业绩对赌协议对并购溢价和市场反应的影响

在推进并购市场契约创新背景下,研究业绩对赌协议有重要的理论和实践意义。本文构建了并购双方在信息不对称市场上的理论效用模型,并以2006—2020年收购方为上市公司的资产收购为样本,得到以下结论：第一,业绩对赌协议中对未来承诺期限规定越严格,溢价规模越大,且业绩对赌相对规模与溢价呈倒U形关系;第二,通过在模型中引入股价异常回报情况,发现业绩对赌协议和市场反应之间为正向关系,在此基础上验证了并购溢价在两者关系中的中间遮掩效用和门槛效用;第三,进一步研究发现,并购溢价会对合约细节与对赌结果、市场反应与对赌结果之间的关系产生影响。本文研究有助于企业避免由过度保护、代理问题和信息不对称造成的估值溢价偏差,进而合理利用并购溢价和协议细节调动市场投资者的积极情绪与信心。     

并购重组业绩承诺推高资产估值了吗

随着并购重组的井喷,业绩补偿承诺作为并购交易定价调整机制逐渐被人们所重视,那业绩承诺是降低还是加剧了并购交易中的投资风险?基于这一问题,本文研究了业绩承诺对标的资产估值及并购方(上市公司)股票价值的影响。结果发现,业绩承诺能够减缓当事方之间的信息不对称,具有较强的信号作用,推高了并购重组时标的资产的评估价值,同时造成上市公司股价的攀升,该相关度在双向业绩承诺重组交易中表现得尤其明显。进一步对业绩承诺进行了事后研究,结果发现,业绩承诺的实现程度与之前的资产高估值并不形成一致关系,预示着高估值资产所蕴涵的预期业绩并未实现,深入分析发现,投资者保护机制不好(外部环境)和上市公司的信息透明度较低(内部环境)是其主要原因。因此,资本市场投资者应慎重看待并购重组中的业绩承诺,防范业绩承诺成为空谈的风险;同时,监管层应强化对业绩承诺的事前和事后管理,而提高公司信息透明度、强化对业绩承诺违约的处罚力度是其重要思路。     

利益输送、信息不对称与定向增发折价

定向增发作为资本市场权益再融资的重要方式之一，已日益受到监管层、上市公司和投资者的重视。本文研究了定向增发折价的形成原因。研究结果显示，大股东的机会主义行为和上市公司与投资者之问的信息不对称是定向增发折价的重要决定因素。我们发现，当大股东购买定向增发股票的比例与其在增发前持有的上市公司股权比例差额越大时，增发折价也越高，并且增发价格相对于基准价格的溢价越低。这一结果表明，大股东通过定向增发实现了以较低的对价稀释中小股东权益的目的，从而在一定程度上侵害了后者的利益。此外，与国外的研究一致，定向增发的折价还与信息不对称的程度成正比，即当不对称的程度越高时，增发的折价也越高。     

高溢价并购可以带来高市场回报吗?

本文以2001―2019年A股上市公司为研究对象,分析了并购溢价与并购短期市场绩效之间的关系,以及吸收合并、商誉和业绩承诺对两者关系的影响。研究结果表明,并购溢价会显著提升并购短期市场绩效,同时资本市场也存在着并购消息提前泄露的问题。异质性分析结果表明,中国资本市场投资者有追高情绪,吸收合并类并购重组的并购溢价更能促进并购短期市场绩效提升;在经历了2015年A股市场异常波动后,市场回归理性,高商誉、高业绩承诺的高溢价并购无法再显著提升并购短期市场绩效。本文结论丰富了并购溢价与企业价值创造关系的研究,为规范并购交易定价和促进资本市场可持续发展提供了学理支持和政策参考。     

多元化与股权融资成本实证研究

多元化公司由于内部各部门、公司与外部投资者之间的信息不对称程度较高,公司经营透明度较低,内部组织摩擦大,使得不知情的外部投资者面临相对更大的风险,因而多元化公司有时不受投资者欢迎,且股权融资成本会高于专营公司。共同保险理论指出多元化公司的负债率往往较高,根据MM定理负债率的升高引起的财务风险增加会导致股权融资成本的升高。本文选取2011-2012年的深证A股上市公司作为样本,对多元化与股权融资成本之间的关系进行了实证研究,发现两者之间存在显著的正相关关系。     

交叉上市、信息不对称与风险特征

本文以"A+H"交叉上市公司价格差异为研究对象,对A股、H股股票价格之间差异及其变化进行研究。根据对36家A+H股上市公司近期9个月溢价水平的分析发现,信息不对称理论能够解释AH股溢价扩大的现象,投资者与公司之间信息不对称问题得到缓解的趋势不明显,反而有所强化;国有股特征导致AH溢价缩小,海外投资者对国有股份的认同度提升;流动性理论、不同风险偏好理论不能解释AH溢价变化,数据分析支持信息不对称理论、风险特征理论和需求理论。     

