Relationship between tax compliance internationally and selected determinants of tax morale

Tax compliance has been studied by analyzing the individual decision of a representative person between planning and evading taxes. A neglected aspect of tax compliance is the impact of a social contract on tax morale. Such implicit contract between the individual and the state guaranteeing a high level of economic freedom, effective competition laws, an important equity market and high moral norms, is hypothesized to have a positive impact on tax compliance. In this paper, empirical evidence based on data from 30 countries indicate that tax compliance internationally is positively related to the level of economic freedom, the level of importance of the equity market and the effectiveness of competition laws and high moral norms.     

Political economy of prudent budgetary policy

The principles of tax smoothing and public debt management with stochastic shocks to future national income are extended for prudence. A prudent government deliberately underestimates future national income and the tax base, especially if the variance and persistence of shocks hitting the tax base are large and the tax rate is high. As a precaution the tax rate is thus set higher and public spending lower to build precautionary buffers. This leads to gradual reductions in debt and debt service over time and thus, depending on political preferences, cuts in taxes or increases in public spending. Prudence offsets the intertemporal spending, tax and debt biases resulting from common-pool distortions. Appointing a strong finance minister with as many voting rights as the spending ministers combined ensures that the intratemporal common-pool distortions of an excessively large public sector are eliminated. A strong and prudent minister of finance can thus offset the impatient profligacy of squabbling spending ministers. However, if voters care about outcomes on election eve, finance ministers are tempted to build excessive precautionary buffers early on to dish out tax cuts and boost spending on election eve. Too much prudence may thus be abused for short-run electoral gains.     

司法廉洁、安全与税收道德——以OECD国家为例

税收道德衡量的是纳税人的态度,而公众价值观调查为我们度量税收道德提供了一个独特的视角,进而能够使税收道德成为一个因变量来方便我们进行分析.通过对OECD国家的研究和分析,结果表明,税收道德与税收遵从之间正相关,而司法廉洁、安全与税收道德之间也存在显著的正相关.即腐败行为将严重损害公民的税收道德,随着严重犯罪的增加,公民的税收道德随之下降.     

Fiscal Decentralisation and Local Economic Growth: Evidence from a Fiscal Reform in China

This paper uses a fiscal decentralisation reform in China – namely, the province‐managing‐county (PMC) reform – to examine the effects of fiscal decentralisation on local economic growth. The PMC reform abolished the subordinate fiscal relationship between prefectures and counties and transferred much of the tax and spending authority from the prefecture to the county level. Exploiting a county‐level panel data set over 2001–11, we find that the reform has led to a significant increase in the GDP growth rate. The effect is considerably more pronounced in regions with superior initial institutional quality. We also identify channels: the PMC reform induced county governments to exert lower tax burdens on firms and increase spending on infrastructure construction.     

Will the real R&D employees please stand up? Effects of tax breaks on firm-level outcomes

This paper evaluates the effect of tax incentives for research and development (R&D) on R&D spending and employment of R&D staff in a quasi-experimental setting. To do this, I exploit an exogenous reform in UK R&D tax policy, which changed the definition of an SME from firms with fewer than 250 employees to those with fewer than 500 employees. I use the UK Business Enterprise Research and Development Survey (BERD), for which companies do not have an incentive to relabel their ordinary employees or spending as R&D. I find that R&D tax incentives help to increase R&D spending at the company level; this translates to a user cost elasticity between ?0.88 and ?1.18. Further, the additional R&D generated through the tax relief can be attributed entirely to an increase in the number of R&D employees in the companies’ workforce. Together, these results challenge a common narrative on the role of R&D tax incentives.     

Political spending,related voluntary disclosure,and the cost of public debt

Following the Supreme Court decision in the Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission case of 2010, which removed restrictions in relation to firms’ political spending, and building on the growing debate over whether voluntary political spending disclosure (VPSD) provides valuable information, we examine the effect of political spending on the cost of public debt and the role of VPSD on this effect. Based on a measure of VPSD that became available in 2012 and a large dataset on US firms’ actual political spending, manually extracted from different filings, we provide novel evidence that, in the post-Supreme Court decision period, political spending increases the cost of public debt. This is consistent with the uncertainty associated with political spending. Moreover, we find that the level of voluntary disclosure weakens the positive association between political spending and the cost of public debt. These results hold across multiple specifications as well as when we use a sudden release of firms’ political spending as an exogenous shock to political spending.     

财政竞争、地方政府政策选择与经济增长——基于中国省际面板数据的实证研究

分税制背景下财政分权体制使得地方政府之间存在着激烈的财政竞争,其典型特征表现为税负、公共投入支出和公共服务支出三种政策工具之间的策略互动,从而影响各地区的经济增长。基于1997～2009年中国省级面板数据,通过估计交互项系数的符号,结果发现:地方政府的三种政策工具是相辅相成的;交互项的作用也存在着地区的差异;税负、公共服务支出和公共投入支出对经济增长有着不同的边际影响。     

Taxation without representation: local fiscal response to intergovernmental transfers in China

This paper studies the effects of intergovernmental transfers on local public spending in China, an authoritarian country where local politicians are not largely accountable to residents. The identification exploits a discontinuity from the central government’s designation of National Poor Counties. We find that additional transfers to county governments increase local public spending one-for-one. We further confirm that counties receiving additional transfers do not reduce the effective tax burden borne by firms. The results echo the empirical anomaly of the flypaper effect found in developed economies under democratic governments.     

