Deposit Insurance, Capital Regulations, and Financial Contagion in Multinational Banks

Abstract:  Banking sector globalization has caused an expansion in foreign-owned bank assets. In this paper we analyse the effects of a MNB's liability structure upon its investment in a foreign country. We develop a model in which capital adequacy requirements introduce some deliberate underinvestment which counters deposit insurance-induced overinvestment. Diversification is unattractive with fixed bank capital requirements, because it reduces the expected value of the deposit insurance net. This effect applies in multinational banks (MNBs), where shocks to the home country economy alter the value of the deposit insurance net and hence affect overseas lending incentives. Thus, MNBs act as a channel for financial contagion. We discuss the policy implications of our results.     

CONVERTIBLE DEBT AND INVESTMENT INCENTIVES

In this paper we examine the effect of convertible debt on the investment incentives facing stockholders. The effect depends critically on the value of existing assets relative to the firm's investment requirements. With a restrictive dividend covenant, convertible debt mitigates the overinvestment incentive associated with risky debt but exacerbates the underinvestment incentive at higher values of existing assets. A less-restrictive dividend covenant exacerbates overinvestment under straight debt financing but reduces the underinvestment incentive induced by the conversion feature. In this context, a convertible debt contract with a less-restrictive dividend covenant maximizes firm value.     

On the Relative Performance of Investment‐Grade Corporate Bonds with Differing Maturities

We find that short‐maturity investment‐grade corporate bonds perform better, controlling for risk differences, than similar bonds with longer maturities. Our results are at least partially attributable to insurance companies’ trading behavior and align with the preferred‐habitat theory of the term structure. We find that insurance‐company purchases create a strong demand for long‐term bonds and that their rebalancing activity results in sales of short‐term bonds. As documented by extant literature, such demand‐supply imbalance is not easily resolved by arbitrageurs or firms seeking to time the market with bond issuance.     

A Model of Intertemporal Discount Rates in the Presence of Real and Inflationary Autocorrelations

This paper discusses the pricing of assets in an intertemporal rational-expectations model when real production and inflation evolve according to first-order autocorrelated processes. The focus is on the structure of the various intertemporal discount rates (yields) exhibited by this economy. Yield curves are identified for consumption claims, indexed bonds, and nominally riskless bonds and can be extended to any claim that can be approximated by a (finite) linear combination of such securities. The model demonstrates that, if the average term structure for nominally riskless securities is upward sloping, then the yield curve for consumption (market) claims is downward sloping, suggesting that conventional methods for computing long-term discount rates err by not accounting for maturity factors. The paper also explores the relationship between the intertemporal equilibrium and its embedded single-period equilibria. The single-period risk measures in this economy are derived and shown to be (generally) functions of maturity. A model of nominal bond betas is constructed along these lines. It is shown that bond betas that are increasing functions of maturity do not necessarily imply an upward-sloping term structure.     

Agency Conflicts and Risk Management

This paper analyzes the relation between agency conflicts andrisk management. In contrast to previous contributions, ouranalysis incorporates not only stockholder-debtholder conflictsbut also manager–stockholder conflicts. We show that thecosts of both underinvestment and overinvestment are essentialin determining the firm's hedging policy. In particular, firmsthat derive more of their value from assets in place (lowermarket-to-book ratios), although having lower costs of underinvestment,generally display larger costs of overinvestment. Thus, theymay be more likely to hedge to control these overinvestmentincentives. Our analysis explains why large profitable firmswith fewer growth opportunities tend to hedge more (Bartramet al., 2004). It also provides a number of new predictionsrelating the benefits associated with risk management to variousdimensions of the firm's economic environment.     

Alternative Solutions to Underinvestment, Under Equity and Credit Rationing

We compare alternative solutions to underinvestment (UI) problems in firms subject to limited access to equity markets, interest ceilings, and constraints on the volume of debt. Collaterals (assets or compensating balances) and credit insurance ('regular' or 'outcome' insurance whereby the premium is paid at the end of the insurance period) are compared on the basis to their costs and their effective use of financial sources. It is shown that when there is no moral hazard problem, credit insurance is the most effective instrument. Otherwise, 'outcome' insurance program is the most effective one.     

Alternative Solutions to Underinvestment, Under Equity and Credit Rationing

We compare alternative solutions to underinvestment (UI) problems in firms subject to limited access to equity markets, interest ceilings, and constraints on the volume of debt. Collaterals (assets or compensating balances) and credit insurance ('regular' or 'outcome' insurance whereby the premium is paid at the end of the insurance period) are compared on the basis to their costs and their effective use of financial sources. It is shown that when there is no moral hazard problem, credit insurance is the most effective instrument. Otherwise, 'outcome' insurance program is the most effective one.     

