投资性房地产中公允价值计量模式选择的影响研究

前言新准则规定在进行投资性房地产后续计量中,有确凿证据表明该投资性房地产的公允价值能够持续可靠取得的,可以对投资性房地产采用公允价值进行后续计量,但也没有规定必须采用公允价值计量,这就使得许多拥有投资性房地产的公司有选择或者不选择公允价值计量投资性房地产的自由,给企业会计政策选择留下了广大空间。究竟哪些企业会选择公允价值模式,哪些企业会依旧选择成本模式?为什么大部分上市公司依旧采用成本模式,是因为公允价值技术上难以取得,还是另有原因?     

投资性房地产为什么不愿采用公允价值后续计量模式

根据最新会计准则的规定,投资性房地产的后续计量可采用成本模式和公允价值模式,不同模式对企业利润等方面产生不同影响,本文从投资性房地产后续计量模式选择出发,分析了投资性房地产后续计量方式的现状。即多数经营房地产的上市公司不愿采用公允价值后续计量模式的原因。     

投资性房地产计量模式的对比分析

2006年,财政部颁布实施的《企业会计准则第3号-投资性房地产》(CAS3)中规定,投资性房地产在以后会计核算上有成本和公允价值两种计量模式.然而自准则实施十年来,多数企业公司对投资性房地产都选用成本模式进行后续计量.文章针对这一现状,对投资性房地产的两种后续计量模式进行对比分析,探究原因,并为推广应用公允价值计量模式提出对策建议.     

投资性房地产计量模式选择的影响因素

本文主要分析公司在选择投资性房地产计量模式时主要考虑的因素。我国的上市公司中有95.25%的公司选择成本模式对投资性房地产进行后续计量,背后的原因主要是:披露成本较低,符合监管层谨慎使用公允价值计量的导向,满足平稳业绩的需要。从会计信息和契约功能来看,投资性房地产理论上更适合公允价值计量模式,有助于提高会计信息的真实性和实用性,丙有助于财务报表使用者获取真实、准确的信息。     

投资性房地产计量模式选择的影响因素

本文主要分析公司在选择投资性房地产计量模式时主要考虑的因素。我国的上市公司中有95.25%的公司选择成本模式对投资性房地产进行后续计量,背后的原因主要是：披露成本较低,符合监管层谨慎使用公允价值计量的导向,满足平稳业绩的需要。从会计信息和契约功能来看,投资性房地产理论上更适合公允价值计量模式,有助于提高会计信息的真实性和实用性,丙有助于财务报表使用者获取真实、准确的信息。     

投资性房地产公允价值计量模式应用情况分析

根据《企业会计准则第3号——投资性房地产》的规定,投资性房地产的后续计量可以选择成本模式或公允价值模式.对投资性房地产采用公允价值计量可以更真实地反映企业资产的现状,能为财务报表使用者提供更有价值的信息.然而在新会计准则实施后,大部分上市公司仍坚持成本模式.本文分析了影响公允价值计量模式选择的因素,据此提出了推行公允价值计量的一些建议     

对《企业会计准则第3号——投资性房地产》的质疑

本文详细指出了《企业会计准则第3号——投资性房地产》中存在的问题,这包括:投资性房地产的内涵和外延问题;投资性房地产按成本进行初始计量存在的问题;投资性房地产后续计量中的成本模式和公允价值模式存在问题、不同方式形成的投资性房地产计量属性的选择问题;会计科目的设置问题;会计处理中成本模式和公允价值模式的核算特点;公允价值模式下会计核算的改进问题以及《企业会计准则讲解》(2006)会计处理的错误问题。     

关于投资性房地产公允价值计量模式的思考——以深圳中航地产为例

一、投资性房地产公允价值计量模式实施现状 证监会关于上市公司2008年年报披露工作的要求中曾明确指出继续谨慎采用公允价值模式计量投资性房地产,除非有明确的证据表明投资性房地产的公允价值能够可靠取得外,应当采用成本模式对投资性房地产进行后续计量.另准则还规定,企业已采用公允价值模式计量的,不得从公允价值模式转为成本模式.可见我国上市公司采用公允价值模式计量投资性房地产的门槛很高且给予上市公司的选择空间较大,企业风险也比较大.     

