The Capital Structure of Firms Subject to Price Regulation: Evidence from the Insurance Industry

Automobile and workers' compensation insurance are relatively homogeneous products sold under varying regulatory systems among the states. This paper investigates how price regulation affects the capital structure decisions of profit-maximizing insurers who sell insurance in both competitive and/or regulated markets. Specifically, we test the hypothesis that insurers subject to price regulation will choose to hold less capital. In addition, we hypothesize insurers subject to more stringent regulatory pricing constraints will choose even higher degrees of leverage because the benefits of holding additional amounts of capital are suppressed. We conduct empirical tests using cross-sectional data on insurers and find evidence consistent with both hypotheses. These findings have important implications for insurance price and solvency regulation. Stricter price regulation increases the default risk (i.e., reduces the financial quality) of insurance contracts purchased by individuals and firms.     

Participating Insurance Contracts and the Rothschild-Stiglitz Equilibrium Puzzle

We extend the Rothschild-Stiglitz (RS) insurance market model with adverse selection by allowing insurers to offer either non-participating or participating policies, that is, insurance contracts with policy dividends or supplementary calls for premium. It is shown that an equilibrium always exists in such a setting. Participating policies act as an implicit threat that dissuades deviant insurers who aim to attract low-risk individuals only. The model predicts that the mutual corporate form should be prevalent in insurance markets where second-best Pareto efficiency requires cross-subsidisation between risk types.     

Multidimensional Screening in Insurance Markets with Adverse Selection

Bundled coverage of different losses and distinct perils, along with differential deductibles and policy limits, are common features of insurance contracts. We show that, through these practices, insurers can implement multidimensional screening of insurance applicants who possess hidden knowledge of their risks, and thereby reduce the externality cost of adverse selection. Competitive forces drive insurers to exploit multidimensional screening, enhancing the efficiency of insurance contracting. Moreover, multidimensional screening allows competitive insurance markets to attain pure strategy Nash equilibria over a wider range of applicant pools, resolving completely the Rothschild–Stiglitz nonexistence puzzle in markets where the perils space is sufficiently divisible.     

On the Lack of Participating Policy Usage by Stock Insurance Companies

Stock insurers can reduce or eliminate agency conflicts between policyholders and stockholders by issuing participating insurance. Despite this benefit, most stock companies don't offer participating contracts. This study explains why. We study an equilibrium with both stock and mutual insurers in which stockholders set premiums to provide a fair expected return on their investment, and with a policyholder who chooses the insurance contract that maximizes her expected utility. We demonstrate that stockholders cannot profitably offer fully participating contracts, but can profitably offer partially participating insurance. However, when the policyholder participation fraction is high, the fair‐return premium is so large that the policyholder always prefers fully participating insurance from the mutual company. Policies with lower levels of policyholder participation are optimal for policyholders with relatively high risk aversion, though such policies are usually prohibited by insurance legislation. Thus, the reason stock insurers rarely issue participating contracts isn't because the potential benefits are small or unimportant. Rather, profitability or regulatory constraints simply prevent stock insurers from exercising those benefits in equilibrium.     

Competitive Insurance Markets and Adverse Selection in the Lab

We provide an experimental analysis of competitive insurance markets with adverse selection. Our parameterised version of the lemons’ model of Akerlof in the insurance context predicts total crowding-out of low risks when insurers offer a single full insurance contract. The therapy proposed by Rothschild and Stiglitz consists of adding a partial insurance contract so as to obtain self-selection of risks. We test the theoretical predictions of these two models in two experiments. A clean test is obtained by matching the parameters of these experiments and by controlling for the risk neutrality of insurers and the common risk aversion of their clients by means of the binary lottery procedure. The results reveal a partial crowding-out of low risks in the first experiment. Crowding-out is not eliminated in the second experiment and it is not even significantly reduced. Finally, instead of the predicted separating equilibrium, we find pooling equilibria. The latter can be sustained because insureds who objectively differ in their risk level do not perceive themselves as being so much different.     

State regulation and the structure,conduct, efficiency and performance of US auto insurers

This research investigates the impact of regulation on state automobile insurance markets while controlling for other state insurance market characteristics that may be related to performance. Data for a large sample of insurers are analyzed. The results suggest that insurers in competitive and non-stringently regulated states may benefit from market power by charging higher unit prices, however insurers in these states are on average more cost X-efficient and cost X-efficient insurers charge lower prices and earn smaller profits. The empirical results also suggest that insurers in some rate regulated states are less revenue and cost-scale efficient than in competitive states.     

Determinants of International Insurers' Participation in Foreign Non-Life Markets

Mirroring the trend in the broader marketplace, the global insurance industry is steadily moving toward increased liberalization and deregulation. This study seeks to develop the first empirical model that examines the importance of foreign market characteristics as they relate to the participation of international insurers in the non‐life business of those countries. The analysis reveals that market structure is an important factor in determining whether international insurers participate in a given foreign market. In addition, for markets that are not competitive, removing trade barriers would significantly improve the desirability of those countries as host markets. The results also suggest that countries with higher gross domestic product tend to attract more involvement from international insurers. While this research focuses on the markets of industrialized countries, the findings will provide significant implications for those emerging markets that have not yet collected relevant data on a number of the variables included in this study.     

