我国上市公司的治理特征与非效率投资

本文主要从上市公司的公司治理特征角度,分析了我国上市公司非效率投资产生的原因。由于制度上对股权设置的相关规定,决定了内部人控制和国有上市公司政府干预在一段时间内将成为我国上市公司内部治理的突出特征,大股东对控制权私人收益的攫取和政府的政治目标会导致非效率投资的发生。因此,减少非效率投资和提高企业价值的有效措施在于构建相互制衡的股权结构和减少各级政府的行政干预。     

政府控制、治理环境与上市公司过度投资

本文基于中国上市公司的经验数据,对政府控制、治理环境与企业过度投资之间的关系进行了探索,研究结果表明:与非政府控制的上市公司相比,政府控制的上市公司过度投资现象较为严重,且地方政府控制的上市公司更易发生过度投资行为;但公司所处治理环境的改善使过度投资行为得到有效抑制。     

我国上市公司非效率投资的原因及对策分析

投资决策在我国上市公司的财务决策中发挥着重要的作用,主导着公司价值的创造,而现实企业中过度投资和投资不足等现象一直影响着企业的发展。在我国,上市公司大多数由大股东控制,而如何发挥大股东的监督作用及抑制非效率投资行为已成为近年来学术界关注的焦点话题。在国有上市公司中,由于大股东的"缺位",其代理人为了控制风险和自身的业绩,更多的表现出投资不足。然而许多企业由于两权分离造成的代理问题、信息不对称等因素存在关联投资、恶性担保、盲目多元化等过度投资现象。本文通过分析其中存在的财务风险、经营风险和危害,进而分析其产生的原因,最后提出相应建议。     

政府控制层级对公司价值的影响研究——基于A股上市公司的实证研究

中国特有的经济＂双轨制＂决定着上市公司受不同最终控制人的影响,由此造成不同控制性质的公司价值存在差异性。以2007-2011年中国所有A股上市公司作为研究样本,根据实际控制人性质将上市公司细分为非政府控制、县级政府控制、市级政府控制、省级政府控制以及中央政府控制这五种类型,实证分析了不同层级政府控制和非政府控制人对公司价值的影响。实证结果表明,相对于非政府控制上市公司,政府控制的上市公司价值更低,其中市级县级等低层级政府控制的上市公司价值更低。同时也发现政府控制的上市公司比例有显著性下降,说明中国经济主体转向非政府控制经济已初见成效。     

上市公司募集资金闲置与投资绩效低迷之关联性研究——基于调查问卷的分析

基于问卷调查的结果,采用结构方程模型研究我国上市公司募集资金闲置与投资绩效低迷之间的关联性,结果表明：我国上市公司闲置募集资金与投资绩效低迷之间存在显著的相关性;在募集资金闲置的表现形式上,上市公司多偏向采用委托理财、投资国债以及购买其他公司股票,而很少会将募集资金存入银行或者拆借给大股东或其他关联单位;当募集资金闲置导致投资绩效低迷时,上市公司应主要从公司内部治理的角度寻找原因,诸如投资决策过程缺乏民主、对项目的控制争反馈失效以及项目管理人员能力不足;而非一味强调政府干预过多以及外部市场环境变化过快。     

大股东控制、财务杠杆与公司价值——国有及民营上市公司治理的比较研究

本文以2002～2004年的上市公司为样本,研究了第一大股东持股比例、财务杠杆与公司价值之间的关系.研究发现,国有控制上市公司与民营控制上市公司公司价值并无显著差异;国有控制上市公司第一大股东持股比例与公司价值呈U形关系,民营控制上市公司第一大股东持股比例与公司价值则呈倒U形关系;国有控制上市公司财务杠杆比率与公司价值负相关,民营控制上市公司财务杠杆比率与公司价值则正相关.其政策含义是,政府应该继续贯彻"抓大放小"的战略方针;监管部门应该关注持股比例较高的民营上市公司第一大股东的资金来源及其行为特征,防止其对公司其他利益相关者的侵害行为;银行贷款应对国有及民营企业一视同仁,银行需要加强对国有控制上市公司贷款的监督.     

产权性质、制度环境与内部控制

内部控制是近年来国内外监管部门、实务界和学术界关注的热点与前沿问题。本文研究我国上市公司最终控制人的产权性质与地区制度环境对公司内部控制质量的影响。利用厦门大学内控课题组(2010)构建的2007-2009年我国上市公司内部控制指数,本文主要发现:首先,相比于中央政府控制的公司,地方政府控制的公司内部控制质量相对较差,而非政府控制的公司内部控制质量与中央政府控制的公司之间则没有明显差异;其次,上市公司所在地区的市场化程度越高或政府对经济的干预程度越低,公司的内部控制质量越高,尤其是对于地方政府控制和非政府控制的上市公司,并且,良好的外部制度环境有助于缩小地方政府控制和非政府控制公司的内部控制与中央政府控制公司之间的差距。本文的研究结果对相关主管部门及监管机构具有一定的政策启示意义。     