Fiscal policy with banks and financial frictions

We assess the role of banks to the transmission of optimal and exogenous changes in fiscal policy to the economy. We built-up a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with patient and impatient agents, banks and a government to find that banks and their associated capital-adequacy constraint mitigate the negative spill-over effects to the economy from higher taxes. Specifically, we confirm that labour income tax is the most distortionary fiscal instrument. The optimal choice of a housing tax is the most favorable funding source to a temporary increase in public spending. The combination of housing and labour taxes is the most preferred tax bundle to be optimally chosen under negative output shocks. Moreover, a permanent increase in housing tax is beneficial if it is welfare enhancing and the existence of banks benefits mainly impatient households under permanently higher consumption taxes. Finally, these results remain robust to various robustness checks.     

我国最优宏观税负水平的实证分析及政策选择

以巴罗、斯库利模型为分析框架,通过相关分析和多元回归分析,进一步研究我国的宏观税负问题。实证研究结果表明：政府通过征税把资源从私人部门转移到公共部门使用的过程中,政府征税对经济产生的负面影响并没有被政府有效地使用税收对经济产生的正效应所抵消,而政府支出本身也对经济产生了负面的影响。从这个角度判断,我国宏观税负水平不是最优的。我国应该进一步完善相关的政策,调整财政体制,进行相应的税收改革。     

Private Equity and Local Public Finances

We study the economic impact of private equity (PE) investments on local governments, which are important corporate stakeholders. Examining over 11,000 deals and private firm data in Europe, we document that target firms' effective tax rates and total tax expenses decrease by 15% and 13% after PE deals. At the same time, target firms expand their capital expenditures and firm boundaries, but do not increase employment. Using administrative data on the public finances of German municipalities and exploiting the geographical and time-series variation in PE deals, we document that PE activity is negatively associated with local governments' tax revenues and spending. This result is likely driven by reduced tax payments of PE portfolio firms, accompanied by only modest positive spillovers of PE investments on regional economic growth. Collectively, our findings suggest that corporate tax efficiency serves as a cost-cutting channel in the PE sector and constrains the finances of local governments.     

Determinants of tax evasion: A cross-country investigation

The purpose of this study is to expand on the work of Riahi-Belkaoiu [Riahi-Belkaoiu, A. (2004). Relationship between tax compliance internationally and selected determinants of tax morale. Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation, 13, 135-143] and systematically investigate, on a cross-country basis, many of the key determinants of tax evasion identified by Jackson and Milliron [Jackson, B. R., & Milliron, V. C. (1986). Tax compliance research: findings, problems and prospects. Journal of Accounting Literature, 5, 125-165]. Based on data for 45 countries, the results of the OLS regression analysis show that non-economic determinants have the strongest impact on tax evasion. Specifically, complexity is the most important determinant of tax evasion. Other important determinants of tax evasion are education, income source, fairness and tax morale. Overall, the regression results indicate that the lower the level of complexity and the higher the level of general education, services income source, fairness and tax morale, the lower is the level of tax evasion across countries. These findings remain robust to a broad range of cross-country control variables, an alternative tax evasion measure and various interactions.     

Long‐Term Effects of Fiscal Policy on the Size and Distribution of the Pie in the UK*

This paper provides a joint analysis of the output and distributional long‐term effects of various fiscal policies in the UK, using a vector autoregression (VAR) approach. Our findings suggest that the long‐term impact on GDP of increasing public spending and taxes is negative, and especially strong in the case of current expenditure. We also find significant distributional effects associated with fiscal policies, indicating that an increase in public spending reduces inequality while a rise in indirect taxes increases income inequality.     

Public capital, public pension, and growth

This paper constructs an endogenous growth model with overlapping generations, whose engine of economic growth is productive public capital. We investigate a public policy under which the government allocates tax revenue between investment in public capital accumulation and public pension provision. We show that increasing the share of spending on public pensions always reduces economic growth. However, we show numerically that public pension provision improves social welfare and there exists an optimal share of spending on public pension provision unless the value of the time discount factor of the government is sufficiently high. Moreover, we show that in an economy facing an aging population, an increase in social security provision for the old rather than an increase in public investment can be preferable from the viewpoint of social welfare.     

THE EFFECT OF TAX PREFERENCES ON HEALTH SPENDING

In this paper, we estimate the effect of the tax preference for health insurance on health care spending using data from the Medical Expenditure Panel Surveys from 1996-2005. We use the fact that Social Security taxes are only levied on earnings below a statutory threshold to identify the impact of the tax preference. Because employer-sponsored health insurance premiums are excluded from Social Security payroll taxes, workers who earn just below the Social Security tax threshold receive a larger tax preference for health insurance than workers who earn just above it. We find a significant effect of the tax preference, consistent with previous research.     

