Heterogeneous agents,the financial crisis and exchange rate predictability

We construct an empirical heterogeneous agent model which optimally combines forecasts from fundamentalist and chartist agents and evaluates its out-of-sample forecast performance using daily data covering an overall period from January 1999 to June 2014 for six of the most widely traded currencies. We use daily financial data such as level, slope and curvature yield curve factors, equity prices, as well as risk aversion and global trade activity measures in the fundamentalist agent's predictor set to obtain a proxy for the market's view on the state of the macroeconomy. Chartist agents rely upon standard momentum, moving average and relative strength index technical indicators in their predictor set. Individual agent specific forecasts are constructed using a flexible dynamic model averaging framework and are then aggregated into a model combined forecast using a forecast combination regression. We show that our empirical heterogeneous agent model produces statistically significant and economically sizeable forecast improvements over a random walk benchmark.     

Screening Talent for Task Assignment: Absolute or Percentile Thresholds?

Matching talents to tasks is an important part of job design. Organizations routinely use performance thresholds to group agents by talent. We see thresholds defined both in terms of an individual's own performance (absolute value) and in terms of peer performance (percentile). Intuition suggests a preference for percentile thresholds because the resulting rank-order statistic is sufficient to assess relative talent. Yet, in the context of a task assignment problem in which the objective is to match talent with task type (using two agents and two task types), we show that absolute thresholds can dominate percentile thresholds under either of two conditions. First, flexibility in task assignment tilts the balance toward absolute thresholds. Second, performance manipulation can adversely affect the inherent advantage of percentile thresholds because they motivate agents to invest relatively more in personally costly influence activities to cast their performance in a favorable light. We examine how these results hold up when there are countably large number of agents and discuss empirical implications.     

A financial CCAPM and economic inequalities

This paper considers a wealth heterogeneous multi-agent (MA) financial pricing CCAPM model. It is based on the following observations: (a) A distinction between what agents are willing to pay for consumption and what they actually pay. The former is a function of a number of factors including the agent’s wealth and risk preferences and the latter is a function of all other agents’ aggregate consumption or equivalently, their wealth committed to consumption. (b) Unlike traditional pricing models that define a representative agent underlying the pricing model, this paper assumes that each agent is in fact ‘Cournot-gaming’ a market defined by all other agents. This results in a decomposition of an n-agents game into n games of two agents, one a specific agent and the other a synthetic agent (a proxy for all other agents), on the basis of which an equilibrium consumption price solution is defined. The paper’s essential results are twofold. First, a Martingale pricing model is defined for each individual agent expressing the consumer willingness to pay (his utility price) and the market price—the price that all agents pay for consumption. In this sense, price is unique defined by each agent’s ‘Cournot game’ Agents’ consumption are then adjusted accordingly to meet the market price. Second, the pricing model defined is shown to account for agents wealth distribution pointing out that all agents valuations are a function of their and others’ wealth, the information they have about each other and other factors which are discussed in the text. When an agent has no wealth or cannot affect the market price of consumption, then this pricing model is reduced to the standard CCAPM model while any agent with an appreciable wealth compared to other agents, is shown to value returns (and thus future consumption) less than wealth-poor agents. As a result, this paper will argue that even in a financial market with an infinite number of agents, if there are some agents that are large enough to affect the market price by their decisions, such agents have an arbitrage advantage over the poorer agents. The financial CCAPM MA pricing model has a number of implications, some of which are considered in this paper. Finally, some simple examples are considered to highlight the applicability of this paper to specific financial issues.     

Asset pricing with heterogeneous beliefs and relative performance

We propose an equilibrium asset pricing model in which agents with heterogeneous beliefs care about relative performance. We find that the concern with relative performance leads agents to trade more similarly, a development that has two effects. First, similar trading directly decreases volatility. Second, similar trading decreases the impact of dominant agents. The second effect dominates the first when agents expect large differences between their final performances, and vice versa when agents expect small differences between their final performances. Compared with the case in which agents are unconcerned about relative performance, the stock return volatility is higher when the second effect dominates, and lower when the first effect dominates. This paper also demonstrates that the concern about relative performance influences investors’ holdings, stock prices and risk premia.     

