农村产权抵押融资的实践探索——基于鄂州的选择

农村产权抵押融资是我国农村土地制度深层次改革和金融深层次创新所面临的一个新课题,也是解决农村金融困境的新途径,具有重要的理论与实践意义。本文对鄂州市开展的"五权"抵押融资进行了全面分析,提出完善鄂州市农村产权抵押融资实验的政策建议,以期形成"可复制、易推广、广覆盖"的模式,为破解农村金融困境提供依据和指导。     

农村产权抵押融资的实践探索——基于鄂州的选择北大核心

农村产权抵押融资是我国农村土地制度深层次改革和金融深层次创新所面临的一个新课题,也是解决农村金融困境的新途径,具有重要的理论与实践意义。本文对鄂州市开展的"五权"抵押融资进行了全面分析,提出完善鄂州市农村产权抵押融资实验的政策建议,以期形成"可复制、易推广、广覆盖"的模式,为破解农村金融困境提供依据和指导。     

农村资源资产抵押担保融资困境及其破解机制——基于天津市的实地调研分析

"三农"融资难是制约农村经济发展的重大障碍之一,其解决途径之一是加快农村资源资本化。因此,为有效推进天津市农村资源资产抵押融资,论文对比剖析了国内农村资源资产抵押担保融资模式的探索实践,在实地调查的基础上分析天津市农村资源资产抵押担保融资的现状及困境,为深化农村资源资产抵押担保融资提出配套政策建议。     

解冻农村物权,缓解农民融资困局——宁波市区信用联社"两权一房"抵押贷款创新举措解析

本文从涵义、创新性和现实意义等方面初步解析宁波市区信用联社最新推出的"两权一房"抵质押贷款.该举措将集体股份经济合作社股权、农村土地承包经营权以及农村住房作为抵押品,纳入农村有效担保物范围,这在全国范围内尚属首次."两权一房"抵质押贷款对于盘活农村农民资产,提升农户资信水平,对缓解目前农村融资困境提供了有效的解决办法.     

林权抵押贷款实践情况调查

遂昌县金融部门依托林权制度改革和森林资源流转平台,以服务"三农"、发展农村经济为出发点的科学发展观为指导,创新支农服务,开办了林权抵押贷款,有效破解了山区农户融资的瓶颈,对增加支农信贷投入,促进农户增产增收和农村各业发展发挥了积极作用.     

解冻农村物权,缓解农民融资困局——宁波市区信用联社“两权一房”抵押贷款创新举措解析

本文从涵义、创新性和现实意义等方面初步解析宁波市区信用联社最新推出的"两权一房"抵质押贷款。该举措将集体股份经济合作社股权、农村土地承包经营权以及农村住房作为抵押品,纳入农村有效担保物范围,这在全国范围内尚属首次。"两权一房"抵质押贷款对于盘活农村农民资产,提升农户资信水平,对缓解目前农村融资困境提供了有效的解决办法。     

解冻农村物权,缓解农民融资困局——宁波市区信用联社“两权一房”抵押贷款创新举措解析

本文从涵义、创新性和现实意义等方面初步解析宁波市区信用联社最新推出的"两权一房"抵质押贷款。该举措将集体股份经济合作社股权、农村土地承包经营权以及农村住房作为抵押品,纳入农村有效担保物范围,这在全国范围内尚属首次。"两权一房"抵质押贷款对于盘活农村农民资产,提升农户资信水平,对缓解目前农村融资困境提供了有效的解决办法。     

完善农村土地经营权抵押融资的思考

"融资难、融资贵"问题一直是困扰我国"三农"经济发展的重要因素之一,完善农村土地承包经营权抵押制度能够有效缓解"融资难、融资贵"问题.从而在促进现代化农业发展中发挥重要作用.目前,中央已明确将土地所有权、承包权、经营权"三权分置".将农村土地承包经营权用于流转、抵押,并出台了相应的政策措施,以解决农村经营主体融资困难的问题.但就目前实际情况看,农村土地的经营权抵押贷款在实施过程中存在一定缺陷,因此,必须进一步完善农村土地经营权抵押贷款相关配套措施,积极创新金融产品.充分发挥农村土地经营权抵押贷款优势,推进土地承包经营权抵押的健康发展,支持地方经济发展.     

