会计师事务所激励机制探讨

会计师事务所激励机制的建立应在遵循物质激励与精神激励相结合原则、差异化原则、系统性原则、适度性原则、竞争性原则的基础上,设计公平的薪酬体系,建立人力资本职业发展规划,进行全面的薪酬激励体系设计,以期创造一个公平的环境,保障事务所内部各方的合法权益,促进会计师事务所的和谐发展.     

非审计业务对审计市场绩效的影响——基于会计师事务所业务结构的角度

以审计质量和审计收费作为审计市场绩效的衡量指标,从会计师事务所业务结构角度来考察我国注册会计师行业拓展非审计业务对审计市场所带来的影响。实证检验发现,相对于其他事务所而言,非审计业务规模越大和当年非审计业务规模较上年扩大的事务所,其审计质量越好,审计收费也越高。这说明在目前审计服务市场容量有限,竞争过于激烈的环境下,拓展非审计业务有利于增强审计独立性和提高审计收费,是改善行业执业环境的一个重要途径。     

会计师事务所行业专门化经营的实证分析

行业专门化经营是会计师事务所产品差异的策略之一.理论上,行业专门化经营会在提高会计师事务所审计质量的同时,使采取行业专门化经营战略的会计师事务所获得审计溢价.对我国2006-2008年A股审计市场数据进行统计分析和实证检验结果表明,以事务所在某行业内的市场占有率来衡量,我国会计师事务所的行业专门化经营水平很低,采取行业专门化经营战略的会计师事务所没有因此而获得审计溢价.     

如何建立有利于会计师事务所做强做大的薪酬制度

薪酬制度是一个事务所内部最重要的制度之一,薪酬制度的合理与否直接关系到每位员工的利益,关系到是否有利于留住各类人才,是否能调动员工积极性不断拓展业务,从而影响到会计师事务所能否做强做大。薪酬制度可分为基于个人绩效的薪酬制度和基于团队绩效的薪酬制度以及基于组织绩效的薪酬制度。基于个人绩效的薪酬制度是个人竞争性的薪酬制度;而基于团队或组织绩效的薪酬制度是合作性的薪酬制度。本文对基于个人绩效薪酬制度和基于团队和组织薪酬绩效制度进行分析,谈谈如何建立有利于事务所做强做大的薪酬制度。     

人力资本对会计师事务所经营效率的提升作用——来自中国审计市场的经验证据

众所周知,人力资本对于会计师事务所的经营管理十分重要,但因为难以获得公开数据,国内外鲜有文献对此问题进行实证研究.笔者对从会计行业管理网、中国注册会计师协会网站及其他渠道手工收集的事务所样本数据进行了统计分析.经验证据表明,教育和行业专长能显著提高事务所的经营效率,声誉和净资产规模也有积极作用.本文的学术贡献主要在于:率先实证研究了教育、执业经验和行业专长这三种人力资本对事务所经营效率的作用;全面分析了事务所经营效率的影响因素.研究结论为事务所的经营管理和行业发展指明了方向.     

中小会计师事务所薪酬管理问题及对策

自1980年我国注册会计师制度恢复重建以来,注册会计师行业得到全面的壮大和发展.伴随我国市场经济的发展逐步完善,对专业的会计服务需求比例逐步提升,会计师事务所在市场供求调节之下迅速发展,并且短时间内具备了一定的服务规模.当前我国中小会计师事务所占据财务服务市场比例超过50％,但是其经营过程中却面临着一个极其严重的问题:人才流失严重.而事务所的经营主要集中在相关会计、审计人员的脑力劳动,事务所能否吸引高素质、高技能的人力资源,并与之保持长期的雇佣或合作关系,成为中小事务所能否在市场立足,并寻求更高的市场份额的根本性依靠.本文从中小事务所薪酬管理角度进行分析,结合笔者在会计师事务所开展薪酬管理工作的经验和教训,提出几点优化薪酬管理的建议,以望有助中小会计事务所降低员工流动,保障人才储备.     

经营绩效、风险控制与银行业薪酬水平研究——基于中国14家上市商业银行的实证检验

完善的企业薪酬制度不仅应与企业经营绩效挂钩,也应将企业风险控制水平纳入考核。本文选取中国14家上市商业银行,利用其2007-2011年的面板数据进行回归分析,以探讨我国银行业薪酬水平与银行经营绩效及风险控制水平之间的相关性。研究结果表明,银行业薪酬水平已基本与经营绩效挂钩,尤其是员工平均薪酬水平与经营绩效的关联性比较明显,但银行业薪酬体系的设计并未考虑风险控制因素。今后,应将商业银行薪酬水平与经营绩效、风险控制水平同时挂钩,使薪酬机制设计更加科学合理。     

我国商业银行高管薪酬与综合绩效关系的实证分析——基于沪深两市上市商业银行的数据

本文以沪深两市14家上市商业银行作为研究样本,使用其2003-2007年度财务数据,运用包含盈利性、流动性、安全性和成长性等指标体系对我国上市商业银行的综合绩效进行评价;然后运用最小二乘估计(OLS),对高管薪酬和公司综合绩效之间的关系进行实证分析.结果表明:高管薪酬与综合绩效呈正相关关系,且弹性系数大于0小于1,说明高薪有一定程度的激励作用但并不是越高越好.     

