Regulations,earnings management,and post-IPO performance: The Chinese evidence

In this study, we examine whether government regulatory initiatives in China involving IPO by SOEs may have contributed to opportunistic behaviors by the issuer. We focus on two sets of IPO regulations issued between January 1, 1996 and February 11, 1999: pricing regulations, which stipulate that IPO prices be a function of accounting performance, and penalty regulations, which penalize IPO firms for overly optimistic forecasts. We find that IPO firms that report better pricing-period accounting performance have larger declines in post-IPO profitability, lower first-day stock returns and worse long-run post-IPO stock performance. Furthermore, IPO firms that make overoptimistic forecasts also have lower first-day returns and worse post-IPO stock performance. Using non-core earnings as the proxy for earnings management, we document some evidence that IPO firms that report higher pricing-period accounting performance have engaged in more income-increasing earnings management. Hence, pricing regulations may have induced IPO firms to inflate pricing-period earnings and affect the post-IPO performance negatively. On the other hand, penalty regulations have deterred IPO firms from making overoptimistic earnings forecast and therefore have a positive impact on the behavior of IPO firms.     

Information Uncertainty,Earnings Management,and Long‐run Stock Performance Following Initial Public Offerings

We examine how information uncertainty surrounding IPO (initial public offering) firms influences earnings management and long‐run stock performance. For low‐information‐uncertainty issuers, at‐issue earnings’ management is positively related to subsequent unmanaged earnings and has no relationship to market reaction to earnings announcement and long‐run stock performance following the offering. For high‐information‐uncertainty issuers, however, at‐issue earnings’ management is unrelated to subsequent unmanaged earnings and negatively related to market reaction to earnings announcement and long‐run stock performance following the offer. The evidence suggests that, on average, managers in low‐information‐uncertainty firms tend to engage in earnings’ management for informative purposes, while managers in high‐information‐uncertainty firms engage in earnings’ management for opportunistic purposes.     

PROFITABILITY, EARNINGS ANNOUNCEMENT TIME LAGS, AND STOCK PRICES

This research addresses (1) whether firms with lower (hgher) than expected earnings fgures released those figures to the public later (earlier) than expected and (2) whether there is a reaction by the capital market to the timing of the earnings announcement. The results indicate that later than expected earnings announcements are likely to contain worse news than early announcements. Also the stock returns of late reporting firms appear to be lower than that of early reporting firms in the days surrounding the earnings announcement date.     

THE RELATION AMONG DIVIDEND POLICY,FIRM SIZE,AND THE INFORMATION CONTENT OF EARNINGS ANNOUNCEMENTS

In this paper we investigate the role of dividends in explaining the size effect. The previous literature concludes that before the firm's earnings announcement, small firm stock prices impound less information than large firm stock prices. This size effect is evidenced by the greater market reaction to small firm earnings announcements than to large firm earnings announcements. We find that if the dividend announcement precedes the earnings announcement, no size effect exists. The implication is that the information conveyed by dividend announcements includes the information conveyed to investors in large firms by other information sources. However, if the firm does not pay dividends or if the firm's earnings announcement precedes its dividend announcement, the size effect exists. The implication is that dividends do not completely explain the size effect. That is, there are information sources other than dividends that are exclusively available to investors in large firms, and the information provided by these sources is reflected in the stock price of large firms before the earnings announcement.     

Risk,Mispricing, and Value Investing

We evaluate the stock return performance of a modified version of the book-to-market strategy and its implications for market efficiency. If the previously documented superior stock return of the book-to-market strategy represents mispricing, its performance should be improved by excluding fairly valued firms with extreme book-to-market ratios. To attain this, we classify stocks as value or glamour on book-to-market ratios and accounting accruals jointly. This joint classification is likely to exclude stocks with extreme book-to-market ratios due to mismeasured accounting book values reflecting limitations underlying the accounting system. Using both 12-month buy-and-hold returns and earnings announcement returns, our results show that this joint classification generates substantially higher portfolio returns in the post-portfolio-formation year than the book-to-market classification alone with no evidence of increased risk. In addition, this superior stock return performance is more pronounced among firms held primarily by small (unsophisticated) investors and followed less closely by market participants (stock price <$10). Finally, and most importantly, financial analysts are overly optimistic (pessimistic) about earnings of glamour (value) stock, and for a subset of firms identified as overvalued by our strategy, the earnings announcement raw return, as well as abnormal return, is negative. These last results are particularly important because it is hard to envision a model consistent with rational investors holding risky stocks with predictable negative raw returns for a long period of time rather than holding fT-bills and with financial analysts systematically overestimating the earnings of these stocks while underestimating earnings of stocks that outperform the stock market.     

