大型央企集团财务治理模式及其制度创新

中央企业集团的财务治理问题是我国实务界和学术界特别纠结的问题。这些年随着中国市场环境和央企的自身战略持续变革,既挑战着现有集团财务理论的研究结论,也迫切需要创新性的、系统化的重构。本文的研究从当今央企的投资经营多元化、多级治理和日益对接资本市场等新变革出发,在文献分析基础上明确了整合央企集团财务治理、财务管控体系和经营目标与价值创造的基本逻辑,提出了强化总部的财务领导力与经营分权、多样化控制机制等基本原则,阐明了央企集团财务治理体系是:以经济增加值EVA为核心的业绩管理体系、以全面预算为主的多级治理体系、以风险边界为重心的财务结构管控体系和以财务增加值为基础的分配控制。     

央企引入EVA业绩考核办法的理论基础

本文在EVA理论的基础上,阐述了经济增加值的核心思想及实施的现实意义,从央企的角度来剖析引人EVA前后对央企的经济价值的变化,并对央企实行的EVA考核进行一次彻底的评价,进而改进考核标准,促使央企企业价值最大化。     

改进EVA在央企绩效评价中的应用探讨

正2010年,国资委对央企绩效考核引入经济增加值指标,替代净资产收益率指标,并给以40%权重,相应利润总额权重调整为30%;2013年,对EVA权重进一步调高为50%,利润总额调低为20%。对经济增加值进行考核,力促央企用有限的资本创造更大的价值,意味着央企从战略管理进入价值管理的新阶段。通过四年来的实施发现,EVA对于引导央企立足主业、创造价值和可持续发展起到积极促进作用,以"有利润的企业不一定创造价值"理念揭示企业真正的经营业绩,从股东角度反映出企业的经营状况,显示了一种新型的价值观。     

情系国计民生——访全国政协委员、中国银监会主席助理阎庆民

央企主管部门应加强考核管理，督促央企尽快回归核心主业。完善“三重大一公开”监督机制和业绩考核考评体系，强化经济增加值（EVA）考核，严控投资方向和股票、期货、大型并购等投资行为，防止盲目扩张。     

经济增加值评价与企业文化的耦合

2011年国务院国资委在对央企的第三轮考核中,正式引入经济增加值这一指标。"经济增加值"(英文全称为Economic ValueAdded,简称EVA),是一个舶来品,其基本涵义是在传统的利润基础上扣除股东投入资本的机会成本。严格地讲,经济增加值不完全是财务指标,而是价值指标。推行经     

市场竞争、EVA评价与企业过度投资

在国资委对央企全面推行经济增加值(EVA)业绩考核之际,本文利用央企控股上市公司的数据,实证检验了EVA对企业过度投资的影响。研究发现,EVA评价体系的实施可显著降低央企过度投资;进一步研究显示,市场竞争环境差异对EVA抑制过度投资的效果产生显著影响,竞争度越高的行业EVA抑制企业过度投资的作用更为明显;反之则并不显著。本文研究结论支持了EVA评价机制应用的有效性,但也从产业竞争角度证明市场经营环境的改善是进一步提升EVA业绩评价体系有效性充分发挥的关键。     

航空业推行EVA考核的挑战与建议——以南方航空公司为例

2010年国资委在央企范围全面推行经济增加值考核,EVA成为央企考核权重最高的财务指标。本文从EVA考核实施的背景出发,研究分析了中国的航空公司在EVA推行过程中所面临的问题和挑战,有针对性地给出一些建议及对策,以期为更好地利用EVA导向提升企业价值提供一些参考。     

浅析经济增加值的利与弊

我国在20世纪末引入了新型的企业业绩评价与激励系-经济增加值,并将于2010年在央企全面推行经济增加值考核。本文主要通过经济增加值与传统会计利润指标的对比分析,总结出采用经济增加值的利与弊。     

经济增加值（EVA）在企业经营中的运用

近两年来，随着经济增加值被国务院国资委引进于央企和国企的考核体系．社会各界在广泛地讨论经济增加值。笔者就经济增加值的概念，经济增加值的考核，如何在企业日常经营中运用经济增加值进行经营决策支持与分析，并列举了三个典型经营决策运用经济增加值的案例。     