Heterogeneity of agents and exchange rate dynamics: Evidence from the EMS

We develop and estimate a dynamic heterogeneous agent model for the EMS period. Our empirical results suggest that the existence of heterogeneous interacting agents is indeed a possible explanation for the dynamics of exchange rates during the EMS. We find strong evidence of heterogeneous boundedly rational beliefs, and the fact that agents switch between these beliefs. Moreover, we show that the dynamic heterogeneous agent model outperforms the random walk and the static heterogeneous agents’ model in out-of-sample forecasting in the large majority of country-horizon combinations.     

Die Zufriedenheit von Versicherungsvertretern als unternehmerische Zielgröße

This paper deals with the Job satisfaction of exclusive agents focusing on its connection with customer loyalty. Although a relationship between these two components is quite feasible, there is a lack of explicit research eviden-ce. Therefore the study examines the direct and indirect relationships between the two components differentiated. First of all, it is examined, why and how exclusive agents contribute to competitive advantages of an insurance Company. Additionally, the determinants of customer loyalty in the insurance industry and the dimensions of exclusive agents job satisfaction are worked out. On this basis, a framework is proposed which integrates approaches from organizational psychology and marketing to job/dealer satisfaction as well as to customer loyalty. The empirical results of a study measuring exclusive agent job satisfaction complete the findings of the analysis, which provide evidence that exclusive agent satisfaction and customer loyalty have to be regarded as complementary aims of an insurance Company due to the certain interactions between them. Lastly, management implications are shown.     

The influence of change agents' behavioral intention on the usage of the activity based costing/management system and firm performance: The perspective of unified theory of acceptance and use of technology

This study adopts the viewpoint of the Unified Theory of Acceptance and Use of Technology (UTAUT) model to examine the change agents' behavioral intentions in the implementation of an activity based costing/management (ABC/M) system. ABC/M is an important management system that emphasizes the allocation of overhead costs on the basis of cost drivers, in order to provide relevant information for improved decision-making. A change agent is a person chosen to cause organizational change. Senior managers and often chief executives usually play the role that implements change. The behavioral intentions have been identified as a proactive attitude and action for promoting the ABC/M system in this study. Since there is little evidence of ABC/M adoption outside the United States and European countries, this research used Taiwanese companies as the sample. Questionnaires were used to investigate the factors influencing change agents' behavioral intentions to promote ABC/M systems and the type of facilitating conditions that affected the extent of usage of ABC/M systems. The questionnaires were carried out through the perspective of user acceptance of information technology (IT). Furthermore, the aim of this paper is also to explore whether use of the ABC/M system will produce an improved effect on performance. The empirical results from 100 valid responses collected indicate that performance expectancy and social influence directly affect change agents' behavioral intentions. Both change agents' behavioral intentions and facilitation conditions are important constructs that affect the extent of usage of ABC/M systems. The extent of ABC/M usage is also significantly associated with relative financial and non-financial performance. The results demonstrate that the adaptive UTAUT model is applicable for measuring change agents' behavioral intentions in current implementations of ABC/M systems. The study also reveals the positive effect of change agents on the performance of ABC/M systems.     

The role of budgeting in eliminating tacit collusion

While accounting textbooks emphasize the roles of budgeting in controlling and coordinating agents' activities, the principal-agent literature has focused primarily on the control aspect. Recent papers have studied the coordination aspect of budgeting in settings in which the agents are technologically dependent (sequential or joint production is considered). In this article, we develop a role for budgeting in coordination, despite the agents being technologically independent (individual production is considered). In our model, the principal uses relative performance evaluation to extract information rents from the agents. However, the use of relative performance evaluation results in a multiple equilibria (tacit collusion) problem. The value of budgeting procedures is derived from their ability to coordinate the agents to arrive at the right equilibrium.     

