破解保税区监管盲点坊控“热钱”借道流入

保税区外汇管理政策以简化外汇收支手续、便利区内企业贸易活动为监管原则,在促进保税区业务发展方面发挥了重要作用。与此同时,也应防范境外异常外汇资金利用政策及业务系统盲点违规流动套利的风险。文章结合辽宁省保税区发展实际,研究异常外汇资金在保税区流动的途径,并提出相关政策建议。     

努力探索履行外汇管理职能的新思路

近年来,我国国际收支形势发生了很大变化,外汇管理政策也不断进行改革调整,外汇政策在国家宏观调控中发挥着越来越重要的作用,这就要求外汇管理部门及时调整思路,转变方式,更好地履行职能。国家外汇管理局青岛市分局主动适应形势变化,积极探索履行外汇管理职能的新思路,一方面努力准确把握形势、全面领会并积极贯彻落实国家宏观调控意图，另一方面紧密结合实际，大力促进地方外向型经济又好又快发展。     

统一口径 放二管一 适当超前——特殊经济区外汇管理政策调整建议

前记：我国自1990年在上海设立第一个保税区（外高轿保税区）起，特殊经济区事业得到了长足发展。其主要类型包括：保税区、出口加工区，钻石交易所．保税物流园区和保税港区等。特殊经济区的发展，极大地促进了我国沿海地区外向型经济的繁荣。但是，现行特殊经济区的外汇管理规则是建立在外汇资金短缺时期导致的“宽进严出”的大背景下的，伴随着经济发展和宏观形势的转变，这些不同类型“经济飞地”遇到的政策问题也不断产生和累积，末来特殊经济区外汇管理政策走向成为业内外人士关注和思考的焦点。有人提出在“经济飞地”上试行“宽进宽出”的外汇管理政策，理由在于，即便未来形势发生变化，数量有限的“经济飞地”也易于被管理者掌控，因此是便利化与可控性的最佳组合。[编者按]     

加快海南省对外开放进程的外汇管理政策研究

营造相对宽松的外汇管理政策环境对于助推海南省＂两区一岛＂建设的意义重大。本文在对保税区、保税港区、自由贸易区和国际旅游岛外汇管理的国际通用做法进行研究和回顾海南省外汇管理发展历程的基础上,对海南省现行的外汇管理政策与国际惯例进行了差异比较和分析,提出了创新外汇政策,促进＂两区一岛＂建设跨越式发展的政策措施。     

上海钻石交易所外汇管理特性及相关政策设计

和保税区、出口加工区相比，由于上海钻石交易所会员成份的多样性和复杂性，对其很难采用统一的法人监管模式。上述基本特征决定了其在外汇管理上也有很大的特殊性，所以，必须在外汇账户监管、启动奖金购汇以及售付汇管理等具体政策上重新加以设计。     

海南建省二十年外汇管理发展历程

海南建省办特区二十余年来,外汇管理历经了外汇留成、额度调剂、人民币经常项目有条件可兑换等多个阶段。不同阶段的外汇管理政策对海南经济发展发挥了巨大的作用。如何在新的形势下制定相应的外汇管理政策,促进海南经济又好又快发展值得深入研究。     

对外汇质押项下人民币贷款政策的思考

政策分析 外汇质押项下人民币贷款政策的演变从一侧面反映了我国不同时期的经济发展形势和外汇政策监管重点。随着近年来外汇管理体制改革的不断深化，特别是经常项目外汇账户管理进行了多次调整，2005年2月5日，国家外汇管理局发布《关于调整经常项目外汇账户限额管理办法的通知》（汇发[2005]7号），对经常项目外汇账户限额管理办法进一步作出重大调整。首先，将境内机构超限额结汇期限由10个工作日延长为90日，允许境内机构在其经常项目外汇账户余额超出核定限额后的90日内仍可保留其外汇资金。其次，扩大了按实际外汇收入100％核定经常项目外汇账户限额的企业范围。     