Unsophisticated Arbitrageurs and Market Efficiency: Overreacting to a History of Underreaction?

Prior research has documented that arbitrage activity significantly reduces or eliminates stock market anomalies. However, if anomalies arise due to unsophisticated investors’ behavioral biases, then these same biases can also apply to unsophisticated arbitrageurs and thereby disrupt the arbitrage process. Consistent with a disruption in the arbitrage process for the post‐earnings announcement drift anomaly, I document that the historically positive autocorrelation in firms’ earnings announcement news has become significantly negative for firms with active exchange‐traded options. For these easy‐to‐arbitrage firms, the firms in the highest decile of prior earnings announcement abnormal return (prior earnings surprise), on average, underperform the firms in the lowest decile by 1.59% (1.43%) at their next earnings announcement. Additional analyses are consistent with investors learning about the post‐earnings announcement drift anomaly and overcompensating. This study suggests that unsophisticated attempts to profit from a well‐known anomaly can significantly reverse a previously documented stock return pattern.     

Does the media help or hurt retail investors during the IPO quiet period?

We examine how the media influences retail trade and market returns during the “quiet period” that follows a firm's IPO. We find that more media coverage during this period is associated with more purchases by retail investors and that such purchases are attention-driven, rather than information-based. Further, these retail trades are negatively associated with stock returns at the firm's first earnings announcement post-IPO. Our results suggest that media coverage, combined with market frictions that limit price efficiency in the post-IPO period, leads to worse investing outcomes for retail investors.     

Effects of early bond refundings: An empirical investigation of security returns

This paper examines bond-for-bond refundings and their effects on stock returns. Refundings can affect the reported income, cash flows (including taxes), dividend constraints and financial ratios of firms. For a sample of 36 NYSE and ASE firms that performed refundings between 1971 and 1980, stock returns were significantly higher than predicted (only) around the release of the quarterly earnings announcement that included the refunding's effects. While the refundings were found to have many characteristics that were hypothesized to benefit shareholders, only the change in earnings per share was found to be associated with the prediction errors. Further, there appears to be no refunding-related information released in the quarterly earnings announcement, except for the refunding gain. These results imply that a portfolio of refunding firms can be created in advance of the quarterly earnings announcement that will generate abnormal returns around the earnings announcement. Because trading rules are inconsistent with the concept of an efficient capital market, these results constitute an anomaly.     

The Roles of Performance Measures and Monitoring in Annual Governance Decisions in Entrepreneurial Firms

This paper analyzes annual corporate governance decisions at firms making initial public offerings (IPOs) of common stock between 1996 and 1999. Our objective is to examine relations between firms' corporate governance decisions and the informativeness of available measures of managerial performance. We consider financial measures such as earnings and stock return, as well as direct monitoring. We collect a sample of IPO firms from the manufacturing, Internet, and technology (non-Internet) industries, and examine how the use of various performance measures in annual compensation grants and turnover decisions varies with the information environment of the firm and with the extent of venture capital influence. Consistent with prior research that finds earnings are of limited usefulness in firm valuation for Internet firms, we find Internet firms place less importance on earnings and greater importance on stock returns in determining compensation grants than do non-Internet firms. We also find that compensation grants of firms with little or no venture capital influence display significantly stronger association with accounting and stock performance measures than those of firms with more intense monitoring by venture capitalists. This result is consistent with direct monitoring and the use of explicit performance measures acting as substitute governance mechanisms.     

