审计师收取客户债务风险溢价了吗?

已有研究发现,公司债务风险越高,审计师收取的审计费用越高;然而,审计费用提高的原因可能是审计投入的增加,也可能是审计师收取客户公司的债务风险溢价。由于缺少审计投入的数据,已有研究无法回答审计师是否收取客户公司债务风险溢价的问题。本文以我国A股上市公司为研究样本,运用我国独到的审计工时数据,就此展开相关问题研究。研究发现,在控制了审计投入之后,客户债务风险与审计费用显著正相关,表明审计师收取了客户公司的债务风险溢价。进一步研究表明,审计师对财务状况较差和治理较差的公司以及非国有企业收取更高的债务风险溢价,规模较小的会计师事务所收取的债务风险溢价高于规模较大的会计师事务所。     

溢价审计费用:经济租金还是审计成本?

界定溢价审计费用是否包含经济租金以及厘清其成因,对于溢价审计费用的有效管制具有重要意义.研究发现,我国资本市场溢价审计费用同时包含经济租金和成本,大部分是审计师相对于小客户的市场优势地位带来的经济租金,小部分来自成本性的审计师声誉溢价,并且四大会计师事务所的声誉溢价显著高于国内其他大所.在排除规模经济性假说以及控制内生性问题之后,上述结果依然稳健.     

上市公司法律风险与审计收费——来自中国上市公司的经验证据北大核心

本文实证检验了法律风险对审计收费的影响。结果发现:上市公司的法律风险和审计收费显著正相关。进一步研究表明,国内会计师事务所审计的上市公司,法律风险和审计收费显著正相关,而由"四大"会计师事务所审计的上市公司,法律风险和审计收费相关性不显著。这可以用审计质量溢价来解释,比起国内会计师事务所,"四大"会计师事务所存在明显的审计质量溢价,在审计定价时,法律风险不是主要影响因素。     

中国证券市场审计师声誉溢价与审计质量的经验研究

审计师在证券市场上被誉为公共利益的守护神。然而,由于证券市场上的利益相关各方无从直接识别审计报告的质量,因而审计市场便具有了“柠糠市场“的特征。当交易双方处在高度的信息不对称条件下时,声誉作为一种信号传递机制发挥着不可替代的作用。本文使用中国沪、深两市上市公司2000—2002年度年报审计费用数据,应用信号传递理论,研究了共2520个样本的审计师声誉溢价现象。研究发现:中国本地前五(四)大会计师事务所相对于本地其他所,其溢价幅度为7.57%;国际“五(四)大“会计公司在中国内地设立的国际合作所,相对于中国本地除前“五(四)大“以外的事务所而言,其声誉溢价的幅度更高,达到23.12%。研究结果表明,国际合作所、国内大、小会计师事务所之间在审计收费方面存在显著差异,即存在审计师声誉溢价现象。这说明审计师声誉作为审计质量的显示信号,已经得到市场的认同。本文的研究初步验证了中国证监会、财政部与中国注册会计师协会促使本地事务所合并、以便做大做强来提升本地会计师事务所声誉和市场竞争力的政策已经取得成效,中国本地会计师事务所的声誉机制正在形成。     

整合审计与审计费用:基于规模协同与知识溢出的双重视角

不同于美国、加拿大等国家,我国特有的(非)整合审计模式的自由选择制度,为本文研究不同模式下审计费用的横向比较提供了基础。利用2011-2015年间A股上市公司数据研究发现,整合审计较非整合审计能够显著降低审计费用,这主要源于整合审计下规模协同效应带来的审计交易效率的提升。进一步分析表明,与"非十大"相比,"十大"实施整合审计的规模协同效应更加显著;随着客户规模的增大,整合审计的规模协同效应也更加显著,但审计师对超大型客户实施整合审计的能力仍显不足。此外,没有发现不同审计模式下审计质量存在显著差异的证据。上述结论对政策制订者完善审计制度以及审计师和上市公司决策,都具有重要的指导意义。     

