关联交易对上市公司的影响分析

企业集团内部存在关联交易是一种正常现象,关联交易可以减少交易对象的搜寻成本和其他交易成本,还可以提高交易效率,对公司业绩有着有利影响,但关联交易对上市公司也存在不利影响,关联交易使得上市公司独立性和资产完整性降低,使得上市公司的资源不能按照市场要求优化配置;在当前法律环境不健全的情况下,控股股东或其他关联方也会通过关联交易对上市公司进行利益侵占,使得中小股东利益受损,应当严厉禁止。     

上市公司治理结构缺陷对非公平关联交易的影响

由于我国上市公司在治理结构方面存在股权集中度高、董事会制度不合理、监事会、独立董事的作用得不到充分发挥、激励机制不健全等问题,使得上市公司与关联各方发生不公平关联交易,损害了中小股东和债权人的利益,因此进一步完善股权结构、完善董事会功能、健全监事会、独立董事制度、完善信息披露制度等方面来治理不公平关联交易。     

我国上市公司控股股东利益侵占行为研究：一个委托代理模型

我国上市公司控股股东侵占上市公司以及中小股东利益的行为屡见不鲜。其主要途径包括：虚假招股说明书、关联交易、股利政策、定向增发以及利润操纵。上市公司中小股东与控股股东间存在着委托代理关系。控股股东的利益侵占行为不仅降低了上市公司的期望收益,还降低了控股股东自身的努力程度以及所享有的收益份额。通过推进上市公司股权分散化、完善上市公司信息披露制度、推进＂以股抵债＂等金融创新,可以纠正上市公司控股股东侵占中小股东利益行为。     

独立董事制度有效性与控股股东关联交易——来自深交所制造业上市公司的经验数据

基于2002～2008年深交所制造业上市公司的证据,本文以控股股东与上市公司之间的关联交易作为研究对象,结合独立董事所占比例、专业性和薪酬等基本特征,考察了独立董事能否有效发挥其监督职能。研究发现:独立董事的专业性对控股股东与上市公司的关联交易有显著的抑制作用,独立董事薪酬与控股股东与上市公司关联交易的频率显著正相关,独立董事的比例对控股股东与上市公司关联交易没有显著影响。这些结论有助于我们从新的视角去改进我国上市公司独立董事制度以提高其监督制约控股股东的职能。     

成本转嫁型关联交易与上市公司利益影响的博弈分析

成本转嫁型关联交易是指关联公司(或控股股东)所有可能引起上市公司产品成本(或经营风险)提高的关联交易行为,本文通过建立一个博弈模型具体分析了上市公司控股股东的成本转嫁型关联交易对上市公司利益的影响.     

金字塔控制、关联交易与公司价值——基于我国民营上市公司的实证研究

本文以我国证券市场2002～2004年329家民营上市公司为样本，考察了金字塔控制、关联交易与公司价值之间的关系。发现民营上市公司的金字塔控制不利干公司价值：民营上市公司的最终控制人主要通过关联方担保、关联方资金占用和上市公司与关联方的商品购销活动来侵占小股东的利益，其政策含义是应该鼓励自然人直接持股上市公司，加强对关联交易的监管。更为重要的是必须改营公司外部治理环境、尤其是法律对投资者权益的保护，从而从根本上杜绝民营上市公司及其最终控制人对小股东的侵害行为，改善公司治理，提高公司价值。     

上市公司并购重组经济后果实证研究——基于关联交易与非关联交易的比较研究

本文以2012年和2013年共143个发生并购重组的上市公司为样本(其中发生关联交易并购重组的样本74个,发生非关联交易并购重组的69个),运用事件研究法,在对总体样本经济后果进行研究的基础上,主要对关联交易并购重组与非关联交易并购重组经济后果进行了比较研究.研究发现,关联交易并购重组经济后果好于非关联交易,但并购重组公告后两者绩效均有所下滑.总体而言,并购重组不但没有给股东带来财富反而产生了负面影响.     

