand the complex role of exit decisions, as venture capitalists seek better exit strategies and performance. IPOs are financing but not “exit” moves. In addition to certifying firm value, insider purchasing of shares in the IPO offering has two major consequences. First, venture capitalists reallocate large sums of capital from early‐stage to late‐stage deals that are expected to have lower risk (but also lower expected return) and shorter time to exit. Second, the speed at which VCs exit after the IPO depends on the firm ownership structure after the IPO and the stock liquidity. Going public with a significant participation by venture capitalists will probably increase the post‐IPO ownership and decrease the free float of the stock, implying a delay of the exit and the realization of the capital gains from the investments. Although this study has focused exclusively on the biotechnology industry, insider participation is not unique to it. Biotech's venture brethren in the software and technology industries also have insider participation in IPOs. During 2003–2015, approximately 41 venture‐backed firms outside of the biotechnology sector had insider participation.     

Liquidity in the Foreign Exchange Market: Measurement,Commonality, and Risk Premiums

We provide the first systematic study of liquidity in the foreign exchange market. We find significant variation in liquidity across exchange rates, substantial illiquidity costs, and strong commonality in liquidity across currencies and with equity and bond markets. Analyzing the impact of liquidity risk on carry trades, we show that funding (investment) currencies offer insurance against (exposure to) liquidity risk. A liquidity risk factor has a strong impact on carry trade returns from 2007 to 2009, suggesting that liquidity risk is priced. We present evidence that liquidity spirals may trigger these findings.     

DOES VENTURE CAPITAL REQUIRE AN ACTIVE STOCK MARKET?

The United States has both an active venture capital industry and well-developed stock markets. Japan and Germany have neither. The authors argue that this is no accident— that venture capital flourishes especially, and perhaps only , when venture capitalists can exit from successful portfolio companies through initial public offerings (IPOs), which in turn require an active stock market.
Understanding the link between the stock market and the venture capital market requires understanding the contractual arrangements between entrepreneurs and venture capital providers, particularly (1) the importance of exit by venture capitalists and (2) the implicit contract over control between venture capitalists and entrepreneurs created by the possibility of exit through an IPO. This possibility gives entrepreneurs a valuable option that, in the event they are successful, allows them to reacquire control of their enterprises from venture capitalists.     

IPO Underpricing and After-Market Liquidity

The underpricing of initial public offerings (IPOs) is generallyexplained with asymmetric information and risk. We complementthese traditional explanations with a new theory where investorsworry also about the after-market illiquidity that may resultfrom asymmetric information after the IPO. The less liquid theaftermarket is expected to be, and the less predictable itsliquidity, the larger will be the IPO underpricing. Our modelblends such liquidity concerns with adverse selection and riskas motives for underpricing. The model’s predictions aresupported by evidence for 337 British IPOs effected between1998 and 2000. Using various measures of liquidity, we findthat expected after-market liquidity and liquidity risk areimportant determinants of IPO underpricing.     

Firm level governance and institutional determinants of liquidity: Evidence from Sub Saharan Africa

This study contrasts well established liquidity measures, namely volume-based turnover ratio, related price-impact Amihud (2002) construct and the multidimensional Liu (2006) indicator alongside the Lesmond, Ogden, and Trzcinka (1999) proportion of zero daily returns metric in explaining bid-ask spread plus commissions costs. We control for six critical firm governance characteristics that impact liquidity alongside the market-based controls that are conventionally solely included in the literature. Using a unique sample of 12 Sub Saharan African (SSA) equity markets, namely Kenya, Mauritius, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Botswana, Malawi, Namibia, Nigeria, Ghana, BRVM (Cote d'Ivoire), and then South Africa's ALT-x and Main boards we find evidence that state and foreign venture capitalist involvement in firms enhances liquidity while involvement of foreign partners, entrepreneurial founders, domestic venture capital and inclusion within an extended business or family network has opposite effect. The evidence supports the use of the proportion of daily zero returns measure in preference to other measures in capturing illiquidity. Furthermore we find that liquidity is closely associated with three of six World Bank Governance measures of institutional quality with these being government effectiveness, regulatory quality and rule of law.     

Liquidity and Credit Risk

We develop a structural bond valuation model to simultaneously capture liquidity and credit risk. Our model implies that renegotiation in financial distress is influenced by the illiquidity of the market for distressed debt. As default becomes more likely, the components of bond yield spreads attributable to illiquidity increase. When we consider finite maturity debt, we find decreasing and convex term structures of liquidity spreads. Using bond price data spanning 15 years, we find evidence of a positive correlation between the illiquidity and default components of yield spreads as well as support for downward‐sloping term structures of liquidity spreads.     