投资性房地产计量模式变更的财务后果研究——以深国商为例

根据企业的不同需求,对投资性房地产可以采用不同的计量方法,所以,投资性房地产应该选择成本模式计量还是公允价值模式计量成为了焦点。因为现在房地产泡沫化严重,房地产的历史成本和公允价值数额相差明显,所以,投资性房地产采用何种后续计量模式也日益成为重要的议题。论文采用案例分析方法,以深国商为案例代表,介绍了深国商企业的背景,挖掘该公司变更会计政策的内在动机,进一步阐释深国商会计政策变更的财务后果,分析这一会计政策变更带来的启示,希望为其他企业如何正确使用公允价值提供借鉴。     

关于投资性房地产公允价值计量模式若干问题的探讨

投资性房地产准则的颁布，是我国会计准则与国际会计惯例趋同的必然结果。但新准则颁发后，由于观念转变较难、条件的限制及管理层的谨慎要求等，投资性房地产采用公允价值模式计量的上市公司占比很小。当前，投资性房地产已成为多数上市公司新的利润增长点，采用公允价值计量投资性房地产是可行的。相关管理部门应当积极采取相应措施，努力实现投资性房地产从成本计量向公允价值计量的平稳过渡。     

Seasoned equity offerings: Quality of accounting information and expected flotation costs

Flotation costs represent a significant loss of capital to firms and are positively related to information asymmetry between managers and outside investors. We measure a firm's information asymmetry by its accounting information quality based on two extensions of the Dechow and Dichev [2002. The quality of accruals and earnings: the role of accrual estimation errors. Accounting Review 77, 35–59] earnings accruals model, which is a more direct approach to assessing the information available to outside investors than the more commonly used proxies. Our main hypothesis is that poor accounting information quality raises uncertainty about a firm's financial condition for outside investors, though not necessarily for insiders. This accounting effect lowers demand for a firm's new equity, thereby raising underwriting costs and risk. Using a large sample of seasoned equity offerings (SEOs), we show that poor accounting information quality is associated with higher flotation costs in terms of larger underwriting fees, larger negative SEO announcement effects, and a higher probability of SEO withdrawals. These results are robust to joint determination of offer size and flotation cost components and to adjustments for sample selection bias.     

Understanding accounting discretion in China: An analysis of fair value reporting for investment property

This study sheds light on the discretionary accounting practices in China, the largest emerging market in the world. In particular, we focus on whether Chinese firms use discretion in investment property fair values to manage reported performance. We examine whether firms’ ex ante needs for accounting discretion affect their decisions to adopt fair value reporting for investment property and the ex post performance management by these fair value adopters. Our findings show that the voluntary adoption of fair value reporting for investment property in China remains low. However, the fair value option for investment property is significantly more likely to be chosen by firms with greater needs for accounting discretion. Consistent with the conjecture that firms choose the fair value model to manipulate reported earnings, we show that fair value adopters use the unrealized gains and losses associated with investment properties to smooth earnings and that these firms are also more likely to meet or beat earnings benchmarks after adoption. Overall, our findings indicate that the use of fair value reporting for investment property in the emerging Chinese market is driven by managerial opportunism.     

Asset Pricing Implications of Nonconvex Adjustment Costs and Irreversibility of Investment

This paper derives a real options model that accounts for the value premium. If real investment is largely irreversible, the book value of assets of a distressed firm is high relative to its market value because it has idle physical capital. The firm's excess installed capital capacity enables it to fully benefit from positive aggregate shocks without undertaking costly investment. Thus, returns to equity holders of a high book‐to‐market firm are sensitive to aggregate conditions and its systematic risk is high. Simulations indicate that the model goes a long way toward accounting for the observed value premium.     

The Value of Mandatory Certification: A Real Effects Perspective

We study the real effects of certification to demonstrate the value of mandatory certification over and above mandatory disclosure in enhancing investment efficiency. In our model, a firm's manager selects a project to maximize the firm's short-term stock price, which is a function of her certification and disclosure decisions about the outcome of the project. Although the manager might be either forthcoming or strategic with regard to the disclosure of her private information, she can strategically choose whether to incur a cost or not to certify her disclosure, unless mandated. The manager always selects the first-best project when both certification and disclosure are mandatory. However, when certification is voluntary, project selection is inefficient. In addition, mandating disclosure without mandating certification can lead to lower investment efficiency than mandating neither. In justifying why mandatory certification is beneficial for public firms, our results offer a note of caution regarding the contemplated regulatory moves for increased disclosures by public firms without corresponding certification requirements, for example, the recent SEC proposal requiring extensive climate-related disclosure.     

Imprecision in Accounting Measurement: Can It Be Value Enhancing?

Accounting measurements of firms' investments are usually imprecise. We study the economic consequences of such imprecision when it interacts with information asymmetry regarding an investment project's ex ante profitability, known only by the firm's managers. Absent agency and risk‐sharing considerations, we find that some degree of accounting imprecision could actually be value enhancing. We characterize the optimal degree of imprecision and identify its key determinants. The greater the information asymmetry regarding the project's profitability, the greater is the imprecision that should be tolerated in the measurement of the firm's investment.     

