宏观计量模型在中央银行的应用

基于理论严谨程度从高到低,宏观经济计量模型可以区分为DSGE、不完全DSGE、混合模型和传统结构性模型,中央银行使用不同类型的计量模型以便于检验模型结果的强健性。通过对目前美联储、欧洲中央银行和IMF等国际机构目前正在使用的计量模型进行介绍,发现其中动态随机一般均衡(DSGE)模型在当代的经济预测和政策评估方面得到了广泛应用,最近几年来各国中央银行纷纷建造了基于DSGE的计量模型。     

宏观审慎管理与货币政策:一个文献回顾

本文在回顾梳理金融摩擦理论的基础上,提出了我国开放经济条件下DSGE模型的建模思路,基本思想是将跨境资金流动纳入货币政策的分析框架,以解释我国宏观经济不稳定的内在原因,为我国构建逆周期宏观审慎管理框架提出政策建议。     

金融经济周期模型及其在我国的应用研究

金融经济周期模型将"金融加速器"加入传统经济周期模型中,考察经济冲击通过金融因素放大和传导的具体过程。本文把房地产市场和信用渠道结合起来,通过建立一个两部门DSGE模型,表明房地产市场是模型的核心机制。主要变量的脉冲响应函数分析也表明,在非耐用品部门全要素生产率、房产部门全要素生产率、贷款与价值比率和住房偏好等因素的冲击下,经济波动被金融因素所放大和传导。因此,当前市场环境下关注经济的周期性波动不能忽略金融因素。中央银行需要密切关注经济整体财务状况、经济结构和金融市场采取提前预警、适度货币政策,将币值稳定、金融市场稳定和经济长期增长纳入统一的目标框架。     

中国经济波动与政策冲击

本文建立了一个包括居民、厂商、政府和中央银行在内的DSGE模型,然后采用校准的方法确定模型中的参数,在模型的稳态值附近进行对数线性化后求得模型的均衡解。最后,分析模型的脉冲相应函数,得出结论。主要结论有:(1)技术冲击对经济具有促进作用,经过短期的调整后,各个经济量基本都会达到高于原均衡水平的状态。(2)货币供应量冲击和政府财政支出冲击使经济变量出现上升后再恢复到原均衡水平。     

利率市场化的宏观经济效应研究

利率是引导金融资源配置的信号,利率市场化改革必将对经济主体利益产生重要影响。本文在分析了经济主体在"存、贷利率管制"情形下福利状况后,基于我国制造业上市企业微观层面的大样本数据,对利率市场化的影响进行了经验分析。分析结果表明,在利率市场化后,企业能更好地平滑融资成本冲击,实现福利增进。基于动态随机一般均衡模型(DSGE)的模拟结果也进一步证实,在利率市场化后,受益于居民消费的跨期平滑、中央银行可以通过调节真实利率进而有效地调控经济增长和物价水平;在居民、企业、中央银行三部门同时实现福利效用最大化的约束前提下,利率市场化能有效提高货币政策传导效率,消除中国经济发展中的价格之谜。     

动态随机一般均衡模型在货币政策分析上的应用:回顾与展望

本文从批判的视角来检视DSGE模型在货币政策分析上的应用。首先我们回顾DSGE模型发展沿革以及该模型与货币政策分析之间的关系。接下来,我们探讨DSGE有关模型设定与估计方法的最新进展,以及提供对于最新的DSGE模型的几点批判,借以说明为何DSGE模型依然不宜作为货币政策制定的依据。最后,我们对DSGE模型未来发展前景做出几点展望。     

基于DSGE模型对我国内生性货币特质的实证分析

货币内生性问题会涉及货币当局货币政策操作,尤其是中间目标选择,会影响货币政策传导机制并最终影响货币政策最终目标的实现.文章创新性地基于DSGE模型框架推导了内生货币和外生货币下模型解,并对我国货币内生性问题进行检验,实证结果显示我国货币内生性特征明显,中央银行以货币供给量为中介目标进行宏观调控显然是不可行的.因此,确立以利率为中间目标的宏观调控体系迫在眉睫.     

宏观审慎政策与货币政策搭配的最优工具选择研究

通过构建一个包含家庭部门、企业部门、金融中介、中央银行这4个主体部门,并细分成8个部门的DSGE模型来研究货币政策与宏观审慎政策的最优工具搭配问题.主要结论是:运用宏观审慎政策的贷款价值比工具以及资本充足率工具与货币政策的扩展型泰勒规则工具搭配,在面临各种需求、供给、偏好和政策冲击时,具有相对最优的降低经济、金融及杠杆率波动,维护经济、金融稳定的效果,也具有相对最优的降低社会福利损失的效果.     