Investment risk allocation and the venture capital exit market: Evidence from early stage investing

This study provides evidence on how venture capitalists’ (VCs’) allocations of capital to riskier investments, as measured by the proportion of early versus late-stage investment in an industry, are linked to exit market conditions. Prior research has primarily focused on how VCs adjust aggregate investment to public equity market conditions. We develop a more inclusive measure of exit market conditions that accounts for recent secular changes that have affected the industry return structure, specifically, the sharp rise in the number of failures and M&A relative to IPO exits. We show that the dollars gained relative to dollars lost in recent exits and failures are significantly positively related to VCs’ allocations to early-stage companies over the period 1990–2008. The changes in allocations are large enough to have an effect on the availability of funding for early stage companies. In sum, our evidence shows that exit market conditions have a significant and economically meaningful influence on VCs’ allocations to riskier investments.     

Banks versus Venture Capital: Project Evaluation, Screening, and Expropriation

Why do some start‐up firms raise funds from banks and others from venture capitalists? To address this question, I study a model in which the venture capitalist can evaluate the entrepreneur's project more accurately than the bank but can also threaten to steal it from the entrepreneur. Consistent with evidence regarding venture capital finance, the model implies that the characteristics of a firm financing through venture capitalists are relatively little collateral, high growth, high risk, and high profitability. The model also suggests that tighter protection of intellectual property rights encourages entrepreneurs to finance through venture capitalists.     

Blurring Firm Boundaries: The Role of Venture Capital in Strategic Alliances

This study documents a new value-added role of venture capitalists and addresses important questions about how resources are combined to create firms. As part of the nexus of contracts surrounding a firm, strategic alliances can be viewed as relational contracts that blur firm boundaries. This paper provides evidence that alliances are more frequent among companies sharing a common venture capitalist. The effect is concentrated in alliances in which contracting problems are more pronounced, consistent with venture capitalists utilizing informational and other advantages in providing resources to firms. Further, these alliances improve the probability of exit for venture-backed firms.     

Asset liquidity and venture capital investment

We examine the relationship between asset market liquidity and venture capital (VC) investment and find that it is inverted U-shaped. Asset liquidity and VC investment are positively related for low levels of asset liquidity but negatively related for higher levels of asset liquidity. We also document evidence that VC firms with more industry experience invest more in a liquid asset market than those without industry experience or with significant experience in other industries. Portfolio companies obtained their first investment in a liquid asset market are less likely to exit successfully; however, given a successful exit, they prefer to exit through mergers and acquisitions rather than going public.     

Stock Liquidity Risk and the Cross‐sectional Earnings‐Returns Relationship

We argue that a higher sensitivity to aggregate market‐wide liquidity shocks (i.e., a higher liquidity risk) implies a tendency for a stock's price to converge to fundamentals. We test this intuition within the framework of the earnings‐returns relationship. We find a positive liquidity risk effect on the relationship between return and expected change in earnings. This effect on the earnings‐returns relationship is distinct from the negative effect observed for stock illiquidity level. Notably, the liquidity risk effect is evident (absent) during periods of neutral/low (high) aggregate market liquidity. We also show that the liquidity risk effect is dominant in firms that: (a) are of intermediate size; (b) are of intermediate book‐to‐market; and (c) are profit making.     

Is a VC Partnership Greater Than the Sum of Its Partners?

This paper investigates whether individual venture capitalists have repeatable investment skill and the extent to which their skill is impacted by the venture capital (VC) firm where they work. We examine a unique data set that tracks the performance of individual venture capitalists' investments over time and as they move between firms. We find evidence of skill and exit style differences even among venture partners investing at the same VC firm at the same time. Furthermore, our estimates suggest the partners' human capital is two to five times more important than the VC firm's organizational capital in explaining performance.     

Measuring Pricing Inefficiencies Under Stressful Market Conditions

This study examines the mispricing and time between arbitrage trades of the Hong Kong Hang Seng index futures and index options contracts under various stressed market conditions. Ex‐ante trading profits and differences in time between trades across up and down as well as stressed and non‐stressed markets are used to measure how well the derivative markets perform under emotional distress. We find evidence of illiquidity in stressed and down markets. In stressful markets and down markets, liquidity suppliers are less likely to trade against the informed traders. This, in turn, leads to longer time between trades and higher arbitrage profits.     

Should Venture Capitalists Put All Their Eggs in One Basket? Diversification versus Pure‐Play Strategies in Venture Capital

Managing the different companies in which they invest while at the same time performing portfolio optimization for themselves, venture capitalists position themselves as a pure-play or diversified conglomerate through their cumulative portfolios. I examine the effects of two investment strategies of venture capitalists:  1)  a specialist "pure-play" strategy that maximizes venture capital involvement and  2)  a more generalist strategy of diversification at the "firm" level that minimizes portfolio risk. I find that neither strategy optimizes both venture capital growth and time to entrepreneurial exit, which highlights a need for institutional investors to clarify fund objectives at the time a fund is established.     