盈余管理对审计费用影响分析——来自中国上市公司首次审计费用披露的证据

审计收费作为客户与注册会计师之间重要的经济联系,是审计研究的重要对象;而在资本市场与会计市场的发展过程中,盈余管理问题也引起了广泛而高度的重视。那么,上市公司的盈余管理问题是否会影响到注册会计师的收费呢?自2001年开始,上市公司需要在年报中披露支付给会计师事务所的报酬情况,本文选取了2001年报按照证监会要求披露审计费用的282家公司作为研究样本,发现公司盈余管理的表现之一,即公司的净资产收益率(ROE)处于“保牌”区间,是年度财务审计费用的显著影响因素;此外,公司规模、是否由国际5大(4大)所审计显著正向影响年度财务审计费用。     

会计师事务所合并与审计定价——基于2003—2009年十起合并案面板数据的研究

会计师事务所合并究竟是会提高还是会降低审计收费,取决于合并后事务所声誉及市场势力提升所带来的审计溢价与规模效应所导致的审计成本降低两方面孰者相对占优。文章以我国2003—2009年间十起事务所合并案为对象,利用其上市公司客户在事务所合并前后各2年的面板数据,检验了事务所合并对审计定价的影响。结果发现,事务所合并后,其审计收费显著提高。对所有事务所客户审计费用的横向比较也印证了上述结论。研究还发现,事务所合并后第一年审计收费的提升较第二年更为明显;就稳定客户数据而言,本土事务所之间合并对审计定价的影响不如涉及"四大"的合并显著;此外,新设合并与吸收合并对审计定价的影响没有显著差异。     

国际金融危机、审计费用溢价与审计质量

以2003-2017年我国A股上市公司为样本,考量当企业受到金融危机冲击时,审计费用与审计质量之间关系的变化。研究结果表明,金融危机期间存在审计费用溢价现象,然而更多的收费却伴随着审计质量的下降。研究结论对于在市场危机环境下进行审计风险管控和审计市场的规范具有一定的借鉴意义。     

金融危机下审计收费风险溢价的研究

基于2008年金融危机这一外生冲击,本文考察了公司风险与审计收费间的关系。研究发现,当危机下公司的经营风险提高时,会计师事务所的审计收费增加,表明公司审计费用存在风险溢价。针对不同行业的分析显示,对于出口型企业,因受危机的影响严重,公司审计收费与经营风险显著正相关;基于不同性质公司的研究表明,由于政府的隐形担保,危机下国有公司的审计费用并未随经营风险的增加而提高;最后,金融危机下审计收费风险溢价现象主要存在于非"四大"审计的公司。     

审计市场供需不平衡、事务所选聘与审计收费

从审计市场供需双维视角,基于2007-2013年沪深两市A股上市公司样本,观察我国省级层面审计市场供需不平衡1对事务所选聘及审计收费的影响。结果表明,当省级审计市场存在供需不平衡时,会计师事务所供给每增加1个标准单位,客户选聘当地事务所的可能性增加1.4%,其中国际"四大"、本土"六大"及其他小所供给每增加1个标准单位,客户选聘当地事务所的可能性增加1.6%、1.2%和2.7%,审计费用将分别增加近2%、降低1.5%和9.9%。论文首次从我国省级层面较好地解释了审计市场供求关系变化对事务所选聘及审计收费的影响,丰富了审计相关理论,也为会计师事务所在不同省域开展业务、监管者评估不同地域间审计市场发展状况提供新的依据。     

Audit pricing and auditor industry specialization in an emerging market: Evidence from China

In this paper we examine the determinants of audit fees by focusing on auditor industry specialization and second tier auditors in the Chinese market. We find evidence of Big 4 premiums for brand name as well as industry specialization in both the statutory and supplementary market. Big 4 industry specialists earn additional premiums in the statutory market as compared to non-industry specialists. We also find that market expansion did not provide the second tier auditors any price advantage. These auditors increased their market share mainly in the mid- and small-sized clienteles. Moreover, industry experience developed by the second tier firms may have helped them gain economy of scale and reduce service fees. This may be their strategy to win future clients that seek low-priced audits.     