AN ANALYSIS OF SHAREHOLDER REACTION TO DIVIDEND CUTS AND OMISSIONS

In this paper the proposition is tested that stock market reaction to a dividend change is a function of its information content. A multiple regression model is formulated to identify the factors that contribute significantly to the capital loss suffered by shareholders when firms decide to cut/omit dividends. Results indicate that, in conformity with the information content hypothesis, the announcement period capital loss induced by a dividend deduction significantly depends on the percentage change in dividends, the size and risk of the firm, and the price performance of the firm's stock in the immediately preceding period. The results further reveal that (1) simultaneous announcements of poor earnings cause larger capital losses; (2) prior announcements of loss/lower earnings, strikes, etc. attenuate the negative impact of dividend cuts; (3) managerial reassurances that the dividend reduction is growth-motivated produces a weakly favorable effect, and (4) institution of stock dividends concurrently with the dividend cut significantly reduces the negative valuation effect. It is concluded from the evidence that stock market reaction to managerial signals is a function of the perceived costs associated with these signals.     

Information transfer and conference calls

A long-standing literature documents intra-industry capital market co-movements around earnings releases, yet the dynamics of these information transfers remain largely unexplored. We provide evidence on both the sources and channels of information transfers by separating two distinct events within the reporting window using intra-day data and by exploring potential mechanisms of information flows. We document that the co-movement of absolute and signed stock returns over the conference call windows of announcing firms and their industry peers are statistically and economically larger than the co-movement over the corresponding earnings announcement windows. Turning to mechanisms, we find that shared analyst coverage, coverage by analysts providing industry recommendations, shared institutional ownership, and joint financial media mentions are each individually and incrementally associated with higher rate of information transfer over both the earnings announcement and conference call windows. Textual analyses reveal that peer mentions and macroeconomic discussions both significantly contribute to conference call information transfers.     

Financial Analysts' Earnings Forecast Dispersion and Intraday Stock Price Variability Around Quarterly Earnings Announcements

This study investigates the relationship between the dispersion of analysts' earnings forecasts and stock price variability around quarterly earnings announcements. Consistent with theoretical predictions, the empirical analysis shows that stock price variability at the time of earnings announcements is positively related to the degree of analysts' predisclosure earnings forecast dispersion. Additionally, firms with high levels of forecast dispersion exhibit significant increases in price variability for longer periods prior to and following earnings announcements than do firms with low levels of forecast dispersion. These results suggest that there is information about the earnings announcement that becomes available to at least a subset of investors prior to the earnings release and that market participants take different amounts of time to process the information conveyed by the earnings announcement.     

Politically connected CEOs,corporate governance,and Post-IPO performance of China's newly partially privatized firms

Almost 27% of the CEOs in a sample of 790 newly partially privatized firms in China are former or current government bureaucrats. Firms with politically connected CEOs underperform those without politically connected CEOs by almost 18% based on three-year post-IPO stock returns and have poorer three-year post-IPO earnings growth, sales growth, and change in returns on sales. The negative effect of the CEO's political ties also show up in the first-day stock return. Finally, firms led by politically connected CEOs are more likely to appoint other bureaucrats to the board of directors rather than directors with relevant professional backgrounds.     

Narcissistic managers and IPO underpricing

Using hand-collected data on the signature size of managers in Chinese initial public offerings (IPOs) from 2007 to 2019 as a proxy for managerial narcissism, we examine how IPOs with narcissistic managers (narcissistic IPOs) affect IPO underpricing. The findings suggest that narcissistic IPOs have higher underpricing than non-narcissistic IPOs. Specifically, we find that on average, a narcissistic IPO exhibits approximately 11.3% higher underpricing than a median IPO firm. Our results are robust to alternative metrics of narcissism and underpricing after controlling for endogeneity. Additional analyses suggest that narcissistic IPOs are more likely to engage in earnings management than non-narcissistic IPOs. The former exhibits excessive risk-taking behavior, gauged by earnings volatility pre-IPO and a higher beta post-IPO. In the cross-sectional analyses, we document that the impact of managerial narcissism on IPO underpricing is more salient for IPOs facing unsophisticated investors, high market sentiment, or poor corporate governance.     

