Learning by lending

This paper studies bank learning through repeated interactions with borrowers from a new perspective. To understand learning by lending, we adapt a methodology from labor economics to analyze how loan contract terms evolve as banks acquire new information about borrowers. We construct “proxy” variables for this information using data from borrowers’ out-of-sample, future credit performance. Due to the timing of their construction, banks could not have used these variables directly to price loans. We nonetheless find that these proxies increasingly predict loan prices as relationships progress, even after controlling for possible omitted variable bias. Our methodology provides strong evidence that: (a) bank learning affects loan prices, and (b) relationship benefits are heterogeneous. In particular, higher quality borrowers face differentially lower spreads as their relationship with lenders develop – and banks learn about their quality – while lower quality borrowers see loan prices increase and their loan amounts fall. We further find suggestive evidence that banks incorporate CEO-specific information into loan prices.     

Interest margins and bank regulation in Central America and the Caribbean

This paper examines empirically the determinants of bank interest margins in Central America and the Caribbean over the period 1998–2014. A particular focus is set on the impact of differences in the regulatory environment and market structure across countries in explaining the interest margins of individual banks. Our results suggest that bank market power, operating costs, credit risk, and liquid asset holdings increase the margin between loan and deposit rates, while increased income diversification and GDP growth are associated with lower loan-deposit spreads. When considering information on banking regulation, we find strong evidence to support our main hypothesis that improvements in market quality and liberalization have a significant effect on interest margins. More specifically, reductions in entry requirements to banking, higher involvement of foreign banks, and increased financial statement transparency are associated with significant reductions in interest margins.     

An investigation of the relationships among consumer satisfaction,loyalty, and market share in Kuwaiti loan services

This study investigates the relationships among customer satisfaction, customer loyalty, and market share in nearly 700 users of Kuwaiti bank loan services. The authors show that the expected positive relationships of satisfaction with market share and of satisfaction with loyalty are not supported in this sector of the banking industry. As expected, however, customer loyalty is shown to be related to market share. It appears that, within this product market, loyalty is not derived from customer satisfaction, but rather is based on other factors such as, for example, price, special deals, or bank–customer relationships. Therefore, market share in Kuwaiti loan services is dependent on banks creating and maintaining a large and loyal customer base.     

Do Banks Value Innovation? Evidence from US Firms

This study evaluates how innovation within companies alleviates the information asymmetry problems in relationship lending. We hypothesize that patenting activities could reveal favorable private information and, hence, reduce the information asymmetry between innovative borrowers and banks. Using a sample of US patenting firms from 1987 to 2004, we show that borrowers with higher innovation capability (revealed by having more patent applications, higher research & development (R&D) productivity, or higher‐quality patents) enjoy lower bank‐loan spreads and better nonprice‐related loan terms. Our evidence further suggests that the information benefits of patenting activities on loan spreads is more pronounced for small or less R&D‐intensive firms.     

Monitoring and bank loan pricing

In this paper, we examine the influence of contract costs on the pricing of bank loans. We find that the loan spread depends on a bank's screening and monitoring incentives, which varies across differentially regulated classes of banks. This leads to significant price disparities in the loan market. In particular, the US branches of Japanese banks participate in syndicated lending to US firms that charge significantly higher spreads compared to syndicated loans to US firms without Japanese participation. This pricing disparity is primarily due to regulatory differences. We also find that as specialized intermediaries, banks price loans based primarily on their own monitoring.     

Lending competition and credit availability for new firms: Empirical study with the price cost margin in regional loan markets

In this paper, I present statistical evidence of the impact of lending competition on credit availability for new firms. A discrete-time duration analysis with respect to the years from the start-up to the first loan approval by a commercial bank or a cooperative bank, which is collected from survey data in Japan, shows that the higher price cost margin (PCM) of banks, which reflects the existence of a quasi-rent for a bank, improves the credit availability for younger firms. Additional analysis to detect the regional determinants of the PCM of banks shows that the share of larger banks in each local credit market has a negative and significant impact on the PCM. In light of the existing empirical finding that smaller banks are more likely to provide relationship banking, these findings provide indirect evidence for the hypothesis that the intensity of relationship banking in each local credit market increases the PCM and this encourages banks to extend a loan to new firms so that they can pre-empt the opportunity to establish lending relationships that are expected to yield such quasi-rents.     

Do tax benefits conferred to Sub-S banks affect their deposit or loan rates?

Positive economics predicts that Sub-S banks, with no taxes paid at the corporate level, will price their products lower than otherwise identical C corporation banks in a competitive environment. Alternatively, if banks price bundle their products, Sub-S tax benefits might have little (no) effect on product rates. The empirical analysis finds that Sub-S deposit (loan) rates are equal to or lower (higher) than similar C corporation bank rates. Thus, there is little evidence of any tax benefits accruing to Sub-S bank customers. In contrast, tax-exempt credit unions do offer higher deposit rates and lower loan rates than C corporation banks.     