企业集团现金分布、管理层激励与资本配置效率

本文以母公司为视角,基于科层代理理论和信息不对称理论,研究不同生命周期阶段母子公司现金分布变化对资本配置效率的影响及母公司管理层激励的治理效应。研究发现:在成长期,母公司 “自主型”财控模式下子公司高持现比率导致了过度投资,对母公司管理层薪酬激励和股权激励能够抑制过度投资,此时对母公司管理层激励表现为抑制子公司经理人圈地的监督机制;在成熟期,母公司 “平衡型”财控模式适度降低子公司持现比率,缓解了过度投资,对母公司管理层股权激励能够进一步抑制过度投资,但薪酬激励无效;在衰退期,母公司“家长型”财控模式下过度回笼资金带来投资不足,股权激励能够抑制投资不足,此时对母公司管理层股权激励表现为驱动子公司经理人投资的勉励机制。     

Reaching for Yield in the Bond Market

This paper studies reaching for yield—investors’ propensity to buy riskier assets to achieve higher yields—in the corporate bond market. We show that insurance companies reach for yield in choosing their investments. Consistent with lower rated bonds bearing higher capital requirements, insurance firms prefer to hold higher rated bonds. However, conditional on credit ratings, insurance portfolios are systematically biased toward higher yield, higher CDS bonds. This behavior is related to the business cycle being most pronounced during economic expansions. It is also characteristic of firms with poor corporate governance and for which the regulatory capital requirement is more binding.     

Equity financing in a Myers–Majluf framework with private benefits of control

This paper generalizes the Myers and Majluf (1984) model by introducing an agency cost structure based on private benefits of control. This new model predicts that many corporate finance variables each have opposing effects on under- and overinvestment. Private benefits exacerbate overinvestment but, interestingly, a small amount of private benefits can enhance firm value by alleviating underinvestment. Likewise, an increase in insider ownership alleviates overinvestment but aggravates underinvestment. When private benefits are small, the adverse effect of insider ownership on underinvestment tends to dominate. When there are considerable private benefits, the incentive-alignment effect of insider ownership is pronounced. Additionally, this model reconciles existing equity financing theories on announcement effects. It helps resolve the puzzle that small-growth firms do not seem to have an asymmetric information disadvantage when they issue new equity.     

Effect of ownership structure on underinvestment and overinvestment: empirical evidence from Spain

This paper investigates how ownership affects the investment‐cash flow sensitivity by taking into account the non‐linearities of ownership with respect to firm value, and using a free cash flow index and a criterion for financial constraints to disentangle underinvestment and overinvestment. Interesting results are provided by estimating using the Generalized Method of Moments to eliminate the endogeneity problem. The alignment of interests between owners and managers and the monitoring by concentrated ownership both alleviate the sensitivity of investment to cash flow both in underinvestor and overinvestor firms. However, in the presence of controlling owners, underinvestment and overinvestment are exacerbated.     

Political Connections and the Efficiency of Capital Allocation Through Bond Financing in Chinese Listed Companies

Using a database of firms issuing short-term financing bonds and mid-term notes in China from 2007 to 2011, we uncover whether and how political connections influence the companies' capital allocation efficiency. The authors show that politically connected firms have significantly lower capital allocation efficiency, especially in the case of overinvestment subsamples. In addition, different types of political connections have different effects on firms' inefficient investments. Compared with firms connected to members of the people's congresses and the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (MPCP firms), firms connected to government officials (GOF) overinvest more and underinvest less. One year after bond financing, GOF politically connected firms decreased overinvestment, while underinvestment undergoes an upward trend in the MPCP firms.     

Risk diversification gains from metropolitan housing assets

The study analyzes the roles of metropolitan housing assets in risk diversification by assessing intertemporal hedging demands for multi‐asset portfolios, which include metropolitan houses, REITs, stocks, bonds, and riskless assets. Investors substitute housing assets in high‐population MSAs with those in low‐population cities, and they switch their holdings of housing assets to less risky bonds in the 2007–2008 housing bust. The findings from the multi‐period portfolio choice problem provide evidence for momentum reversal since forward‐looking investors substitute bottom metropolitan housing assets for top ones in the housing boom, and the GTTB index and the lagged REIT price return have negative impacts on various asset returns.     

