商业银行同业业务发展及其对流动性管理的影响

近年来,金融机构同业业务发展迅速,对于实现规模扩大、调剂资金余缺、增强盈利水平发挥了重要作用,但还存在高杠杆率、期限错配和规避监管等诸多问题,给流动性管理带来较大压力,给金融体系安全稳定运行带来较大隐患.本文全面分析了同业业务现状,分析了其对流动性管理的影响,并借鉴英国北岩银行倒闭案例,提出完善我国同业业务发展的若干建议.     

浅谈商业银行同业业务风险控制

同业业务通常主要承担商业银行司库职能，其主要目的是用于银行资金的流动陆管理。近年来，商业银行在传统盈利模式受到挑战、表内贷款规模受到限制的压力下，开始挖掘同业业务的发展空间，大量配置非标准化债权资产，央行称之为“同业渠道”业务。这种盈利模式给银行带来了较好的收益，但同时电加重了银行同业资产和负债的期限错配，增加了银行体系的流动性风险。     

货币政策、同业业务与银行流动性创造

本文通过构造商业银行同业和非同业流动性创造指标,研究了货币政策对银行流动性创造的总体和结构性影响,根据商业银行参与同业业务的不同程度分析了货币政策作用的异质性,并检验了商业银行参与同业业务的影响因素。研究结果表明:第一,货币政策同时影响商业银行的流动性创造增速和结构,宽松的货币政策提高了银行总体流动性创造增速和非同业流动性创造增速,但是降低了同业流动性创造增速;第二,对参与同业业务程度不同的银行,货币政策的影响存在异质性,具体为宽松的货币政策降低了高参与度银行的同业流动性创造增速,提高了低参与度银行的同业流动性创造增速;第三,货币政策显著地改变了银行的同业资产持有比例,银行的风险越高,参与同业业务的程度越高。因此,在宏观审慎政策框架下,应该加强货币政策和金融监管的配合;运用多种货币政策工具,及时进行预调微调;进一步促进金融市场的发展,降低银行对同业业务的过度依赖。     

近年商业银行阶段性的流动性紧缺问题研究

本文首先概述了商业银行流动性管理策略,然后分析了近年我国银行体系流动性状况,剖析了商业银行从2008年以前的流动性过剩转向2011年以后阶段性流动性紧缺的原因,主要包括金融危机时期银行业巨额信贷投放、存款利率管制与金融脱媒背景下银行存款比重下降、银行理财产品和同业业务期限错配、中央银行采取稳健从紧的货币政策、外部监管及美联储量化宽松政策退出的影响。最后,本文提出改善商业银行流动性管理的建议。     

近年商业银行阶段性的流动性紧缺问题研究

本文首先概述了商业银行流动性管理策略,然后分析了近年我国银行体系流动性状况,剖析了商业银行从2008年以前的流动性过剩转向2011年以后阶段性流动性紧缺的原因,主要包括金融危机时期银行业巨额信贷投放、存款利率管制与金融脱媒背景下银行存款比重下降、银行理财产品和同业业务期限错配、中央银行采取稳健从紧的货币政策、外部监管及美联储量化宽松政策退出的影响.最后,本文提出改善商业银行流动性管理的建议.     

商业银行期限错配下流动性风险测度及影响因素分析

本文立足于我国新的宏观经济金融形势，梳理分析商业银行期限错配与流动性风 险的相互关系。在此基础上，以某城市商业银行为例，通过H-P滤波流动性缺口分析方法对其 期限错配下的流动性风险进行了测度，通过测量发现该商业银行在近几年存在一定的流动性 风险。随后通过建立面板数据模型进一步分析了外部相关因素对商业银行期限错配下流动性 风险的影响关系和程度。研究表明，宏观经济增长、同业拆借利率、不良贷款以及存款准备金 率等因素都会对流动性产生不同程度的影响。据此提出相应的对策建议。     

期限错配如何影响商业银行的稳健性——基于商业银行微观数据的实证分析

本文从理论层面梳理了我国商业银行期限错配与经营稳健性之间的内在传导机制。在此基础上,以2011—2018年间我国202家商业银行的非平衡面板数据为样本,实证分析了期限错配对银行稳健性的影响,并按照银行性质不同进行了异质性研究。研究发现:(1)期限错配显著弱化了银行经营的稳健性;(2)将影响程度进行分样本比较,全国性股份制银行高于城市商业银行,大型国有商业银行和农村商业银行结果不显著;(3)进一步分析期限错配影响银行稳健性的传导渠道,发现流动性风险在两者之间具有显著的中介效应,在样本分类比较中,全国性股份制银行流动性风险的相对贡献为10.3%,低于城市商业银行的22.6%,说明相较于城市商业银行,全国性股份制银行的融资渠道多、融资能力强,因而流动性风险对其稳健性的影响有限。     