Re-assessing the merits of measuring tax evasion through business surveys: an application of the crosswise model

Self-assessments by respondents in surveys are often the only available measure of tax evasion in developing countries at the microeconomic level. However, they suffer from the reluctance of respondents to reveal their own illicit behavior. This paper evaluates whether this weakness of self-assessments can at least partially be overcome through a novel questioning method, the crosswise model, which allows estimating the prevalence of tax evasion, but not identifying whether the individual respondent engages in tax evasion or not. Using evidence from Serbia, we show that crosswise model-based estimates of the share of firms which significantly underreport sales exceed those obtained from conventional methods by around 10 % points or more. With respect to wage underreporting to evade payroll tax and social security contributions, we do not find differences. These results appear to be robust to a number of modifications, and we explore various potential causes that lead to these results.     

Government R&D spending,fiscal instruments and corporate technological innovation

Using panel data from 242 cities in China, we examine the impact of government research and development (R&D) spending on corporate technological innovation. We find that listed firms located in cities with higher government R&D expenditures are more innovative than firms in other cities. Further, the positive effect of government R&D spending depends on fiscal instruments and factor allocation. Through subsidies and tax incentives, government R&D spending enhances firm innovation by alleviating financing constraints, improving employee creativity and ensuring efficient operations. We demonstrate that subsidies are more effective than taxes in spurring corporate technological innovation. We also show that the impact of government R&D spending is stronger for state-owned and high-tech enterprises than for other enterprises. Overall, our findings suggest that government R&D spending can substantially improve corporate technological innovation through fiscal instruments.     

What is the After‐Tax Price of R&D? An Interstate Comparison*

As of 2005, 31 US states offered corporate income tax credits on research and development (R&D) expenses in order to encourage more in‐state innovation activities. Empirical questions about the efficacy of such tax breaks at the state level persist, in part because the complexity of the tax laws means that simple credit‐rate comparisons across states do not fully capture the differential variation in effective after‐tax price incentives firms face in choosing where to locate R&D activities. We are unaware of any research analysing and comparing the effective prices of R&D faced by firms, across all US states and utilising micro‐level data. Using data extracted from detailed reading of individual firms' 10‐K and S‐1 filings and of state‐level tax credit rules, we estimate the effective after‐tax price of basic and qualified research expenditure each firm would have faced in each of the 50 states had they been located there. Our methodology simulates the effective tax price of each firm's marginal dollar of research expenditure, assuming the firm chose to move all of its R&D operations to each of the 49 other states. Through Monte Carlo techniques, we consider the sensitivity of our interstate comparative results to several modelling assumptions. We find significant variation in after‐tax R&D prices across states with quite different R&D tax laws. Prices range from $0.176 to $0.520 on a marginal dollar of R&D in Virginia and Washington State, respectively. We also find that the interstate variability is generally more important – indeed, much wider than we had anticipated before investigating state‐by‐state regulations – than the inter‐firm variability within states.     

Why Do Countries Mandate Accrual Accounting for Tax Purposes?

This study investigates why countries mandate accruals in the definition of corporate taxable income. Accruals alleviate timing and matching problems in cash flows, which smoothes taxable income and thus better aligns it with underlying economic performance. These accrual properties can be desirable in the tax setting as tax authorities seek more predictable corporate tax revenues. However, they can also make tax revenues procyclical by increasing the correlation between aggregate corporate tax revenues and aggregate economic activity. We argue that accruals shape the distribution of corporate tax revenues, which leads regulators to incorporate accruals into the definition of taxable income to balance the portfolio of government revenues and expenditures. Using a sample of 26 OECD countries, we find support for several theoretically motivated factors explaining the use of accruals in tax codes. We first provide evidence that corporate tax revenues are less volatile in high accrual countries, but high accrual countries collect relatively higher (lower) tax revenues when the corporate sector grows (contracts). Critically, we then show that accruals and smoother tax revenues are favored by countries with higher levels of government spending on public services and uncertain future expenditures, while countries with procyclical other tax collections favor cash rules and lower procyclicality of corporate tax revenues.     

Endogenous differential mortality,non-contractible effort and non-linear taxation

This paper studies a problem of non-linear taxation when individuals have different longevities resulting from a non-monetary effort (like exercising). We first present the laissez-faire and the first best. Like Becker and Philipson (J. Polit. Econ. 106(3):551–573, 1998), we find that the laissez-faire level of effort is too high compared with the first best, because individuals do not internalize the impact of survival on the return of their savings. We also claim that because of its non-monetary form, effort is not contractible. That is why we modify our framework and assume, for the rest of the paper, that effort is determined by the individual while the social planner only allocates consumptions. It turns out that, under full information, a tax on the return of annuitized savings is desirable for both types. This tax is higher for the low-survival individual. Under asymmetric information, the low-survival individual still faces a tax while the high-survival individual might now face a positive or negative tax on annuities. Interestingly, our results depend on the value of life.