Junk bonds,life insurer insolvency,and stock market reactions: The case of first executive corporation

The First Executive Corporation was the largest failure in the history of the life insurance industry. The company was one of the most aggressive purchasers of junk bonds through the 1980s and was the first of several large failures in the staid life insurance industry. In this article, we examine the effect of First Executive's failure on the value of companies in the life insurance industry. We find that the price of other life insurance companies' stock is negatively affected by the earnings announcement that preceded First Executive's failure. The magnitude of an individual company's reaction to First Executive's loss varies according to the proportion of the company's assets invested in junk bonds, the proportion of the company's assests invested in real estate, and the financial strength of the company as measured by A.M. Best's rating.     

Corporate fraud and investment distortions in efficient capital markets

Inefficient investment allocation induced by corporate fraud, where informed insiders strategically manipulate outside investors' beliefs, has been endemic historically and has recently attracted much attention. We reconcile corporate fraud and investment distortions with efficient capital markets, building on shareholder‐manager agency conflicts and investment renegotiation in active takeover markets. Because investments that are ex post inefficient are not renegotiation proof, the optimal renegotiation‐proof contract induces overstatements by managers, accompanied by overinvestment in low return states and underinvestment in high return states by rational investors. Our framework also helps explain why easy access to external capital appears to facilitate corporate fraud.     

Institutional investors' site visits,information asymmetry,and investment efficiency

Based on data from Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2012 to 2017, this paper studies the relationship between institutional investors' site visits (SVs) and corporate investment efficiency and its intrinsic transmission mechanism. Institutional site visits (SVs) can effectively mitigate firms' underinvestment, but it has no significant inhibitory effect on overinvestment. The conclusion still holds after using the instrumental variables and alternative measurements of investment efficiency. Mechanism analysis finds that site visits can alleviate underinvestment by reducing information asymmetry. We further document that the impacts are more pronounced for brokerages, funds, and private equity firms, firms with higher levels of internal governance, and firms' regions with better marketization. Our study suggests that institutional SVs mainly contribute to mitigating underinvestment rather than inhibiting overinvestment. This study provides practical insights for regulating corporate investment decision-making and is of significant practical significance for promoting the healthy development of enterprises.     

Subjective evaluation of delayed risky outcomes for buying and selling positions: the behavioral approach

This paper analyzes time discounting as a function of risk, using reservation prices. Based on experimental data, we compare bidder reservation prices for riskless assets with those for risky assets. The experiments rely on a second price auction with real monetary incentives and real delay in payoffs. We estimate the pure time discount rate for different maturities, considering riskless assets (bonds) and risky assets (delayed lotteries). An innovation in the experimental design allows disentangling pure time from pure risk discounting effects. If subjects bid for assets, we find implied discount rates for risky assets to be uniformly lower than those for riskless assets, across all maturities (the risk moderation effect). However, there is no risk moderation effect if subjects quote ask prices. We argue that delaying a payoff has a stronger effect on the price of bonds than on the price of risky assets since, in the case of bonds, the investor moves from a position of certainty to a position of risk, or uncertainty. Our findings on the risk moderation effect may be used to explain the attractiveness of compensation contracts with options, as commonly used in the financial industry.     

Financing constraint,over-investment and market-to-book ratio

In a simple symmetric information continuous-time model, we consider leverage as way to finance a fraction of the investment cost. We show that underinvestment cannot arise while overinvestment may and the room for overinvestment is negatively related with the fraction paid by equityholders. Finally, we show that our model predicts the (empirically observed) negative relation between the market-to-book ratio and the leverage ratio.     

The Capital Budgeting Process: Incentives and Information

We study the capital allocation process within firms. Observed budgeting processes are explained as a response to decentralized information and incentive problems. It is shown that these imperfections can result in underinvestment when capital productivity is high and overinvestment when it is low. We also investigate how the budgeting process may be expected to vary with firm or division characteristics such as investment opportunities and the technology for information transfer.     

多目标规划在保险公司决策管理中的应用研究——以产险公司业务和资产结构决策为例

本文在公司价值最大化的终极目标下,通过分析保险公司各个层级的发展目标,指出保险公司的决策管理具有多目标属性。在对多目标规划理论进行系统梳理的基础上,以产险公司的业务和资产结构决策为例,构建了以公司规模、利润和风险为目标的资本和监管约束下的多目标规划模型。分析发现,将多目标规划理论应用于保险公司管理中的确能够平衡不同目标的关系,有效提高公司经营的稳健性。