Entrepreneurs' financing choice between independent and bank-affiliated venture capital firms

This paper analyzes how the affiliation of a venture capital firm affects the deal terms for innovative entrepreneurial ventures. We develop a theory to explain the advantages of independent and bank-affiliated venture capital funds for entrepreneurs. We assume that independent venture capital firms provide better support quality while bank-affiliated firms are less financially constrained. The entrepreneur selects the optimal contract by trading-off these characteristics. The model allows several empirically testable predictions concerning the nature of projects financed by either type of venture capital firm. Entrepreneurs should seek capital from independent or affiliated venture capitalists contingent on the degree of sophistication of their project, their liquidation value, the importance of expected management support, and the remaining time to fundraising.     

Debt financing,venture capital,and the performance of initial public offerings

We examine the roles of two financial intermediaries, lenders and venture capitalists, in a sample of more than 6000 IPO firms during 1980–2012. Venture capitalists and lenders generally fund different types of firms and, on average, are substitutes; however, in some instances we observe interactions and complementary roles between the two funding sources. Firms with high debt have lower valuation uncertainty, and lower initial day returns than those backed by venture capital. However, firms with high debt levels underperform in the long-run, especially those without venture capital. We provide some evidence that firms backed by reputable venture capitalists perform better.     

How venture capital works

The popular mythology surrounding the U.S. venture-capital industry derives from a previous era. Venture capitalists who nurtured the computer industry in its infancy were legendary both for their risk taking and for their hands-on operating experience. But today things are different, and separating the myths from the realities is crucial to understanding this important piece of the U.S. economy. Today's venture capitalists are more like conservative bankers than the risk takers of days past. They have carved out a specialized niche in the capital markets, filling a void that other institutions cannot serve. They are the linch-pins in an efficient system for meeting the needs of institutional investors looking for high returns, of entrepreneurs seeking funding, and of investment bankers looking for companies to sell. Venture capitalists must earn a consistently superior return on investments in inherently risky businesses. The myth is that they do so by investing in good ideas and good plans. In reality, they invest in good industries--that is, industries that are more competitively forgiving than the market as a whole. And they structure their deals in a way that minimizes their risk and maximizes their returns. Although many entrepreneurs expect venture capitalists to provide them with sage guidance as well as capital, that expectation is unrealistic. Given a typical portfolio of ten companies and a 2,000-hour work year, a venture capital partner spends on average less than two hours per week on any given company. In addition to analyzing the current venture-capital system, the author offers practical advice to entrepreneurs thinking about venture funding.     

Entrepreneurial finance: Banks versus venture capital

We analyze how entrepreneurial firms choose between two funding institution: banks, which monitor less intensively and face liquidity demands from their own investors, and venture capitalists, who can monitor more intensively but face a higher cost of capital because of the liquidity constraints that they impose on their own investors. Because the firm's manager prefers continuing the firm over liquidating it and aggressive (risky) continuation strategies over conservative (safe) continuation strategies, the institution must monitor the firm and exercise some control over its decisions. Bank finance takes the form of debt, whereas venture capital finance often resembles convertible debt. Venture capital finance is optimal only when the aggressive continuation strategy is not too profitable, ex ante; the uncertainty associated with the risky continuation strategy (strategic uncertainty) is high; and the firm's cash flow distribution is highly risky and positively skewed, with low probability of success, low liquidation value, and high returns if successful. A decrease in venture capitalists’ cost of capital encourages firms to switch from safe strategies and bank finance to riskier strategies and venture capital finance, increasing the average risk of firms in the economy.     

基于信号模型及天使投资人参与下的风险投资

在风险投资过程中,由于信息的不对称,一方面风险投资家要找到优质项目往往需要付出高额成本;另一方面众多优质项目亟须风险投资家的青睐。针对该问题,本文在传统的风险投资家(venture capitalists,以下简称VC)与企业家所构成的风险投资博弈模型的基础之上引入了天使投资人(Angel),充当筛选优质项目以及信息传递者的角色,并且在多阶段风险投资过程中引入了二次信号模型,揭示项目进展情况。研究发现:天使投资人的存在及信号模型的引入对风险资本形成了很好的保护机制,并且提高了风险资本对于优质项目的配置效率,有利于风险投资多方达到共赢。     

A model of liquidity hoarding and term premia in inter-bank markets

Financial crises are associated with reduced volumes and extreme levels of rates for term inter-bank loans, reflected in one-month and three-month LIBOR. We explain such stress by modeling leveraged banks' precautionary demand for liquidity. Asset shocks impair a bank's ability to roll over debt because of agency problems associated with high leverage. In turn, banks hoard liquidity and decrease term lending as their rollover risk increases over the term of the loan. High levels of short-term leverage and illiquidity of assets lead to low volumes and high rates for term borrowing. In extremis, inter-bank markets can completely freeze.