The Interaction of Monetary and Macroprudential Policies

I analyze a New Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model where the financing of productive investment is affected by a moral hazard problem. I solve for jointly Ramsey‐optimal monetary and macroprudential policies. I find that when a financial friction is present in addition to the standard nominal friction, the optimal policy can replicate the first‐best allocation if the social planner can conduct both monetary and macroprudential policy. Using monetary policy alone is not enough: a policy trade‐off between stabilizing inflation and output gap emerges. When policy follows simple rules, the source of fluctuations is relevant for the choice of the appropriate policy mix.     

Coordinating Monetary and Macroprudential Policies

This paper studies noncooperative games between a monetary authority and a macroprudential regulator whose objectives are a subset of those in the social loss function. The analysis is based on a New Keynesian model with a financial sector and a financial friction à la Gertler and Karadi (2011). When the friction affects the financing of all factors of production equally, macroprudential policy is shown to be a powerful additional tool, fully eliminating inefficiencies, regardless of the source of the shock and no matter whether the central bank and the regulator cooperate. But when trade‐offs are present and policy is discretionary, the institutional arrangements become crucial. While coordination leads to higher welfare than a setting in which each authority takes the decision rule of the other as given (namely, the Nash equilibrium), our analysis shows that a noncooperative setting in which the macroprudential authority acts as a leader within the period can be superior to cooperation. Finally, our conclusions are unaffected by whether the macroprudential instrument affects funding costs or acts as a liquidity requirement.     

Optimal Macroprudential Policies and House Prices in Korea

This article investigates the impacts of the macroprudential policy of limitation on credit growth in housing market on Korean economy to find empirical and theoretical implications. Empirical results based on VAR models show that macroprudential policies like LTV and DTI in Korea have significant and persistent effect on real household credit and real house price. This article further addresses implications of optimal macroprudential and monetary policy in Korea by employing a standard DSGE model. The results suggest that the time-varying macroprudential policy responding to the borrower’s debt to income ratio is most effective in stabilizing household debt among the macroprudential policy rules considered, but produces a moderate downturn of the economy.     

Testing Commitment Models of Monetary Policy: Evidence from OECD Economies

Inflation in many Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries was low in the 1960s, rose for a time before peaking in the 1970s or early 1980s, and then fell back to initial levels. This paper shows that a simple time inconsistency model of monetary policy does not explain OECD inflation outcomes, except in the United States. The hypothesis that time inconsistency mattered only in earlier decades fits the data no better than the baseline model. We find some, albeit limited support for a model in which inflation spills over from the United States into other countries as a result of exchange rate targeting.     

Notes on the Underground: Monetary Policy in Resource‐Rich Economies

The central bank of a commodity‐exporting small open economy faces the traditional trade‐off between domestic inflation and output gap. The commodity sector introduces a terms‐of‐trade inefficiency that gives rise to an endogenous cost‐push shock, changes the target level for output, reduces the slope of the Phillips curve, and increases the importance of stabilizing the output gap. Optimal monetary policy calls for a reduction of the interest rate following a drop in the oil price. In contrast, a central bank with a mandate to stabilize consumer price inflation raises interest rates to limit the inflationary impact of an exchange rate depreciation.     

从通货膨胀目标制看货币政策透明度建设

近年来，通货膨胀目标制已成为一种新的货币政策框架，而通货膨胀目标制的显著优点在于能通过增强货币政策的透明度，提高政策的可信度，进而提高货币政策的有效性。提高货币政策的透明度正在成为一种国际趋势。因此．本文通过借鉴实施通货膨胀目标制的西方发达国家的成功经验，探讨我国应如何加强货币政策透明度的建设，提高货币政策有效性。     

Effective Macroprudential Policy: Cross‐Sector Substitution from Price and Quantity Measures

Macroprudential policy is increasingly being implemented worldwide, and is mostly applied to banks. A key question is whether this prompts substitution toward nonbank credit. Using two different global data sets on macroprudential measures and different methodologies, including detrended series, panel estimations, and propensity score matching, we find evidence of such substitution. Substitution toward nonbank credit appears to be stronger when policy measures are binding and are implemented in economies with well‐developed nonbank credit markets. This substitution partially offsets the fall in bank credit, thus dampening the policies’ effect on total credit.     

Power‐Sharing in Monetary Policy Committees: Evidence from the United Kingdom and Sweden

Committees may make better monetary policy decisions than individuals; however, the benefits of group decision making could be lost if committee members cede power to a chairman. We develop an econometric model to describe intracommittee power‐sharing across members. Estimation of the model permits us to classify monetary policy committees into the typology developed by Blinder ( 2004 , 2007 ). We estimate our model for the United Kingdom's Bank of England (BOE) and Sweden's Riksbank. Results for the BOE suggest that the Governor has little influence over other committee members, while those for the Riksbank indicate that the Governor is highly influential.     

Phillips Curve Instability and Optimal Monetary Policy

Empirical evidence suggests the Phillips curve has flattened over the past few decades. To capture this feature of the data, I develop a framework where firms face a changing cost of price adjustment, which produces a Phillips curve with a slope coefficient that varies over time. To evaluate the implications for monetary policy, I construct the utility‐based welfare criterion where the relative weight on output gap deviations changes synchronously with the slope of the Phillips curve. The systematic component of the rule that implements optimal policy is constant under discretion and commitment.     

