所有权、负债与大股东利益侵占——来自中国控制权转移公司的证据

负债的公司治理作用是公司财务研究的重要问题。已有文献探讨了负债在股权分散公司中的公司治理作用,而在股权集中公司中负债对大股东与中小股东之间的代理问题的影响,已有的经验证据相当有限。本文以我国国有控制权转移上市公司为样本,研究了负债在股权集中公司中的治理作用。研究发现,负债与大股东的利益侵占存在显著正相关关系;相对于国有控股公司来说,私有公司的负债水平更高,其原因在于私有大股东通过负债对中小股东利益的侵占程度高于国有大股东。本文提供了负债与大股东利益侵占之间关系的直接证据,揭示了大股东通过负债侵占中小股东利益的行为,以及所有权性质对大股东通过负债侵占小股东利益行为的影响。     

股利政策、第一大股东和公司成长性:自由现金流理论还是掏空理论

本文以763家上市公司2003年的横截面数据为样本,检查了股利政策和第一大股东持股以及企业成长性机会之间的统计关系,考察了股利政策的股权效应,并比较分析了企业成长性机会对股利政策股权效应的影响程度。作者发现,第一大股东具有发放现金股利的显著动机,而且这种动机不受股东性质的显著影响。文章进一步观察到,企业成长性机会能够弱化第一大股东分配现金股利的激励,并促使公司保留更多的现金用于有价值的投资机会。本文的经验结果并不支持“掏空”理论,而更支持自由现金流理论:第一大股东能够迫使公司吐出多余的自由现金流,并能根据企业的成长性机会调整股利政策(在成长性高的公司增加投资,在成长性低的公司增加股利)。     

大股东持股、并购商誉与股价涨跌风险北大核心CSSCI

本文基于大股东持股的视角,以2007年至2017年中国A股上市公司为样本,分析大股东持股对并购商誉与股价下跌风险关系的影响。研究发现:(1)公司的并购商誉规模越大,未来的股价下跌风险越大;(2)公司第一大股东持股比例的增加降低了并购商誉对股价下跌风险的正向影响;(3)大股东持股对并购商誉与股价下跌风险关系的影响在代理冲突严重、外部审计质量较低、公司成长性较高和企业业绩下滑时更加显著。     

创业板股权集中度与公司绩效——基于面板数据的门槛效应研究

本文使用创业板面板数据,检验了公司股权集中度对经营绩效的门槛效应。实证结果显示,股权集中度与公司绩效之间存在显著的单一门槛效应。具体来看,第一大股东持股比例对公司绩效的影响总体为负,但在跨越相应门槛值后,负向作用显著降低;前五大股东持股比例对公司绩效的影响显著为正,但在跨越门槛值后,正向作用显著降低且不再显著。与此同时,前十大股东持股比例对公司绩效的影响则在统计上不显著。最后,本文给出了创业板公司相对较优的股权集中结构,并对创业板股权结构现状进行了评价。     

基于逐步回归的我国上市公司股权集中度与公司经营绩效的关系研究

以2012年上海证券交易所和深圳交易所上市的非金融类公司为样本,对公司经营绩效（资产收益率）和股权集中度指标（第一大股东持股比例CR₁、第一大股东与第二大股东持股份额比值Z指数、赫芬达尔指数H₅指数）进行相关性研究,并运用逐步回归法建立方程,深入研究股权集中度对公司经营绩效的影响机制。研究发现:股权集中度与公司绩效存在显著的相关性;公司第一大股东持股比例与公司资产收益率存在显著的正相关关系;公司第一大股东与第二大股东持股比例比值与公司资产收益率存在着不太显著的负相关关系。     

个人大股东持股与股价暴跌风险

本文以2007至2016年中国A股上市公司为样本,考察了个人大股东持股与股价暴跌风险之间的关系。研究发现:第一,个人大股东持股比例的增加能够显著降低公司未来股价暴跌风险。这一结论在剔除了个人大股东中董监高持股数量、进行内生性处理、更换不同统计检验方法后依然成立。第二,个人大股东持股对公司管理层监督的效果并不明显,个人大股东持股比例的增加对于公司应计盈余管理、真实盈余管理、投资效率、过度投资等可能影响公司股价暴跌风险的经营指标并没有显著影响。第三,个人大股东的持股加强了公司股权制衡的力度,进而显著降低了公司股价暴跌风险。股权制衡机制解释了大股东持股对股价暴跌风险一半以上的影响。本文的研究对于全面认识个人大股东在资本市场中发挥的作用,促进股市平稳发展具有重要的理论和现实意义。     

大股东资金占用和公司绩效：来自其他应收款的证据

在具体考察大股东资金占用的经济后果和制度成因时,首先发现其他应收款比重不仅对公司经营绩效（EPS和ROE）具有显著且较强的负面影响,还对公司盈利能力（盈利概率）具有显著且较强的负面影响。结果表明,大股东通过其他应收款账户对上市公司的占款行为会对上市公司的经营绩效和盈利能力造成不利影响,并会损害其他中小股东的利益以及公司长远发展的后劲。另外还发现,第一大股东持股对其他应收款比重具有显著较强的非线性影响：当第一大股东的控股地位较弱时,第一大股东具有较强的激励效应去改善公司绩效,并减少对上市公司资金的无效占用;当第一大股东的控股地位较强时,第一大股东具有较强的动机和能力去攫取私人利益,并增加对上市公司的资金占用。     

