Disentangling Managers’ and Analysts’ Non‐GAAP Reporting

Researchers frequently proxy for managers’ non‐GAAP disclosures using performance metrics available through analyst forecast data providers (FDPs), such as I/B/E/S. The extent to which FDP‐provided earnings are a valid proxy for managers’ non‐GAAP reporting, however, has been debated extensively. We explore this important question by creating the first large‐sample data set of managers’ non‐GAAP earnings disclosures, which we directly compare to I/B/E/S data. Although we find a substantial overlap between the two data sets, we also find that they differ in systematic ways because I/B/E/S (1) excludes managers’ lower quality non‐GAAP numbers and (2) sometimes provides higher quality non‐GAAP measures that managers do not explicitly disclose. Our results indicate that using I/B/E/S to identify managers’ non‐GAAP disclosures significantly underestimates the aggressiveness of their reporting choices. We encourage researchers interested in managers’ non‐GAAP reporting to use our newly available data set of manager‐disclosed non‐GAAP metrics because it more accurately captures managers’ reporting choices.     

The Role of Financial Incentives in Balanced Scorecard‐Based Performance Evaluations: Correcting Mood Congruency Biases

Moods are low‐intensity affective states that individuals bring to a decision, and may be especially important when the balanced scorecard (BSC) is used for performance evaluation purposes. We propose that financial incentives can motivate decision‐makers to correct mood congruency biases, in which judgments and decisions are consistent with moods. In experiment 1, participants rated the performance of one division manager based on two accounting measures and another manager based on a 16‐measure BSC; there were mood congruency biases at both levels of information load. Financial incentives to make benchmark‐consistent judgments eliminated bias in the former condition but not in the BSC condition. In experiment 2, incentives were offered and performance evaluations were based on an eight‐measure BSC; mood congruency bias was eliminated. Results suggest that management control systems, specifically financial incentives, should be included in future affect correction research.     

Disclosure strategies among S&P 500 firms: Evidence on the disclosure of non-GAAP financial measures and financial statements in earnings press releases

This paper examines the prominence of non-GAAP financial measures in press releases, testing whether managers emphasize these adjusted performance measures relative to GAAP numbers in four different settings where their disclosure helps managers reach strategic earnings benchmarks on a pro forma basis when they would otherwise fall short using GAAP numbers. Moreover, this research investigates the information content of disclosures reconciling non-GAAP to GAAP earnings (and other financial statements). The data is hand collected from quarterly earnings press releases of a sample of S&P 500 firms during the 2001–2003 period. In this particular sample, the disclosure of non-GAAP financial measures is frequent. The results suggest that managers strategically give more prominence to non-GAAP measures than to GAAP figures when the GAAP earnings number falls short of a benchmark but the non-GAAP earnings number does not. This disclosure strategy may influence the perception of the firm's financial results. Furthermore, the results suggest that both the reconciliation and the non-GAAP income statement contain information useful for users.     

The Economic Value of Corporate Eco‐Efficiency

This study adds new insights to the long‐running corporate environmental‐financial performance debate by focusing on the concept of eco‐efficiency. Using a new database of eco‐efficiency scores, we analyse the relation between eco‐efficiency and financial performance from 1997 to 2004. We report that eco‐efficiency relates positively to operating performance and market value. Moreover, our results suggest that the market's valuation of environmental performance has been time variant, which may indicate that the market incorporates environmental information with a drift. Although environmental leaders initially did not sell at a premium relative to laggards, the valuation differential increased significantly over time. Our results have implications for company managers, who evidently do not have to overcome a tradeoff between eco‐efficiency and financial performance, and for investors, who can exploit environmental information for investment decisions.     

Short‐selling constraints and corporate payout policy

This study shows that managers adjust corporate payout policies to counteract intensified short‐selling pressures following the removal of a short‐selling constraint. We use a controlled experiment, the Regulation SHO pilot program, to find that changing the short‐selling rule brings small companies to increase cash dividends, but not to repurchase more shares. Because paying dividends is costly, it is acknowledged as a more reliable signal of stock undervaluation than share repurchase. While our evidence suggests that companies select this payout strategy to deter predatory short sellers, it also shows that a short‐selling activity has a causal effect on corporate payout decisions.     

