商业银行绩效评价:将经济增加值与平衡记分卡方法相结合

随着我国经济改革和对外开放的逐步深入,商业银行的经营和组织方式正在不断转变,绩效评估体系变革的要求也越来越迫切。本文针对当前商业银行绩效评价实践中所出现的问题,提出了将经济增加值(EVA)与平衡计分卡(BSC)两种方法相结合来进行绩效评估的新思路。     

基于因子分析的中国商业银行经营绩效评价研究——来自2010—2011年上市银行的经验证据

构建科学、高效的商业银行经营绩效评价体系,对于改进我国银行业整体经营绩效,从而提升我国银行业的核心竞争力,具有非常重要的理论与现实意义。对此,文章从现金流生成视角,设计了反映商业银行全面经营绩效的评价指标,主要包括上市直接融资能力、贷款管理能力和表外业务运营能力三方面内容,并选取我国国内主板市场的16家上市银行为样本,运用SPSS中的因子分析方法,对我国上市银行全面经营绩效评价进行了实证分析,并给出了相关政策建议。本研究成果将重塑我国商业银行经营绩效的评价机制,从而为更好地指导我国银行业的科学化实践提供了重要的理论依据与决策参考。     

我国上市商业银行全面经营绩效评价的实证研究——基于现金流生成路径的视角

2008年全球金融危机的爆发,深刻揭示了商业银行传统意义上的经营绩效评价机制存在缺陷,原因在于传统意义上商业银行经营绩效评价往往侧重于商业银行经营管理能力的评价,而忽视了商业银行的抗风险能力。文章基于现金流生成路径,设计了反映商业银行全面经营绩效的评价指标,主要包括经营管理能力、风险运营能力、直接融资能力三方面内容,并选取我国国内主板市场的16家上市银行为样本,运用SPSS中的因子分析方法,对我国上市商业银行全面经营绩效评价进行了实证分析,并给出了相关政策建议。这将为重塑我国商业银行经营绩效的评价机制,从而更好地指导我国银行业的科学化实践,提供重要的理论依据与决策参考。     

环境不确定性视角的商业银行绩效评价研究

随着我国金融业的改革发展,商业银行的经营环境发生了巨大变化,从根本上改变了银行间的竞争格局。为了在竞争中取胜,现代商业银行对绩效评价日益重视并提出更高要求。本文以商业银行绩效评价相关理论为研究基础,提出基于组织环境的商业银行绩效分析系统框架,为我国进行商业银行绩效评价理论和实务发展提供一个共同的视角。     

环境不确定性视角的商业银行绩效评价研究

随着我国金融业的改革发展,商业银行的经营环境发生了巨大变化,从根本上改变了银行间的竞争格局。为了在竞争中取胜,现代商业银行对绩效评价日益重视并提出更高要求。本文以商业银行绩效评价相关理论为研究基础,提出基于组织环境的商业银行绩效分析系统框架,为我国进行商业银行绩效评价理论和实务发展提供一个共同的视角。     

我国商业银行经营绩效影响因素实证研究

为了探究我国商业银行经营绩效的影响因素,本文首先构建了银行经营绩效评价体系,然后通过对影响因素的理论分析和银行经营数据的实证检验,得出当前我国商业银行资产份额与绩效成正比,存、贷款份额和银行规模与银行绩效成反比的结论,最后针对该结论提出了提高我国商业银行经营绩效的建议。     

浅析EVA在中小银行管理中的运用

经济增加值(EVA)考核体系是我国当前绩效评价的常用方法之一,运用该体系对单位的绩效进行评价既切合实际,也更客观公正,正因如此,当前我国部分商业银行已经开始推广应用。基于此,本文从中小商业银行的视角出发,总结和阐述了EVA的内容和计量方式,并在此基础上探讨EVA在中小商业银行管理中的运用,旨在为其有效的提升绩效评价水平,实现健康稳定的运营提供有益的参考。     

RAROC和EVA指标解读及在商业银行中的应用

RAROC是风险调整后资本收益率(Risk-adjusted Return on Capital)的简称,EVA是经济增加值(Economic Value Added)的简称,这两个指标是当前管理领先银行中最流行、最核心的绩效评价指标,相关技术构成了现代商业银行内部管理的核心技术。目前我国监管部门正引导商业银行提高RAROC和EVA在经营管理中的应用,在《银行业金融机构绩效考评监管指引》(银监发[2012]34号)中银监会明确要求,商业银行在绩效考评中应当将"风险调整后收益指标"作为经营效益类指标的核心指标。下面就这两个指标的概念、关系作简     

