Disentangling Managers’ and Analysts’ Non‐GAAP Reporting

Researchers frequently proxy for managers’ non‐GAAP disclosures using performance metrics available through analyst forecast data providers (FDPs), such as I/B/E/S. The extent to which FDP‐provided earnings are a valid proxy for managers’ non‐GAAP reporting, however, has been debated extensively. We explore this important question by creating the first large‐sample data set of managers’ non‐GAAP earnings disclosures, which we directly compare to I/B/E/S data. Although we find a substantial overlap between the two data sets, we also find that they differ in systematic ways because I/B/E/S (1) excludes managers’ lower quality non‐GAAP numbers and (2) sometimes provides higher quality non‐GAAP measures that managers do not explicitly disclose. Our results indicate that using I/B/E/S to identify managers’ non‐GAAP disclosures significantly underestimates the aggressiveness of their reporting choices. We encourage researchers interested in managers’ non‐GAAP reporting to use our newly available data set of manager‐disclosed non‐GAAP metrics because it more accurately captures managers’ reporting choices.     

The Role of Financial Incentives in Balanced Scorecard‐Based Performance Evaluations: Correcting Mood Congruency Biases

Moods are low‐intensity affective states that individuals bring to a decision, and may be especially important when the balanced scorecard (BSC) is used for performance evaluation purposes. We propose that financial incentives can motivate decision‐makers to correct mood congruency biases, in which judgments and decisions are consistent with moods. In experiment 1, participants rated the performance of one division manager based on two accounting measures and another manager based on a 16‐measure BSC; there were mood congruency biases at both levels of information load. Financial incentives to make benchmark‐consistent judgments eliminated bias in the former condition but not in the BSC condition. In experiment 2, incentives were offered and performance evaluations were based on an eight‐measure BSC; mood congruency bias was eliminated. Results suggest that management control systems, specifically financial incentives, should be included in future affect correction research.     

Disclosure strategies among S&P 500 firms: Evidence on the disclosure of non-GAAP financial measures and financial statements in earnings press releases

This paper examines the prominence of non-GAAP financial measures in press releases, testing whether managers emphasize these adjusted performance measures relative to GAAP numbers in four different settings where their disclosure helps managers reach strategic earnings benchmarks on a pro forma basis when they would otherwise fall short using GAAP numbers. Moreover, this research investigates the information content of disclosures reconciling non-GAAP to GAAP earnings (and other financial statements). The data is hand collected from quarterly earnings press releases of a sample of S&P 500 firms during the 2001–2003 period. In this particular sample, the disclosure of non-GAAP financial measures is frequent. The results suggest that managers strategically give more prominence to non-GAAP measures than to GAAP figures when the GAAP earnings number falls short of a benchmark but the non-GAAP earnings number does not. This disclosure strategy may influence the perception of the firm's financial results. Furthermore, the results suggest that both the reconciliation and the non-GAAP income statement contain information useful for users.     

The Economic Value of Corporate Eco‐Efficiency

This study adds new insights to the long‐running corporate environmental‐financial performance debate by focusing on the concept of eco‐efficiency. Using a new database of eco‐efficiency scores, we analyse the relation between eco‐efficiency and financial performance from 1997 to 2004. We report that eco‐efficiency relates positively to operating performance and market value. Moreover, our results suggest that the market's valuation of environmental performance has been time variant, which may indicate that the market incorporates environmental information with a drift. Although environmental leaders initially did not sell at a premium relative to laggards, the valuation differential increased significantly over time. Our results have implications for company managers, who evidently do not have to overcome a tradeoff between eco‐efficiency and financial performance, and for investors, who can exploit environmental information for investment decisions.     

Short‐selling constraints and corporate payout policy

This study shows that managers adjust corporate payout policies to counteract intensified short‐selling pressures following the removal of a short‐selling constraint. We use a controlled experiment, the Regulation SHO pilot program, to find that changing the short‐selling rule brings small companies to increase cash dividends, but not to repurchase more shares. Because paying dividends is costly, it is acknowledged as a more reliable signal of stock undervaluation than share repurchase. While our evidence suggests that companies select this payout strategy to deter predatory short sellers, it also shows that a short‐selling activity has a causal effect on corporate payout decisions.     

Value Maximisation, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective Function

