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1.
政府董事是国家基于股权或特别立法,委派到公司制国企或承担了公共任务的私企董事会中履行公务职责的董事,在世界各国普遍存在。近年来,我国学者也相继提出了政府董事的概念,但相关代表性观点仅反映了政府董事某一方面特征,难以揭示其实质内涵及全貌。综观各国政府董事立法与实践,结合我国国情,我国的政府董事当为国家股权董事且为非管理层董事并兼具公私法双重身份,如此才能发挥其作为政府董事的功能,防止企业国有资产流失并保障政府目标的实现,从而为我国国企混合所有制改革提供制度保障。  相似文献   

2.
公司中经国有股权支持当选的董事及监事,负有公法上特定的国资经营与监督职责,实质为国家出资人公务代表。而作为公司的董监事,其与公司为私法上的委任与代表关系,由此决定了其兼具公法人格与私法人格。因公私法调整的对象及侧重的利益点不同,其双重人格必然发生冲突。为解决其冲突并实现其平衡,立法应确立国家出资人代表与公司经理层的隔离机制,创设影子董事责任制度和国家民事赔偿制度,并通过公司章程的规制来实现。  相似文献   

3.
妥当定位公司慈善捐赠中董事的行为规则,是解决公司慈善捐赠活动中各种利益冲突的关键.客观上公司慈善捐赠会增进社会公共利益,但董事决策公司慈善捐赠的行为目标却应该与董事在公司治理中的职责相一致,即促进公司利益最大化.公司慈善捐赠中董事需对公司承担忠实义务和勤勉义务,以公司利益为自己的行为准则,竭力通过捐赠促进公司长期与短期利益的最大化.  相似文献   

4.
从公司治理层面完善国有控股企业的股权制衡是国企混合所有制改革的重点和难点,以往学者仅仅研究了股权制衡与公司绩效之间的关系,很少研究两者关系的作用路径和影响机理.因此,引入非国有股东委派董事这一概念,研究非国有股东委派董事在股权制衡与公司绩效之间发挥的中介效应.结果表明:股权制衡有利于公司绩效的提升,非国有股东委派董事在股权制衡与公司绩效两者之间发挥了中介效应.  相似文献   

5.
胡鹏程 《金卡工程》2009,13(7):98-98
学术自由是大学赖以生存的土壤,它极容易被政府等力量侵蚀。大学法律为保障学术自由,首先要确立大学的独立法人身份,赋予大学与政府平等的人格,使大学可以更好的维护自己的权利,政府敬畏大学的学术自由。我国大学公法上的公务法人身份不明,导致政府对大学过度干预。需要进一步明确大学的公务法人身份。  相似文献   

6.
政府董事是公司制国企中经国家股权支持委派或当选的董事。各国实践表明,政府董事虽具公司法上董事的外在形式,但实质为公职人员。政府董事的双重身份决定了其选任不能纯粹遵循私法的逻辑,需综合考虑公私法上双重因素。我国政府董事存在选任主体多元、标准不明、选任方式与程序不规范等问题。建议借鉴国外有益经验,在政府层面设立政府董事提名委员会,建立任职资格制度和董事池,优化提名、考察及任免等程序,并由政府与选定的政府董事签订聘任合同,将其纳入聘任制公务员管理。  相似文献   

7.
杨如彦 《中国金融》2005,(24):72-72
我国上市公司最终控制人的身份,决定了国内公司治理结构的“中国特色”,也成为公司治理中最引人注目的因素。据统计,国内上市公司的最终控制人中,国有公司占据71%以上.民营公司占据17%以上.这两类身份的股东,其行为特征各具“特色”:国有会司并非总是以利润最大化为经营目标,在地方政府或其下属机构的作用下,  相似文献   

8.
政府行为对我周商业银行经营管理的控制主要体现在两个方面:一方面是通过持有商业银行股权来获得对商业银行的控制权,并且通过国有股权的高度集中使国有控股的地化保持不变.这样的股权结构特点又衍生出一系列的问题,如委托人不明确或缺位,激励机制的扭曲,内部人控制问题突出等.另一方面,政府通过对商业银行大多数管理者的任命制以及薪酬制定的干预来获得对商业银行人力资本市场的控制.这将导致商业银行管理嚣的激励目标发生偏移,政治目标、职位的提升取代经济目标成为他们最重要的目标;并且薪酬水平与其承担的责任、风险不相匹配.  相似文献   