EVA考核方法能否有效抑制非效率投资——来自中央企业的证据

从2010年开始国资委在对中央企业的考核中引入了经济增加值(EVA)这一新的考核指标,这一指标能更有效地反映企业价值,旨在使央企高管的经营理念从“追求利润最大化”转换到“追求企业价值最大化”,以利于企业的长远发展.以2008～2012年沪深A股央企作为样本,对EVA考核方法实施前后进行的对比发现,EVA考核方法整体上有利于降低非效率投资行为,但这种影响要建立在EVA考核能够影响到高管薪酬的基础上.EVA考核方法也应在其他企业广泛推广.     

基于EVA的国企价值管理体系构建

2010年始,国资委在央企全面推行以EVA为核心指标的年度经营业绩考核体系,国企如何建立与此相适应的价值管理体系是亟需解决的理论和实践问题.本文在阐述EVA的历史沿革、核心理念、国资委EVA考核体系政策意义基础上,初步探讨了以EVA为导向的国企价值管理体系的几个核心要素-战略管控、财务决策、绩效考核和激励制度设计相关问...     

Incentives and Investor Expectations

This article argues that the Expectations‐Based Management (EBM) measure proposed by Copeland and Dolgoff (in the previous article) is essentially the same measure that EVA companies have used for years as the basis for performance evaluation and incentive compensation. After pointing out that the analyst‐based measures cited by Copeland and Dolgoff do not provide a basis for a workable compensation plan, the authors present the outline of a widely used expectations‐based EVA bonus plan. In so doing, they demonstrate the two key steps in designing such a plan: (1) using a company's “Future Growth Value”—the part of its current market value that cannot be accounted for by its current earnings— to calibrate the series of annual EVA “improvements” expected by the market; and (2) determining the executive's share of those improvements and thus of the company's expected “excess” return. One of the major objections to the use of EVA, or any single‐period measure, as the basis for a performance evaluation and incentive comp plan is its inability to reflect the longer‐run consequences of current investment and operating decisions. The authors close by presenting a solution to this “delayed productivity of capital” problem in the form of an internal accounting approach for dealing with acquisitions and other large strategic investments.     

基于EVA的商业银行经济资本管理与价值创造研究

只有为企业带来超过资本最低回报要求的业务,才真正为企业创造了价值,而那些创造收益水平低于资本最低回报要求的业务,实际上是在消耗企业的价值,因而价值最大化是银行经营最终目标。银行经济资本管理可以为银行创造价值。以EVA作为价值创造能力衡量指标,经济资本管理为银行创造价值路径有四个:绩效考评、战略制定、产品定价和资产组合选择。     

Abnormal investment and firm performance

We find a negative relation between abnormal investment and future stock performance. Such a negative relation is mainly driven by under-investment, not over-investment. Our results are robust to various estimation methods and investment models. Both delayed market reaction and agency issues may lead to the apparently anomalous return predictability of under-investment. First, market investors may not react promptly to the fundamental information contained in under-investment about a firm’s future profitability, asset growth, and financial distress probability. Second, the negative relation between under-investment and future stock returns is more pronounced for firms with lower investor monitoring and higher agency costs.     

A Better Way to Measure Operating Performance (or Why the EVA Math Really Matters)

Most companies rely heavily on earnings to measure operating performance, but earnings growth has at least two important weaknesses as a proxy for investor wealth. Current earnings can come at the expense of future earnings through, for example, short‐sighted cutbacks in investment, including spending on R&D. But growth in EPS can also be achieved by investing more capital with projected rates of return that, although well below the cost of capital, are higher than the after‐tax cost of debt. Stock compensation has been the conventional solution to the first problem because it's a discounted cash flow value that is assumed to discourage actions that sacrifice future earnings. Economic profit—in its most popular manifestation, EVA—has been the conventional solution to the second problem with earnings because it includes a capital charge that penalizes low‐return investment. But neither of these conventional solutions appears to work very well in practice. Stock compensation isn't tied to business unit performance—and often fails to provide the intended incentives for the (many) corporate managers who believe that meeting current consensus earnings is more important than investing to maintain future earnings. EVA doesn't work well when new investments take time to become profitable because the higher capital charge comes before the related income. In this article, the author presents two new operating performance measures that are likely to work better than either earnings or EVA because they reflect the value that can be lost either through corporate underinvestment or overinvestment designed to increase current earnings. Both of these new measures are based on the math that ties EVA to discounted cash flow value, particularly its division of current corporate market values into two components: “current operations value” and “future growth value.” The key to the effectiveness of the new measures in explaining changes in company stock prices and market values is a statistical model of changes in future growth value that captures the expected effects of significant increases in current investment in R&D and advertising on future profits and value.     

