我国上市公司财务困境成本的计量问题分析

本文通过选取1998—2013年间沪、深两市48家A股ST公司为样本,对已有研究成果进行总结和评价,分析认为上市公司陷入财务困境可能会引起企业业绩的下降,并且企业业绩下降也会导致上市公司陷入财务困境,最终分析认为无法从经营业绩观计量财务困境成本。对基于权益价值观从样本公司财务困境开始年到困境解除年的财务困境成本问题进行了研究,研究发现:企业投资者在财务困境期间平均承担了1.68%的财务困境成本,针对存在财务困境成本的原因进行分析的同时提出了应对财务困境风险的措施。     

我国上市公司财务困境成本的计量问题分析

本文通过选取1998—2013年间沪、深两市48家A股ST公司为样本,对已有研究成果进行总结和评价,分析认为上市公司陷入财务困境可能会引起企业业绩的下降,并且企业业绩下降也会导致上市公司陷入财务困境,最终分析认为无法从经营业绩观计量财务困境成本。对基于权益价值观从样本公司财务困境开始年到困境解除年的财务困境成本问题进行了研究,研究发现：企业投资者在财务困境期间平均承担了1.68%的财务困境成本,针对存在财务困境成本的原因进行分析的同时提出了应对财务困境风险的措施。     

上市公司财务困境成本的定量分析--基于1998～2002年度ST公司的实证研究

选取1998～2002年度沪深股市42家ST摘帽公司为财务困境企业样本,从财务和市场两个视角定量考察我国上市公司是否存在财务困境成本.研究发现,从陷入财务困境之前到解除财务困境之后企业经行业调整之后的经营业绩平均增长了8%,但从权益市场价值的变化角度来看,投资者平均承担4.91%的财务困境成本.     

浅议自由现金流量与财务困境成本关系

自由现金流量及其假说与财务困境成本都是目前的研究热点,前者的核心在于研究现代产权制度下自由现金流量带来的代理成本问题,引申出负债控制效应和并购效应两个主要假说;后者主要研究企业陷入财务困境后对公司业绩的影响和成本计量。两者的链接点在于负债,一方面可以减少企业的代理成本,但另一方面也可能导致企业的财务困境。对这两者的关系有必要在理论上和实证两方面进行。本文在理论上进行了阐述,并提出了进一步研究方向。     

浅议自由现金流量与财务困境成本关系

自由现金流量及其假说与财务困境成本都是目前的研究热点，前者的核心在于研究现代产权制度下自由现金流量带来的代理成本问题，引申出负债控制效应和并购效应两个主要假说；后者主要研究企业陷入财务困境后对公司业绩的影响和成本计量。两者的链接点在于负债，一方面可以减少企业的代理成本．但另一方面也可能导致企业的财务困境。对这两者的关系有必要在理论上和实证两方面进行。本文在理论上进行了阐述，并提出了进一步研究方向。     

国有产权、政府干预与财务困境成本

本文以2000～2006年发生财务困境的480个观测数据为样本,检验国有产权与政府干预如何影响财务困境成本。我们以经行业中位数调整后的正常期间资产报酬率与困境期间资产报酬率的差额度量财务困境成本,检验发现:地区政府干预程度越高,公司财务困境成本越低;在政府干预程度较高的地区,国有公司的财务困境成本显著更低;但在政府干预程度较低的地区,国有产权对财务困境成本无显著影响。     

财务困境上市公司信息披露行为初探

众多的研究表明,上市公司的信息披露程度和质量会对公司声誉、股票价格、资本成本等多方面产生重大的影响,因而位于财务困境中的上市公司往往会在对社会公众进行公司财务信息披露方面采取一定的策略。与正常运营时期相比,财务困境上市公司在披露数量和披露内容方面都可能会发生改变。然而,目前国内研究大多仅将面临的财务危机作为导致上市公司会计信息失真的因素之一,却没有对位于财务困境中的上市公司信息披露行为做更为全面深入的探讨。本文对该类上市公司信息披露行为各方面的改变进行了归纳并探讨这些改变发生的原因。并进一步论述了把握财务困境上市公司信息披露的规律对投资者以及市场监管机构的重要性。     

产权性质、政府干预与企业财务困境应对——基于中国远洋、尚德电力和李宁公司的多案例研究

本文以中国远洋、尚德电力和李宁公司为研究对象,分析了财务困境企业的应对措施,并从产权性质和政府干预的视角进行了解释。本文发现,为了应对财务困境,企业需要站在全局的角度进行公司治理重组、战略和运营重组、资产重组和财务重组。在重组中,国有企业更倾向于采取关联交易等非市场化手段,而民营企业更注重公司战略和经营策略的调整。国有企业的财务困境应对成本要显著小于民营企业。对于财务困境企业,政府干预体现为"支持之手"。政府干预的"支持之手"不仅体现为国有企业中的预算软约束,也会对民营企业发挥作用。但是,投资者对政府干预导致民营企业应对财务困境措施的非市场化反应消极。     