Conflicts between principals and agents: evidence from residential brokerage

When a homeowner uses an agent to sell his property, he may have less information than his agent and be disadvantaged in price setting and negotiating. This study examines whether the percentage commission structure in real estate brokerage creates agency problems. We investigate whether agents are able to use their information advantage to either sell their own property faster or for a higher price than their clients’ properties. The empirical results confirm our theoretical predictions of agency problems, as we find that agent-owned houses sell no faster than client-owned houses, but they do sell at a price premium of approximately 4.5%.     

The Ex Post Performance of Four Portfolio Selection Algorithms

This paper explores the ex post performance of four widely cited (and sometimes applied) normative portfolio selection models. Each is supposed to solve the same portfolio selection problem relative to the same mean-variance efficiency criteria. It has been shown elsewhere, and this paper confirms, that the models result in vastly different ex ante stock selection strategies. However, the acid test of normative theory is ex post performance relative to a set of efficiency criteria or some other standard. The empirical results reported here show that, with one exception, the ex post performance of the models is consistent with the same mean-variance efficiency criteria, and, over a predictable range of outcomes, consistently outperform the index portfolio based on Standard & Poor's 500 Stock Index.     

Relational contracting and endogenous formation of teamwork

We study a relational contracting model with two agents where each agent faces multiple tasks: effort toward the agent's own project and helping effort toward another agent's project. We show that the optimal task structure is either specialization without help or teamwork with a substantial amount of help: teamwork with a small amount of help is never optimal. Specialization with high‐powered incentives can be implemented by relative performance evaluation. However, under teamwork, the evaluation scheme must be substantially different to overcome the multitasking problem. Consequently, a small amount of help is dominated by specialization with high powered incentives.     

非对称信息下保险代理人激励机制分析

当前我国保险代理人中存在大量的违规操作行为,本文运用霍姆斯特姆和米尔格罗姆的多项任务委托--代理模型对保险代理人的佣金制度进行深入剖析,得出对保险代理人的薪酬激励不应单纯地重视业务数量,而应促其重视业务质量,最后给出相关激励机制建议.     

MUTUAL FUND DAILY CONDITIONAL PERFORMANCE

The empirical finance literature reveals that conditional models estimated with monthly data generally improve fund performance. Furthermore, it has been shown that using daily instead of monthly returns in an unconditional framework increases the proportion of abnormal performances relative to timing. In this article, we study conditional performance estimated with daily data in a bivariate generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (GARCH) framework. Our daily conditional alphas and global performances with GARCH are significantly better than those estimated with other parametrizations and they persist over time. Finally, the proportion of abnormal timing performances diminishes significantly when conditional parametrizations are used.     

Agent‐based stochastic production lines design

An artificial agent‐based approach has been developed to improve the design and control of stochastic production lines. Genetic algorithms have been used as the premier agents learning mechanism. We benchmark our agent‐based approach with other well‐studied approaches such as infinitesimal perturbation analysis and mean‐value analysis methods. The performances of our agents are comparable with other approaches; in some cases, the agent‐based approach discovers even better solutions than the so‐called ‘optimal’ solutions by other approaches. The paper is one of the series of our work on multi‐agent intelligent enterprise modeling, and it seves as one of the most fundamental building blocks for other related works. © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The effect of financial repression and enforcement on entrepreneurship and economic development

A general equilibrium model with heterogeneous agents (with respect to wealth and ability) shows that differences across countries in intermediation costs and enforcement generate differences in occupational choice, firm size, credit, output and income inequality. Counterfactual experiments are performed for Latin American, European, transition and high growth Asian countries, with empirical estimates of each country's financial frictions and United States values for all other parameters. The results isolate the quantitative effect of these financial frictions in explaining the performance gap between each country and the United States, and depend critically on whether a general equilibrium factor price effect is operative.     

What is the impact of wealth shocks on asset allocation?