The determinants of bank interest rate margins: an international study

This paper studies the determinants of bank net interest margins (NIMs) in six selected European countries and the US during the period 1988–1995 for a sample of 614 banks. We apply the Ho and Saunders model (Ho, T., Saunders, A., 1981. The determinants of bank interest margins: theory and empirical evidence. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analyses 16, 581–600) to a multicountry setting and decompose bank margins into a regulatory component, a market structure component and a risk premium component. The regulatory components in the form of interest-rate restrictions on deposits, reserve requirements and capital-to-asset ratios have a significant impact on banks NIMs. The empirical results suggest an important policy trade-off between assuring bank solvency—high capital-to-asset ratios—and lowering the cost of financial services to consumers—low NIMs. The more segmented or restricted the banking system—both geographically and by activity—the larger appears to be the monopoly power of existing banks, and the higher their spreads. Macro interest-rate volatility was found to have a significant impact on bank NIMs; this suggests that macro policies consistent with reduced interest-rate volatility could have a positive effect in reducing bank margins.     

Determinants of bank interest margins: Impact of maturity transformation

This paper explores the extent to which interest risk exposure is priced into bank margins. Our contribution to the literature is twofold: First, we extend the Ho and Saunders (1981) model to capture interest rate risk and expected returns from maturity transformation. Banks price interest risk according to their individual exposure separately in loan and deposit intermediation fees, but reduce (increase) these charges for loans (deposits) when positive excess holding period returns from long-term exposures are expected. Second, we test the model-derived hypotheses not only for the commonly investigated net interest margin but also for interest income and expense margins separately in a sample encompassing the German universal banking sector between 2000 and 2009. Our results suggest that banks price their individual interest rate risk and corresponding expected excess holding period returns via the asset side into the net interest margin. For liabilities, we find that interest rate risk exposure is only priced in by smaller, local banks.     

Does non-interest income make banks more risky? Retail- versus investment-oriented banks

In this paper, we show that the impact of non-interest income on bank risk differs between retail- and investment-oriented banks. More specifically, while retail-oriented banks such as savings, cooperative and other banks that focus on lending and deposit-taking services become significantly more stable (in the sense of having a higher Z-score) if they increase their share of non-interest income, investment-oriented banks become significantly more risky. They do not only generate a higher share of their income from non-traditional activities, but also engage in significantly different activities from retail-oriented banks. This might limit the potential benefits to investment-oriented banks of diversifying into non-interest income. Overall, therefore, our paper implies that it is important to distinguish between retail- and investment-oriented banks when drawing general conclusions regarding the impact of non-interest income on bank risk.     

Cost stickiness and bank loan contracting

This study examines whether and, if so, how borrowers' asymmetric cost behavior (i.e., cost stickiness) is factored into the price and non-price terms of bank loan contracts. We provide strong and reliable evidence that ex-ante, the loan spread increases with cost stickiness after controlling for other known determinants of loan contract terms. Moreover, we find that the effect is more pronounced for borrowers with higher default risk and higher information risk. This is consistent with borrowers' asymmetric cost behavior increasing lenders' uncertainty about the liquidation value of assets, and hence, lenders need to be compensated ex-ante. Additionally, we conjecture that higher cost stickiness may increase the need for ex-post monitoring. Consistent with this conjecture, we find some evidence that lenders impose tighter non-price terms on firms with stickier costs. This study integrates cost stickiness research with the banking literature by showing that banks incorporate borrowers' asymmetric cost behavior into loan contracting terms.     

Bank Competition and Financial Stability

Under the traditional “competition-fragility” view, more bank competition erodes market power, decreases profit margins, and results in reduced franchise value that encourages bank risk taking. Under the alternative “competition-stability” view, more market power in the loan market may result in higher bank risk as the higher interest rates charged to loan customers make it harder to repay loans, and exacerbate moral hazard and adverse selection problems. The two strands of the literature need not necessarily yield opposing predictions regarding the effects of competition and market power on stability in banking. Even if market power in the loan market results in riskier loan portfolios, the overall risks of banks need not increase if banks protect their franchise values by increasing their equity capital or engaging in other risk-mitigating techniques. We test these theories by regressing measures of loan risk, bank risk, and bank equity capital on several measures of market power, as well as indicators of the business environment, using data for 8,235 banks in 23 developed nations. Our results suggest that—consistent with the traditional “competition-fragility” view—banks with a higher degree of market power also have less overall risk exposure. The data also provides some support for one element of the “competition-stability” view—that market power increases loan portfolio risk. We show that this risk may be offset in part by higher equity capital ratios.

The effects of reputation and relationships on lead banks’ certification roles

We investigate the certification roles of lead bank retention in US syndicated loans with respect to interest rates, then explore how lead banks’ reputation and previous relationships with the borrower alter such certification effects. Our findings support the certification hypothesis. Loan spreads are found to decrease with a higher retention ratio, after controlling for the endogeneity of loan price and retention. The magnitude of certification effect is reduced when the lead bank is a more reputable lender and when there are prior bank–borrower relationships. Lead bank reputation and prior lending relationships can therefore substitute for the need to certify.     