Value Maximisation, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective Function

This paper examines the role of the corporate objective function in corporate productivity and efficiency, social welfare, and the accountability of managers and directors. I argue that since it is logically impossible to maximise in more than one dimension, purposeful behaviour requires a single valued objective function. Two hundred years of work in economics and finance implies that in the absence of externalities and monopoly (and when all goods are priced), social welfare is maximised when each firm in an economy maximises its total market value. Total value is not just the value of the equity but also includes the market values of all other financial claims including debt, preferred stock, and warrants. In sharp contrast stakeholder theory, argues that managers should make decisions so as to take account of the interests of all stakeholders in a firm (including not only financial claimants, but also employees, customers, communities, governmental officials and under some interpretations the environment, terrorists and blackmailers). Because the advocates of stakeholder theory refuse to specify how to make the necessary tradeoffs among these competing interests they leave managers with a theory that makes it impossible for them to make purposeful decisions. With no way to keep score, stakeholder theory makes managers unaccountable for their actions. It seems clear that such a theory can be attractive to the self interest of managers and directors. Creating value takes more than acceptance of value maximisation as the organisational objective. As a statement of corporate purpose or vision, value maximisation is not likely to tap into the energy and enthusiasm of employees and managers to create value. Seen in this light, change in long‐term market value becomes the scorecard that managers, directors, and others use to assess success or failure of the organisation. The choice of value maximisation as the corporate scorecard must be complemented by a corporate vision, strategy and tactics that unite participants in the organisation in its struggle for dominance in its competitive arena. A firm cannot maximise value if it ignores the interest of its stakeholders. I offer a proposal to clarify what I believe is the proper relation between value maximisation and stakeholder theory. I call it enlightened value maximisation, and it is identical to what I call enlightened stakeholder theory. Enlightened value maximisation utilises much of the structure of stakeholder theory but accepts maximisation of the long run value of the firm as the criterion for making the requisite tradeoffs among its stakeholders. Managers, directors, strategists, and management scientists can benefit from enlightened stakeholder theory. Enlightened stakeholder theory specifies long‐term value maximisation or value seeking as the firm’s objective and therefore solves the problems that arise from the multiple objectives that accompany traditional stakeholder theory. I also discuss the Balanced Scorecard, the managerial equivalent of stakeholder theory. The same conclusions hold. Balanced Scorecard theory is flawed because it presents managers with a scorecard which gives no score—that is, no single‐valued measure of how they have performed. Thus managers evaluated with such a system (which can easily have two dozen measures and provides no information on the tradeoffs between them) have no way to make principled or purposeful decisions. The solution is to define a true (single dimensional) score for measuring performance for the organisation or division (and it must be consistent with the organisation’s strategy). Given this we then encourage managers to use measures of the drivers of performance to understand better how to maximise their score. And as long as their score is defined properly, (and for lower levels in the organisation it will generally not be value) this will enhance their contribution to the firm.     

Are Auditors Professionally Skeptical? Evidence from Auditors’ Going‐Concern Opinions and Management Earnings Forecasts

We examine whether auditors exercise professional skepticism about management earnings forecasts when making going‐concern decisions. Using publicly issued management earnings forecasts as a proxy for earnings forecasts provided by managers to auditors, we find that management earnings forecasts are negatively associated with both auditors’ going‐concern opinions and subsequent bankruptcy. The weight auditors put on management forecasts in the going‐concern decision is not significantly different from the weight implied in the bankruptcy prediction model. Moreover, compared with the bankruptcy model, auditors assign a lower weight to management forecasts they perceive as being less credible, including those (1) issued by managers who issued optimistic forecasts in the previous two years, and (2) predicting high earnings increases or high earnings. Taken together, our evidence is consistent with auditors being professionally skeptical about management earnings forecasts when making going‐concern decisions.     

