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1.
This note derives the long-run implications of rent controls when rent-controlled apartments are implicitly rationed to tenants who are more efficient in searching for apartments in the controlled sector. Rent controls are shown to involve transfers that essentially are from some to other tenants, as well as dead-weight losses due to higher search costs that are borne by tenants. Key to this analysis is the condition that, at the margin, rent plus the higher cost of search for a rent-controlled apartment must equal rent in the noncontrolled sector.  相似文献   

2.
The paper is a positive and normative public choice analysis of rent control. The positive public choice section hypothesizes that differences in rent control regimes across countries emerge out of differences in the political power of tenants and landlords, out of differing attitudes to security of tenure and the fairness of gains from property ownership, and out of differing values regarding equality of opportunity versus equality of result. The normative public choice analysis evaluates rent control by asking whether rent control would be allowed under a unanimously approved constitution. It is argued control would not be allowed; not because the objectives of control are outside the sanctioned domain of government but because control is horizontally inequitable.  相似文献   

3.
This paper investigates the relationship between operating expenses and rents of Energy Star and LEED certified buildings in the Central and Eastern United States. Several studies have shown that sustainable buildings command a rent premium compared to comparable conventional buildings. Lower operating expenses are expected to be a major source of the rent premium that sustainable buildings command. This is especially the case for buildings with triple-net leases, where tenants directly benefit from savings in operating costs. For a large dataset of U.S. office buildings this study finds significantly lower operating expenses in LEED certified buildings. However, savings in operating expenses only explain part of the rent premium. Additional factors must be at work. Surprisingly, we find significantly higher operating expenses in Energy Star rated buildings. Hence, intangible benefits appear to be the major source of rental premiums of Energy Star rated buildings.  相似文献   

4.
Housing markets are thin, and consumer search for housing is costly, time consuming, and risky. Mismatches between tenants and dwellings are common in a laissez-faire market. There are scale economies in accumulating tenants and houses and then matching them up to improve welfare. In many European countries, some housing is rent controlled and rationed by public centralized matching. Waiting time, risk in rationing, and risk in matching are costs that arise from such regulation. We show that welfare improvements over laissez-faire occur if gains from centralized matching can offset the decrease in housing quality, the possible increase in waiting times, and the risks in rationing induced by rent controls. Under regulation, there is a welfare maximizing partition of the stock into free and controlled markets; and contrary to observed practice, it is often welfare improving to set controlled rents above (not below) laissez-faire, which increases the supply offered for centralized matching and the opportunity for a better match.  相似文献   

5.
Landlords face unique concerns in maximizing profits when they accept subsidized as well as unsubsidized tenants. Subsidized tenants come with lower rental collection risk because part or all of the rent is paid by a public agency and accepting subsidized tenants may widen the potential tenant market. But subsidized tenants tend to reduce overall tenant quality and to impose higher operating costs. By accepting subsidies, landlords may also subject themselves to periodic site inspections that may increase capital costs. Further, subsidized tenants may eventually crowd out unsubsidized tenants, lowering the average quality of the resident mix. Tests from Washington, DC apartments on accepting and advertising for Section 8 tenants support these qualitative predictions. Accepting Section 8 tenants enhances revenues, but advertising for them lowers revenues. More aggressive solicitation of subsidized tenants leads to a crowding out or displacement risk that dominates over any diminished collection risk.  相似文献   

6.
The aim of this paper is to describe the rent control system in Sweden, evaluate the effects on consumption and production in the housing market, and provide a public choice explanation of the present rent control system.The first section of this paper contains introductory remarks and an overview of the rental market in Sweden. The Swedish rent control system and its prerequisites are described in section 2. Attention is given to two important prerequisites: the existence of a large municipal housing sector and a strong tenants' movement. As a result, a rent system has been developed with all rents set by negotiations. The rent structure is determined by a fairness principle, which has some resemblance to market adapted rents. The rent level will be determined by a non-profit condition in municipal housing companies.In section 3 the effects of the existing rent control system are discussed with the municipality of Stockholm as a test case. Effects on rent level and rent structure are evaluated, and the relation between rent policy in municipal housing companies and resulting rents in private housing is analyzed. Gains and losses to tenants and landlords are evaluated as well as effects on construction and maintenance.In section 4 a political perspective is discussed. The aim is to explain why the system is not implemented in the market adapted way it was intended. Finally, the future of the rent system is discussed.  相似文献   

7.
Private Benefits of Control: An International Comparison   总被引:86,自引:1,他引:86  
We estimate private benefits of control in 39 countries using 393 controlling blocks sales. On average the value of control is 14 percent, but in some countries can be as low as ?4 percent, in others as high a +65 percent. As predicted by theory, higher private benefits of control are associated with less developed capital markets, more concentrated ownership, and more privately negotiated privatizations. We also analyze what institutions are most important in curbing private benefits. We find evidence for both legal and extra‐legal mechanisms. In a multivariate analysis, however, media pressure and tax enforcement seem to be the dominating factors.  相似文献   

8.
The post-Glass–Steagall era has presented insurers with new opportunities and risks during a time when information flows and business processes are being impacted by changing technology. In this article, we explore how insurers use and perceive current technology to carry out their operations by reporting results from a sample of insurers that includes some of the nation's largest property and casualty insurers. We find among insurers in our sample that an online channel is having a significant impact on customer retention and revenue enhancement, but a lesser impact on cost reduction. Interestingly, about two-thirds of our sample has experienced an increase in their overall number of transactions following the adoption on an online channel. Moreover, while the Internet is perceived as giving marketing benefits it is not being used as a substitute for agents. We find that 65 percent of respondents have used technology to integrate customer data across functional areas and another 23 percent plan to do so in the next 3 years. Nearly 71 percent of respondents have or plan to adopt service-oriented architecture in their technology infrastructure.  相似文献   

9.
We examine how the rent-seeking incentives of local government motivate private firms1 listed in China to establish political connections, and whether such connections lead to more concentrated corporate control structures. Our results show that such firms are more likely to establish political connections in regions in which the local economy is less market-oriented or in which the government has more discretion in allocating economic resources. This is consistent with the notion that the presence of incentives for government officials to engage in rent seeking motivates private firms to look for alternative safeguards through political connections. We also find that the controlling owners of politically connected firms tend to concentrate their shareholdings and dominate the board of directors by occupying the position of either chairman or CEO, which supports the conjecture that a concentrated control structure facilitates rent seeking through political connections and allows the controlling owner to retain all of the benefits arising from connections with politicians.  相似文献   

10.
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