目标公司R&D投入强度对并购溢价产生的影响研究

并购能够使企业规模迅速得到扩张,也是获取外部R&D能力与技术知识的重要手段。但是并购企业为取得目标企业的控制权通常会支付较高的并购溢价。本文从信息不对称与技术并购角度探讨了并购溢价产生的根源,并以目标企业的研发投入作为代理变量,研究了目标企业特征对并购溢价的影响。     

交易特征、并购溢价及并购绩效分析——来自上市公司大宗股权协议转让的经验证据

本文详细分析了交易特征和并购溢价对并购现金流绩效的影响。研究结果发现，并购溢价与并购后现金流业绩显著正相关，转让价格在一定程度上能反映购买方对上市公司价值的判断，对公司未来的业绩有信号作用。当控股股东将国有股权转让给关联方且股权性质发生了变更时，并购后现金流业绩显著降低。这在某种程度上证实了在新型委托代理关系中大股东利用股权转让和关联交易掠夺上市公司财富进而剥削中小股东。     

并购重组前的知情交易行为研究

并购重组中基于内幕信息的知情交易行为既是监管重点,也是学术界关注的热点问题。本文以2006—2020年我国上市公司并购重组事件为样本,考察并购重组前的知情交易行为对并购公告收益的影响。研究发现：并购重组前的知情交易行为引发了主并公司股价的提前反应,从而降低了并购公告时的市场反应,这一现象是由内幕信息泄露引起,且内幕信息主要来源于包括员工在内的公司内部人,而非机构投资者。进一步分析表明,改善信息环境可以有效缓解并购重组的信息泄露问题,体现为知情购买交易的信息泄露效应受到分析师跟踪、审计质量和问询函制度的有效制约。本文研究深化了现有的并购重组内幕交易行为研究,为实施精准监管和防范内幕交易等政策提供了一定参考和依据。     

后股改时代上市公司并购趋势及对策研究

股权分置改革的顺利进行为上市公司并购的发展奠定了坚实的基础,后股改时代的上市公司并购将出现主体多元化、方式多样化等特点,应采取加强对外资并购国内上市公司的监管,进一步推进并购融资工具创新,拓宽并购资金来源等措施,推动和规范上市公司的并购行为.     

Customer concentration and M&A performance

This paper examines how the target's customer concentration affects merger performance. We find that the acquirer purchasing a customer-concentrated firm experiences significantly lower stock market returns and worse long-run operating performance. The effect is more pronounced when customers face lower switching costs or the target undertakes a higher level of relationship-specific investments, exhibits higher cash volatility, or is acquired by a less well-known company. Further analysis shows that the negative association is mainly driven by corporate customers, while relatively safe government customers moderate the effect. We also find that shared major customers, overconfident CEOs, and poor corporate governance are more likely to increase the likelihood of customer-concentrated acquisitions. Overall, our findings suggest that higher customer concentration leads to lower value creation in mergers.     

Board connections and M&A transactions

We examine M&A transactions between firms with current board connections and find that acquirers obtain higher announcement returns in transactions with a first-degree connection where the acquirer and the target share a common director. Acquirer returns are also higher in transactions with a second-degree connection where one acquirer director and one target director serve on the same third board. Our results suggest that first-degree connections benefit acquirers with lower takeover premiums while second-degree connections benefit acquirers with greater value creation. Overall, we provide new evidence that board connectedness plays important roles in corporate investments and leads to greater value creation.     

Shareholder wealth effects of M&A withdrawals

This paper provides evidence on the wealth effect in the event of the withdrawal of a merger or acquisition, and the impact of termination fee provisions on acquirer withdrawal returns. I report a significant negative correlation between acquirer withdrawal returns and announcement returns, consistent with the theory of managerial learning in M&As. Target firms reap net gains in deal withdrawals, showing evidence of a permanent revaluation of targets even if the deals fail. I also find that acquirer termination fee provisions are positively associated with acquirer withdrawal returns, suggesting that such provisions may play a disciplinary role in the withdrawal decision-making and protect acquirer shareholders’ interests in deal withdrawals. Furthermore, my results also show that target termination fee provisions are negatively associated with acquirer withdrawal returns, which supports the efficiency hypothesis.