结合塘沽实际对当前外汇管理的几点建议

随着我国入世的需要，未来的保税区发展前景如何、如何定位我们关心的问题，若向自由贸易区模式发展，夕卜汇管理将发生相应的改变。笔认为，对保税区企业区外开户应放宽。以塘沽地区为例，塘沽中心支局按照属地管理的原则，外汇管辖范围为塘沽区、开发区、保税区和出口加匝区。按照现行保税区外汇管理办法，保税区企业不能在保税区外开立外汇账户。我认为，塘沽中心支局作为塘沽地区外汇局，既然保税区在其管辖范围内，保税区企业在塘沽地区都可以开户，超出属地管理范围，应界定为异地。     

外汇管理政策频繁调整带来的负面影响

自1994年国家实行外汇体制改革以来，国家外汇管理局根据国际国内政治经济形势发展的需要，相继出台了许多外汇管理政策。加入世贸组织后，许多原有的外汇管理法律法规难以适应世贸组织的要求，因而修改幅度更大，变动更加频繁。新的外汇管理政策、法规的不断出台，虽然对促进国民经济     

强化银行外汇管理职能的探究

为了更好地支持外向型经济发展，国家外汇管理政策调整改革的步伐不断加快。外汇管理由直接管理为主向以间接管理为主转变，在间接管理为主的模式下，银行执行外汇管理规定的情况，直接关系到国家外汇管理政策能否落到实处。因此，应进一步强化外汇指定银行管理职能，全面提高整体外汇管理水平，保证国家外汇方针政策的顺利贯彻执行，促进外汇业务的健康发展。     

Seeking safety: The relation between CEO inside debt holdings and the riskiness of firm investment and financial policies

CEO inside debt holdings (pension benefits and deferred compensation) are generally unsecured and unfunded liabilities of the firm. Because these characteristics of inside debt expose the CEO to default risk similar to that faced by outside creditors, theory predicts that CEOs with large inside debt holdings will display lower levels of risk-seeking behavior (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Consistent with the theoretical predictions, we find a negative association between CEO inside debt holdings and the volatility of future firm stock returns, R&D expenditures, and financial leverage, and a positive association between CEO inside debt holdings and the extent of diversification and asset liquidity. Collectively, our results provide empirical evidence suggesting that CEOs with large inside debt holdings prefer investment and financial policies that are less risky.     

Are All Inside Directors the Same? Evidence from the External Directorship Market

Agency theory and optimal contracting theory posit opposing roles and shareholder wealth effects for corporate inside directors. We evaluate these theories using the market for outside directorships to differentiate among inside directors. Firms with inside directors holding outside directorships have better operating performance and market‐to‐book ratios, especially when monitoring is more difficult. These firms make better acquisition decisions, have greater cash holdings, and overstate earnings less often. Announcements of outside board appointments improve shareholder wealth, while departure announcements reduce it, consistent with these inside directors improving board performance and outside directorships being an important source of inside director incentives.     

CEO Inside Debt Incentives and Corporate Tax Sheltering

This paper examines the relation between CEO inside debt holdings (pension benefits and deferred compensation) and corporate tax sheltering. Because inside debt holdings are generally unsecured and unfunded liabilities of the firm, CEOs are exposed to risk similar to that faced by outside creditors. As such, theory (Jensen and Meckling [1976]) suggests that inside debt holdings negatively impact CEO risk‐appetite. To the extent that corporate tax shelters are likely to result in high cash flow volatility in the future, we expect that inside debt holdings will curb CEOs from engaging in tax shelter transactions. Consistent with the prediction, we document a negative association between CEO inside debt holdings and tax sheltering. Additional analyses suggest that the effect of inside debt on tax sheltering is more (less) pronounced in the presence of high default risk and liquidity threats (cash‐out options in pension packages). Overall, our results highlight the importance of investigating the implication of CEO debt‐like compensation for corporate tax policies.     