管理层权力、高管人力资本激励与企业绩效

合理的高管人力资本激励机制是发挥高管人力资本效用进而提高企业绩效的有效途径。本文通过实证检验管理层权力、高管人力资本激励与企业绩效的关系,结果表明:高管货币薪酬与企业绩效显著正相关,与国有企业相比,非国有企业的相关性更明显;管理层权力削弱了高管货币薪酬对企业绩效的激励作用。国有企业的在职消费与企业绩效显著负相关,但非国有企业其二者之间的相关性并不显著;管理层权力加大了在职消费对企业绩效的负向影响。高管团队内部薪酬差距与企业绩效显著正相关,且非国有企业比国有企业的相关性更明显;管理层权力削弱了高管团队内部薪酬差距对企业绩效的激励作用。     

会计师事务所合并能提高财务报表的可比性吗?——基于中国上市公司的经验证据

以1998-2012年中国A股上市公司数据为样本,本文考察了会计师事务所合并对客户财务报表可比性的影响。研究发现,合并后事务所审计的财务报表可比性显著高于合并前事务所审计的财务报表可比性。进一步的研究还发现,事务所合并后的整合程度会影响合并的效果。合并后事务所对签字会计师重新配置的比例越高,则事务所合并对报表可比性的提升作用越明显。本研究为监管层更全面地评价和改进事务所"做大做强"政策提供实证支持。     

Emerging Derivatives Markets: The Case of Chile

We compare the performance of firms affiliated with diversified business groups with the performance of unaffiliated firms in Turkey, an emerging market. We address the question of whether group-affiliated firms create internal capital markets or control large cash flows. Our findings indicate that group affiliation improves a firm's accounting performance, but not stock market performance. Deviation of cash-flow rights from voting rights has a negative but insignificant effect on accounting performance, but a significant effect on market performance. We also find that a firm's accounting, but not stock market, performance increases with the level of group diversification. Our results show that internal capital markets play an important role for the existence of business groups in an emerging market context.     

企业内部薪酬差距与人力资本结构调整

本文考察薪酬差距如何影响企业内部的人力资本结构变动。基于员工不同教育程度划分人力资本层次,本文研究发现:(1)薪酬差距的增加显著降低了大学学历员工的比例,同时提升了高中及以下学历员工的比例;(2)通过构造工具变量和基于全球性经济危机的场景设定,我们发现薪酬差距和人力资本结构之间存在显著的因果关系;(3)在薪酬差距水平较高的情况下,薪酬差距的增加显著吸引了更有可能进入企业中高层的高学历员工。在薪酬差距水平较低的情况下,扩大薪酬差距显著提升(降低)了高中及以下学历(大学学历)员工比例,一个可能原因在于不同学历员工的议价能力存在差异。(4)薪酬差距与人力资本结构变化之间的相关性主要体现在规模较大、管理者平均年龄较低的企业。(5)人力资本结构在薪酬差距影响创新的过程中发挥了显著的中介效应,薪酬差距提升了研究生和本科学历员工比例,促进了企业创新。     

Corporate capital budgeting and CEO turnover

When a firm has minimal agency and informational asymmetry problems it should make efficient capital budgeting decisions. Many firms over-invest prior to CEO turnover, halt investments in the period surrounding the turnover, and then greatly increase their level of expenditures. Empirical analysis of the cross-sectional and inter-temporal variation in the quality of firms' corporate capital budgeting decision reveals that the impact of CEO turnover is asymmetric between under- and over-investing firms, and this complements the larger literature using average firm-wide performance measures. Firms are more likely to have forced turnovers when there is more over-investment prior to the turnover, and these firms make more efficient investment decisions subsequently. Board influence is largely insignificant prior to a CEO turnover but is consistently associated with higher levels of investment subsequently.     

IPO anomalies and innovation capital

Innovation capital are typically expensed and/or unrecognized as assets under current generally accepted accounting principles. This results in accounting-related information asymmetry. This paper examines the association of innovation capital (as measured here by the proxies of R&D expenditures and granted patents) and initial public offerings (IPO) anomalies. These anomalies include initial IPO underpricing, duration of honeymoon (a distinct feature of the Taiwanese IPO environment), and long-term performance. The theoretical model underlying this research is a signaling model. The results indicate that more innovative firms are more likely to be underpriced, and have longer honeymoon periods than less innovative firms. Further, the more innovative firms have positive and growing long-term market-adjusted returns. This stands in contrast to the declining long-term stock performance of initial public offering firms that is evidenced in the literature. We conclude that pre-IPO research and development expenditures disclosed in the IPO prospectus, official monthly reports of newly developed patents released to the public, and the frequency of patent citations significantly signal both underpricing and future market performance of IPO firms in Taiwan.     