上市公司关联交易监管制度问题及完善对策

关联交易是企业关联方之间在公司运作中经常出现的而又易于发生不公平结果的交易。我国上市公司关联交易的监管因先天不足,导致违法违规时有发生,极大地损害了投资者的利益。为此,遏制有害的关联交易,保护投资者利益,显得十分必要。本文从我国关联交易现有制度出发,分析了关联交易监管制度存在的问题及弊端,提出了完善我国上市公司监管制度的对策。     

论上市公司关联交易的审计策略

目前，我国上市公司发生关联交易情况十分普遍。据对1018家上市公司的调查统计，发生各类关联交易行为的公司有949家，占被调查对象总数的93．22％，其中有214家公司在资本经营活动中发生关联交易，占发生关联交易公司总数的22．60％，产品经营活动中发生关联交易的公司更是多达937家，占98．73％。上市公司中关联方交易类型有多种多样，包括：购买或销售商品、     

上市公司关联方交易的信息披露研究

关联方交易是上市公司和它的关联方及控股子公司之间发生的转移义务或资源的事项,且不论是否收取价款。关联方交易具有隐蔽性、非公允性、难监管性等特点。为增强上市公司披露信息的实用可比性,帮助会计报表使用者更详细准确地了解企业关联交易风险,加大对关联交易的监管力度,结合我国上市公司关联交易的披露现状,必须制定相关制度,帮助会计报表使用者更详细准确地了解企业关联交易风险。要更好地发挥注册会计师的审计监督作用以及加强行业自律和监管结构监督,加大对违规披露行为的处罚力度。     

Related party transactions and firm value: The moderating role of corporate social responsibility reporting

This study investigates the influence of related party transactions (RPTs) on firm value. Further, it examines whether a firm’s corporate social responsibility (CSR) reporting reflects its corporate values and ethical concerns, therefore mitigating the value-destroying effects of RPTs. Based on 274 observations from publicly listed firms in Indonesia, our results show that RPTs (i.e., related party sales) are negatively related to firm value. Further, we find that in the presence of better CSR reporting, the relationship between RPTs and firm value becomes more positive. This is in line with the view that CSR reporting, which reflects firms’ ethical concerns, may serve as a mechanism against managers’ opportunism. However, we find that related party payables have a positive relationship with firm value. Further investigation reveals that, although certain RPTs show a short-term, value-enhancing effect, these transactions seem to result in subsequent tunneling activities, suggesting managerial opportunism in the long term.     

Value relevance of disclosed related party transactions

Several recent North American corporate scandals have brought attention to the potential for accounting manipulations associated with related party transactions (RPTs), which have lead to a decline in perceived earnings quality. We examine the value relevance of disclosed RPTs in Chinese corporations. We focus on two types of RPTs: sales of goods and sales of assets. From 1997 to 2000, we find that the reported earnings of firms selling goods or assets to related parties exhibit a lower valuation coefficient than those of firms in China without such transactions. This result is not observed during 2001-2003 after a new fair value measurement rule for RPTs came into effect. Our evidence suggests that the new RPT regulation in China is perceived to be effective at reducing the potential misuse of RPTs for earnings management purposes. Since RPTs have been the subject of numerous scandals in North America, our evidence from the Chinese stock markets suggests that new RPT accounting standards could prove an efficient solution to this issue.     

Do related party transactions affect family firm valuations?

We examine the likelihood and value relevance of related party transactions in family firms. Based on an extensive hand-collected sample, we find that founder-led family firms are more likely to enter into related party transactions than other firms. We also find that the founder-led family firm valuation premium is reduced when these firms disclose related party transactions, especially opportunistic related party transactions. We also examine the significant change in related party transaction reporting regulations enacted in 2006 and find that it led to a decline in the number of value-decreasing related party transactions for founder-led family firms. We find a corresponding decrease in the detrimental effect of related party transactions on founder-led family firms’ valuation. Our results suggest that changes in the 2006 SEC related party transaction reporting regulations better protected minority shareholders from wealth extraction via related party transactions in founder-led family firms.     