投资者合理组合提高收益

正一行三会日前联合外汇局发布《关于规范金融机构同业业务的通知》(以下简称127号文)明确表示,将对同业业务的期限错配问题进行监管,控制好流动性风险。对同业业务进行规范,有利于控制流动性风险,但是对普通投资者来说,可能要面临理财收益下行的情况。     

我国商业银行同业业务高杠杆化的模式、影响和监管研究

近年来,在金融脱煤、利率市场化等方面的多重压力下,银行间低成本、低资本占用的同业业务快速扩张,其高杠杆、期限错配的特点在提高银行收益的同时也埋下了风险隐患。本文在详细梳理银行业同业业务主要模式的基础上,深入分析了银行业同业业务提高杠杆率的机制;通过进一步阐述同业业务高杠杆率对银行的主要影响以及可能带来的潜在风险,论证了同业业务去杠杆的必要性和迫切性;最后借鉴欧美等国的去杠杆经验,对规范我国同业业务发展提出了建议。     

商业银行强化同业风险治理体系的探索

<正>近年来,银行同业业务发展势头迅猛,特别是在经济结构调整、商业银行竞争加剧下,受利益的驱使,同业业务的发展趋势有悖于其最初作为流动性管理工具的初衷,沦为商业银行风险扩张的手段,成为监管的重点。商业银行要想在强监管下突围,另辟蹊径开展同业业务,需要强化风险治理体系,健全投资决策机制。一、银行同业的风险管理现状在盈利模式趋同、息差收窄加剧的背景下,为追求超额利润,多家银行通过美化指标、逃避监管、降低信用、放大杠杆、进行期限错配等手段,以承担风险扩张为代价,开展同业业务进行各种套利,以刺激利润快速增长。同业业务的     

银行间市场流动性与金融风险救助机制研究

文章从我国银行间市场结构特征出发,分析了近年来银行间市场利率和流动性大 幅波动的内在机理与原因。研究认为,塔形市场交易结构下,银行间市场存在流动性风险易聚 集不易分散的缺陷,且难以依靠“有形之手”得到弥补。文章结合塔形市场结构的特点建立矩 阵分析法,对40家金融机构资产负债表进行实证分析。结论印证了理论分析,即塔形市场交易 结构下风险冲击影响时间更长,且央行流动性救助效果降低,但流动性救助机制能降低风险对 中小型地方法人金融机构的冲击。因此,有必要建立流动性风险救助机制,弥补银行间市场客 观存在的缺陷,增强中小型地方法人金融机构抵御银行间市场流动性风险冲击的能力。     

Lending-of-last-resort is as lending-of-last-resort does: Central bank liquidity provision and interbank market functioning in the euro area

This paper investigates the impact of ample liquidity provision by the European Central Bank on the functioning of the overnight unsecured interbank market from 2008 to 2014. We use novel data on interbank transactions derived from TARGET2, the main euro area payment system. To identify exogenous shocks to central bank liquidity, we exploit the timing of ECB liquidity operations and use a simple structural vector auto-regression framework. We argue that the ECB acted as a de facto lender-of-last-resort to the euro area banking system and identify two main effects of central bank liquidity provision on interbank markets. First, central bank liquidity replaces the demand for liquidity in the interbank market, especially during the financial crisis (2008–2010). Second, it increases the supply of liquidity in the interbank market in stressed countries (Greece, Italy and Spain) during the sovereign debt crisis (2011–2013).     

An early warning indicator system to monitor the unsecured interbank funds market

A core goal of regulators and financial authorities is to understand how market prices convey information on the financial health of its participants. From this viewpoint we build an Early-Warning Indicators System (EWIS) that allows for identifying those financial institutions perceived as risky counterparts by the participants of the interbank market. We use micro-level data from bilateral overnight unsecured loans performed in the interbank market between January 2011 and December 2014. The EWIS identifies those participants that systematically pay high prices for liquidity in this market. We employ coverage tests to estimate EWIS’ robustness and consistency. We find that financial institutions with an elevated frequency of signals tend to exhibit a net borrower liquidity position in the interbank market, hence suggesting they are facing recurrent liquidity needs. Those institutions also exhibit higher probability of insolvency measured by the Z-score indicator. Thus, our results support the existence of market discipline based on peer-monitoring. Overall, the EWIS may assist financial authorities in focusing their attention and resources on those financial institutions perceived by the market as those closer to distress.     