9.
以2005~2012年中国上市公司为样本构建面板数据,研究在不同股权结构的公司中连锁董事对公司绩效的影响,结果发现:连锁董事在董事会中所占比例与公司绩效呈正相关;具有丰富社会资源与经验的连锁董事在国有股权比例高的企业可带来较高的边际效应;国有股权所占比例高的企业,连锁董事在董事会中所占比例越高。  相似文献   

10.
上市公司国有股权管理的核心和基石是确定与我省省情及上市公司实情相符的、科学合理的国有股权管理目标.国有股权管理目标决定着上市公司国有股权管理的政策、方向、手段和途径.甘肃省上市公司国有股权管理目标的确定要综合考虑国家国有资产管理部门的义务、国有股权管理的基本任务、我省国有控股和参股的上市公司在我省经济中的战略地位及我省上市公司国有股权的现状等因素.……  相似文献   

11.
The separate legal entity doctrine in corporate law means that directors are not generally liable for their company's liabilities. However, there have been actions taken by governments and courts to make directors liable in certain cases. This article examines and compares legislative provisions in the United Kingdom and Australia to make directors liable for the debts of their companies. These provisions, namely section 214 of the UK's Insolvency Act 1986 (wrongful trading) and section 588G of the Australian Corporations Act 2001 (insolvent trading), had the same starting point, but now differ substantially, even though, arguably, they retain very similar objectives. The article investigates: the reasons for these differences; the criteria on which each of the provisions focus; and the ramifications for the different approaches. It also endeavours to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of the respective approaches adopted in each country. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.  相似文献   

12.
Materiality is an elusive, but fundamentally important concept in corporate reporting of all kinds—not only in traditional financial reporting, but in sustainability and integrated reporting as well. In the end, materiality is entity‐specific and based on judgment. Moreover, it is a judgment that should ultimately be made by a company's board of directors, which makes materiality as much a governance as a reporting issue. Whether a given ESG issue is material is in large part a function of the corporate stakeholders, or “audiences,” that the company's board of directors deems to be “significant”—that is, important to the company's ability to create value over the short, medium, and long term. The identification of such audiences—together with the time frames the board uses to evaluate the impact of the company's decisions on these audiences—provides the basis for determining the sustainability issues that corporate management must focus on for performance and reporting purposes. To help ensure that decisions about materiality receive the attention they deserve, the authors propose that corporate boards articulate their views in an annual “Statement of Significant Audiences and Materiality.” Contrary to the prevailing belief that the fiduciary duty of the board is to place shareholders’ interests first, nothing precludes corporate boards from issuing such a statement. Recent research, including the compilation of legal memos on fiduciary duty and nonfinancial reporting for all G20 countries, makes it clear that the board's fiduciary duty is to “the corporation itself.” In exercising this duty, directors have full discretion, under the business judgment rule and other authorities, to decide which audiences, along with the company's shareholders, should be deemed significant.  相似文献   

13.
Uncertainty is a constant theme when corporations are in financial distress. Yet any successful restructuring of an insolvent corporation requires numerous stakeholders, including creditors, employees and suppliers, repose some degree of trust in those corporate officers who are trying to continue to operate the firm while restructuring it into a viable entity. This article looks at the issue of the positive and negative incentives that can be generated for corporate officers and directors from both their continuing control of corporate assets and their potential personal liability arising from corporate activity both before and after the corporation became insolvent. The potential role these incentives can play in providing a basis for the trust needed to meet the other governance challenges that arise in a restructuring is reviewed in the context of recent developments in Canada concerning the duties of corporate directors to creditors during insolvency. Also reviewed is the role of directors' insurance and indemnification in altering the incentives' effects on directors' behavior. Finally a critical appraisal is given of the present legal regime's provision for compromise of claims against corporate officers during restructuring, as well as the proposal to amend the law to allow complete exoneration of corporate directors from certain liabilities on insolvency. The article urges caution in altering the effects of incentives that may create the necessary basis for trust in the distressed corporation's officers amongst those stakeholders whose co‐operation is crucial to restructuring. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.  相似文献   

14.
Directors are obviously critical to the management of companies, and perhaps even more so when a company is in financial difficulties. This paper examines the position of directors when their company is in the vicinity of insolvency. It provides an analytical exposition of the law that exists in common law jurisdictions where, in the vicinity of insolvency, there is a shift in the nature of the duties of its directors, namely, directors have to take into account the interest of the creditors when exercising their powers and discharging their duties. The paper endeavours to identify and discuss the main problems that exist with this shift in the nature of duties so that if other jurisdictions do consider implementing it, they are aware of the drawbacks and may be able to address them. Copyright © 2015 INSOL International and John Wiley & Sons, Ltd  相似文献   