AUDITOR CONCENTRATION AND MARKET SHARES IN THE US: 1988–1999 A DESCRIPTIVE NOTE

This paper examines from a historical perspective the effects of the Big Eight and Big Six accounting firm mergers on concentration measures and market share percentages of major accounting firms in the US large company audit market. Concentration ratios and Herfindahl indices reflect an increasingly concentrated audit market, though individual firms differ in their success at capturing market shares in the three exchanges examined, as well as in their ability to capture newly listed companies or companies switching auditors over the 1988 to 1999 period.     

Note on Self‐Selection of Auditors in the Municipal Sector*

The objective of this article is to revisit the literature on Big‐N audit fee premiums in the municipal setting using a methodology that controls for self‐selection bias. Because auditor choices can be predicted based on certain client characteristics, using standard one‐stage ordinary least squares regressions to draw inferences about the presence or absence of such a premium in the extant public‐sector audit fee studies may not be appropriate. Results indicate that, after controlling for a self‐selection bias, Big‐6 (non‐Big‐6) municipal clients on average pay a fee premium, compared to the case if they were to retain a non‐Big‐6 (Big‐6) auditor. Results continue to hold when we conduct further analyses on a subset of municipalities with access to both Big‐6 and non‐Big‐6 auditors in a local market defined by a 60‐km radius, rather than over a province‐wide audit market. The existence of non‐Big‐6 audit fee premiums has not been documented previously in the private‐ or public‐sector audit fee literature. We surmise that it may be caused by the dominance (79.4 percent) of non‐Big‐6 auditors in the Ontario municipal market, compared to most private‐sector audit markets where their market share generally does not exceed 20 percent. The strong market position of non‐Big‐6 firms in turn may have allowed these auditors to command a fee premium for the subset of municipalities that self‐selects to be audited by them. An implication from our study is that Ontario municipalities often choose to be audited by more costly auditors, even though they could have paid lower audit fees by switching to an alternative auditor type. These results do not support those reported by Chaney et al. (2004) , who find that U.K. private firms are audited by the least costly auditor type. The conflicting findings may be attributable to the fact that the Ontario municipal audit market is subject to regulation by not just the audit profession but also the Ontario government and that, unlike business corporations, municipalities receive funding from provincial governments to fulfil much of their financial requirements. Thus, municipal clients may be relatively more willing to accept higher audit fees provided their chosen auditor (or auditor type) matches their needs.     

Note on audit fee premiums to client size and industry specialization

This research note examines the impact of client size on the estimation of audit fee premiums in the Australian market for audit services. Previous research suggests that higher audit fees are expected for both larger clients and for industry specialization. We find that in the Australian market for audit services, the fee premium attributed to industry specialist audit firms is concentrated in the audit fees paid by the largest clients in each industry. One reason for higher fees paid by larger clients is the demand for additional audit services. We find higher fees for companies cross‐listed on US exchanges. We also find that fee premiums to auditors that are city‐industry leaders are strongly related to client size.     

Determinants and consequences of voluntary switches to Chinese auditors in Hong Kong

Hong Kong market regulators have permitted 12 large Chinese accounting firms to audit the financial statements of Chinese firms that cross list in Hong Kong (i.e., H-share firms) since 2010. This paper examines the characteristics of H-share firms that voluntarily replaced their Hong Kong (HK) auditors with Chinese auditors, and the market reaction to auditor switches following this policy. We find that 38 out of 147 H-share firms voluntarily switched to Chinese auditors during 2011–2013. Switching firms are larger in size and are less likely to use Big4; they also have less need for external financing, a longer cross listing history, and a lower percentage of foreign revenue. We also find that investors negatively react to the auditor switches from HK non-Big4 to China non-Big4, but do not react to the auditor switches from HK Big4 to China Big4. This suggests that investors perceived lower audit quality for China non-Big4.     