商标剥离决策与关联交易

本文分析了上市公司的商标剥离决策与关联交易之间的关系,发现商标所有权属的划分为母公司提供了除股权以外的控制上市公司的新手段,而无偿取得所有权或者使用权的方式将商标培育成本在改制过程中转嫁给了母公司,客观上造成母公司会在企业上市后通过一定的关联交易转移利益、弥补成本的强烈动机。具体表现为:其它条件均等的情况下,母公司掌握商标所有权的上市公司的关联交易金额水平大于商标所有权归上市公司的样本组;无偿获得商标所有权或者使用权的上市公司的关联交易发生额大于有偿取得的样本组;以不确定的金额从母公司获得商标使用权的上市公司的关联交易发生额高于以确定金额从母公司获得使用权的样本。     

基于效率观和掏空观的关联交易与盈余质量关系研究

目前学术界关于大股东控制下的关联交易对上市公司的影响主要存在"效率促进"和"掏空"两种主流观点。郑国坚等(2007)发现关联交易与上市公司价值之间存在N型关系,表明两种效应在我国同时存在。本文进一步从会计盈余质量的角度检验这两种观点。通过对我国2000-2005年5576家上市公司的实证研究发现,关联交易与会计盈余质量之间是一种直线关系,关联交易程度越高,盈余管理程度越大、价值相关性也越低。这说明,从会计盈余质量的角度看,关联交易主要表现为掏空效应,损害会计盈余质量。     

Product market competition,ultimate controlling structure and related party transactions

Previous studies have shown that product market competition has an important effect on corporate strategies and internal governance mechanisms. Using a sample of China’s listed firms from 2004 to 2009, we explore the relationship between product market competition and normal related party transactions and find a significant positive relationship. In addition, we investigate the substitutive effect of product market competition and the cash flow rights owned by ultimate controlling shareholders on the extent of normal related party transactions. In particular, our results suggest a positive relationship between the ultimate controlling shareholders’ cash flow rights and normal related party transactions that is strongest in noncompetitive industries and weakens as product market competition increases.     

Not All Related Party Transactions (RPTs) Are the Same: Ex Ante Versus Ex Post RPTs

Related party transactions (RPTs) are potential means for insiders to expropriate outside shareholders via self‐dealing. There are, however, possible benefits to these arrangements for outside shareholders. We find that the overall volume of disclosed RPTs is generally not significantly associated with shareholder wealth as measured by operating profitability or Tobin's Q. However, the results for total RPT volume obscure that ex ante RPTs, transactions that predate a counterparty becoming a related party, are innocuous at worst in terms of their association with operating profitability and significantly positively associated with Tobin's Q whereas ex post RPTs, transactions initiated after a counterparty becomes a related party, are significantly negatively associated with operating profitability. Ex post RPTs also result in significant share price declines when first disclosed and are associated with an increased likelihood that a firm will enter financial distress or deregister its securities. These results are consistent with ex post RPTs serving as means for insiders to expropriate outside shareholders.     

董事高管责任保险与上市公司关联交易——基于我国上市公司经验数据的检验

董事高管责任保险(D&O保险)是一个市场化的外部治理机制。基于沪深证券交易所2003—2017年上市公司数据,本文实证检验了D&O保险对上市公司关联交易的影响。研究发现,D&O保险显著提升了关联交易总水平、关联销售金额和关联购买金额;根据控股产权性质分组研究发现,D&O保险对非国有控股公司关联交易的正向影响,比对国有控股公司更加显著;D&O保险、关联交易均与公司价值显著正相关,且关联交易发挥中介效应。研究表明,D&O保险通过监督效应提升关联交易,并促使其对公司价值发挥支持效应。研究加深了对D&O保险治理职能的理解,更新了对关联交易经济后果的惯性认知,对促进公司治理治理机制建设和完善现代企业制度具有重要的理论和现实意义。     

商业银行关联交易的管理规制

关联交易可以实现资源互补,但也可能损害商业银行自身利益。关联交易规制有利于健全银行的公司治理与控制风险。关联交易的立法目的在于规范关联交易行为,遏制关联交易的负面作用,维护商业银行及股东整体权益,保障金融安全。商业银行应该从以下六个方面加强关联交易管理:强化关联交易风险意识,提高重视程度;完善关联交易管理制度,强化执行力度;区别关联交易风险程度,增强管理的科学有效性;建立关联交易管理系统,提升信息化水平;兼顾关联交易信息披露及其豁免原则的适用;加强集团成员关联交易风险管理。