多元化经营与我国商业银行绩效关系研究——基于银行规模和银行性质的视角

以我国24家商业银行2008—2016年面板数据为研究对象,基于银行规模和银行性质的视角,实证分析了银行规模对多元化经营与不同性质商业银行绩效关系的调节效应。研究表明:多元化经营对商业银行绩效具有显著促进作用;银行规模对多元化经营与银行绩效具有显著正向调节作用。银行性质是影响银行规模调节作用的重要因素,银行规模对国有商业银行、城市商业银行多元化经营与绩效关系分别发挥着正向、负向调节作用,对全国性股份制商业银行多元化经营绩效关系的调节作用不显著。进一步研究发现,反映资本实力和经营风险的控制变量对调节作用的影响存在差别。研究结论可为银行业的经营管理及金融体制改革提供决策参考。     

经济资本配置:商业银行绩效评估与考核的核心

经济资本作为一种风险资本,直接反映了商业银行风险状况对资本的内在要求。国内越来越多的商业银行改革传统的以规模为主的绩效评估的方法,代之于平衡记分卡等先进的绩效管理手段,并在此过程中运用EVA和RAROC的指标和方法,但要科学度量这些指标,必须科学地进行经济资本配置。为商业银行建立EVA和RAROC绩效评估的指标,笔者从可操作的角度出发,研究了经济资本的配置方法和步骤,期望对拟实施EVA和RAROC进行绩效考核的商业银行有一定的借鉴意义。     

中国上市银行的经济增加值及其驱动因素

金融业的全面对外开放使得银行之间的竞争日趋激烈，对中国商业银行经营绩效作出科学评价成为大势所趋。本文选取中国沪深两市14家上市银行作为研究样本，结合银行业的特殊性和中国商业银行的实际情况，对它们的经济增加值（EVA）进行测算，得出中国上市银行经营绩效不容乐观；进一步深入探索EVA潜在驱动因素得出，EVA与资产规模、存货比、资本充足率非显著相关，与外部治理显著正相关，与固定资产比例及不良货款率呈显著负相关。因此中国商业银行应完善内外治理机制，建立以EVA为核心风险管理体系。     

The Validity of the Economic Value Added Approach: an Empirical Application

This study investigates the relative explanatory power of the Economic Value Added (EVA) model with respect to stock returns and firms' market value, compared to established accounting variables (e.g. net income, operating income), in the context of a small European developing market, namely the Athens Stock Exchange, in its first market‐wide application of the EVA measure. Relative information content tests reveal that net and operating income appear to be more value relevant than EVA. Additionally, incremental information tests suggest that EVA unique components add only marginally to the information content of accounting profit. Moreover, EVA does not appear to have a stronger correlation with firms' Market Value Added than the other variables, suggesting that – for our Greek dataset – EVA, even though useful as a performance evaluation tool, need not necessarily be more correlated with shareholder's value than established accounting variables.     

THE EVA REVOLUTION

Stern Stewart's EVA framework for financial management and incentive compensation is the practical application of both modern financial theory and classical economics to the problems of running a business. It is a fundamental way of measuring and motivating corporate performance that encourages managers to make decisions that make economic sense, even when conventional accounting-based measures of performance tell them to do otherwise. Moreover, EVA provides a consistent basis for a comprehensive system of corporate financial management—one that is capable of guiding all corporate decisions, from annual operating budgets to capital budgeting, strategic planning, and acquisitions and divestitures. It also provides companies with a "language" for communicating their goals and achievements to investors—a language that the market is increasingly coming to interpret as a sign of superior future performance.
The authors report that more than 300 companies have implemented Stern Stewart's EVA framework, including a growing number of converts in Europe, Asia, and Latin America. After describing significant behavioral changes at a number of EVA companies, the article focuses in detail on a single case history—that of auto parts manufacturer Federal-Mogul. Besides bringing about a dramatic change in the company's strategy and significant operating efficiencies, the adoption of EVA also led to an interesting change in Federal—Mogul's organizational structure—a combination of two large business units into a single profit center designed to achieve greater cooperation and synergies between the units.     