Analyst reputation and management earnings forecasts

Prior studies show that analysts with high reputation are influential in the market. This paper examines whether managers consider analyst reputation in shaping their voluntary disclosure strategy. Using Institutional Investor magazine’s All-American (AA) rankings as a proxy for analyst reputation, we find that the coverage of AA analysts is positively associated with the likelihood of quarterly management earnings forecasts (MEFs). We also find that AA analysts’ forecast optimism is more positively associated with the likelihood of MEFs than non-AA analysts’ forecast optimism when the firm is covered by AA analysts. Analyses based on AA analyst coverage changes and AA status changes confirm the relation between analyst reputation and MEFs. We further find that analyst reputation influences other MEF properties, such as forecast news, bias, and revisions, and that our results are robust to alternative measures of analyst reputation. Further analyses show that market reactions at quarterly earnings announcements are more positive (negative) when firms meet/beat (miss) AA analysts’ forecasts than when firms meet/beat (miss) non-AA analysts’ forecasts. Collectively, our findings suggest that managers strategically provide voluntary forecasts by taking into account the reputation of individual analysts following their firms.     

The judgmental effects of strategy maps in balanced scorecard performance evaluations

We examine whether supplemental information displays affect decisions made using a common strategic performance measurement system, the balanced scorecard. A distinguishing feature of the balanced scorecard (BSC) is the number and diversity of its metrics. To effectively formulate a decision from such a complex information set, managers must view these measures within their strategic context ( [Kaplan and Norton, 1993] and [Kaplan and Norton, 1996] ). However, academic studies indicate that problems in communication and comprehension of the strategic logic underlying the scorecard hinder its implementation and use ( [Lipe and Salterio, 2000] , [Malina and Selto, 2001] , [Ittner et al., 2003a] and [Ittner et al., 2003b] ). We investigate whether a supplemental information display, in the form of a strategy map, results in performance evaluation judgments consistent with the recognition of relations between performance metrics and strategy. Strategy maps are causal diagrams depicting temporally-separate and non-linear relations between scorecard performance measures and overriding strategic objectives. As predicted, we find that performance evaluation decisions are more consistent with the achievement of strategic objectives when participants are provided with strategy maps.     

An Investigation of Auditors’ Judgments When Companies Release Earnings Before Audit Completion

The majority of U.S. public companies release annual earnings prior to the completion of audit fieldwork. We investigate this phenomenon in a controlled experiment with audit partners and senior managers. We find that releasing earnings before completion of the audit pressures auditors to adopt the goals of management, thereby reducing the likelihood of post‐announcement audit‐adjustment recommendations. We also examine the effect of audit committee (AC) strength in improving auditors’ judgments after annual earnings are released. When ACs are actively involved in accounting issues and proactively communicating with auditors—characteristics currently lacking in most ACs—the negative effects on auditors’ judgments are completely mitigated. Our study provides evidence on potential unintended consequences of early release of earnings and the importance of investing in high‐quality ACs to mitigate adverse effects of client pressures on audit judgment and financial reporting quality.     

Directors’ and Officers’ Liability Insurance and Aggressive Tax‐Reporting Activities: Evidence from Canada

This paper examines the relationship between directors’ and officers’ liability insurance (D&O insurance) and firms’ aggressive tax reporting. Using large Canadian public companies listed on the TSX300 and relying on several measures to capture aggressive tax‐reporting activities, including GAAP effective tax rates, cash effective tax rates, and the total and residual book‐tax differences, I find that D&O insurance exhibits a strong negative relationship with the GAAP effective tax rates and a strong positive relationship with both the total and residual book‐tax differences. However, there is generally no evidence showing that D&O insurance is associated with the cash effective tax rates. I interpret these results as indicating that D&O insurance reduces the tax expenses reported in the financial statements but not the actual tax paid. In other words, D&O insurance contributes to financial tax management but not to cash tax savings. Further tests in this study reveal that firms with fluctuating D&O coverage limits engage in more aggressive tax reporting than other firms, suggesting that managers may consider the level of D&O insurance that they purchase when they make aggressive tax‐reporting decisions.     