MARKET POWER IN THE PROPERTY/CASUALTY INSURANCE INDUSTRY

Abstract: Pro-consumer groups have charged that insurance firms are able to exercise market power to reduce coverage and/or increase rates. The ability of firms to earn economic rents (abnormal profits) is a factor in banks' interest in entering insurance markets. In classical economics such collusion is usually only possible with cartels. Recent work, examining the relationship between industry structure indicates that the power that can be exercised by cartels may be more limited than under the classical paradigms. We examine the ability of insurers to exercise market power in light of these modern theories.     

Relative Hedging of Systematic Mortality Risk

A number of problematic issues have arisen in anticipation of the potential role of molecular tests for genetic predispositions to illness in risk assessment by insurance underwriters. We argue in this paper that the regrettable history and current risks of genetic discrimination warrant a presumption that genetic predisposition status should not be used in any nonmedical contexts, unless compelling evidence can demonstrate that serious harm will result to third-party interests without such use. We argue that insurers should not be able to initiate testing for genetic predisposition. We also argue that there are many reasons to doubt whether patients’ test results will result in such serious adverse selection as to cause substantial harm to insurance markets, except possibly at higher policy amounts in life or disability income insurance. We conclude that the burden of proof must be on insurers to demonstrate necessity of use in specific cases in which test availability shows high probability of imminent, serious harm to insurance markets.     

Aspekte internationaler Durchdringung des Seeversicherungsgeschäftes im 20. Jahrhundert

The business of marine insurance is characteristically international in scope, with many transactions across national borders, and it is only lightly regulated in a free market. Apparently there is no need to cast doubt on the general importance of foreign business, neither for single competitors in this branch nor for the world-wide market of marine insurance as a whole. Keeping a closer focus on recent history of individual marine insurance markets reveals that selected countries will show an individual character referring to international competition: host market characteristics affect the international marine insurers participation in foreign markets in different ways.     

Providers’ affiliation,insurance and collusion

This paper provides a theoretical analysis of the benefits for an insurance company to develop its own network of service providers when insurance fraud is characterized by collusion between policyholders and providers. In a static framework without collusion, exclusive affiliation of providers allows insurance companies to recover some market power and to lessen competition on the insurance market. This entails a decrease in the insured’s welfare. However, exclusive affiliation of providers may entail a positive effect on customers’ surplus when insurers and providers are engaged in a repeated relationship. In particular, while insurers must cooperate to retaliate against a fraudulent provider under non-exclusive affiliation, no cooperation is needed under exclusive affiliation. In that case, an insurer is indeed able to reduce the profit of a malevolent provider by moving to collusion-proof contracts when collusion is detected, and this threat may act as a deterrent for fraudulent activities. This possibility may supplement an inefficient judicial system: it is thus a second-best optimal anti-fraud policy.     

Temporal Profitability and Pricing of Long-Term Care Insurance

Equilibrium models of dynamic insurance markets can be bifurcated according to underlying assumptions about whether or not insurers commit to long‐term contracts. The difference is substantial in that commitment models imply price highballing over time while no‐commitment models indicate price lowballing. Extant empirical studies provide mixed evidence, however. We use long‐term care (LTC) insurance data, which allow us both to better control for heterogeneous, observable risk, to examine dynamic profitability and pricing in a relatively young, innovative insurance market. Our tests generally indicate temporal price lowballing, thereby providing support for the no‐commitment models.     

Are health insurers in multiple lines of business less profitable? An examination of scope economies in health insurance

In markets where companies can offer multiple products or services, production costs may decline, and profitability may increase as business scope expands. Using a sample of health insurers from 2015 to 2018 with data reported in the annual NAIC Supplemental Health Care Exhibit, we test whether scope economies exist among health insurers. We evaluate the relationship between scope and four profitability metrics—the medical loss ratio, the expense ratio, the underwriting profit ratio, and a profit efficiency measure obtained using a data envelopment analysis technique. We test two competing hypotheses from prior literature on scope economies in insurance. The strategic focus hypothesis states performance is higher for insurers that specialize in one line of business. The conglomeration hypothesis states performance is higher for insurers that operate in multiple lines of business. Our results provide evidence in support of the strategic focus hypothesis among US health insurers.     