Why EVA Bonus Plans Failed—and How to Revive Them

Most companies rely heavily on earnings to measure their financial performance, but earnings growth has at least two important weaknesses as a proxy for investor wealth. Current earnings growth may come at the expense of future earnings through, say, shortsighted cutbacks in corporate investment, including R&D or advertising. But growth in earnings per share can also be achieved by “overinvesting”—that is, committing ever more capital to projects with expected rates of return that, although well below the cost of capital, exceed the after‐tax cost of debt. Stock compensation has been the conventional solution to the first problem because it's a discounted cash flow value that is assumed to discourage actions that sacrifice future earnings. Economic profit—in its most popular manifestation, EVA—has been the conventional solution to the second problem because it includes a capital charge that penalizes low‐return investment. But neither of these conventional solutions appears to work very well in practice. Stock compensation isn't tied to business unit performance, and often fails to motivate corporate managers who believe that meeting consensus earnings is more important than investing to maintain future earnings. EVA often doesn't work well because increases in current EVA often come with reduced expectations of future EVA improvement—and reductions in current EVA are often accompanied by increases in future growth values. Since EVA bonus plans reward current EVA increases without taking account of changes in expected future growth values, they have the potential to encourage margin improvement that comes at the expense of business growth and discourage positive‐NPV investments that, because of longer‐run payoffs, reduce current EVA. In this article, the author demonstrates the possibility of overcoming such short‐termism by developing an operating model of changes in future growth value that can be used to calibrate “dynamic” EVA improvement targets that more closely align EVA bonus plan payouts with investors’ excess returns. With the use of “dynamic” targets, margin improvements that come at the expense of business growth can be discouraged by raising EVA performance targets, while growth investments can be encouraged by the use of lower EVA targets.     

A Better Way to Measure Operating Performance (or Why the EVA Math Really Matters)

Most companies rely heavily on earnings to measure operating performance, but earnings growth has at least two important weaknesses as a proxy for investor wealth. Current earnings can come at the expense of future earnings through, for example, short‐sighted cutbacks in investment, including spending on R&D. But growth in EPS can also be achieved by investing more capital with projected rates of return that, although well below the cost of capital, are higher than the after‐tax cost of debt. Stock compensation has been the conventional solution to the first problem because it's a discounted cash flow value that is assumed to discourage actions that sacrifice future earnings. Economic profit—in its most popular manifestation, EVA—has been the conventional solution to the second problem with earnings because it includes a capital charge that penalizes low‐return investment. But neither of these conventional solutions appears to work very well in practice. Stock compensation isn't tied to business unit performance—and often fails to provide the intended incentives for the (many) corporate managers who believe that meeting current consensus earnings is more important than investing to maintain future earnings. EVA doesn't work well when new investments take time to become profitable because the higher capital charge comes before the related income. In this article, the author presents two new operating performance measures that are likely to work better than either earnings or EVA because they reflect the value that can be lost either through corporate underinvestment or overinvestment designed to increase current earnings. Both of these new measures are based on the math that ties EVA to discounted cash flow value, particularly its division of current corporate market values into two components: “current operations value” and “future growth value.” The key to the effectiveness of the new measures in explaining changes in company stock prices and market values is a statistical model of changes in future growth value that captures the expected effects of significant increases in current investment in R&D and advertising on future profits and value.     

STOCK BUYBACKS, CORPORATE PERFORMANCE, AND EVA

Most studies of corporate stock repurchase focus on the effect of stock buyback announcements on the stock price performance of companies announcing the programs, and on the corporate motives for undertaking stock buyback programs. The study described in this article examines the effects of actual stock buyback activities on corporate performance, addressing the question whether buybacks are associated with increases in economic value or EVA. In general, the study reports that the operating performance of buyback companies is better than that of non-buyback companies, and that performance improves in the year following the initiation of repurchasing activities. Although it is not the central focus of this study, the findings are consistent with both the free cash flow and the information signaling hypotheses as motives for engaging in stock buybacks.     

Incentives and Investor Expectations

This article argues that the Expectations‐Based Management (EBM) measure proposed by Copeland and Dolgoff (in the previous article) is essentially the same measure that EVA companies have used for years as the basis for performance evaluation and incentive compensation. After pointing out that the analyst‐based measures cited by Copeland and Dolgoff do not provide a basis for a workable compensation plan, the authors present the outline of a widely used expectations‐based EVA bonus plan. In so doing, they demonstrate the two key steps in designing such a plan: (1) using a company's “Future Growth Value”—the part of its current market value that cannot be accounted for by its current earnings— to calibrate the series of annual EVA “improvements” expected by the market; and (2) determining the executive's share of those improvements and thus of the company's expected “excess” return. One of the major objections to the use of EVA, or any single‐period measure, as the basis for a performance evaluation and incentive comp plan is its inability to reflect the longer‐run consequences of current investment and operating decisions. The authors close by presenting a solution to this “delayed productivity of capital” problem in the form of an internal accounting approach for dealing with acquisitions and other large strategic investments.     