我国上市银行公司治理与内部控制关系的实证研究

商业银行良好的公司治理对于我国金融系统的稳定具有十分重大的作用。本文选取2010-2012年我国16家上市银行的数据对银行公司治理机制与内部控制的关系进行了实证研究。结果发现,内部控制绩效与独立董事比例、董事会专门委员会数量和第二到第五大股东的持股比例之间呈负相关,并且都是显著的。而董事会规模、监事会规模、外部监事比例和第一大股东的持股比例并没有对银行内部控制产生显著影响。此外,大股东的国有性质有利于银行的风险控制。     

大股东掏空会提高上市公司控制权变更可能性吗？

基于2010-2020年的A股上市公司样本数据，本文研究了大股东掏空对公司控制权变更的影响，结果表明：（1）大股东掏空程度越高，公司控制权变更倾向越大，股权质押爆仓导致的控制权变更与大股东掏空具有更显著的正向关系，一系列稳健性检验后，结论依然成立。（2）大股东掏空会通过恶化企业财务状况（降低公司业绩，进而提高融资约束）和提高股权质押动机来影响控制权变更。（3）在民营企业、机构投资持股比例低、高管持股比例低以及独立董事占比低的公司中，大股东掏空与控制权变更具有更强的正向关系。     

控股股东控制、负债融资与企业投资

使用我国上市公司2000～2005年间非平衡面板数据,本文检验了控股股东控制下负债融资对企业投资的影响。研究表明：企业负债与投资规模显著负相关,但负债对国有控股公司投资水平抑制作用较弱;负债抑制了低成长公司的过度投资,而对于高成长公司,负债抑制了其正常投资;短期负债相比长期负债相机治理作用较强;银行借款对非国有控股企业投资支出抑制作用更强;企业投资与银行借款的负相关关系随着国有控股股东持股比例的增加而减弱,而非国有控股企业控股股东的持股比例变化不会对投资与银行借款之间的关系产生显著影响。     

资本结构与企业绩效的互动关系研究——基于创业板上市公司的实证检验

中小企业在我国经济中具有重要地位,随着我国创业板市场的推出,中小企业的融资问题将会得到有效缓解。本文通过建立资本结构与企业绩效的联立方程模型,应用广义矩估计法(GMM)对联立方程进行估计研究,考察创业板上市企业资本结构与企业绩效之间的互动关系。研究结果表明,资本结构与企业绩效确实存在互动关系,在企业绩效中资本结构、成长能力、股权集中度、董事会兼任经理人和企业规模都对其有显著影响,而在资本结构中盈利性、成长能力、偿债能力、资产担保价值和企业规模五个因素对企业资本结构选择具有显著影响。     

金字塔式控股结构与上市公司资本运作的机会主义倾向

在处于金字塔式控股结构的上市公司中,反映实际控制人责任承担能力的现金流权与其影响公司决策的控制权是分离的,由此形成了责任与权利不对称的负外部性。不同于以往研究,本文从纵容市场炒作和资本运作这一新的视角,实证考察金字塔式控股结构下控股股东及其背后实际控制人资本运作的机会主义倾向,以此揭示金字塔式控股结构存在的其他负外部性。研究表明,随着金字塔结构复杂程度的增加,处在金字塔式控股结构下的上市公司的股票更具有“彩票股”的特征、非金融企业的金融资产配置更多,且会进行更多的关联资本运作,但这些行为并没有带来预期的企业绩效改善,而在很大程度上演化为以实现控股股东及其背后实际控制人财富短期快速增值为目的的机会主义资本运作行为。因而,金字塔式控股结构在一定程度上助长了“脱实向虚”的资金流动趋势,并加剧了资本市场的波动。如何抑制金字塔式控股结构的负外部性由此成为促使我国资本市场有效助力实体经济发展的关键环节之一。     

Capital structure,equity ownership and firm performance

This paper investigates the relationship between capital structure, ownership structure and firm performance using a sample of French manufacturing firms. We employ non-parametric data envelopment analysis (DEA) methods to empirically construct the industry’s ‘best practice’ frontier and measure firm efficiency as the distance from that frontier. Using these performance measures we examine if more efficient firms choose more or less debt in their capital structure. We summarize the contrasting effects of efficiency on capital structure in terms of two competing hypotheses: the efficiency-risk and franchise-value hypotheses. Using quantile regressions we test the effect of efficiency on leverage and thus the empirical validity of the two competing hypotheses across different capital structure choices. We also test the direct relationship from leverage to efficiency stipulated by the Jensen and Meckling (1976) agency cost model. Throughout this analysis we consider the role of ownership structure and type on capital structure and firm performance.     