深化农村产权制度改革 推动抵押融资方式创新

<正>长期以来,农村产权由于受到集体产权的限制,无法在金融机构进行抵押融资,造成贷款难局面,严重阻碍了农村经济的持续快速发展。针对当前农村金融的发展现状,扩大农村产权的有效担保范围,推进农村产权抵押融资,显得尤为重要。十八届三中全会召开后,中央对深化农村改革作出全面部署,在政策上对加快推进农村产权抵押融资予以明确,这对于解决农村贷款难、促进农业农村发展和农民增收具有十分重要的意义。农村产权抵押融资方式的创新,是围绕农村产权制度改革而进行的。只有不断深化农村产权制度改革,才能实现农村产权抵押融资方式的变革,使农村产权变成"一池     

林权抵押贷款:破解"三农"融资难题的有效途径

融资难是制约当前"三农"发展的因素之一,而融资难的主要症结又在于担保难.我国正在进行的集体林权制度改革为破解"三农"融资担保难提供了契机.人民银行福州中心支行敏锐地抓住这一契机,引导福建省各金融机构在全国率先以林权抵押贷款为主要形式,创新"三农"信贷投入机制,为支持农村经济发展,破解"三农"融资担保难创造了一条新的途径.     

Fixed-Rate Endowment Mortgage and Mortgage Indemnity Valuation

We use a contingent claims framework for valuing the the default and prepayment embedded options in certain British fixed-rate endowment mortgages, with a (capped) mortgage indemnity guarantee (MIG). This methodology provides a template for the borrower, lender, and insurer to compare mortgage terms, including the fairness of contract rates, arrangement fees, prepayment penalties, any MIG premiums required, and co-insurance exposure. With empirical inputs, this model may eventually be useful as a mark-to-value proxy for all parties, as expected parameters change (especially interest rate and house price levels, and expected future volatilities), for purposes of determining valued added accounting, appropriate reserves, and indeed for setting premiums and business drivers. Fixed-rate endowment mortgages differ from fixed-rate repayment mortgages primarily because, in the event of early termination, the amount owed by the borrower is a function of the evolution of the term structure of interest rates, whereas for a repayment mortgage it is pre-determined. We compare endownment and repayment mortgages for different levels of loan-to-value ratios, interest rate and house price volatilities.     

Mortgage defaults

A life-cycle model is developed in which households face income and house-price risk and buy houses with mortgages. This model, which accounts for key features in U.S. data, is used as a laboratory for prudential policy. Recourse mortgages increase the cost of default but also lower equity and increase payments. The effect on default is nonmonotonic. Loan-to-value (LTV) limits increase equity and lower the default rate, with negligible effects on housing demand. Combining recourse mortgages and LTV limits reduces the default rate while boosting housing demand. Together, they also prevent spikes in default after large declines in aggregate house prices.     

Mortgage convexity

Most home mortgages in the United States are fixed-rate loans with an embedded prepayment option. When long-term rates decline, the effective duration of mortgage-backed securities (MBS) falls due to heightened refinancing expectations. I show that these changes in MBS duration function as large-scale shocks to the quantity of interest rate risk that must be borne by professional bond investors. I develop a simple model in which the risk tolerance of bond investors is limited in the short run, so these fluctuations in MBS duration generate significant variation in bond risk premia. Specifically, bond risk premia are high when aggregate MBS duration is high. The model offers an explanation for why long-term rates could appear to be excessively sensitive to movements in short rates and explains how changes in MBS duration act as a positive-feedback mechanism that amplifies interest rate volatility. I find strong support for these predictions in the time series of US government bond returns.     

Mortgage timing

We study how the term structure of interest rates relates to mortgage choice at both household and aggregate levels. A simple utility framework of mortgage choice points to the long-term bond risk premium as distinct from the yield spread and the long yield as a theoretical determinant of mortgage choice: when the bond risk premium is high, fixed-rate mortgage payments are high, making adjustable-rate mortgages more attractive. We confirm empirically that the bulk of the time variation in both aggregate and loan-level mortgage choice can be explained by time variation in the bond risk premium, whether bond risk premia are measured using forecasters’ data, a vector autoregressive (VAR) term structure model, or a simple household decision rule based on adaptive expectations. The household decision rule moves in lock-step with mortgage choice, lending credibility to a theory of strategic mortgage timing by households.     

