对后危机时代最后贷款人法律制度创新的思考

无论一种制度如何先进,与动态的社会而言,其都是一个此一时彼一时的问题。若具有相对真理性的制度意图\"常青不败\",那么它就必须与时俱进。虽然古典的最后贷款人制度实现了既定史命,但是金融自由化、金融电子化与国际化已从另一侧面检测着该制度的精致或拙劣。是急流勇退,还是迎难而新,这是后危机时代该制度因时而化中所必须权衡的重大问题。     

Securitization markets and central banking: An evaluation of the term asset-backed securities loan facility

In response to the near collapse of US securitization markets in 2008, the Federal Reserve created the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility, which offered non-recourse loans to finance investors’ purchases of certain highly rated asset-backed securities. We study the effects of this program and find that it lowered interest rate spreads for some categories of asset-backed securities but had little impact on the pricing of individual securities. These findings suggest that the program improved conditions in securitization markets but did not subsidize individual securities. We also find that the risk of loss to the US government was small.     

Macroeconomic shocks and banking supervision

We build a simple model of banking in the presence of macroeconomic shocks where the comparative roles of private and public monitors can be analyzed. This model provides endogenous justifications for prudential regulation (capital requirements) and emergency liquidity assistance by the Central Bank (lender of last resort). We show that market discipline can be helpful, but does not solve the fundamental problem of regulatory forbearance. We propose some directions of reform of the regulatory system that could improve the management of banking crises.     

Systemic banks and the lender of last resort

We propose a model where systemic and non-systemic banks are exposed to liquidity shortfalls so that a lender of last resort policy is required. We find that it is socially optimal to override the decision of the central bank by the unconditional provision of liquidity support when the shortfall is large enough, i.e. in crisis times. The existence of systemic banks provides a rationale for the central bank to act as lender of last resort for non-systemic banks in a larger range of their liquidity shortfalls. However, the impact of systemic risk on the optimal allocation of the lender of last resort responsibilities for systemic banks depends on the relative size of counteracting effects.     

Bank liquidity regulation and the lender of last resort

Banks can make suboptimal liquidity choices and gamble for lender of last resort (LOLR) support. Endogenous bailout rents are driven by the need to preserve bankers' incentives under uncertain net worth. In equilibrium, banks can herd in risk management, choosing suboptimal liquidity when they expect others to do so. Optimal liquidity can be restored by quantitative requirements, but such regulation is costly. An LOLR policy incorporating bank capital information can reduce distorting rents and allow for a more efficient solution, but may only be possible in transparent economies.     

Liquidity provision during the crisis of 1914: Private and public sources

Caught between the end of the National Banking Era and the beginning of the Federal Reserve System, the crisis of 1914 provides an example of a banking panic avoided. We investigate how this outcome was achieved by examining data on the issues of Aldrich-Vreeland emergency currency and clearing house loan certificates to New York City institutions that identify the borrower and the quantity requested for each type of temporary liquidity measure. The extensive provision of temporary credit to a wide array of financial intermediaries was, in our opinion, essential to the successful alleviation of financial distress in 1914. Empirical results indicate an important role for clearing house loan certificates that is distinct from the influence of Aldrich-Vreeland emergency currency issues.     

Floating a “lifeboat”: The Banque de France and the crisis of 1889

When faced with a run on a “systemically important” but insolvent bank in 1889, the Banque de France pre-emptively organized a lifeboat to ensure that depositors were protected and an orderly liquidation could proceed. To protect the Banque from losses on its lifeboat loan, a guarantee syndicate was formed penalizing those who had participated in the copper speculation that had caused the crisis bringing the bank down. Creation of the syndicate and other actions were consistent with mitigating the moral hazard from such an intervention. This episode contrasts the advice given by Bagehot to the Bank of England to counter a panic by lending freely at a high rate on good collateral, allowing insolvent institutions to fail.     

O.M.W. Sprague (the man who “wrote the book” on financial crises) and the founding of the Federal Reserve

O.M.W. Sprague was America's leading expert on financial crises when America was debating establishing the Federal Reserve. His History of Crises under the National Banking System is the most enduring intellectual legacy of the National Monetary Commission; a still frequently cited classic. Since the Commission recommended a central bank, and its recommendation after some modifications became the Federal Reserve System, it might be assumed that Sprague was a strong supporter of establishing a central bank. But he was not. Initially, Sprague favored far more limited reforms, a position that he did not abandon until the Federal Reserve became a fait accompli. Here I discuss the sources of Sprague's opposition to a central bank and the relationship of that opposition to his understanding of the history and structure of the American banking system at the turn of the nineteenth century.     

Sound Money and Sound Financial Policy

Anna Schwartz has long promoted a policy of stable money. She also has advocated sound financial policy. The financial environment, according to her work, is strongly influenced by the degree of aggregate price stability. In this article historical evidence for the U.S. is presented that shows a strong association between aggregate price movements and measures of financial distress. Even in an environment of aggregate price stability in the face of shocks, however, a monetary authority should follow the financial policies of a lender of last resort as advocated over a century ago by Walter Bagehot—to promote adequate funds to allay the public's demand for means of payment in the face of a real financial crisis. Other circumstances involving asset market reversals that Schwartz calls pseudo crises should not be the subject of the monetary authorities' actions.