Determinants of intellectual capital disclosure in prospectuses of initial public offerings

Intellectual capital is recognised as the new economic era’s pivotal factor underlying value creation. Deficient and inconsistent intellectual capital reporting is escalating information asymmetry between informed and uninformed investors. This provides fertile ground for informed investors to extract higher abnormal returns and higher wealth transfers from uninformed investors, particularly during a firm’s initial public offering (IPO). This study investigates the association between intellectual capital disclosure levels in prospectuses of 444 IPOs listing on the Singapore Stock Exchange between 1997 and 2006, and three potential explanatory determinants: (1) ownership retention; (2) proprietary costs; and (3) corporate governance structure. Statistical analysis supports our conjecture of a positive association between intellectual capital disclosure and ownership retention. We also find, consistent with expectations, a negative influence of proprietary costs on the positive intellectual capital disclosure – ownership retention association. However, contrary to predictions, we do not find an IPO’s corporate governance structure significantly influences the negative interaction of proprietary costs on the ownership retention – proprietary cost association. Our findings have implications for various parties such as regulators who may impose unnecessary costs on issuers if they introduce mandatory disclosures whilst lacking an understanding of the factors influencing intellectual capital disclosures.     

Managerial incentives and corporate leverage: evidence from the United Kingdom

This paper investigates the effect of managerial incentives and corporate governance on capital structure using a large sample of UK firms during the period 1999–2004. The analysis revolves around the view that managerial incentives are important in determining a firm's leverage. However, we argue that the exact impact of these incentives on leverage is likely to be determined by firm‐specific governance characteristics. To conduct our investigation, we construct a simple corporate governance measure using detailed ownership and governance information. We present evidence of a significant non‐monotonic relationship between executive ownership and leverage. There is also strong evidence suggesting that corporate governance practices have a significant impact on leverage. More importantly, the results reveal that the nature of the relation between executive ownership and leverage depends on the firm's corporate governance structure.     

智力资本对上市商业银行绩效的影响--基于VAIC测算方法的实证研究

本文使用VAIC测算方法测算2013-2017年31家上市商业银行智力资本,使用静态面板模型和动态面板模型探究智力资本对商业银行绩效的长短期影响。研究发现,智力资本及其组成对商业银行绩效具有显著促进作用,其中结构资本效率的作用大于人力资本效率;智力资本对商业银行绩效的作用受银行的所有制结构影响;智力资本对商业银行绩效的作用具有持续性。结果带来的启示在于,商业银行应积极响应国家金融供给侧结构性改革政策,充分重视对智力资本资源的利用,不同所有制结构的商业银行对组织结构变革要有针对地实施不同措施。     

上市公司资本结构影响因素分析——来自我国房地产行业的经验数据

论文选取房地产行业58家上市公司作为实证样本,运用多元回归分析的方法,分析了影响资本结构的主要因素。研究结论表明：公司规模与资本结构显著正相关;盈利能力、偿债能力与资本结构显著负相关;成长性和股权结构与资本结构不显著正相关。论文的研究以期为更好的优化上市公司资本结构提供依据,为其实现公司价值的最大化提供一定的借鉴意义。     

The impact of state and foreign ownership on banking risk: Evidence from the MENA countries

This paper investigates the impact of foreign and state ownership on banking risk. Panel data regression analysis is applied to a sample of 171 commercial banks from the MENA region during the 2006–2012 period. Two-stage least-squares analysis is conducted. Our results show that State ownership encourages banks to take more risks while foreign ownership reduces risk-taking. In addition, state-owned banks tend to increase capital adequacy ratio to hedge against high level of risk. Our finding also indicates that all categories of shareholders take a prudent attitude that influences risk reduction after the 2008 crisis.     

Employee stock ownership and the cost of capital

This paper investigates the relationship between employee stock ownership and the cost of capital, the main determinant of shareholder value creation computed through economic value added (EVA). By reducing agency conflicts within the firm, we hypothesize that employee share ownership reduces the firm’s cost of capital by affecting its two components, i.e. the cost of equity and the cost of debt. We test this hypothesis in France, a leading country in terms of employee ownership, based on a panel of the 120 largest listed companies for the 2000–2011 period. We find: (i) no significant relationship between employee stock ownership and the cost of equity; (ii) a negative curvilinear relationship between employee stock ownership and the cost of debt; (ii) a negative curvilinear relationship between employee stock ownership and the weighted average cost of capital. These results suggest debtholders regard ESO as positive as long it is moderate because it shifts risk from them to employees and that this effect is still perceptible in the weighted average cost of capital.     

Multiple corporate governance attributes and the cost of capital – Evidence from Germany

This paper investigates the extent to which corporate governance affects the cost of debt and equity capital of German exchange-listed companies. I examine corporate governance along three dimensions: financial information quality, ownership structure and board structure. The results suggest that firms with high levels of financial transparency and bonus compensations face lower cost of equity. In addition, block ownership is negatively related to firms' cost of equity when the blockholders are other firms, managers or founding-family members. Consistent with the conjecture that agency costs increase with firm size, I find significant cost of debt effects only in the largest German companies. Here, the creditors demand lower cost of debt from firms with block ownerships held by corporations or banks. My findings demonstrate that a uniform set of governance attributes is unlikely to satisfy suppliers of debt and equity capital equally.