双重委托下大股东激励、壁垒效应实证分析

本文通过对中国沪深两市A股上市公司的大样本研究，阐述了由于股权集中所产生的双重委托代理关系对上市公司绩效产生的各种影响。实证分析发现，公司价值的确随着大股东所有权与控制权的差距缩小而上升。在结合上市公司股权结构特征分析后发现，竞争的股权结构也同样能够为公司价值带来积极影响，通过代理权的竞争能够遏制大股东利用控制权进行掠夺，从而为公司价值带来积极影响。     

监督还是合谋:多个大股东与公司内部控制质量

中国上市公司大股东持股比例相对较高,大股东之间可能存在合谋掏空或监督制衡的关系,为此,以2008~2016年A股上市公司为样本,探究多个大股东的股权结构对公司内部控制质量的影响。研究发现：相对于只有单一大股东的公司而言,具有多个大股东的公司内部控制质量更高;大股东数量越多、非控股大股东持股比例越高、大股东之间股权偏离度越低,公司内部控制质量越高;外国投资者和国有法人大股东能够显著提升公司内部控制质量;多个大股东的治理效应主要体现在非国有企业中,公司所处地区的法律及市场环境越好,多个大股东监督效应对公司内部控制质量的提升作用越明显。     

内部控制在上市公司投资中的角色:效率促进还是抑制?——基于A股上市公司的经验证据

有效的投资效率是上市公司成长与现金流增加的动力源泉与重要基础,同时也是提升公司价值的根本所在。上市公司投资效率的提升可以帮助其很好地把握市场发展契机、合理配置企业现金流,提高资金的利用效率,实现最大限度投资的回报。针对现阶段上市公司投资效率的现状,本文探讨内部控制对上市公司投资效率的影响效用,提出理论假设,并构建内部控制与上市公司投资效率结构方程模型。通过对2011-2012年我国沪深A股上市公司的实证分析发现:有效的内部控制可以帮助上市公司提升投资效率,为上市公司投资效率的提升提供了理论依据与实践指导,并从内部控制的角度提升投资效率提出了相应的建议。     

政府治理、控制权结构与投资决策—基于家族上市公司的经验证据

本文基于双重代理视角分析了地方政府治理水平和控制权结构影响家族企业投资行为的机理。以2002～2008年间我国家族上市公司为研究样本,实证检验发现,超额控制程度较高的家族企业,其内部人有动机为实现其私人收益,忽略资本市场股票价格所提供的投资机会信号,偏离最优投资决策,降低公司投资股价之间敏感度。而较高的地方政府治理水平一方面通过约束内部人的机会主义行为,另一方面使企业拥有更多的外部融资便利,减少与政府的协调成本,提高市场配置资源的能力,从而提高投资股价敏感度。进一步研究发现,家族超额控制降低投资-股价敏感度的动机在地方政府治理水平较差的家族企业中更为显著,并且会降低投资对公司业绩的贡献程度。该研究发现不仅有助于我们从理论层面更好地理解镶嵌于政府层面代理问题的中国家族企业的投资行为,而且对于提高地方政府在维持证券市场的公共治理水平,进而推动我国家族企业健康发展有着重要的政策意义。     

Access to private equity and real firm activity: Evidence from PIPEs

We study how access to private equity financing affects real firm activities using a broad panel of publicly traded U.S. firms that raise external equity through private placements (PIPEs) between 1995 and 2008. The public firms relying on PIPEs are generally small, high-tech firms that cannot finance investment internally and likely face severe external financing constraints; PIPEs are by far the most important source of finance for these firms. We show that firms use PIPE inflows to maintain extremely high R&D investment ratios and to build substantial cash reserves. We also use GMM techniques that control for firm-specific effects and the endogeneity of the decision to raise private equity and find that PIPE funding has a substantial impact on corporate investment in cash reserves and R&D, and a smaller but significant impact on investment in non-cash working capital, but little impact on fixed investment or acquisitions. Our estimates indicate that R&D investment initially increases by $0.20–$0.25 for each dollar of private equity flowing into the firm, and that PIPE funds initially invested in cash ultimately go to R&D. These findings offer direct evidence that access to private equity finance has an important effect on the key input that drives innovation at the firm- and economy-wide levels.     

Blockholder mutual fund participation in private in-house meetings

The Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) in China is unique worldwide in requiring disclosure of the timing, participants, and selected content of private in-house meetings between firm managers and outsider investors. We investigate whether these private meetings benefit hosting firms and their major outside institutional investors—blockholder mutual funds (i.e., funds with ownership ≥5%). Using a large data set of SZSE firms, we find that blockholder mutual funds have more access to private in-house meetings, and top management is more likely to be present, especially when a meeting is associated with negative news. Furthermore, when blockholder mutual funds attend negative-news meetings with top management, they are less likely to sell shares, their investment relationship with the hosting firm lasts longer, and hosting firms experience lower postmeeting stock return volatility. These findings suggest that private in-house meetings are an informative disclosure channel that improves social bonding between top management and blockholder mutual funds in ways that benefit hosting firms.     

