Adverse selection in mortgage securitization

Using several large data sets of mortgage loans originated between 2004 and 2007, we find that in the prime mortgage market, banks generally sold low-default-risk loans into the secondary market while retaining higher-default-risk loans in their portfolios. In contrast, these lenders retained loans with lower prepayment risk relative to loans they sold. Securitization strategy of lenders changed dramatically in 2007 as the crisis set in with most unwilling to retain higher-default-risk loans in return for lower prepayment risk. Contrary to the prime market, the subprime market does not exhibit any clear pattern of adverse selection.     

Government intervention in the mortgage market: A study of anti-redlining regulations

This paper addresses the question of whether economic incentives exist for mortgage lenders to avoid or to minimize mortgage originations in neighborhoods inhabited primarily by low-income racial minorities. The Option Pricing Model is utilized to determine what mortgage borrower characteristics affect the market value of the mortgage contracts. It is found that existing laws do not enable mortgage lenders to vary either origination prices or mortgage terms so as to adjust for differences in the market values of mortgages. As a result, incentives are created for both the mortgage lender and the mortgage insurer to avoid originations and underwritings in areas with relatively high default probabilities. Various changes in mortgage lending regulations are suggested to eliminate these incentives, and the effects of alternative programs to subsidize mortgage borrowers with relatively high default probabilities are considered.     

Asymmetric Information in the Subprime Mortgage Market

Because of impersonal securitization in the secondary market, the ultimate investors in a mortgage have only a limited amount of information about the borrower??s characteristics. This creates an asymmetric information problem because of hidden knowledge on the part of the primary lenders, who naturally have much better access to this information. This is aggravated by the free rider problem when there are multiple investors. We discuss to what extent the secondary market then seeks to sort the loans to ameliorate this problem and what role reputations play. More importantly, however, the actions of the primary lender in terms of which kinds of loans they choose to approve are partly hidden, and this typical principal-agent situation importantly aggravates the incentive problem. To judge the nature and magnitude of this moral hazard dilemma, we use data to compare how well investors in the secondary mortgage market can predict default given the information they typically have access to as compared to the ability of primary lenders to similarly predict default given the larger set of information they typically will have access to. Finally, the implications of these results are indicated, particularly in light of the recent mortgage crisis.     

Pricing Effects of the Decision to Sell or Hold Adjustable Rate Mortgage Loans in a Portfolio

Residential mortgage originators can transfer loans to ultimate lenders quickly and efficiently using the secondary mortgage market. Some adjustable rate mortgage (ARM) lenders use this outlet consistently while others hold whole loans in their portfolios on a long-term basis. Selling and holding lenders should respond to different economic factors when setting yields on ARM loans originated because their long-term positions in the loans are so diverse. This paper develops and tests a model of differential pricing behavior for selling and holding strategies. Empirical results support the notion that lenders use different factors to price loans and that these factors are related to the risks faced by the originating lender given its origination strategy. Additional findings suggest that institutional and firm-specific pricing tendencies exist in the primary mortgage market for adjustable rate debt.     

Assessing Systemic Risk Exposure from Banks and GSEs Under Alternative Approaches to Capital Regulation

A key function of capital regulation is to mitigate the potential for systemic financial risk by maintaining public confidence in the ability of regulated market participants to honor their financial obligations in times of market stress. While it is well known that the portfolios of banks and non-banks, especially those intermediaries specializing in mortgage securitization or in specialized mortgage lending, differ in important respects, debate over alternative capital regulations has yet to recognize the implications of these differences, despite the increasing importance of non-bank intermediaries in risk-sharing markets. This paper uses a simple two-date discrete state space exchange economy with opportunities for moral hazard on the part of financial intermediaries to investigate the design of capital regulations to control systemic risk. Holding constant asset risks, we show that intermediaries that issue contingent liabilities may exhibit low or no risk of insolvency while holding significantly less capital than deposit-taking institutions because banks primarily issue claims that promise fixed payments in all states of nature. We also show that, rather than raising capital requirements, the control of systemic risk may involve lowering capital requirements and extending guarantees to liability-holders, without a necessary increase in expected subsidy payments, if such requirements account for shareholder incentives. Specifically, we analyze an example of regulatory policy in which lower capital requirements and an ex post penalty schedule reduce systemic risk by increasing the volume of tradable securities exchanged and by offering a credible mechanism by which intermediaries can signal the true riskiness of their portfolios to liability-holders.     