15.
This paper critically examines the duties of receiver/managers in Nigeria and Ghana with a view to determining their adequacy or otherwise. The paper distinguishes between a receiver/manager appointed pursuant to ownership or management dispute and a receiver/manager appointed pursuant to the realization of security. With respect to the former the paper concludes that the persons appointed thereby are better described as managers and suggests a more detailed elaboration of their duties. To determine the duties of receiver/managers appointed to realize security the paper examines the meaning of the receiver/managers; the capacity to be appointed to that office and the duties of a receiver/manager appointed by the court as well as those appointed out of court by the security holders. The paper also considers the consequences of a breach of duty and concludes that the law on receivership is largely the same in Nigeria and Ghana even though there is more litigation in Nigeria. Furthermore the paper suggests the importance of appointing professionals as receiver/managers; the need for the clarity of rules to enable the receiver/managers effectively discharge their duties to enable an assessment of the adequacy of the duties. In this regard the paper recommends a comprehensive reform of insolvency law in Nigeria and Ghana. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.  相似文献   

16.
The primary insolvency restructuring mechanism in the UK is administration under the Insolvency Act 1986, as amended by the Enterprise Act 2002. In an administration, an insolvency professional known as an administrator, who is accountable to the insolvent company's creditors as a whole, is appointed to oversee the restructuring. The administration process was designed to rehabilitate distressed but viable companies and businesses and to maximize creditors' recoveries. Increasingly, however, insolvent companies are using this process to sell substantially all of their assets through pre‐packaged administrations or ‘pre‐packs’. In a pre‐pack, the insolvent company and its senior creditors negotiate the terms of the sale prior to initiating administration proceedings and appointing an administrator. The administrator then implements the deal, often with little or no input from junior creditors or other stakeholders. Both the US Bankruptcy Code and the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act in Canada permit insolvent companies to sell substantially all of their assets under the auspices of the restructuring legislation. This article compares pre‐packs with these US and Canadian processes, arguing that they are all functionally equivalent in that they facilitate quick realizations for secured creditors by bypassing traditional restructuring processes. This analysis suggests that pre‐packs may give too much control over the restructuring process to secured creditors, encouraging rent‐seeking and other value‐destructive behaviours that undermine the fundamental goals of insolvency law. Copyright © 2017 INSOL International and John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.  相似文献   

17.
依据2007-2016年中国上市公司数据,考量上市公司董事会报告的可读性、制度环境与股权资本成本之间的关系。结果发现:董事会报告更好的可读性、制度环境更完善有助于降低公司股权资本成本;制度环境越完善,公司股权资本成本越少受到董事会报告可读性的影响。鉴此,应完善公司非财务信息披露和外部制度环境,促进企业有效信息的对外传递,降低企业融资成本。  相似文献   

18.
经济法责任特征新论   总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1  
经济法责任在形式上表现为由若干法律责任元素遵循行政责任在先、民事责任居中、刑事责任在后,市场主体责任在先、主管机关责任在后这一基本规律形成的链条,体现着经济法先规制市场失灵,再控制政府失灵这一事实逻辑和经济法产生与发展的轨迹.经济法责任链有长有短,链条中所包括的责任元素有多有少,这取决于经济违法行为给社会造成危害的可能性与严重程度.在实质上,经济法责任链是经济违法行为外部性在法律责任上的体现,是社会责任本位对经济法的内在要求,体现了经济法的价值目标--社会整体经济效率.  相似文献   

19.
A former CEO of a large and successful public company teams up with a former chief investment strategist and a well‐known academic to suggest ten practices for public companies intent on creating long‐run value:
  1. Establish long‐term value creation as the company's governing objective.
  2. Ensure that annual plans are consistent with the company's long‐term strategic plan.
  3. Understand the expectations embedded in today's stock price.
  4. Conduct a “premortem”—and so gain a solid understanding of what can go wrong—before making any large capital allocation decisions.
  5. Incorporate the “outside view” in the strategic planning process.
  6. Reallocate capital to its highest‐valued use, selling corporate assets that are worth more to or in the hands of others.
  7. Prioritize strategies rather than individual projects.
  8. Avoid public commitments, such as earnings guidance, that can compromise a company's capital allocation flexibility.
  9. Apply best private equity practices to public companies.
  10. CEOs should work closely with their boards of directors to set clear expectations for creating long‐term value.
These practices, as the authors note in closing, “are meant to provide a starting point for public companies in carrying out their mission of creating long‐run value—and in a way that earns the respect, if not the admiration and support, of all its important stakeholders.”  相似文献   

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