Barriers to entry to the big firm audit market: Evidence from market reaction to switches to second Tier audit firms in the post-sox period

The US Government Accountability Office (GAO) studied concentration in the audit market and found that the Big 4 firms continue to dominate the market for clients with revenue of more than $500 million while non-Big 4 firms have gained market share among clients with revenue of $500 million or less (GAO, 2008). The US Treasury Advisory Committee on the Auditing Profession has expressed concern about barriers to entry that might prevent a non-Big 4 firm from increasing its market share among large publicly-traded clients (Advisory Committee, 2008). One of these barriers may be the potential cost to shareholders if the stock market reacts negatively to the appointment of a non-Big 4 auditor (GAO, 2003). We examine whether the stock market reacts negatively when clients switch from a Big 4 to a non-Big 4, because a negative reaction might make such switching less likely to occur. We find that the market does not react more negatively when clients move from a Big 4 to a Second Tier auditing firm than when clients move from a Big 4 to another Big 4 firm. Our results suggest that a negative market reaction may not represent a significant barrier to entry among Second Tier auditing firms.     

The Removal of a Specialist Oversight Body for Local Public Audit: Insights from the Health Service in England

The abolition of the Audit Commission in England and Wales removes the ‘protector of the public purse’. The oversight body and its audit practice are largely replaced by the private sector regime and audit firms. We analyse the audit market for health service foundation trusts, an area of local public audit that operates without oversight from the Commission. We find evidence of premiums paid to some Big4 firms and that the presence of specialist public service auditors results in fee discounts. The firms limit their liability and assurance of audit quality is reduced under new audit regimes and governance structures.     

Client importance and audit partner independence

We use data from Taiwan where audit partners are required to sign audit reports to examine whether audit partners compromise their independence for economically important clients. Uniquely, we include both listed and unlisted clients in audit partners’ client portfolios and separately study these clients for Big N and non-Big N auditors. We employ multiple proxies for auditor independence, including various abnormal accruals measures, the propensity of audit partners to issue modified audit opinions, and the probability that clients meet or just beat earnings targets. We fail to find evidence that Big N audit partners compromise their independence for economically important clients; however, we find such evidence for non-Big N auditors. Our results are robust to a battery of sensitivity analyses. While our inferences are limited to the Taiwanese capital market, our study may be of interest to market participants and regulators in other well developed capital markets.     

The financial crisis in Norway: effects on financial markets and measures taken

This article guides through the measures implemented in Norway in order to dampen negative effects stemming from the financial crisis. We also discuss some features of the Norwegian money market and the liquidity system in Norway. From the point of view of central banks, the widening gap between money market rates and the key policy rate has been one disturbing element of the financial crises. We develop a simple model, which illustrates how developments in forward exchange premiums can provide insight as to why money market premiums differ across currencies. The model shows that the excess supply of term liquidity in dollar relative to the excess supply of term liquidity in other currencies has an impact on the domestic money market premium relative to that on USD.     

Corporate governance and market segmentation: evidence from the price difference between Chinese A and H shares

This paper empirically examines whether the price difference between Chinese A shares, which are traded in the domestic market, and their matching H shares, which are traded in the Hong Kong market, can be explained by firms’ corporate governance characteristics. We find that the A- to H-share price premiums are higher for firms in which the controlling shareholders and corporate insiders have greater potential to expropriate wealth from outside investors. This result is robust when we use a variety of corporate governance variables specific to listed Chinese companies to explain the A-share price premiums and when we control for differences between domestic and foreign investors in required returns, degree of speculative trading, liquidity, information, and demand elasticity. Our findings highlight the important role of corporate governance in explaining the price difference in segmented stock markets.