Private firms' financial constraints and share pledging by controlling shareholders of publicly listed firms: Evidence from China

Private firms face significant financial constraints that limit their investment and growth. Recognizing the fact that many private firms belong to business groups that contain at least one publicly listed firm, we hypothesize that private firms can partially relieve their financial constraints through the cash proceeds from share pledging of publicly listed firms by the common controlling shareholder. Using data from publicly listed Chinese firms, we find results consistent with this hypothesis, especially for private firms facing greater financial constraints. However, such share pledging also creates a negative spillover on shareholder value of publicly listed firms under common ownership.     

Socially responsible investment in Japanese pensions

As the level of retirement-related assets has grown, so too has public and private interest in so-called “Socially Responsible Investment” (SRI), an investment strategy that employs criteria other than the usual financial risk and return factors when selecting firms in which to invest. This study evaluates whether SRI indices would alter portfolio risk and return patterns for the new defined contribution pension plans currently on offer in Japan. We conclude that SRI funds can be included as an option, albeit with some cost; consequently, mandatory investment in SRI portfolios cannot reasonably be justified.     

Family Control of Firms and Industries

We test what explains family control of firms and industries and find that the explanation is largely contingent on the identity of families and individual blockholders. Founders and their families are more likely to retain control when doing so gives the firm a competitive advantage, thereby benefiting all shareholders. In contrast, nonfounding families and individual blockholders are more likely to retain control when they can appropriate private benefits of control. Families are more likely to maintain control when the efficient scale is small, the need to monitor employees is high, investment horizons are long, and the firm has dual-class stock.     

Firm listing status and the investment home bias

Are public firm investment rates more sensitive than private firm rates to new investment opportunities? We offer a new explanation for differences in public and private firm investment sensitivities: investment sensitivities differ because the type of investments favored by firms varies with their listing status. Specifically, we consider the geography of investment opportunities and find that private firms have a much stronger investment home-bias than similar public firms which makes their investment decisions more sensitive to local investment opportunities than public firms. Controlling for local investment opportunities explains four-fifths of the differential sensitivity between public and private firms not explained by more traditional measures of investment opportunities.     

现金流权与控制权分离下的公司价值——基于我国家族上市公司的实证研究

为探究现金流权与控制权的分离对我国家族上市公司价值的作用机理以及影响程度,本文首先建立了一个基于控制权私人收益的理论模型。然后,本文以121家家族上市公司为样本,对现金流权、控制权、现金流权与控制权的分离率以及影响公司价值的诸多因素进行细致的分析。研究表明,我国家族上市公司现金流权与控制权的分离率平均为62%,并且此分离程度在东亚为最高。另外,研究发现:我国家族上市公司价值与现金流权比例显著负相关,这可能是与控股股东的“掠夺性分红”行为有关;我国家族上市公司价值与控制权比例显著负相关,与独立董事人数占董事会比例、负债规模、净资产收益率均不相关,与公司规模显著负相关;公司规模与现金流权与控制权的分离率显著负相关。     

Operational Improvement: The Key to Value Creation in Private Equity

With credit tightening having reduced the availability of leverage and intensified the competition for new deals, the economic recession has caused many companies in private equity firm portfolios to under-perform. These changes are forcing the private equity firms to depend even more on their ability to improve operating performance to achieve their investment goals and generate attractive returns. But few PE firms have proved capable of achieving such improvements in portfolio companies consistently over time.
In this paper, the authors discuss several ways that private equity firms use their operating expertise to drive value in their portfolio companies. They also examine the analytical framework used by some PE firms when assessing and prioritizing the many operational initiatives that could be undertaken within a newly acquired company. Part of that examination involves a detailed look at how private equity firms assemble an attractive mix of operational improvement projects in their initial 100-day plans. Finally, the authors explore one of the challenges faced by private equity firms when attempting to implement operational enhancements in newly acquired companies: bringing about change without alienating company management.
The real-world application of this approach is demonstrated with a case study that shows how one private equity buyer put its operational skills into practice to help create value within a mid-sized portfolio company.     

Does Public Firms’ Mandatory IFRS Reporting Crowd Out Private Firms’ Capital Investment?

We investigate how the mandatory adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) by publicly listed firms in the European Union affects peer private firms. We find that private firms’ capital investment decreases significantly after the IFRS mandate, relative to public firms. Private firms also display decreased investment when benchmarked against firms relatively insulated from the impact of the IFRS mandate, but the magnitude of the effect is smaller in this case. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that mandatory IFRS reporting (combined with other reforms), while increasing public firms’ financing and investment, crowds out funding for private firms. The effect is more pronounced for larger private firms and in industries where public peers have greater external financing needs. Our evidence suggests that financial reporting regulations cause shifts in resource allocation in an economy.