固定利率住房抵押贷款违约行为及其定价研究

固定利率住房抵押贷款的信用风险主要是违约风险,基于理性期权的定价模型往往会低估借款人的违约概率.通过分析违约成本及非理性违约因素,可以确定借款人违约时贷款机构收回的现金流,得到固定利率住房抵押贷款定价的期望值模型,并得出模型的求解方法.     

Mortgage Default during the U.S. Mortgage Crisis

Which theory can quantitatively explain the rise in mortgage defaults during the U.S. mortgage crisis? This paper finds that the double‐trigger hypothesis, which attributes mortgage default to the joint occurrence of negative equity and a life event such as unemployment, is consistent with the evidence. By contrast, a traditional frictionless default model strongly overpredicts the increase in default rates. This paper provides microfoundations for double‐trigger behavior in a model where unemployment causes liquidity problems for the borrower. This framework implies that mortgage crises may be mitigated at a lower cost by bailing out borrowers instead of lenders.     

典当:枯木逢春

一度绝迹 典当,是一个古老的行业,堪称金融业的鼻祖,迄今已有1700余年的历史了. 新中国建立后,典当行一度绝迹.1987年12月,四川成都开办了新中国第一家典当行--华茂典当服务商社,率先恢复了古老的典当行.自此,开办典当行之风大兴,大有席卷全国之势,最盛时的1993年全国各地开设了3000多家典当行,几经沉浮,如今尚存1000余家.这其中的大起大落,也与对典当行定位的认识不清、把握不准有关.     

抵押选择性风险转移产品

选择性风格转移产品（Alternative Risk Transfer，简称ART）的发展，是近年来引起国际保险界广泛关注的一个问题。ART产品之所以兴起，其根本原因就在于全球经济的迅速发展，适应于广大股东对新型保险产品的迫切需求，代表着21世纪保险业发展的新趋势。     

Optimal Mortgage Contract Choice Decision in the Presence of Pay Option Adjustable Rate Mortgage and the Balloon Mortgage

The unprecedented run-up in global house prices of the 2000s was preceded by a revolution in U.S. mortgage markets in which borrowers faced a plethora of mortgages to choose from collectively known as nontraditional mortgages (NTMs), whose poor performance helped ignite the global financial crisis in 2007. This paper studies the choice of mortgage contracts in an expanded framework where the menu of contracts includes the pay option adjustable rate mortgage (PO-ARM), and the balloon mortgage (BM), alongside the traditional long horizon fixed rate mortgage (FRM) and the short horizon regular ARM. The inclusion of the PO-ARM is based on the fact it is the most controversial and perhaps the riskiest of the NTMs, whereas the BM has not been analyzed in the literature despite its different risk-sharing arrangement and long vintage. Our inclusive model relates the structural differences of these contracts to the horizon risk management problems and affordability constraints faced by the households that differ in terms of expected mobility. The numerical solutions of the model generates a number of interesting results suggesting that households select mortgage contracts to match their horizon, manage horizon risk and mitigate liquidity or affordability constraints they face. From a risk management and welfare perspectives, we find that the optimal contract for households with shorter horizons, specifically households who expect to move house once every 1 to 2 years, is the PO-ARM. Beyond 2 years the welfare advantage of the PO-ARM diminishes and BM becomes the more optimal contract up to 5-year horizon. Overall, the results suggest that households are neither as risk averse as the selection of the FRM would suggest, nor are they as risk-seeking as the selection of PO-ARM or regular ARM would suggest. The results also suggest that the exuberance demonstrated for NTMs by borrowers, especially PO-ARMs, may be both rational and irrational.     

The Effect of Mortgage Price and Default Risk on Mortgage Spreads

Variations over time in mortgage yield spreads should reflect changes in the underlying prepayment option value; moreover, the relationship between mortgage yield spreads and interest rate dynamics should weaken as the value of the borrowers prepayment option declines. We verify this hypothesis through an empirical analysis of residential mortgage yield spread behavior, and we also present evidence that the strength of the relationship between mortgage spreads and interest rate dynamics weakens (strengthens) as the level of default risk increases (decreases). This result is consistent with the competing risks effect between a borrowers option to prepay or default. Our results demonstrate the importance of accounting for mortgage price discount to par as well as default risk when developing time series of mortgage yields.