Accounting Measurement Basis, Market Mispricing, and Firm Investment Efficiency

In this paper, we investigate how the accounting measurement basis affects the capital market pricing of a firm's shares, which, in turn, affects the efficiency of the firm's investment decisions. We distinguish two broad bases for accounting measurements: input‐based and output‐based accounting. We argue that the structural difference in the two measurement bases leads to a systematic difference in the efficiency of the investment decisions. In particular, we show that an output‐based measure has a natural advantage in aligning investment incentives because of its comprehensiveness. The (first‐)best investment is achieved when the output‐based measure is noiseless and manipulation free. In addition, under an output‐based measure, more accounting noise/manipulation always leads to more inefficient investment choices. Therefore, if an output‐based accounting measure is highly noisy and easy to manipulate in practice, the induced investment efficiency can be quite low. On the other hand, an input‐based accounting measure, while not as comprehensive, may induce more efficient investment decisions than an output‐based measure if some noise is unavoidable in either measure. The reason is twofold. First, input‐based measures may be associated with less noise and limited manipulation in practice. Second, and more importantly, we show that under an input‐based measure, a slight increase in accounting noise/manipulation may lead to more efficient investment choices. In fact, the (first‐)best result is achieved when the noise/manipulability is small but positive. In other words, for an input‐based measure, being less comprehensive makes small but positive accounting noise/manipulability desirable. Two extensions of the basic model are also explored.     

投资性房地产公允价值计量的财务影响与决定因素:以北辰实业为例

以北辰实业为例,本文分析了企业在投资性房地产成本模式与公允价值计量模式之间选择的财务影响及其决定因素。与成本模式相比,投资性房地产公允价值计量将大幅提高其账面价值,加剧了企业当期净利润的波动。北辰实业在A股年报中采用成本模式,而在H股年报中采用公允价值计量,这主要源于以下因素:(1)香港会计准则与我国会计准则的差异;(2)两地监管机构对公允价值会计的态度不同;(3)两地投资性房地产信息披露的差异;(4)资本市场成熟度与投资者的理性程度的差异。最后我们总结了本案例对于企业选择公允价值计量模式、监管层推行公允价值会计与应对会计国际趋同三个方面的政策含义。     

Discretionary Accounting Choices: A Debt covenants Based Signalling Approach

This paper seeks to explain the discretionary accounting choices made by managers in a world characterised by asymmetric information between managers and investors. It considers a firm whose capital structure consists of both debt and equity, a manager who protects the interests of the firm's existing shareholders, and a financial market. The manager is committed to engage in an investment opportunity and needs to raise some equity to finance it. He is furthermore endowed with some private information about his firm's future earnings. The paper shows how, under certain conditions, the manager may credibly communicate his private information to investors through his accounting choices. In this equilibrium, the selection of balance sheet strengthening and income increasing accounting choices signals unfavourable information while the use of balance-sheet weakening and income- decreasing accounting choices signals favourable private information. The latter firms should thus experience positive abnormal returns around the announcement dates of their accounting choices.     

会计信息可比性与企业商业信用融资——基于企业市场地位和行业竞争环境的双重考量

不同于传统的基于资本市场情境进行的会计信息可比性经济后果研究,将研究场景拓展至商品市场中企业供应链层面,考察企业会计信息可比性能否影响供应链伙伴的商业信用政策制定,进而反映到企业的商业信用融资水平.研究发现:会计信息可比性越高的企业,其商业信用融资水平也越高;会计信息可比性对商业信用融资的促进作用只在市场地位较低、所处行业竞争程度较高的企业中存在.进一步的拓展研究证实,提高会计信息可比性可以有效缓解我国中小微企业普遍存在的融资难问题.     

Ownership Structure and Accounting Method Choice: A Study of European Real Estate Companies

Companies can under IAS 40 Investment Properties choose between the fair value and the cost models. The fair value model arguably results in more relevant information but is also more costly to use. Based on studies suggesting that financial reports are a more important medium for communication with investors if ownership is dispersed, we hypothesize that the use of the fair value model is positively associated with ownership dispersion. We study European Real Estate firms and find support for this prediction. We also find a positive association between trade of shares and ownership dispersion, supporting the view that financial statements are less important if ownership concentration is high. Finally, we examine whether the choice depends on the identity of large owners. Companies with a financial company as the largest owner are somewhat more likely to choose the fair value model. Overall, the results indicate that accounting rules facilitating optional accounting policies have benefits.