国有产权、公司特征与困境公司绩效

尽管众多研究表明国有产权在公司正常经营期间会降低绩效,但一旦陷入财务困境,源于国有产权的预算软约束却可以降低财务困境成本,从而有利于国有公司。本文以1999—2005年期间发生财务困境的上市公司为研究对象,发现在财务困境期间国有产权对公司绩效具有积极影响,并且当公司规模较小或者财务杠杆较高时,这种积极作用更为明显。     

上市公司财务状况分类研究

如何对众多上市公司的财务状况进行合理分类 ,判别公司的财务处境 ,进而指导公司的财务行为 ,对于公司财务政策的制定具有重要意义。本文突破以往文献将企业财务状况仅仅基于“好”与“坏”标准进行简单分类、即财务困境企业和非财务困境企业的界限 ,在理论上首次将公司的财务状况分为五类 ,即财务闲置、财务充盈、财务均衡、财务困境和财务破产。实证研究表明 ,我国上市公司确存在五种财务状况 ,支持理论假设 ,进一步 ,我们发现 ,中国上市公司普遍存在财务状况不佳的现象 ,隐性财务破产的上市公司多于证券市场上实际披露的数目。     

Determinants of Financial Distress Costs

This paper provides international evidence on financial distress costs. To achieve this aim, we have developed a model where financial distress costs are determined, on the one hand, by making use of a more accurate indicator of the probability of financial distress and, on the other, by a set of variables that, according to financial theory, explain the magnitude of the costs borne by a firm in the case of financial distress. Our results reveal the relevance of our improved indicator of the probability of financial distress, since it positively affects financial distress costs in all the countries analyzed. Furthermore, since our model controls for the probability of financial distress, we can test the trade-off between the benefits and costs of debt. This allows us to verify that the benefits debt outweigh the costs. Our results also indicate that distress costs are negatively related to liquid assets; hence, their benefits more than offset their opportunity costs.     

Explanators of Local Government Distress

This article develops a statistical model to explain sources of distress in local government. Whereas ‘financial distress’ in the private sector has been equated with a failure to meet financial commitments, here ‘distress’ is interpreted as an inability to maintain pre-existing levels of services to the community. Since the late 1990s local councils in an Australian state (New South Wales) have been required to estimate the cost of restoring infrastructure assets to a satisfactory condition (a requirement which predates that form of reporting on infrastructure condition introduced as an option in U.S. GASB 34). Information regarding the cost of restoring infrastructure is used in this study as a proxy for levels of distress (in contrast to the binary classification that characterizes much of prior private sector financial distress research). Data regarding service levels for a sample of 161 councils for 2001 and 2002 were used and a multiple regression model was estimated and interpreted. The main findings were that the degree of distress in local councils is positively associated with the size of the population they serve and the size and composition of their revenues. Road maintenance costs featured prominently in results, as higher road program costs were associated with higher levels of distress (particularly when interacted with other variables). However, the revenue generating capacity of councils had the strongest statistical impact on local government distress. Councils with lower percentages of rates revenue to total revenue and lower ordinary revenue levels to total assets were typically identified as more distressed. However, no systematic evidence was found that rural councils have higher distress levels than urban councils (i.e., both rural and urban councils serving larger populations were relatively more distressed than councils serving smaller populations). It is suggested that the model (or modifications thereof) may serve as an early warning system for those monitoring the circumstances and performance of local governments.     

Macroprudential regulation,credit spreads and the role of monetary policy

We study the macroprudential roles of bank capital regulation and monetary policy in a borrowing cost channel model with endogenous financial frictions, driven by credit risk, bank losses and bank capital costs. These frictions induce financial accelerator mechanisms and motivate the examination of a macroprudential toolkit. Following credit shocks, countercyclical regulation is more effective than monetary policy in promoting price, financial and macroeconomic stability. For supply shocks, combining macroprudential regulation with a stronger anti-inflationary policy stance is optimal. The findings emphasize the importance of the Basel III accords in alleviating the output-inflation trade-off faced by central banks, and cast doubt on the desirability of conventional (and unconventional) Taylor rules during periods of financial distress.     

