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1.
本文从终极控制人的视角,以我国2002-2006年民营上市公司为研究对象,研究了终极控制股东现金流权及控制权与现金流权的偏离对公司绩效的影响,并在此基础上考察了自由现金流对终极控制股东攫取行为的约束作用。研究表明:现金流权与公司绩效显著正相关,对终极控制股东存在"激励效应";控制权与现金流权的偏离与公司绩效显著负相关,终极控制股东对公司具有"堑壕效应",且当现金流权较高时,终极控制股东的"堑壕效应"显著降低。进一步研究发现,终极控制股东攫取行为的发生不仅需要其有"能力"和"动机",还需要有充足的自由现金流这个"机会",较少的自由现金流能够有效地约束终极控制股东的攫取行为。  相似文献   

2.
从终极产权的视角,以我国沪、深两市公司为研究对象,考察了终极股东控制权、现金流权与债务期限结构的关系。发现:终极股东现金流权水平越高,其掠夺外部投资者的成本也就越高,债务融资的代理成本降低,银行等金融机构愿意为公司提供更多较长期限的债务资金,终极控制股东现金流权对公司债务期限结构具有显著正向影响。而终极股东控制权与现金流权分离程度越高,其越有可能掠夺外部投资者,增大了公司与债权人的代理冲突,导致较高的债务融资代理成本,银行等金融机构倾向于为其提供更多的短期资金来约束终极控制股东。  相似文献   

3.
终极股东特征、公司多元化与融资约束   总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2  
理论研究表明公司多元化经营形成的内部资本市场有助于缓解公司所面临的融资约束,不同的终极股东特征可能由于代理问题或由于加强内部资本市场功能而减弱或增强缓解公司融资约束的作用。本文以2004~2009年中国上市公司作为样本,实证考察不同终极股东特征下,非国有控制公司与国有控制公司多元化经营战略缓解公司融资约束的作用是否存在显著差异。实证结果表明当终极股东现金流权与控制权不偏离,或者当终极股东控制链层级较多时,非国有控制公司多元化缓解融资约束的作用显著强于国有控制公司。然而,当终极股东现金流权与控制权偏离,或者当终极股东控制链层级较少时,国有控制公司多元化缓解融资约束的作用并没有显著强于非国有控制公司。  相似文献   

4.
以安徽省民营上市公司为研究样本,用样本公司2009-2011年的面板数据对终极控制股东控制权、现金流权以及两权分离情况与公司绩效之间的关系进行研究,统计结果表明:安徽省民营上市公司终极控制人两权分离度与公司绩效的显著负相关,控制权、现金流权与公司绩效显著正相关。由此得出结论,终极控制股东的控制权与现金流权两权过度偏离会导致公司绩效下降。  相似文献   

5.
为探究现金流权与控制权的分离对我国家族上市公司价值的作用机理以及影响程度,本文首先建立了一个基于控制权私人收益的理论模型。然后,本文以121家家族上市公司为样本,对现金流权、控制权、现金流权与控制权的分离率以及影响公司价值的诸多因素进行细致的分析。研究表明,我国家族上市公司现金流权与控制权的分离率平均为62%,并且此分离程度在东亚为最高。另外,研究发现:我国家族上市公司价值与现金流权比例显著负相关,这可能是与控股股东的“掠夺性分红”行为有关;我国家族上市公司价值与控制权比例显著负相关,与独立董事人数占董事会比例、负债规模、净资产收益率均不相关,与公司规模显著负相关;公司规模与现金流权与控制权的分离率显著负相关。  相似文献   

6.
本文以2004年至2008年期间的上市公司为样本,对终极股东控制权与现金流权的分离、多元化经营与公司价值的关系进行实证研究.研究结果表明,终极控制股东的两权分离对多元化经营与公司价值的关系产生负面影响,而且这种负面作用在高自由现金流公司及地方政府控制的上市公司中更严重.  相似文献   

7.
近年来,随着研究的不断深入,越来越多的证据表明,股利政策正沦为终极控制人侵占中小股东的“隧道”,增加了终极控制人与中小股东之间的代理成本.本文选取2007-2010年间沪深两市A股上市公司的数据作为研究样本,从终极控制人的经济性质、控制权、现金流权及两权分离度等角度,运用多元线性回归分析方法研究终极控制人对现金股利分配倾向和分配水平的影响.  相似文献   