劳动市场摩擦与机会主义货币政策

本文在存在劳动市场摩擦的DSGE模型框架下考察机会主义货币政策的合理性。研究发现,当经济中存在显著的工资粘性、雇佣成本和搜寻匹配摩擦时,实行灵活通胀目标的机会主义货币政策在社会福利效果上优于以稳定通胀和产出缺口为目标的标准泰勒规则,并接近无约束最优政策的福利效果。因此在这些条件下,机会主义货币政策是中央银行合理的政策选择。     

我国中央银行内部控制评价研究

本文通过研究中央银行内部控制评价的背景及意义,分析我国中央银行内部控制评价的现状,从评价的标准、程序、方法、指标体系和模型五个方面提出我国中央银行内部控制评价体系框架,并从完善制度规范、扩展评价主体、构建评价方法和指标体系等方面进行了探讨。     

Dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) modelling in practice: identification,estimation and evaluation

In recent years, dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models have come to play an increasing role in central banks, as an aid in the formulation of monetary policy (and increasingly after the global crisis, for maintaining financial stability). DSGE models, compared to other widely prevalent econometric models (such as vector autoregressive or large-scale econometric models), are less a-theoretic and with secure micro-foundations based on the optimizing behaviour of rational economic agents. Additionally, the models in spite of being strongly tied to theory, can be ‘taken to the data’ in a meaningful way. A major feature of these models is that their theoretical underpinnings lie in what has now come to be called as the New Consensus Macroeconomics (NCM). This paper concentrates on the econometric structure underpinning such models. Identification, estimation and evaluation issues are discussed at length with a special emphasis on the role of Bayesian maximum likelihood methods.     

Exploiting the monthly data flow in structural forecasting

A quarterly stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model is combined with a now-casting model designed to read timely monthly information as it becomes available. This implies (1) mapping the structural quarterly DSGE with a monthly version that maintains the same economic restrictions; (2) augmenting the model with a richer data set and (3) updating the estimates of the DSGE׳s structural shocks in real time following the publication calendar of the data. Our empirical results show that our methodology enhances the predictive accuracy in now-casting. An analysis of the Great Recession also shows that our framework would have helped tracing the DSGE׳s structural shocks in real time, obtaining, for example, a more timely account of the 2008 contraction.     

Monetary Policy and the Asset Risk‐Taking Channel

How important is the risk‐taking channel for monetary policy? To answer this question, we develop and estimate a quantitative monetary DSGE model where banks choose excessively risky investments, due to an agency problem that distorts banks' incentives. As the real interest rate declines, these distortions become more important and excessive risk taking increases, lowering the efficiency of investment. We show theoretically that this novel transmission channel generates a new monetary policy trade‐off between inflation and real interest rate stabilization, whereby the central bank may prefer to tolerate greater inflation volatility in order to lower excessive risk taking.     

流动性、银行间市场摩擦与借贷便利类货币政策工具

通过内生引入流动性短缺银行(拆入行)对流动性盈余银行(拆出行)的流动性需求机制,本文构建了一个包含银行间市场的DSGE模型,对借贷便利类货币政策工具的传导机制和传导效果进行了理论和实证研究。研究表明:(1)负向冲击会同时增加拆入行和拆出行对流动性的预防性需求,在经济形势不确定的情形下,拆出行不会很快恢复对拆入行的流动性供给,引起银行间市场流动性缺口放大和市场失灵。(2)由于仅依赖银行间市场自发回归稳态的过程太过缓慢,需要央行进行流动性干预。借贷便利类工具可以通过引导贷款市场定价和流动性效应这两个渠道来影响银行融资可得性,进而降低银行间市场流动性风险对宏观经济的负面影响。(3)借贷便利类货币政策工具的影响效果边际递减,央行可根据借贷便利操作的收益和成本,制定最佳的反应程度参数。     

流动性、银行间市场摩擦与借贷便利类货币政策工具

通过内生引入流动性短缺银行(拆入行)对流动性盈余银行(拆出行)的流动性需求机制,本文构建了一个包含银行间市场的DSGE模型,对借贷便利类货币政策工具的传导机制和传导效果进行了理论和实证研究。研究表明:(1)负向冲击会同时增加拆入行和拆出行对流动性的预防性需求,在经济形势不确定的情形下,拆出行不会很快恢复对拆入行的流动性供给,引起银行间市场流动性缺口放大和市场失灵。(2)由于仅依赖银行间市场自发回归稳态的过程太过缓慢,需要央行进行流动性干预。借贷便利类工具可以通过引导贷款市场定价和流动性效应这两个渠道来影响银行融资可得性,进而降低银行间市场流动性风险对宏观经济的负面影响。(3)借贷便利类货币政策工具的影响效果边际递减,央行可根据借贷便利操作的收益和成本,制定最佳的反应程度参数。     