Economic policy uncertainty,investor attention and post-earnings announcement drift

How the market incorporates information into stock price is a core issue in finance. This study focuses on the impact of economic policy uncertainty (EPU) on the stock prices information efficiency of China's A-share market and underlying role of investors' attention allocation mechanism. This study analyzes the information efficiency of stock prices using the sensitivity of stock cumulative abnormal return to earnings information across different windows following earnings announcement. Based on the earnings announcement events of listed companies in China's A-share market, this study presents an empirical study of the aforementioned issues using event study and regression analysis methods. The following results are seen: (1) EPU aggravates the underreaction of stock price earnings information and the post-earnings announcement drift in the A-share market. (2) Under highly uncertain economic policies, investors show a limited attention allocation pattern of devoting increasing attention to macroeconomic policies and decreasing attention to earnings information, which leads to a decrease in the information efficiency of stock price. This study also analyzes the heterogeneity of the influence of EPU on stock price information efficiency using the institutional shareholding ratio. The results show that increasing institutional shareholding does not reduce the adverse effects of EPU on the information efficiency of stock prices. This study not only provides empirical evidence for Brunnermeier, Sockin, and Xiong (2022) and rational inattention theory, but also reveals that institutional investors show similar behavioral characteristics to retail investors in China's stock market. The results of this study have policy significance for improving the information efficiency of stock market.     

Does aggressiveness help? Evidence from IPO corruption and pricing in China

Using a unique database of Chinese firms bribing initial public offering (IPO) regulators, we examine the impact of bribing on IPO pricing. Our findings suggest that bribing firms are younger, smaller, more volatile in their operating activities, and more generous in compensating underwriters and management. Most important, bribing firms price their IPO shares more aggressively than non-bribing firms and exhibit a higher price-to-earnings ratio, lower first-day return, and poorer post-IPO stock performance. Additional analyses suggest that both bribing and non-bribing firms exhibit negative announcement returns after the arrest of corrupt officials. However, the effect is stronger for bribing firms. Overall, bribing firms are systematically more aggressive than their non-bribing counterparts. They concede less to IPO investors and reward underwriters and management for helping them access the capital market.     

Information efficiency of the U.S. credit default swap market: Evidence from earnings surprises

The credit default swap (CDS) market attracted much debate during the 2008 financial crisis. Opponents of CDS argue that CDS could lead to financial instability as it allows speculators to bet against companies and make the crisis worse. Proponents of CDS believe that CDS could increase market competition and benefit hedging activities. Moreover, an efficient CDS market can serve as a barometer to regulators and investors regarding the credit health of the underlying reference entity. We investigate information efficiency of the U.S. CDS market using evidence from earnings surprises. Our findings confirm that negative earnings surprises are well anticipated in the CDS market in the month prior to the announcement, with both economically and statistically stronger reactions for speculative-grade firms than for investment-grade firms. On the announcement day, for both positive and negative earnings surprises, the CDS spread for speculative-grade firms presents abnormal changes. Moreover, there is no post-earnings announcement drift in the CDS market, which is in direct contrast to the well-documented post-earnings drift in the stock market. Our evidence supports the efficiency of the CDS market.     

Do institutional investors reinforce or reduce agency problems? Earnings management and the post-IPO performance

This study investigates the dual roles of institutional investors in earnings management during initial public offerings (IPOs). Research suggests that institutional investors play a monitoring role in the corporate governance of firms by mitigating earnings management to reduce agency problems. However, institutional investors have incentives to opportunistically maximize their wealth by manipulating earnings when firms engage in IPOs. Results suggest that institutional investors facilitate accrual-based earnings management before IPOs but restrain earnings management after their issuance. We also find that firms with high institutional ownership experience superior post-IPO stock returns and operating performance, thereby suggesting that the capital market positively prices the monitoring function of institutional investors after IPOs, and the performance of these firms is improved. Our results are robust to controlling the endogeneity problem of institutional investors and further identifying active institutional investors.     

Timing,earnings management and over-reaction around pure placings

This paper provides new evidence about firms conducting pure placings in the UK. It examines their abnormal performance (stock and operating), earnings management (accrual and real activities) and abnormal growth prospects for up to three years surrounding the event. It questions whether (i) timing, (ii) earnings management and/or (iii) over-reaction hypotheses can explain these performance, earnings quality and growth paths. The results document that pure placing firms have high earnings quality and abnormally high growth opportunities at the announcement. For this reason, the market is overenthusiastic. It expects more than what is eventually fulfilled, in line with the over-reaction hypothesis. Weak evidence that placing firms may exploit market timing is noted, whilst there is no supportive evidence of earnings management. These findings distinguish the earnings quality and growth opportunities of pure placing firms from that of firms conducting open offers, firm commitment offers and other seasoned equity offerings (SEO) that are not private placements, for which prior evidence reports mainly timing and/or earnings management prior to the event. This paper facilitates a better understanding of UK SEO.