8.
本文利用我国91家民营上市公司2003-2005年面板数据检验终极股东控制与资本结构的关系。研究发现,终极股东控制权一致性与总资产负债率、流动负债率显著正相关,终极股东控制权/现金流权偏离度与总资产负债率、流动负债率显著负相关。这表明资本结构决策本身存在代理问题,终极股东一方面积极利用股权融资的非稀释效应,另一方面对负债的破产威胁效应和利益转移限制效应作出了壕沟防守反应。  相似文献   

9.
近年来,随着研究的不断深入,越来越多的证据表明,股利政策正沦为终极控制人侵占中小股东的"隧道",增加了终极控制人与中小股东之间的代理成本。本文选取2007-2010年间沪深两市A股上市公司的数据作为研究样本,从终极控制人的经济性质、控制权、现金流权及两权分离度等角度,运用多元线性回归分析方法研究终极控制人对现金股利分配倾向和分配水平的影响。  相似文献   

10.
以2004—2007年我国上市公司为样本,实证研究结果发现:(1)控股股东的”合理掏空动机”与”超额掏空动机”伴随着现金流权的上升呈现的是一种此消彼长的关系,而这两类动机都会引致控股股东对于控制权私有收益的追逐,但是二者的作用机理却是完全不同的;(2)伴随着现金流权的影响,控股股东的”超额掏空动机”之于控制权私有收益的正向效应和”合理掏空动机”之于控制权私有收益的负向效应的综合作用结果是不同的。  相似文献   

11.
This paper examines the effect of controlling shareholders on stock price synchronicity by focusing on two salient corporate governance features in a concentrated ownership setting, namely, ultimate cash flow rights and the separation of voting and cash flow rights (i.e., excess control). Using a unique dataset of 654 French listed firms spanning 1998–2007, this study provides evidence that stock price synchronicity increases with excess control, supporting the argument that controlling shareholders tend to disclose less firm-specific information to conceal opportunistic practices. Additionally, this study shows that firms with substantial excess control are more likely to experience stock price crashes, consistent with the conjecture that controlling shareholders are more likely to hoard bad information when their control rights exceed their cash flow rights. Another important finding is that firms’ stock prices are less synchronous and less likely to crash when controlling shareholders own a large fraction of cash flow rights. This is consistent with the argument that controlling shareholders have less incentive to adopt poor disclosure policies and to accumulate bad news, since high cash flow ownership aligns their interests with those of minority investors.  相似文献   

12.
Private Benefits of Control, Ownership, and the Cross-listing Decision   总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1  
This paper investigates how a foreign firm's decision to cross-list on a U.S. stock exchange is related to the consumption of private benefits of control by its controlling shareholders. Theory has proposed that when private benefits are high, controlling shareholders are less likely to choose to cross-list in the United States because of constraints on the consumption of private benefits resulting from such listings. Using several proxies for private benefits related to the control and cash flow ownership rights of controlling shareholders, we find support for this hypothesis with a sample of more than 4,000 firms from 31 countries.  相似文献   

13.
This study investigates the effect of product market competition on the ownership choice of controlling shareholders in the Korean business groups known as chaebols. We find that member firms in more competitive markets have less disparity between the control and cash flow rights of controlling shareholders. The adjustment in ownership due to product market competition is implemented mainly through an adjustment in the ownership of affiliates rather than in the direct ownership of controlling shareholders. The disciplinary effect of product market competition is observed only in member firms with lower market power in their own industries. The result implies that product market competition works as a disciplinary mechanism that reduces the incentive of chaebols’ controlling shareholders to pursue the private benefits of control.  相似文献   

14.
Abstract:   This study investigates the relationship between ownership structure and acquiring firm performance. A large proportion of Canadian public companies have controlling shareholders (families) that often exercise control over voting rights while holding a small fraction of the cash flow rights. This is achieved through the concurrent use of dual class voting shares and stock pyramids. Many suggest that these ownership structures involve larger agency costs than those imposed by dispersed ownership structures and that they distort corporate decisions with respect to investment choices such as acquisitions. We find that average acquiring firm announcement period abnormal returns for our sample of 327 Canadian transactions are positive over the 1998–2002 period. Cash deals, acquisitions of unlisted targets and cross‐border deals have a positive impact on value creation. Governance mechanisms (outside block‐holders, unrelated directors and small board size) also have a positive influence on the acquiring firm performance. Further, the positive abnormal returns are greater for family firms. We do not find that separation of ownership and control has a negative impact on performance. These results suggest that, contrary to other jurisdictions offering poor minority shareholder protection or poor corporate governance, separation of control and ownership is not viewed as leading to value destroying mergers and acquisitions, i.e., market participants do not perceive families as using M&A to obtain private benefits at the expense of minority shareholders. We do find a non‐monotonic relationship between ownership level and acquiring firm abnormal returns. Ownership of a majority of the cash flow rights has a negative impact on announcement returns. This is consistent with the view that large shareholders may undertake less risky projects as their wealth invested in the firm increases.  相似文献   

