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1.
在董事会结构与公司绩效间关系的研究中,动态内生性问题通常被忽略。本文以2002-2011年410家上市公司为样本,在动态内生性的框架下,运用动态面板的System GMM估计方法,研究了董事会结构与公司综合绩效间的关系。结果表明:董事会结构与公司绩效间存在动态内生性问题,当期董事会结构与公司绩效没有显著的相关性,前期的董事会结构与公司绩效间存在显著的正相关关系,且前期公司绩效对当期董事会规模产生了显著的正向的反馈效应,但前期公司绩效并未对当期董事会的独立性产生显著影响。  相似文献   

2.
In this paper, we analyze how the tenure and the number of directorships of independent directors may influence the relationship between board independence and firm performance. Our sample is composed of US listed firms for the period 2008–2012. Several robustness checks and sensitivity analyses are performed and we confirm that the board’s independence positively influences the firm’s performance. Nevertheless, this relationship exists only under certain values of directors’ tenure and external directorships. Our findings show that these variables determine the effectiveness of independent directors. Therefore, this paper highlights the need for a more specific approach, based on the personal characteristics of independent directors, in order to study their influence on corporate decisions, strategy and outcomes. Furthermore, our evidence has direct implications for companies in the selection of board members.  相似文献   

3.
This study examines whether the relationship between corporate board and board committee independence and firm performance is moderated by the concentration of family ownership. Based on a sample of Hong Kong firms, we find no significant association between the independence of corporate boards or board committees and firm performance in family firms, whereas board independence is positively associated with firm performance in non-family firms. Additionally, our findings show that the proportion of independent directors on the corporate boards of family firms is lower than that of non-family firms, but we find no significant difference in the representation of independent directors on the key committees of corporate boards between family and non-family firms. Overall, these results suggest that the “one size fits all” approach required by the regulatory authorities for appointing independent directors on corporate boards may not necessarily enhance firm performance, especially for family firms. Thus, the requirement to appoint independent directors to the corporate boards of family firms needs to be reconsidered.  相似文献   

4.
This study examines whether CEO duality affects the association between board independence and demand for higher quality audits, proxied by audit fee. The findings show that there is a positive association between board independence and audit fees. This result is consistent with findings of Carcello et al. (2002) that more independent boards demand higher audit quality and effort. However, this positive association is only present in firms without CEO duality, thus suggesting that CEO duality constrains board independence. The results support recommendations against CEO duality by showing that dominant CEOs may compromise the independence of their board of directors. Additionally, evidence is provided that board size (the number of directors on the board) is positively associated with audit fee pricing. This is consistent with prior studies that indicate that larger board sizes are associated with inefficiency and negative firm performance.  相似文献   

5.
A significant and growing percentage of U.S. firms now have boards where the CEO is the only employee director (hereinafter fully independent boards). This paper studies whether and how this practice impacts board effectiveness. I find that fully independent boards are associated with a significant reduction in firm performance. Further tests suggest two channels for this effect. First, full independence deprives the board of spontaneous and regular access to the firm-specific information of other senior executives. Second, full independence eliminates the first-hand exposure of future CEOs to board-level discussions of strategy, which steepens the learning curve for eventually promoted candidates.  相似文献   

6.
通过对我国上市公司2000~2007年的数据分析发现,独立性程度较高的董事会与较小的(ROA)波动之间存在着显著的正相关关系,与Q的波动之间不存在显著的相关关系,另外,对董事会独立性与绩效波动之间的中间作用机制进行分析发现,拥有较高独立性董事会的公司,在一定程度上是通过减少企业的非经常性收益和经营性操控应计的波动来对企业绩效的波动产生影响.  相似文献   

7.
This study uses data from companies listed in the Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE) for the years 2005–2006 to investigate the role of corporate governance indices on firm performance. We use board size, board independence, board leadership and institutional investors on the board as corporate governance indices and EPS, ROA and ROE as firm performance surrogates. Our regression results show that board size is negatively associated with firm performance. Moreover, the presence of outside directors strengthens the firms' performance. We find, however, no relationship between leadership structure and firm performance. Likewise, the presence of institutional investors on the board of directors is not positively associated with firm performance.  相似文献   

8.
Using the 2003 SEC regulations (following the Sarbanes–Oxley Act) on board independence as an identification for externally imposed governance changes, I compare its influence on firm performance to the effect of voluntarily conducted adjustments. I use publicly listed US firms between 1998 and 2009. In a triple-difference (dif-in-dif-in-dif) analysis setting, I explicitly interact the dictated change in board independence with the identifiers of the shock and non-compliant firms. Controlling for companies with voluntary changes, firms forced to modify their governance by increasing board independence experience a decrease in ROA, asset turnover, and sales growth. Testing the joint influence of dictated and voluntary adjustments in board independence on performance through a cross-sectional logistic-regression model, and controlling further for potential endogeneity through an instrumental variable (IV) regression model, I obtain consistent results. The findings are robust for other mandated provisions and stronger for bigger changes; small, single-segment firms operating in wholesale, retail, and high-tech industries; and constrained companies with financial distress, high leverage, low cash, high volatility, high growth and R&D expenses.  相似文献   

9.
When are outside directors effective?   总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1  
This paper uses recent regulations that have required some companies to increase the number of outside directors on their boards to generate estimates of the effect of board independence on performance that are largely free from endogeneity problems. Our main finding is that the effectiveness of outside directors depends on the cost of acquiring information about the firm: when the cost of acquiring information is low, performance increases when outsiders are added to the board, and when the cost of information is high, performance worsens when outsiders are added to the board. The estimates provide some of the cleanest estimates to date that board independence matters, and the finding that board effectiveness depends on information cost supports a nascent theoretical literature emphasizing information asymmetry. We also find that firms compose their boards as if they understand that outsider effectiveness varies with information costs.  相似文献   

10.
In this study, we focus on the relation between bank governance and bank merger results under Taiwan’s special regulatory environment in 2000. Adopting governance variables (executive remuneration, managerial ownership, and board diversity), we find that managerial ownership is positively related to bank merger results and that board size is negatively correlated with bank mergers’ performance. This study supports sound governance mechanisms to prevent banks from pursuing a value-loss merger and acquisition (M&A). Our results offer the insight that internal bank governance structures have a bigger impact on the value effects from bank mergers. Thus, regulators may elevate the performance of bank M&As by enhancing corporate governance codes.  相似文献   

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