Hedging the value of waiting

We analyze the optimal hedging policy of a firm that has flexibility in the timing of investment. Conventional wisdom suggests that hedging adds value by alleviating the under-investment problem associated with capital market frictions. However, our model shows that hedging also adds value by allowing investment to be delayed in circumstances where the same frictions would cause it to commence prematurely. Thus, hedging can have the paradoxical effect of reducing investment. We also show that greater timing flexibility increases the optimal quantity of hedging, but has a non-monotonic effect on the additional value created by hedging. These results may help explain the empirical findings that investment rates do not differ between hedgers and non-hedgers, and that hedging propensities do not depend on standard measures of growth opportunities.     

EVA, ACCOUNTING PROFITS, AND CEO TURNOVER: AN EMPIRICAL EXAMINATION, 1985–1994

A growing number of companies use EVA or related measures of economic profits as metrics for corporate planning and executive compensation. Unlike traditional accounting measures of performance, EVA attempts to measure the value that firms create or destroy by subtracting a capital charge from the cash returns they generate on invested capital. For this reason, EVA is seen by its proponents as providing the most reliable year-to-year indicator of a market based performance measure known as market value added, or MVA. Although EVA and MVA have received considerable attention in recent years, there has been little empirical study of these performance measures—and what studies have been produced have provided mixed results. This study joins the debate over EVA vs. conventional accounting measures by asking a different question: Which performance measures do the best job of explaining not only stock returns, but the probability that a CEO will be dismissed for poor performance? Using a sample of 452 firms during the period 1985–1994, the authors report that EVA has a somewhat stronger correlation with stock price performance than conventional accounting measures such as ROE and ROA. But, of greater import, EVA appears to be a considerably more reliable indicator of CEO turnover than conventional accounting measures.     

Local fiscal distress and investment efficiency of local SOEs

In this paper, we use A-share listed firms between 2002 and 2010 to investigate the relationship between local fiscal distress and the investment efficiency of local SOEs, along with the effect of corporate tax payments on this relationship. We find a positive relationship between the extent of local SOEs' overinvestment and the fiscal distress of the corresponding local government where the enterprise and this relationship become stronger for firms that pay fewer taxes. The pattern of underinvestment among local SOEs was in contrast,and these relationships do not exist for non-SOEs or central SOEs. Moreover,we find that expanding a firm's investment scale leads to an increase in total taxes paid, including income and turnover taxes, which further result in more local fiscal revenue. Overall, we conclude that local governments have an incentive to increase fiscal revenue when faced with fiscal distress by raising the investment scale of local SOEs and that the incentives and effects of such interventions appear to be stronger among firms that contribute less to local fiscal revenue.ó 2013 Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. on behalf of China Journal of Accounting Research. Founded by Sun Yat-sen University and City University of Hong Kong.     

The Impact of Government Intervention on Corporate Investment Allocations and Efficiency: Evidence from China

We examine whether government intervention plays an important role in determining corporate investment allocations and efficiency in China. We find the government tends to intervene to promote corporate investment in fixed assets, equity in other state‐owned enterprises (SOEs), and natural resources including oil, natural gas, and mines, but reduces research and development (R&D) investment. However, the effects of government intervention on these investment allocations are primarily found in local SOEs rather than in central SOEs or in private enterprise. Government intervention also induces a crowding‐out effect in natural resource investments of private firms, suggesting that government intervention distorts investment allocations and reduces investment efficiency.