EVA Momentum: The One Ratio That Tells the Whole Story

Virtually all corporate managers use ratios like profit margin, earnings growth, and return on equity to set goals, analyze operations, and measure success or failure. Yet all ratios are wrong in the sense that every one of them can make it appear that operations are improving when a business actually is faltering, and vice versa .
In this article, one of the pioneers of the modern economic profit school of financial management claims to have discovered a new ratio that accurately consolidates all the pluses and minuses of decisions and operations into a single reliable overall measure that cannot be increased without truly creating value. "EVA Momentum," as the measure is called, is the change in a company's economic profit (or EVA) in a given period divided by its sales in the prior period. In other words, it is the size-adjusted change in economic profit.
The author goes on to demonstrate why most companies can use EVA Momentum as both their overarching financial target and the best way to keep score for multiple business lines. The article also shows why EVA Momentum is a better performance measure than ROI and that, as a diagnostic and management tool, it provides a more effective alternative to the popular DuPont ROI formula. Unlike the DuPont formula, EVA Momentum reflects the contributions to overall performance of important factors such as profitable growth, strategic retrenchment, and the quality of resource allocation decisions in general. At the same time, it provides a more accurate and informative means of examining performance, weighing tradeoffs, identifying investment opportunities, and prioritizing initiatives—all on the basis of their expected impact on a company's market value.     

EVA® FOR BANKS: VALUE CREATION, RISK MANAGEMENT, AND PROFITABILITY MEASUREMENT

This article presents a complete ranking of America's 100 largest bank holding companies according to their shareholder value added. This research, the first of its kind for the banking industry, defines an EVA measurement for banks and presents evidence of EVA's stronger correlation with bank market values than traditional accounting measures like ROA and ROE. Besides developing EVA and MVA as analytical tools for viewing the economic performance of the organization from a shareholder perspective, the authors also present a framework for calculating EVA at all levels of the organization, including lines of business, functional departments, products, customer segments, and customer relationships. The implementation of an EVA profitability measurement system at the business unit (or lower) level requires methods for three critical tasks: (1) transfer pricing of funds; (2) allocation of indirect expenses; and (3) allocation of economic capital. Although solutions to the first two are fairly straightforward, the allocation of capital to business units is a major challenge for banks today. In contrast to the complex, “bottom-up” approach used by a number of large banks in implementing their RAROC systems, the authors propose a greatly simplified, “top-down” approach that requires calculation of only the volatility of a business's operating profit (or NOPAT). The advantage of using NOPAT volatility is that it allows EVA analysis at any level of the organization in a way that captures the volatility effects from all sources of risk (credit, interest rates, liquidity, or operations). While such a top-down approach is clearly not meant to take the place of a comprehensive, bottom-up RAROC analysis, it is intended to provide a complement–a high-level “check” on the detailed, bottom-up risk management procedures and controls now in place at most banks. Moreover, for those banks that have developed extensive funds transfer pricing, cost allocation, and RAROCstyle capital allocation systems, the EVA financial management system can either be integrated with those systems or serve as an independent economic assessment of the bank's business risks and returns.     

EVIDENCE ON EVA

EVA has attracted considerable attention as an alternative to traditional accounting earnings for use in both valuation and incentive compensation. With a host of consultants now marketing related metrics, numerous claims have been made—most based on anecdotal evidence or in-house studies. This paper summarizes the authors' independent evidence regarding EVA's alleged advantages.
The authors begin by reviewing the theory that links the underlying concept of residual income to shareholder value. Second, they discuss how Stern Stewart modifies residual income to produce its proprietary EVA metric and show how median EVA compares with residual income, net income, and operating cash flows over the period 1988–97. Third, they examine the claim that EVA is more closely associated with stock returns and firm value than is net income. Their evidence indicates that EVA does not dominate net income in associations with stock returns and firm values. Fourth, they examine a second claim that compensation plans based on residual income motivate managers to take actions consistent with increasing shareholder value. Here the evidence (from a study by Wallace) suggests that managers do respond to residual income-based incentives by, for example, increasing asset sales, cutting capital expenditures, repurchasing stock, and producing higher levels of residual income. The authors conclude by arguing that a metric such as EVA can be effective for internal incentive purposes even if it conveys little news to market participants regarding the firm's valuation.