Nonfinancial Performance Measures and Promotion-Based Incentives

In this paper, I examine the sensitivity of promotion and demotion decisions for lower‐level managers to financial and nonfinancial measures of their performance and investigate the extent to which the behavior of lower‐level managers reflects promotion‐based incentives. Additionally, I test for learning versus effort‐allocation effects of promotion‐based incentives. I find that promotion and demotion decisions for store managers of a major U.S.‐based fast‐food retailer (QSR) are sensitive to nonfinancial performance measures of service quality and employee retention after controlling for financial performance. The likelihood of demotion in this organization is also sensitive to nonfinancial performance on the dimension of service quality, while the probability of exit is primarily sensitive to financial performance measures rather than nonfinancial performance measures. I also find evidence that the behavior of lower‐level managers is consistent with the incentives created by the weighting of nonfinancial performance measures in promotion decisions. Managers in locations where there is a higher ex ante probability of promotion and a higher potential reward upon promotion demonstrate significantly higher levels and rates of performance improvement in service quality. Finally, consistent with promotion‐based incentives inducing both effort‐allocation and learning effects, I find that performance‐improvement rates for service quality: (1) are higher in prepromotion periods in markets where promotions occur, (2) decrease immediately after the occurrence of a promotion in the same market area, and (3) remain higher than in markets where promotions do not occur. These findings provide some of the first empirical evidence on an alternative to the explicit weighting of nonfinancial metrics in compensation contracts as a mechanism for generating improvements in nonfinancial dimensions of performance.     

Synthesizing enterprise data to strategically align performance: The intentionality of strategy surrogation

Strategic performance measurement systems (SPMS) are employed by senior management as a means of translating strategy into performance measures. Recent research suggests that this translation can lead managers to focus on personal performance measures as opposed to overall organizational strategy—a phenomenon referred to as strategy surrogation. Emerging technologies are increasingly used to operationalize SPMS via smart phone/tablet/laptop formats that inherently promote the use of small subsets of performance measures and have the potential to exacerbate strategy surrogation effects. This study explores executive managers' motivations in deploying dashboards and the resulting effect on operational managers' focus on associated performance measures. An exploratory cross-sectional field study is conducted with 27 executive to mid-level managers to establish a theoretical model explaining how and why organizations deploy dashboards and why managers use dashboards to facilitate their activities and decisions. Despite concerns over the propensity of managers to focus on performance measures and lose sight of strategic objectives (i.e. strategy surrogation), the interview data indicate that executive management intentionally designs dashboards to achieve strategy surrogation. The impact of this intentional surrogation appears to arise through operational managers' beliefs that dashboard measures align with organizational strategy and lead to improved managerial and organizational performance. However, this relationship between perceived alignment of performance measures and managerial and organizational performance is mediated by dashboard quality and information quality. These findings have important implications as the effects of SPMS on strategy surrogation are further explored by researchers, and as system designers consider the side effects of emerging technologies on effective strategic performance measurement.     

The impact of litigation risk on the strategic timing of management earnings forecasts

This paper examines whether managers strategically time their earnings forecasts (MEFs) as litigation risk increases. We find as litigation risk increases, the propensity to release a delayed forecast until after the market is closed (AMC) or a Friday decreases but not proportionally more for bad news than for good news. How costly this behaviour is to investors is questionable as share price returns do not reveal any under‐reaction to strategically timed bad news MEF released AMC. We also find evidence consistent with managers timing their MEFs during a natural no‐trading period to better disseminate information.     

The Impact of Media Attention on the Use of Alternative Earnings Measures

The practice of reporting earnings measures that deviate from generally accepted accounting principles (non‐GAAP measures) has received negative attention in the media. In a period of increased regulatory concern for these reporting practices, we explore whether there has been a shift away from the use of non‐GAAP metrics. This study focuses on the Dutch situation, where regulators responded conservatively (‘light’) to the accounting scandals. This contrasts with the U.S., where regulators intervened with a radical (‘heavy’) reform of regulation. We analyse a sample of earnings press releases published in the period 2000–05 from companies listed at Euronext Amsterdam. Our findings indicate that Dutch companies report non‐GAAP measures frequently and prominently. However, companies' reporting behaviour changes after a peak in negative media attention for non‐GAAP reporting. The magnitude of the adjustments to GAAP earnings becomes smaller and companies seem to have different reasons to report non‐GAAP measures. The effect of the media attention is stronger when companies have been criticized for their non‐GAAP reporting in the press. Investors seem to have become more hesitant towards the use of non‐GAAP measures for their decision‐making after negative media attention. Together, these findings suggest that the negative media attention for non‐GAAP measures has influenced the decisions of investors and managers.     