The deregulation of capital markets in France

This paper investigates how the deregulation of French capital markets affected corporate investment in the 1980s. Access to public financial markets may be less important in countries that have traditionally relied on institutional investors to finance their corporate investment projects. This should be true for France where, contrary to the US, banks and government agencies have always been involved in firms’ long term activities. In this study, French firms are categorized based on their ownership structure and trading characteristics. Two investment models are augmented with measures of corporate liquidity in order to test the role of internal funds on investment. Empirical results show that only small French firms trading on the secondary stock market have to rely on liquid assets to finance their capital expenditures. French firms with strong bank ties avoid this constraint since they are allowed to maintain higher debt levels.     

A resolution of the distress risk and leverage puzzles in the cross section of stock returns

We revisit findings that returns are negatively related to financial distress intensity and leverage. These are puzzles under frictionless capital markets assumptions but are consistent with optimizing firms that differ in their exposure to financial distress costs. Firms with high costs choose low leverage to avoid distress, but they retain exposure to the systematic risk of bearing such costs in low states. Empirical results are consistent with this explanation. The return premiums to low leverage and low distress are significant in raw returns, and even stronger in risk-adjusted returns. When in distress, low-leverage firms suffer more than high-leverage firms as measured by a deterioration in accounting operating performance and heightened exposure to systematic risk. The connection between return premiums and distress costs is apparent in subperiod evidence. Both are small or insignificant prior to 1980 and larger and significant thereafter.     

Access to Capital, Capital Structure, and the Funding of the Firm

Based upon a large data set of public and private firms in the United Kingdom, I find that compared to their public counterparts, private firms rely almost exclusively on debt financing, have higher leverage ratios, and tend to avoid external capital markets, leading to a greater sensitivity of their capital structures to fluctuations in performance. I argue that these differences are due to private equity being more costly than public equity. I further examine the private firms subsample to show that private equity is more costly than its public counterpart due to information asymmetry and the desire to maintain control.     

会计师事务所人力资本特征与审计质量——来自中国资本市场的经验证据

人力资本在会计师事务所中具有十分重要的意义。本文利用2009年我国会计师事务所及其非金融类上市公司客户的数据,以操控性应计额度量审计质量,检验会计师事务所中注册会计师所占比重以及注册会计师的学历、年龄、参加行业领军人才培训情况等人力资本特征对审计质量的影响,结果发现,在我国本土事务所中,注册会计师的年龄以及入选行业领军人才培训计划的人数与正向的操控性应计额之间存在显著的负向关系,这表明,会计师事务所中注册会计师的经验丰富程度和对培训的重视程度对于抑制客户的正向盈余管理行为、提高审计质量具有积极作用。文章没有发现会计师事务所中注册会计师的比重以及注册会计师中高学历者所占比重与审计质量之间存在显著关系的证据。     

The Roles of Performance Measures and Monitoring in Annual Governance Decisions in Entrepreneurial Firms

This paper analyzes annual corporate governance decisions at firms making initial public offerings (IPOs) of common stock between 1996 and 1999. Our objective is to examine relations between firms' corporate governance decisions and the informativeness of available measures of managerial performance. We consider financial measures such as earnings and stock return, as well as direct monitoring. We collect a sample of IPO firms from the manufacturing, Internet, and technology (non-Internet) industries, and examine how the use of various performance measures in annual compensation grants and turnover decisions varies with the information environment of the firm and with the extent of venture capital influence. Consistent with prior research that finds earnings are of limited usefulness in firm valuation for Internet firms, we find Internet firms place less importance on earnings and greater importance on stock returns in determining compensation grants than do non-Internet firms. We also find that compensation grants of firms with little or no venture capital influence display significantly stronger association with accounting and stock performance measures than those of firms with more intense monitoring by venture capitalists. This result is consistent with direct monitoring and the use of explicit performance measures acting as substitute governance mechanisms.     

Post-acquisition performance of private acquirers

We provide the first evidence on the performance of private operating firms as acquirers. Private bidders experience greater post-acquisition operating performance improvements compared to public bidders. This effect is not due to differences in target types, merger accounting, financing constraints, private equity ownership or subsequent listing of some private bidders, and is robust to instrumentation. Further analysis of governance arrangements at least partially attributes the private bidder effect to lower agency costs in private firms. Not only do private firms pay lower prices for target firm assets, they also operate them more efficiently by containing overhead costs and capital expenditures.