Housing vacancies,thin markets,and idiosyncratic tastes

This paper presents a model with rental housing vacancies in equilibrium. Because of the indivisibility and multi-dimensional heterogeneity of housing units, the housing market is thin. As a result, a typical household entering the market is willing to pay a premium for its most-preferred over its second most-preferred available (vacant) unit. This confers monopoly power on landlords, which they exploit by setting rents above costs. Free entry and exit force profits to zero, with vacancies as the equilibrating mechanism. A nice feature of the model is that housing vacancies are socially useful in expanding the choice set of entering households, though there is no presumption that the market vacancy rate is socially optimal. Thin markets are modeled by assuming an idiosyncratic component to households' tastes over housing units.The positive and normative properties of the basic model, which assumes costless search, are investigated. Then the model is extended to treat costly search. Finally, directions in which the model could usefully be extended are discussed.     

Corporate Hedging in the Insurance Industry

Abstract

In this paper we investigate the extent to which insurance companies utilize financial derivatives contracts in the management of risks The data set we employ allows us to observe the universe of individual insurer transactions for a class of contracts, namely, those normally thought of as off-balance-sheet (OBS) We provide information on the number of insurers using various types of derivatives contracts and the volume of transactions in terms of notional amounts and the number of counterparties. Life insurers are most active in interest rate and foreign exchange derivatives, while property/casualty insurers tend to be active in trading equity option and foreign exchange contracts Using a multivariate probtt analysis, we explore the factors that potentially influence the existence of OBS activities. We also investigate questions relating to whether certain subsets of OBS transactions (for example, exchange traded) are related to such things as interest rate risk measures, organizational form and other characteristics that may discriminate between desired risk/return profiles across a cross-section of insurers. We find evidence consistent with the use of derivatives by insurers to hedge risks posed by guaranteed investment contracts (GICs), coilater-alized mortgage obligations (CMOs), and other sources of financial risk     

Insurance Rating Games: Strikes,Spares, and Bags

Carefully designed classroom activities and games can be used to increase student engagement, motivation, and learning. This article describes two games that have been used with students of risk management and insurance to help highlight the intricacies of insurance pricing. These two games, bowling insurance and bags insurance, help students experience the challenging nature of premium determination in risk transfer contracts and also connect the various actions taken by insurers during the insurance transaction.     

投资收益、经营效率和寿险企业市场绩效

中国寿险业的垄断型市场结构并没有造成垄断企业控制市场以获得超额利润的情况。本文选取中国人寿、泰康人寿、新华人寿三家企业1998年～2007年间的面板数据作为样本数据,分析了我国寿险公司绩效的影响因素,认为在中国寿险业日益激烈的市场竞争下,寿险企业的利润主要来自投资收益,经营效率高的企业虽然不能因为技术效率和规模效率而获得高利润,但是可以在竞争中占有更多的市场份额。     

Vertragsrechtliche Anforderungen an die Gestaltung von „Self-Tracking“-Tarifen in der Privatversicherung

The phenomenon of digitalization is reaching into our everyday lives, and “self-tracking” practices gain new adherents. Yet “self-tracking”, the practice of systematically recording information about one’s health and lifestyle by digital means, is not only an opportunity for the self-tracker to enhance his self-knowledge, but also for insurers to detail and personalize their risk assessment. The following article deals with “self-tracking”-insurance contracts, i.?e. insurance contracts that adapt to the personal risk data of the insured person and offer discounts for risk-aware policyholders. In these contracts, self-tracking data will either be used as a basis for premium calculation or as an element to calculate the bonuses payable as profit participation on with-profit policies. The article focuses on the control of standard terms of “self-tracking”-insurance contracts, but also covers the legal prerequisites under which the insurance contract may be combined with a separate self-tracking-contract between the self-tracker and a third party.     

Complete Versus Incomplete Insurance Contracts under Adverse Selection with Multiple Risks

This article extends the standard adverse-selection model for competitive insurance markets, which assumes a single source of risk, to the case where individuals are subject to multiple risks. We compare the following market situations—the case where insurers can offer comprehensive policies against all sources or risks (complete contracts) and the case where different risks are covered by separate policies (incomplete contracts). In the latter case, we consider whether the insurer of a particular risk has perfect information regarding an individual's coverage against other sources of risks. The analysis emphasizes the informational role of bundling in multidimensional screening. When the market situation allows bundling, it is shown that in equilibrium the low-risk type with respect to a particular source of risk does not necessarily obtain partial coverage against that particular risk.     

Convergence of Insurance and Financial Markets: Hybrid and Securitized Risk-Transfer Solutions

One of the most significant economic developments of the past decade has been the convergence of the financial services industry, particularly the capital markets and (re)insurance sectors. Convergence has been driven by the increase in the frequency and severity of catastrophic risk, market inefficiencies created by (re)insurance underwriting cycles, advances in computing and communications technologies, the emergence of enterprise risk management, and other factors. These developments have led to the development of hybrid insurance/financial instruments that blend elements of financial contracts with traditional reinsurance as well as new financial instruments patterned on asset-backed securities, futures, and options that provide direct access to capital markets. This article provides a survey and overview of the hybrid and pure financial markets instruments and provides new information on the pricing and returns on contracts such as industry loss warranties and Cat bonds.