The effect of foreclosure laws on securitization: Evidence from U.S. states

A mortgage that defaults is more likely to enter foreclosure rather than renegotiation if it has been securitized in the private non-agency market, according to previous research. We study whether this foreclosure-propensity affects lenders’ securitization decision ex-ante. Due to the higher foreclosure probability, the value of a mortgage should be more sensitive to foreclosure costs if it is securitized. Comparing loans made in the same metropolitan area but under different foreclosure laws, we find that lenders are less likely to securitize mortgages in states with higher foreclosure costs, as measured by laws requiring judicial foreclosure. Two additional results are consistent with the proposed channel. First, the effect increases for loans with higher expected default rates and disappears for mortgage-like loans not subject to these laws. Second, the effect of judicial requirements increases for loans with higher expected default rates, consistent with differences in loss given default driving the results. Borrowers in states without judicial requirements also get riskier loans.     

On the Economics of Subprime Lending

US mortgage markets have evolved radically in recent years. An important part of the change has been the rise of the subprime market, characterized by loans with high default rates, dominance by specialized subprime lenders rather than full-service lenders, and little coverage by the secondary mortgage market. In this paper, we examine these and other stylized facts with standard tools used by financial economists to describe market structure in other contexts. We use three models to examine market structure: an option-based approach to mortgage pricing in which we argue that subprime options are different from prime options, causing different contracts and prices; and two models based on asymmetric information–one with asymmetry between borrowers and lenders, and one with the asymmetry between lenders and the secondary market. In both of the asymmetric-information models, investors set up incentives for borrowers or loan sellers to reveal information, primarily through costs of rejection.     

Does Regulatory Capital Arbitrage, Reputation, or Asymmetric Information Drive Securitization?

Banks can choose to keep loans on balance sheet as private debt or transform them into public debt via asset securitization. Securitization transfers credit and interest rate risk, increases liquidity, augments fee income, and improves capital ratios. Yet many lenders still retain a portion of their loans in portfolio. Do lenders exploit asymmetric information to sell riskier loans into the public markets or retain riskier loans in portfolio? If riskier loans are indeed retained in portfolio, is this motivated by regulatory capital incentives (regulatory capital arbitrage), or a concern for reputation? We examine these questions empirically and find that securitized mortgage loans have experienced lower ex-post defaults than those retained in portfolio, providing evidence consistent with either the capital arbitrage or reputation explanation for securitization.     

Differential Impacts of Structural and Cyclical Unemployment on Mortgage Default and Prepayment

The Great Recession (the fourth quarter of 2007 through the second quarter of 2009) has been characterized by high rates of foreclosures and unemployment. Using a sample of community reinvestment loans, we examine the impact of structural unemployment and cyclical unemployment on mortgage terminations (default and prepayment). We find that mortgage default and prepayment are more sensitive to changes in the structural component of the local unemployment rate than in the cyclical component. In addition, depending on whether structural unemployment rates are high or low, borrowers and lenders react differently to the incentives to terminate a loan.     

Are Commercial Mortgage Defaults Affected by Tax Considerations?

We study whether tax considerations are an important determinant of commercial mortgage default. We also study whether large lenders are better informed, or better at interpreting information for lending purposes, and hence have lower foreclosure rates; whether lenders have more information on larger borrowers than smaller borrowers, and hence have lower foreclosure rates on larger loans; and whether commercial mortgage defaults are related to debt service coverage and loan-to-values, both initial and contemporaneous. The paper’s main findings are fourfold. First, holding all else equal, there is evidence that tax considerations influence investors’ decisions about when to “put” assets to lenders. The results are consistent with the argument of Constantinides (J Financ Econ 13:65–89, 1984). Second, the evidence suggests that large lenders are especially knowledgeable about commercial mortgage borrowers and commercial property markets, in that they have lower foreclosure rates than smaller lenders. Third, on the question of whether lenders have more information on larger borrowers than smaller borrowers, we find that larger loans have, on average, lower default rates than smaller loans. Fourth, the findings suggest that lower default rates are associated with higher debt service coverage ratios, both initial and contemporaneous.