How Kimberly‐Clark Uses Real Options

During the past five years, Kimberly‐Clark (K‐C) has faced a familiar management challenge: How can senior managers bring the rigor and discipline used to make daily operating decisions to the uncertain and risky world of innovation? The challenge was particularly acute at K‐C because the company is well known for its reliance on Return On Invested Capital (ROIC) and Discounted Cash Flow (DCF), both measures that are widely believed to lead to undervaluation of projects with risky upside potential. This article discusses how and why K‐C adopted and now uses the real options approach to project evaluation and management. The authors also share some lessons learned during the adoption process, including how the company adapted the real options framework to its own circumstances and requirements. The K‐C experience shows that successful adoption rests on a number of factors that have less to do with the rigor or precision of quantitative models than with matters of corporate process and organizational design.     

Earnings Quality Based on Corporate Investment Decisions

In this paper, I examine a new approach for measuring earnings quality, defined as the closeness of reported earnings to “permanent earnings,” based on firm decisions with regard to capital and labor investments. Specifically, I measure earnings quality as the contemporaneous association between changes in the levels of capital and labor investment and the change in reported earnings. This approach follows the reasoning that (1) firms make investment decisions based on the net present value (NPV) of investment projects and (2) reported earnings with higher quality should more closely associate with real investment decisions. I find that measures of earnings quality based on managerial labor and capital decisions correlate positively with earnings persistence and have incremental explanatory power relative to earnings‐quality measures used in the accounting literature. Furthermore, investment‐based earnings‐quality measures are less informative when managers tend to overinvest.     

The high cost of accurate knowledge

Many business thinkers believe it's the role of senior managers to scan the external environment to monitor contingencies and constraints, and to use that precise knowledge to modify the company's strategy and design. As these thinkers see it, managers need accurate and abundant information to carry out that role. According to that logic, it makes sense to invest heavily in systems for collecting and organizing competitive information. Another school of pundits contends that, since today's complex information often isn't precise anyway, it's not worth going overboard with such investments. In other words, it's not the accuracy and abundance of information that should matter most to top executives--rather, it's how that information is interpreted. After all, the role of senior managers isn't just to make decisions; it's to set direction and motivate others in the face of ambiguities and conflicting demands. Top executives must interpret information and communicate those interpretations--they must manage meaning more than they must manage information. So which of these competing views is the right one? Research conducted by academics Sutcliffe and Weber found that how accurate senior executives are about their competitive environments is indeed less important for strategy and corresponding organizational changes than the way in which they interpret information about their environments. Investments in shaping those interpretations, therefore, may create a more durable competitive advantage than investments in obtaining and organizing more information. And what kinds of interpretations are most closely linked with high performance? Their research suggests that high performers respond positively to opportunities, yet they aren't overconfident in their abilities to take advantage of those opportunities.     

THE PERFORMANCE OF BANK‐MANAGED MUTUAL FUNDS

The ability of banks to offer proprietary mutual funds has expanded over recent years, and the mutual fund industry has been a significant growth area for banks. I examine the growth and performance of bank proprietary bond mutual funds. The empirical results show no evidence that bank‐managed mutual funds underperform nonbank funds. I find some evidence that bank managers are more conservative than nonbank managers in terms of investment strategy and that banks appear more likely to target individual rather than institutional investors. Also, I find that abnormal fund performance does not appear to be a significant determinant of the net asset flows into and out of bank‐managed mutual funds. Rather, the results suggest bank investors rely mainly on past marketing information and the general reputation of the bank. JEL classification: G11, G21