15.
本文选取2003~2005年沪市和深市的1748家上市公司为样本,研究我国上市公司超能力派现与公司治理结构之间的关系.研究发现,第三大股东持股比例与超能力派现正相关,监事会规模、资产负债率和净资产收益率与超能力派现负相关.第一大股东持股比例与超能力正相关没有通过显著性检验,反映我国前几大股东可能合谋实现超能力派现.我国迫切需要优化公司治理结构争完善法制来制止超能力派现的发生.  相似文献   

16.
本文在界定以生产为起点和以销售为起点的两种传统预算编制方法所适用的条件的同时,论证了以所有 权与管理权相分离为特征的现代公司应以每股收益或利润为起点编制预算的观点。在实务上按照这种现点编制 预算,不仅有助于提升所有者和经营者对整个公司计划和控制的能力,顺势通过改善经营管理来影响本公司股 价,而且还为财务报告的改进提供了新的线索。由于预算编制结果也可用资产负债表、利润表和现金流量表来 表述,本文建议将按每股收益为起点编制的预算以及定期甚至实时编制的预算反馈报告进行公开披露,以增强 现行财务报告的前瞻性、及时性和明细化程度,为投资者提供更加有用的信息。  相似文献   

17.
We examine the relationship between the controlling shareholder’s cash flow rights and the funds transfer in the internal capital market within Korean business groups (chaebols) during the period from 1998 to 2001. We find that the funds allocation in the firms where controlling shareholders have high cash flow rights is better aligned with the investment opportunities and therefore, more efficient than in the firms where they have low cash flow rights. This effect is stronger when they have controlling powers large enough to expropriate minority shareholders. However, during the financial crisis period, funds simply move toward the firms where controlling shareholders have high cash flow rights. The results evidence the tunneling behavior in the internal capital market within a chaebol that the ownership structure distorts the allocation of internal funds in such a way as to benefit the controlling shareholders.JEL Classification: G31, G30  相似文献   

18.
We use a sample of 800 firms in eight East Asian countries to study the effect of ownership structure on value during the region's financial crisis. The crisis negatively impacted firms' investment opportunities, raising the incentives of controlling shareholders to expropriate minority investors. Crisis period stock returns of firms in which managers have high levels of control rights, but have separated their control and cash flow ownership, are 10–20 percentage points lower than those of other firms. The evidence is consistent with the view that ownership structure plays an important role in determining whether insiders expropriate minority shareholders.  相似文献   

19.
The authors' study of audit committees in 450 large East Asian companies (150 each in Hong Kong, Singapore, and Malaysia) finds a strong positive correlation between the “cash flow” ownership (as opposed to just the voting rights) of large shareholders and the percentage of independent audit committee members. The study also reports a strong positive correlation between the “cash flow” ownership of large shareholders and the percentage of audit committee members with financial expertise and experience. This finding is consistent with the hypothesis that larger cash flow ownership provides large shareholders with strong incentives for more effective governance. Conversely, the lower percentages of independent or professional audit directors at companies with large disparities between cash ownership and voting rights is consistent with the authors' hypothesis that entrenched large shareholders prefer inferior governance structures that pose fewer obstacles to their tendency to exploit the wealth of minority shareholders. Furthermore, the authors find higher valuations (market‐to‐book ratios) for companies with audit committees that consist entirely of independent directors and have larger percentage of members with financial expertise. And when viewed as a whole, the authors' findings provide support for the argument that ownership structure affects the composition of audit committees, and that independent and professional audit committees can help increase firm value.  相似文献   

20.
This paper examines the impact of ownership structure on executive compensation in China's listed firms. We find that the cash flow rights of ultimate controlling shareholders have a positive effect on the pay–performance relationship, while a divergence between control rights and cash flow rights has a significantly negative effect on the pay–performance relationship. We divide our sample based on ultimate controlling shareholders' type into state owned enterprises (SOE), state assets management bureaus (SAMB), and privately controlled firms. We find that in SOE controlled firms cash flow rights have a significant impact on accounting based pay–performance relationship. In privately controlled firms, cash flow rights affect the market based pay–performance relationship. In SAMB controlled firms, CEO pay bears no relationship with either accounting or market based performance. The evidence suggests that CEO pay is inefficient in firms where the state is the controlling shareholder because it is insensitive to market based performance but consistent with the efforts of controlling shareholders to maximize their private benefit.  相似文献   

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