Central bank digital currency and the effectiveness of negative interest rate policy: A DSGE analysis

Implementing a negative interest rate policy (NIRP) in the traditional fiat system is less effective than desired because of the zero lower bound (ZLB) constraint on interest rates and the cash barrier. Would this problem be solved if a new form of currency was introduced, i.e., central bank digital currency (CBDC), in the economy? To answer this question, we construct a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model to analyze the effectiveness of NIRP upon the introduction of CBDC. The results suggest that: (i) The CBDC can eliminate the ZLB constraint and stabilize the economic fluctuations caused by NIRP. (ii) The central bank can implement NIRP by directly adjusting the interest rate of digital currency to stimulate consumption, investment, and output and to accelerate macroeconomic recovery. (iii) Welfare analysis shows that the central bank can effectively choose different NIRP rules according to the economic objectives.     

Excess reserves,monetary policy and financial volatility

This paper examines the real and financial effects of reserves in a Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model with monopoly banking and credit market imperfections. The framework explicitly accounts for the fact that commercial banks hold excess reserves and they incur costs in holding these assets. The model also accounts for imperfect substitutability between bank funding sources and it shows that this feature is an important channel through which reserve requirement shocks can affect real variables. Numerical experiments show that an increase in reserve requirements creates a countercyclical effect for real economic activity. The results also indicate that the combination of an augmented Taylor rule which responds to excess reserves and a countercyclical reserve requirement rule is optimal to mitigate macroeconomic and financial volatility associated with liquidity shocks.     

“双支柱”调控、政策协调搭配与宏观稳定效应

本文通过构建包含金融部门和“双支柱”调控政策的DSGE模型,系统考察了货币政策和宏观审慎政策的组合在不同经济金融冲击下的宏观经济和金融稳定效应。相关分析得出了三个基本结论:一是纳入宏观审慎政策的“双支柱”调控框架确实比单一使用货币政策具有相对更好的经济和金融稳定效应;二是“双支柱”调控框架在应对金融冲击时的稳定效应表现得更加明显,这说明宏观审慎政策确实是通过金融稳定渠道发挥作用的,从而与货币政策侧重实体经济(产出和通胀)的稳定效应形成了有效互补;三是不论是在价格型的货币政策工具下,还是在数量型的货币政策工具下,“双支柱”调控框架都较单一使用货币政策具有更好的经济金融稳定效应,这说明“双支柱”调控框架的有效性不依赖于货币政策工具的改变而改变,在具体的政策工具组合方面具有较为普遍的适用性。     

“双支柱”调控、政策协调搭配与宏观稳定效应

本文通过构建包含金融部门和“双支柱”调控政策的DSGE模型,系统考察了货币政策和宏观审慎政策的组合在不同经济金融冲击下的宏观经济和金融稳定效应。相关分析得出了三个基本结论:一是纳入宏观审慎政策的“双支柱”调控框架确实比单一使用货币政策具有相对更好的经济和金融稳定效应;二是“双支柱”调控框架在应对金融冲击时的稳定效应表现得更加明显,这说明宏观审慎政策确实是通过金融稳定渠道发挥作用的,从而与货币政策侧重实体经济(产出和通胀)的稳定效应形成了有效互补;三是不论是在价格型的货币政策工具下,还是在数量型的货币政策工具下,“双支柱”调控框架都较单一使用货币政策具有更好的经济金融稳定效应,这说明“双支柱”调控框架的有效性不依赖于货币政策工具的改变而改变,在具体的政策工具组合方面具有较为普遍的适用性。     

Bank runs, foreign exchange reserves and credibility: When size does not matter

The paper considers the sizes of banking sectors that are vulnerable to runs when the central bank cares about economic stability and currency peg credibility. It is shown that when banks are small, the central bank will recapitalize unhealthy banks because doing so will not compromise its peg. While recapitalizations of large banking sectors will compromise a peg, central banks will also bailout large banking sectors in distress to prevent great economic instability. Given the central bank's expected response, a range of sizes for banking systems, which are vulnerable to runs, is found along with a condition in which size will not matter. That is, if that condition is satisfied, banking sectors of all sizes will be immune to runs. The experiences of Asia and Argentina are discussed to provide anecdotal support for the model.