I test the assumption of constant relative risk aversion using U.S. macroeconomic data and analyse the role of wealth shocks in generating transitory changes in asset portfolio composition. I show that the risky asset share exhibits cyclical behavior and it is significantly (and positively) affected by unexpected variation in wealth. Therefore, the empirical evidence suggests that risk aversion is counter-cyclical. I also find that the portfolio share of housing wealth falls when the agent is faced with a positive wealth shock, i.e. housing is a hedge against unfavorable wealth fluctuations. Finally, considering a variety of wealth definitions, the results show that: (i) wealth effects are stronger for direct holdings of risky assets than for indirect holdings, which highlights that investors do not typically trade some assets such as pension or mutual funds; (ii) although significant, wealth effects on asset allocation are mainly temporary as agents quickly rebalance the asset portfolio composition (i.e. there is weak evidence of inertia or slow adjustment in asset allocation); and (iii) changes in expected returns partially explain the variation in risky asset allocation.     

相对业绩差距评估对基金经理风险承担的激励研究

基金经理在选择投资组合风险时,不仅会考虑基金的业绩排名,同时会考虑基金业绩之间的差距,由此提出了业绩差距排名,并提出了新的实证方法,即线性回归的方法来研究业绩差距排名对基金经理风险承担的影响,同时验证了BHS结论在中国基金市场中的适用性。结果表明BHS结论在中国基金市场中是不成立的,同时表明在中国基金市场中基金经理具有相对业绩排名目标,但此相对业绩排名是本文中所提出的业绩差距排名,此结论可以为监管部门规范基金投资行为以及为投资者选择基金提供参考。     

CEO turnover in a competitive assignment framework

There is widespread concern about whether Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) are appropriately punished for poor performance. While CEOs are more likely to be forced out if their performance is poor relative to the industry average, overall industry performance also matters. This seems puzzling if termination is disciplinary, however, we show that both absolute and relative performance-driven turnover can be natural and efficient outcomes in a competitive assignment model in which CEOs and firms form matches based on multiple characteristics. The model also has new predictions about replacement managers' equilibrium pay and performance. We document CEO turnover events during 1992–2006 and provide empirical support for our model.     

Subjective Performance Indicators and Discretionary Bonus Pools

Key indicators of managerial performance are frequently subjective, that is, they are difficult to specify and/or verify for contracting purposes. When a principal must rely on subjective information to create incentives for a group of agents, discretionary bonus pools are shown to be optimal mechanisms. Despite their optimality, however, discretionary bonus pools entail an additional agency cost relative to the benchmark of optimal contracts based on objective and verifiable information. Our analysis identifies circumstances under which this additional agency cost is small, for example, the subjective information signals are precise, or the number of agents participating in the bonus pool increases. When incentive schemes can be based on both objective and subjective performance indicators, the relative weights to be placed on alternative signals are shown to differ from the ones predicted by models with objective signals only. We also demonstrate that correlation in measurement errors has a different impact on the structure of optimal incentive schemes when the performance indicators are merely subjective.     

Tax incentives for inefficient executive pay and reward for luck

I study the economic consequences of tax deductibility limits on salaries for the design of incentive contracts. The analysis is based on an agency model in which the firm’s cash flow is a function of the agent’s effort and an observable random factor beyond the agent’s control. According to my analysis, limiting the tax deductibility of fixed wages has two consequences. The principal rewards the agent on the basis of the observable random factor and adjusts the amount of performance-based pay in the optimal incentive contract. The new contract can have weaker or stronger work incentives than without the tax. The theoretical findings have implications for empirical compensation research. First, the analysis shows that reward for luck can be the optimal response to recent tax law changes, whereas earlier empirical literature has attributed this phenomenon to managerial entrenchment. Second, I demonstrate that a simple regression analysis that fails to control for separable measures of luck is likely to find an increased pay for performance sensitivity as a response to the introduction of tax deductibility limits on salaries even if the pay for performance sensitivity has actually declined.