This paper examines the role of the corporate objective function in corporate productivity and efficiency, social welfare, and the accountability of managers and directors. I argue that since it is logically impossible to maximise in more than one dimension, purposeful behaviour requires a single valued objective function. Two hundred years of work in economics and finance implies that in the absence of externalities and monopoly (and when all goods are priced), social welfare is maximised when each firm in an economy maximises its total market value. Total value is not just the value of the equity but also includes the market values of all other financial claims including debt, preferred stock, and warrants. In sharp contrast stakeholder theory, argues that managers should make decisions so as to take account of the interests of all stakeholders in a firm (including not only financial claimants, but also employees, customers, communities, governmental officials and under some interpretations the environment, terrorists and blackmailers). Because the advocates of stakeholder theory refuse to specify how to make the necessary tradeoffs among these competing interests they leave managers with a theory that makes it impossible for them to make purposeful decisions. With no way to keep score, stakeholder theory makes managers unaccountable for their actions. It seems clear that such a theory can be attractive to the self interest of managers and directors. Creating value takes more than acceptance of value maximisation as the organisational objective. As a statement of corporate purpose or vision, value maximisation is not likely to tap into the energy and enthusiasm of employees and managers to create value. Seen in this light, change in long‐term market value becomes the scorecard that managers, directors, and others use to assess success or failure of the organisation. The choice of value maximisation as the corporate scorecard must be complemented by a corporate vision, strategy and tactics that unite participants in the organisation in its struggle for dominance in its competitive arena. A firm cannot maximise value if it ignores the interest of its stakeholders. I offer a proposal to clarify what I believe is the proper relation between value maximisation and stakeholder theory. I call it enlightened value maximisation, and it is identical to what I call enlightened stakeholder theory. Enlightened value maximisation utilises much of the structure of stakeholder theory but accepts maximisation of the long run value of the firm as the criterion for making the requisite tradeoffs among its stakeholders. Managers, directors, strategists, and management scientists can benefit from enlightened stakeholder theory. Enlightened stakeholder theory specifies long‐term value maximisation or value seeking as the firm’s objective and therefore solves the problems that arise from the multiple objectives that accompany traditional stakeholder theory. I also discuss the Balanced Scorecard, the managerial equivalent of stakeholder theory. The same conclusions hold. Balanced Scorecard theory is flawed because it presents managers with a scorecard which gives no score—that is, no single‐valued measure of how they have performed. Thus managers evaluated with such a system (which can easily have two dozen measures and provides no information on the tradeoffs between them) have no way to make principled or purposeful decisions. The solution is to define a true (single dimensional) score for measuring performance for the organisation or division (and it must be consistent with the organisation’s strategy). Given this we then encourage managers to use measures of the drivers of performance to understand better how to maximise their score. And as long as their score is defined properly, (and for lower levels in the organisation it will generally not be value) this will enhance their contribution to the firm.     

Are Auditors Professionally Skeptical? Evidence from Auditors’ Going‐Concern Opinions and Management Earnings Forecasts

We examine whether auditors exercise professional skepticism about management earnings forecasts when making going‐concern decisions. Using publicly issued management earnings forecasts as a proxy for earnings forecasts provided by managers to auditors, we find that management earnings forecasts are negatively associated with both auditors’ going‐concern opinions and subsequent bankruptcy. The weight auditors put on management forecasts in the going‐concern decision is not significantly different from the weight implied in the bankruptcy prediction model. Moreover, compared with the bankruptcy model, auditors assign a lower weight to management forecasts they perceive as being less credible, including those (1) issued by managers who issued optimistic forecasts in the previous two years, and (2) predicting high earnings increases or high earnings. Taken together, our evidence is consistent with auditors being professionally skeptical about management earnings forecasts when making going‐concern decisions.     

Analyst reputation and management earnings forecasts

Prior studies show that analysts with high reputation are influential in the market. This paper examines whether managers consider analyst reputation in shaping their voluntary disclosure strategy. Using Institutional Investor magazine’s All-American (AA) rankings as a proxy for analyst reputation, we find that the coverage of AA analysts is positively associated with the likelihood of quarterly management earnings forecasts (MEFs). We also find that AA analysts’ forecast optimism is more positively associated with the likelihood of MEFs than non-AA analysts’ forecast optimism when the firm is covered by AA analysts. Analyses based on AA analyst coverage changes and AA status changes confirm the relation between analyst reputation and MEFs. We further find that analyst reputation influences other MEF properties, such as forecast news, bias, and revisions, and that our results are robust to alternative measures of analyst reputation. Further analyses show that market reactions at quarterly earnings announcements are more positive (negative) when firms meet/beat (miss) AA analysts’ forecasts than when firms meet/beat (miss) non-AA analysts’ forecasts. Collectively, our findings suggest that managers strategically provide voluntary forecasts by taking into account the reputation of individual analysts following their firms.     

The judgmental effects of strategy maps in balanced scorecard performance evaluations

We examine whether supplemental information displays affect decisions made using a common strategic performance measurement system, the balanced scorecard. A distinguishing feature of the balanced scorecard (BSC) is the number and diversity of its metrics. To effectively formulate a decision from such a complex information set, managers must view these measures within their strategic context ( [Kaplan and Norton, 1993] and [Kaplan and Norton, 1996] ). However, academic studies indicate that problems in communication and comprehension of the strategic logic underlying the scorecard hinder its implementation and use ( [Lipe and Salterio, 2000] , [Malina and Selto, 2001] , [Ittner et al., 2003a] and [Ittner et al., 2003b] ). We investigate whether a supplemental information display, in the form of a strategy map, results in performance evaluation judgments consistent with the recognition of relations between performance metrics and strategy. Strategy maps are causal diagrams depicting temporally-separate and non-linear relations between scorecard performance measures and overriding strategic objectives. As predicted, we find that performance evaluation decisions are more consistent with the achievement of strategic objectives when participants are provided with strategy maps.