     

Pathways to Success in M&A

For many if not most publicly traded companies, acquisition capabilities remain a critical component of sustainable longterm growth and profitability. And even as investors press companies to return excess capital through dividends and stock buybacks, the market continues to assign premium valuations to companies that earn above-average returns through a combination of internal investment and judicious acquisition spending.
This article begins by describing major challenges facing acquirers in the current business and regulatory environment. Then, after showing how M&A can be used to address strategic goals, the authors identify key elements in the M&A strategies of three highly successful companies: General Electric, Danaher, and Illinois Tool Works.     

Corporate life cycle and M&A activity

We investigate the impact of corporate life cycle on takeover activity from the perspective of acquiring firms. Using the earned/contributed capital mix as the proxy for firm life cycle, we find a highly significant and positive relation between firm life cycle and the likelihood of becoming a bidder. This finding is, however, driven by the mature rather than the old acquirers in the sample. Further we find that, whilst firm life cycle has a positive effect on the probability that a deal will be negotiated, it is negatively related to tender offers. In addition, the likelihood of making both cash and mixed deals are positively related to the corporate life cycle. Finally, we find that life cycle has a negative impact on the abnormal returns generated on the announcement of a deal although it is unable to distinguish between the returns received by firms at different stages in their life cycle.     

Explaining M&A Success in European Banks

We study 98 large M&As of European bidding banks from 1985 to 2000 in order to investigate drivers of excess returns to the shareholders of the targets, the bidders, and to the combined entity of the bidder and the target. Our findings show that many of 13 drivers identified mostly from prior, US‐focused research have significant explanatory power, indicating that the stock market reaction to M&A announcements of European bidding banks can be at least partly forecast. Our results are largely consistent with the US‐experience and confirm the preference of stock markets for focused transactions and against diversification. Moreover, we find that less active bidders create more value than more active/experienced bidders. This stands in contrast to some US research and may indicate that managers of frequent European bidding banks may be motivated by other objectives than creating shareholder value.     

M&A Operations and Performance in Banking

This paper investigates whether M&A operations influence the performance of banks. Using a sample of 714 deals involving EU acquirers and targets located throughout the world over the period 1991–2005, we investigate whether M&A operations are associated with improved performance (using both standard accounting ratios and cost and alternative profit X-efficiency measures). Despite the extensive and ongoing consolidation process in the banking industry, we find that M&A operations are associated with a slight deterioration in return on equity, cash flow return and profit efficiency and with a marked improvement in cost efficiency. Hence, the improvements in cost efficiency appear to be transferred to bank clients. These changes in performance are directly attributable to the M&A operations, and would not have occurred in their absence. Moreover, these changes exhibit a particularly negative trend for cross-border deals to testify the importance of geographical relatedness in order to achieve better post-M&A performance. The environmental and bank-characteristics that make a deal successful or unsuccessful are finally identified.     

期权激励与企业并购行为

本文以2006年至2015年我国上市公司为研究对象,考察了期权激励对企业并购行为的影响。研究发现:授予高管的期权激励显著提升了企业发起并购的可能性和并购规模。缓解代理问题和提升风险承担是潜在的作用渠道。进一步研究表明,激励对象异质性会影响期权激励的效果,期权激励对企业并购倾向和并购规模的提升作用在管理者年龄较高、管理者任期较长以及管理者相对薪酬水平较低的企业中更加明显。此外,期权激励对企业并购行为的影响在非国有企业中更加突出。最后,本文还发现期权激励提升了企业并购的财务业绩。本文的研究不仅丰富了有关期权激励效果方面的文献,而且对于理解企业并购行为具有一定的参考意义。     

The PIN anomaly around M&A announcements

The probability of information-based trading (PIN) introduced by Easley and O’Hara (1987) has been increasingly used in empirical research in finance. We investigate its behavior around a sample of merger and acquisition announcements that took place on Euronext Paris between 1995 and 2000. The behavior of the PIN seems to be in contradiction with clear evidence of information leakages in our sample during the pre-event period. We investigate the reasons for its unusual behavior and raise some concerns about its use as an information-based trading indicator, at least around major corporate events.     

Board involvement in the M&A negotiation process

This paper examines whether the active engagement of target firm directors in the sale process affects merger outcomes. Using data manually extracted from merger-related SEC filings, I create two measures of target board involvement in merger negotiations: the number of days it takes for the board to meet after the beginning of the sale process and the number of board meetings held throughout the entire process. I find that early board involvement in merger talks increases target shareholder returns and premiums, especially when shareholders have weak control over their firms and are thus in greater need of board protection. Although the two measures of target board activity do not affect acquirer cumulative abnormal returns or the likelihood of competition, such activity does reduce the likelihood of an excessive target termination fee. Robustness analyses dismiss an alternative explanation whereby attractive initial bids lead to both early board involvement and attractive final bids.