Gender, Professions and Management in the Public Sector

This article examines the location and status of women professionals in the public services, noting their small numbers in the élite sectors and at the highest levels. It also charts the rise in managerialism in the public sector, particularly in those areas where women dominate, and argues that the rise in managerialism is a gendered phenomenon which ensures that women remain in roles and occupations subordinate to men. Equal opportunities policies will have little effect while occupations numerically dominated by women remain devalued and continue to be controlled by men from outside the profession.     

Insider rates versus outsider rates in lending

When information asymmetries exist between lenders, an uninformed outside bank that competes with an informed inside bank faces a winner’s curse. This paper examines a benchmark model’s prediction for interest rates. Although the outside bank wins more bad firms, the inside bank extracts rents from good firms and the outside bank underbids for bad firms. An analytical solution reveals the surprising result that the average interest rate paid to the inside bank following bidding outcomes can be higher than the average interest rate paid to the outside bank.     

Why do firms appoint CEOs as outside directors?

Companies actively seek to appoint outside CEOs to their boards. Consistent with our matching theory of outside CEO board appointments, we show that such appointments have a certification benefit for the appointing firm. CEOs are more likely to join boards of large established firms that are geographically close, pursue similar financial and investment policies, and have comparable governance to their own firms. The first outside CEO director appointment has a higher stock-price reaction than the appointment of another outside director. Except for a decrease in operating performance following the appointment of an interlocked director, CEO directors do not affect the appointing firm's operating performance, decision-making, and CEO compensation.     

Flood insurance literacy and flood risk knowledge: Evidence from Portland,Oregon

Flood costs are escalating due to climate change and increased development in hazardous areas. Flood insurance plays a critical role in financial recovery, but there is very little research on how well consumers understand flood insurance policies. Poor insurance literacy could lead to suboptimal risk management decisions. This paper presents some of the first evidence on homeowner flood insurance literacy from a survey of residents in Portland, Oregon. We find that while a basic understanding of general insurance terms is widespread, details about flood insurance policies are not well-understood and many respondents do not know the specific terms of their policy. Residents of the 100-year floodplain are more likely to know that their homeowners’ insurance does not cover flooding, but do not have substantially better understanding or knowledge of specifics about their policy than those outside the floodplain. We also find that the majority of survey respondents did not learn about their flood risk or the cost of flood insurance until after making an offer on their property.     

The Nature of Board Nominating Committees and Their Role in Corporate Governance

This study examines the association between the employment and composition of nominating committees with board and ownership characteristics. First, the results suggest that the likelihood of using a nominating committee is inversely related to the level of inside ownership and positively weakly, related to the independence, but not the number, of outside board members. Second, the percentage of insiders participating in the committee is positively related to inside ownership, and negatively related to proxies for outside director quality. Finally, outside directors are more likely to serve on the nominating committee the more outside directorships they hold, and the longer their tenure in the firm. The likelihood of insider committee membership rises with a director's equity investment, with board tenure, and with other committee memberships. Taken together, the results are consistent with nominating committees substituting inside ownership in controlling management, mostly improving board quality, and being staffed with independent, experienced, and knowledgable members.     

Is an Outside Chair Always Better? The Role of Non‐CEO Inside Chairs on Corporate Boards

Proponents of separating the CEO and chairman positions advocate having an outside chairperson, although having an inside chairperson can be valuable for some firms. I find inside chairs are more likely where firm‐specific human capital is more important and, in these firms, inside chairs are associated with higher firm valuation and better operating performance. Furthermore, skilled inside chairs increase forced CEO turnover sensitivity to performance. The evidence suggests that certain inside chairs can be valuable when firm‐specific information is important for monitoring and an outside chair may be costly.     

Banks, private money, and government regulation

We study competition between inside and outside money in economies with trading frictions and financial intermediation. Claims on banks circulate if the redemption rate is low. When the quantity of fiat money is scarce, coexistence of inside and outside money dominates equilibria with a unique medium of exchange. If outside money is ample, banks choose to redeem claims in outside money, which increases welfare. Under binding reserve requirements, tightening monetary policy leads to credit rationing. Our results support recent trends toward lower reserve requirements. However, we also identify situations where restrictions on note issue are beneficial.