Inflation,Employment, and Monetary Policy: Objectives and Outcomes in the UK and U.S. Compared

This paper explores how sensitive is monetary policy to the precise preferences of the central bank over inflation and economic activity. It does so in order to address a puzzle—which is that the U.S. Fed and the Bank of England appear to have quite different objectives and yet have adopted strikingly similar policies in recent years. I use a calibrated model to assess how policy might be sensitive to attaching different weights to inflation, output, and the output gap in central bank objectives. I find that a wide range of weights can give rise to rather similar monetary policies.     

State‐Dependent Transmission of Monetary Policy in the Euro Area

We estimate a logit mixture vector autoregressive model describing monetary policy transmission in the euro area over the period 1999–2015. In contrast to other classes of nonlinear vector autoregressive models, regime affiliation is neither strictly binary, nor binary with a transition period, and based on multiple variables. We show that monetary policy transmission in the euro area can be described as a mixture of two states. In both states, output and prices are found to decrease after contractionary monetary policy shocks. However, the effects of monetary policy are less enduring in the “crisis state.”     

Monetary Policy and the Natural Rate of Interest

It is most important for monetary policy to track the natural rate of interest when interest rates take large and sustained swings away from their long‐run equilibrium values. Here, we study two models: a standard New Keynesian model and one in which government bonds provide liquidity. Policy rules that cannot track the natural rate perform poorly in both models, but are especially bad in the second because of sustained movements in the natural rate induced by fiscal shocks. First difference rules, on the other hand, do surprisingly well. When model uncertainty is taken into account, the dominance of the first difference rule is even more pronounced.     

货币政策和金融稳定

近期的金融危机使世界各国的中央银行加强了对金融稳定问题的关注,对货币政策目标的选择与实施更加慎重。为更好实现金融稳定目标,中央银行应根据具体情况,在宏观审慎政策与货币政策之间做好平衡,在不同种类的宏观审慎政策工具间做出选择。     

On Targeting Frameworks And Optimal Monetary Policy

We show that speed limit policy, a monetary policy strategy that focuses on stabilizing inflation and the change in the output gap, consistently outperforms flexible inflation targeting and flexible price level targeting in empirical medium‐scale DSGE models under discretionary policymaking. In contrast to small‐scale New Keynesian models, this welfare ranking of the targeting frameworks is not overturned when inflation dynamics are mostly backward‐looking. Importantly, the performance of the speed limit policy shows less sensitivity to its parameterization than other frameworks that target the inflation rate or the price level.     

Monetary Policy and Financial Stability: Cross‐Country Evidence

We explain the heterogeneous response of central banks to financial stability risks based on a financial stability orientation (FSO) index, which reflects statutory, regulatory, and discretionary components of central banks' monetary policy frameworks. Our baseline results from a cross‐country panel of modified Taylor rules suggest that central banks with a high FSO increase their policy rates in response to elevated financial stability risks by 0.27 percentage points more than central banks with a low orientation. Back‐of‐the‐envelope calculations suggest that this policy rate differential translates into a reduced crisis probability but also into considerably lower inflation and output growth rates.     

The Interaction between Capital Requirements and Monetary Policy

The interaction between capital requirements and monetary policy is assessed by means of simple rules in a dynamic general equilibrium model featuring a banking sector. In “normal” times, when economic dynamics are driven by supply shocks, an active use of capital requirements generates modest benefits in terms of volatility of the target variables compared to the case in which only the central bank carries out stabilization policies. The lack of cooperation between the two policymakers may result in excessive volatility of the monetary policy rate and capital requirements. The benefits of introducing capital requirements become sizeable when financial shocks, which affect the supply of loans, are important drivers of economic dynamics; the availability of capital requirements as a policy tool yields a significant gain in terms of macroeconomic stabilization, regardless of the type of interaction between monetary and capital requirements policies.     

中国核心通货膨胀率的度量及其货币政策涵义

基于包含实际总产出、货币供给M2和CPI的向量自回归模型(VAR),将CPI分解为长期变动趋势和短期波动项。将长期趋势部分定义为核心通货膨胀率。运用1994～2009年中国季度数据进行实证检验,核心通胀率与CPI有长期均衡关系,主导CPI的长期变动趋势,是CPI的前导变量,能够为预测CPI提供有用信息,对为中央银行判断总体通货膨胀走势、制定及时有效的货币政策有所启示。     

货币政策目标、资产价格波动与最优货币政策

货币政策目标的实现程度是判定货币政策优劣的标准。通过建立中央银行的决策模型,推导出忽略和考虑资产价格的最优货币供应量反应函数,并据此对中国不同货币政策目标下的宏观经济运行进行模拟,以认识货币政策目标对资产价格波动与最优货币政策之间关系的影响,结果表明最优货币政策是否应该对资产价格的波动反应取决于货币政策目标。因此,应充分重视货币政策目标的取向,同时加强对最优货币政策目标确定的研究。     

Monetary Policy and the Asset Risk‐Taking Channel

How important is the risk‐taking channel for monetary policy? To answer this question, we develop and estimate a quantitative monetary DSGE model where banks choose excessively risky investments, due to an agency problem that distorts banks' incentives. As the real interest rate declines, these distortions become more important and excessive risk taking increases, lowering the efficiency of investment. We show theoretically that this novel transmission channel generates a new monetary policy trade‐off between inflation and real interest rate stabilization, whereby the central bank may prefer to tolerate greater inflation volatility in order to lower excessive risk taking.