改善银行间外汇市场衍生品流动性的初步设想

随着金融市场的深入发展,我国外汇衍生品市场发展迅速,外汇衍生品的品种逐渐丰富。在银行间市场上,有些较为复杂的外汇衍生品现阶段流动性不高。文章以货币掉期和外汇期权这两种流动性尚不充分的衍生品为样本,通过对其交易情况和市场参与情况的分析,归纳出流动性不高的表现和产生原因。最后从市场组织方的角度提出改善银行间外汇市场衍生品流动性的初步设想。     

Money and liquidity in financial markets

We argue that there is a connection between the interbank market for liquidity and the broader financial markets, which has its basis in demand for liquidity by banks. Tightness in the market for liquidity leads banks to engage in what we term “liquidity pull-back,” which involves selling financial assets either by banks directly or by levered investors. Empirical tests on the stock market are supportive. Tighter interbank markets are associated with relatively more volume in more liquid stocks; selling pressure, especially in more liquid stocks; and transitory negative returns. We control for market-wide uncertainty and in the process also contribute to the literature on portfolio rebalancing. Our general point is that money matters in financial markets.     

Bank market power,asset liquidity and funding liquidity: International evidence

Our investigation of the association between bank market power and liquidity in 101 countries reveals that a bank's initial gains of market power lead to increases in bank liquidity, but does so at a diminishing rate. Beyond an empirically determined threshold, further increases in market power are inversely associated with bank liquidity. From a cross-sectional viewpoint, banks that lack market power hold more liquid assets and are net lenders in the interbank market. In contrast, dominant banks hold less liquid assets and are net interbank borrowers. For a given level of market power, ceteris paribus, developed nation banks hold less asset liquidity and obtain more interbank funding liquidity than their developing country peers. These results remain equally relevant during the 2007–2009 global financial crisis (GFC).     

Investigating risk contagion initiated by endogenous liquidity shocks: evidence from the US and eurozone interbank markets

This paper investigates liquidity spillovers between the US and European interbank markets during turbulent and tranquil periods. We show that an endogenous model with time-varying transition probabilities is effective in describing the propagation of liquidity shocks within the interbank market, while predicting liquidity crashes characterised by changed dynamics. We show that liquidity shocks, originating from movements of the spread between the Asset Backed Commercial Paper and T-bill, drive regime changes in the euro fixed-float OIS swap rate. Our results support the idea of endogenous contagion from the US money market to the eurozone money market during the global financial crisis.     

Interbank liquidity risk transmission to large emerging markets in crisis periods

In this paper, we conduct two investigations regarding funding liquidity risk in large emerging economies: Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa — BRICS. In the first, we track the relevance of monetary policy decisions originating in developed economies for interbank funding liquidity risk in BRICS economies during crisis periods by applying a time-varying parameter model in a Bayesian framework. The results indicate weak associations between interbank credit market and US monetary policy and market conditions. In contrast, the Federal Reserve's National Financial Conditions Index (NFCI) — a representative of the health of both real and financial sectors in the US — matters more. The temporal patterns of the results imply that key central banking decisions precede or coincide with low degrees of associations. In the second, we examine whether interbank credit crunch exerts an influence on market liquidity risk in BRICS economies using a Granger causality approach. The results reveal that interbank credit crunch depresses market liquidity in the corresponding domestic market and that the state of fear and credit market conditions in the US exert some influence in this regard. Overall, our findings hint at judicious market intervention and liquidity management by BRICS central banks.     

中国银行业系统流动性风险考察与控制——基于资产抛售价格视角

基于银行业在宏观风险来临时出现的流动性不足和系统性风险,通过建立 DSGE-VAR 模型,考量银行业在宏观经济运行框架下的系统流动性风险,结果发现:银行同业借贷、其他证券资产和交易性负债业务的综合作用会使得银行系统流动性风险总体增大,银行如果想要降低存款提取率对其流动性的影响,就要在银行间市场停止拆出资金、出售政府证券及其他流动资产,并出售潜在的流动性较低的资产.从监管层面来讲,应当通过监管的引导效应将交易性负债进行转化,引导同业借贷和其他证券资产业务向平衡区域集中,并在一定范围内减少银行其他证券资产业务的规模.     

Stressed,Not Frozen: The Federal Funds Market in the Financial Crisis

We examine the importance of liquidity hoarding and counterparty risk in the U.S. overnight interbank market during the financial crisis of 2008. Our findings suggest that counterparty risk plays a larger role than does liquidity hoarding: the day after Lehman Brothers' bankruptcy, loan terms become more sensitive to borrower characteristics. In particular, poorly performing large banks see an increase in spreads of 25 basis points, but are borrowing 1% less, on average. Worse performing banks do not hoard liquidity. While the interbank market does not freeze entirely, it does not seem to expand to meet latent demand.