How Costly is Financial (Not Economic) Distress? Evidence from Highly Leveraged Transactions that Became Distressed

This paper studies thirty-one highly leveraged transactions (HLTs) that become financially, not economically, distressed. The net effect of the HLT and financial distress (from pretransaction to distress resolution, market- or industry-adjusted) is to increase value slightly. This finding strongly suggests that, overall, the HLTs of the late 1980s created value. We present quantitative and qualitative estimates of the (direct and indirect) costs of financial distress and their determinants. We estimate financial distress costs to be 10 to 20 percent of firm value. For a subset of firms that do not experience an adverse economic shock, financial distress costs are negligible.     

Contracting costs and the window of opportunity for straight debt issues

We analyze whether fluctuation in economy-wide factors cause time-series variation in the contracting costs of moral hazard, adverse selection, and financial distress for a sample of straight debt issues. We find that the announcement period abnormal returns to debt issues are more negative in periods of higher interest rates and in industry downturns. When we partition the impact of each issue- and firm-specific measure of contracting costs across high and low levels of each economy-wide variable, we find that only the measures of agency cost are significant in general, and measures of financial distress become relevant for those debt issues that constitute a leverage increase for the firms.     

An Analysis of the Underreported Magnitude of the Total Indirect Costs of Financial Distress

In this paper we examine 1,041 ongoing firms over the time period 1982–92. Using quarterly data for the detection and measurement of the magnitude of the indirect costs of financial distress, we find three important explanatory factors: (a) the distinctiveness of the pattern of increasing financial distress over time, (b) the degree of leverage in the capital structure and (c) the size of the firm. For those firms with a distinctive pattern of increasing financial distress over time, the average annual losses as a percentage of market value is –10.3%. The maximum loss is –76%. Even if the firm never fails, its market value can be severely impacted by the presence of the indirect costs of bankruptcy over time. This study finds a significantly positive relationship between Altman's Z-score and the firm capital investment growth rate. This relation holds after controlling for other variables such as leverage, firm size and market/book ratio. This implies that lost investment opportunities may be also an important part of the total indirect costs of financial distress, which appear now to be much larger than previously recorded.     

The disciplinary effects of non-debt liabilities: Evidence from asbestos litigation

I study firms with past asbestos ties that suffer from significant increases in legal liabilities after a U.S. Supreme Court ruling in 1999. This event provides a natural experiment setting to estimate the indirect effects of financial distress on real activities. While direct litigation and bankruptcy costs are significant, value computations and clinical evidence at the operational level show that defendant firms suffer only minor indirect costs of financial distress. Furthermore, these firms actively restructure and refocus on core operations during distress. Overall, my results provide support for potentially significant disciplinary effects of non-debt liabilities.     

Estimating Risk‐Adjusted Costs of Financial Distress

The search for the optimal, or value‐maximizing, capital structure involves weighing the expected benefits of higher leverage against the expected “costs of financial distress.” These costs include not only the direct costs of reorganization, but less quantifiable effects of financial trouble such as damage to the firm's reputation, the loss of key employees and customers, and the loss of value from forgone investment opportunities. This article proposes a new method for valuing expected financial distress costs. While researchers have provided estimates of the costs associated with financial distress when it takes place, whether or when these costs will be incurred is, of course, unknown at the time the financing decision. As a result, the “correct” discount rate for valuing expected distress costs is difficult to derive. Instead of adjusting the discount rate to reflect historical default rate probabilities, the authors' method uses “risk‐neutral” probabilities of encountering distress that allow for discounting at the risk‐free rate. The risk‐neutral probabilities of default are derived by incorporating the systematic risk premia implicit in corporate bond yield spreads. This method results in a significant increase in estimates of financial distress costs. In a simple example presented by the authors, distress costs estimated at about 1.6% of firm value using the conventional method turn out to run about 5% after adjusting for the increased systematic risk associated with financial distress.     

Why and How UK Firms Hedge

This paper attempts to differentiate among the theories of hedging by using disclosures in the annual reports of 400 UK companies and data collected via a survey. I find, unlike many previous US studies, strong evidence linking the decision to hedge and the expected costs of financial distress. The tests show that this is mainly because my definition of hedging includes all hedgers and not just derivative users. However, when the tests employ the same hedging definition as previous US studies, financial distress cost factors still appear to be more important for this sample than samples of US firms. Therefore, a secondary explanation for the strong financial distress results might be due to differences in the bankruptcy codes in the two countries, which result in higher expected costs of financial distress for UK firms. The paper also examines the determinants of the choice of hedging method distinguishing between non‐derivative and derivatives hedging. My evidence shows that larger firms, firms with more cash, firms with a greater probability of financial distress, firms with exports or imports and firms with more short‐term debt are more likely to hedge with derivatives. Thus, differences in opportunities, in incentives for reducing risk and in the types of financial price exposure play an important role in how firms hedge their risks.