Bank accounting conservatism and bank loan pricing

This paper studies the effects of bank accounting conservatism on the pricing of syndicated bank loans. We provide evidence that banks timelier in loss recognition charge higher spreads. We go onto consider what happens to the relationship between spreads and timeliness in loss recognition during the financial crisis. During the crisis, banks timelier in loss recognition increase their spreads to a lesser extent than banks less timely in loss recognition. These findings are broadly consistent with the argument that conditional accounting conservatism serves a governance role. The policy implication is that banks timelier in loss recognition exhibit more prudent and less pro-cyclical loan pricing behaviour.     

Do Information Rents in Loan Spreads Persist over the Business Cycles?

In this paper, we seek empirical evidence for information rents in loan spreads by analyzing a sample of UK syndicated loan contracts for the period from 1996 to 2005. We use various measures for borrower opaqueness and control for bank, borrower and loan characteristics and we find that undercapitalized banks charge approximately 34 bps higher loan spreads for loans to opaque borrowers. We further analyze whether this effect persists throughout the business cycle and find that this effect prevails only during recessions. However, we do not find evidence that banks exploit their information monopolies during expansion phases.     

Bank exposure to market fear

We find that increases in implied market volatility (a proxy for market fear) have a significant impact on returns of bank stocks, above and beyond systematic risk proxied by the expected excess market return during a bad economic regime. Large bank returns are favorably affected by increases in implied market volatility during the crisis, while small banks are adversely affected by increases in implied market volatility. We attribute the different effects among the size-categorized bank portfolios to the perception that large banks are protected by too-big-to-fail policies. Within the sample of small banks, the adverse share price response to increased implied market volatility is more pronounced for banks that rely more heavily on non-traditional sources of funds, use a high proportion of loans in their assets, have a higher level of non-performing assets, and have a relatively low provision for loan losses. The adverse effect of negative innovations in implied market volatility on small bank returns during the crisis is primarily driven by exposure of their loan portfolio to weak economic conditions.     

Can Banks in Emerging Economies Benefit from Revenue Diversification?

This paper investigates the effect of revenue diversification on bank performance and risk. Using a panel dataset of 226 listed banks across 11 emerging economies and a new methodological approach, System Generalized Method of Moments estimators (System GMM), the results in this paper provide empirical evidence of the impact of the observed shift towards non-interest income generating activities on insolvency risk and bank performance. The core finding is that diversification across and within both interest and non-interest income generating activities decrease insolvency risk and enhance profitability. The results also show that these benefits are largest for banks with moderate risk exposures. By extension, these results have significant strategic implications for bank managers, regulators and supervisors who share a common interest in boosting bank performance and stability.     

Market Discipline of Banks: The Asset Test

As the banking business grows more complex, government supervisors of banks seem increasingly willing to share the role of policing bank risk with private investors, especially bondholders. Using spreads on nearly 500 bank bond issues between 1993 and 1998, this paper investigates the relationship between the spreads on those bonds and the full portfolio of assets held by the issuing bank. Our results show that bond spreads reflect the overall mix of banks' assets at the time of issuance, even after controlling for the standard measures of risk and performance used in earlier studies. Banks contemplating a shift into riskier activities like trading, for example, can expect to pay higher spreads as a result. Credit card and commercial and industrial lending also carry a penalty in terms of higher spreads. Overall, these results suggest that investors do price the ex ante credit and other risks implicit in banks' asset portfolios. Their vigilance should help to deter excessive or inefficient risk taking by banks.     

Decoupling the distressed banks and their clients,and coupling the distressed firms and their lending banks

This paper simultaneously investigates the responses of stock prices of the related banks and the client firms when one of them is in distress. Two effects are examined. The distressed bank effect, which claims that the stock price of client firms are coupled to that of their related distress banks, and the distressed firm effect, which claims that the related banks are negatively affected when their client firms are in distress. We collect the detailed information of individual transaction loan data to find the relationship between banks and their client firms. Asymmetric responses are reported in this paper. Our results reject the distressed bank effect but, by contrast, cannot reject the distressed firm effect. We propose the fund diversification hypothesis and the leverage hypothesis, and argue the decoupling effect of the distressed bank and their listed firms, owing to the diversified choice of clients' financing channel.     

Performance of Canadian banks and oil price movements

We employ dynamic panel data models to examine the performance (profitability and asset quality) of a large sample of Canadian banks from 1996Q1 to 2018Q2. Profits, measured as return on assets (ROA), depend on bank factors (capital adequacy, loan loss provisions (LLP) and non-interest income), the slope of the yield curve, and several oil price measures. Our findings suggest that the persistence of profits is estimated to be around 0.40 and the direct impact of oil prices tends to be positive on profits. When oil interacts with non-interest income, there is a strong positive relationship. This can be interpreted as oil price increases leading to more banking transactions (derivatives, fees) and then higher profits. Our evidence also suggests that positive oil price changes increase the asset quality of Canadian banks by reducing the ratio of LLP.