Whistleblowers and Outcomes of Financial Misrepresentation Enforcement Actions

Whistleblowers are ostensibly a valuable resource to regulators investigating securities violations, but whether there is a link between whistleblower involvement and the outcomes of enforcement actions is unclear. Using a data set of employee whistleblowing allegations obtained from the U.S. government and the universe of enforcement actions for financial misrepresentation, we find that whistleblower involvement is associated with higher monetary penalties for targeted firms and employees and with longer prison sentences for culpable executives. We also find that regulators more quickly begin enforcement proceedings when whistleblowers are involved. Our findings suggest that whistleblowers are a valuable source of information for regulators who investigate and prosecute financial misrepresentation.     

The Effectiveness of White‐Collar Crime Enforcement: Evidence from the War on Terror

This paper analyzes the impact of changes in regulatory priorities and resource allocation on criminal enforcement of white‐collar criminal activities. Using the 9/11 terrorist attacks as a shock to the FBI's priorities and allocation of investigative resources, as well as variation in the Muslim population in the United States, I examine whether prioritization of counterterrorism investigations after 9/11 is associated with weaker enforcement of laws targeting white‐collar crime. I then use a difference‐in‐differences estimation to study the magnitude of any increase in white‐collar crime resulting from reduced oversight. I find a significantly greater reduction in white‐collar criminal cases referred by FBI field offices that shifted more of their investigative focus away from white‐collar crime to counterterrorism. Further, geographic areas in the jurisdictions of FBI field offices with greater shifts in attention from white‐collar crime to counterterrorism experienced greater increases in wire fraud, illegal insider‐trading activities, and fraud within financial institutions.     

Financial statement comparability and accounting fraud

We examine the association between financial statement comparability and the likelihood of accounting fraud. Prior research documents a negative association between the quality of a firm's reporting environment and accounting fraud. We build on this literature and show that poor financial statement comparability is associated with a greater likelihood of accounting fraud. We also find that accounting comparability declines over time as the year of fraud detection approaches and that the association between comparability and fraud becomes more negative over this time. In addition, we find that financial statement comparability improves after fraud detection, consistent with the notion that managers improve their financial reporting quality after fraud.     

Industry informational interactions and corporate fraud

We examine three information channels through which product market interactions in an industry can affect firms' incentives to misreport financial information to investors. We find that lower product market sensitivity to individual firms' information and greater use of relative performance evaluation encourage the commission of financial fraud. Industry structures that give rise to less collection of information about individual firms decrease the probability of fraud detection and increase the probability of fraud commission. We also examine dynamic effects of fraud. Our results suggest that, in fragmented industries, fraud can amplify cyclical fluctuations in the real economy.     

Predicting fraud by investment managers

We test the predictability of investment fraud using a panel of mandatory disclosures filed with the SEC. We find that disclosures related to past regulatory and legal violations, conflicts of interest, and monitoring have significant power to predict fraud. Avoiding the 5% of firms with the highest ex ante predicted fraud risk would allow an investor to avoid 29% of fraud cases and over 40% of the total dollar losses from fraud. We find no evidence that investors receive compensation for fraud risk through superior performance or lower fees. We examine the barriers to implementing fraud prediction models and suggest changes to the SEC's data access policies that could benefit investors.     

The value of political ties for firms experiencing enforcement actions: Evidence from China

We study the value of political ties for firms experiencing enforcement actions. We find that stronger corporate political ties alleviate the negative market shocks caused by enforcement action announcements of listed firms in China, and the relationship between political ties and market reaction is more pronounced for enforcement actions that signal loss of market credibility than for enforcement actions that signal loss of political ties and in regions with greater government intervention. We further find that firms with stronger political ties experience larger increases in long-term debt after enforcement actions, suggesting that it is the investors' expectation of government support to connected firms that mitigates the negative market reaction.     

Corporate Tax Enforcement Externalities and the Banking Sector

We explore whether corporate tax enforcement can affect bank lending. Specifically, we hypothesize that tax enforcement efforts aimed at small and midsized enterprises (SME) can improve their information environments, which in turn could lead to increased bank commercial lending. Exploiting the regional structure employed by the IRS until 1999, we find that the corporate tax return audit probability for SMEs is associated with greater commercial lending growth for regionally focused banks. We find similar evidence when exploiting the IRS reorganization from a regional to federal system in 2000. Further results show that tax enforcement's impact on SME informational environments is at least partially responsible for this association: The impact of tax auditing on bank lending is stronger for banks facing greater informational disadvantages and in areas where SMEs face greater hold-up problems. Finally, we find that the tax audit rate is positively associated with loan portfolio quality, suggesting that tax enforcement can lead to better loan decisions. Our findings are consistent with the tax authority's mandate having important externalities on bank lending and SME access to capital, suggesting that the benefits to tax enforcement go beyond improving tax collection.     

Enforcement actions and their effectiveness in securities regulation: Empirical evidence from management earnings forecasts

Due to resource constraints, securities regulators cannot find or punish all firms that have conducted irregular or even illegal activities (hereafter referred to as fraud). Those who study securities regulations can only find the instances of fraud that have been punished, not those that have not been punished, and it is these unknown cases that would make the best control sample for studies of enforcement action criteria. China’s mandatory management earnings forecasts solve this sampling problem. In the A-share market, firms that have not forecasted as mandated are likely in a position to be punished by securities regulators or are attempting to escape punishment, and their identification allows researchers to build suitable study and control samples when examining securities regulations. Our results indicate that enforcement actions taken by securities regulators are selective. The probability that a firm will be punished for irregular management forecasting is significantly related to proxies for survival rates. Specifically, fraudulent firms with lower return on assets (ROAs) or higher cash flow risk are more likely to be punished. Further analysis shows that selective enforcement of regulations has had little positive effect on the quality of listed firms’ management forecasts.     

The impact of corporate fraud on director‐interlocked firms: Evidence from bank loans

We examine the impact of corporate fraud committed by one firm (the “fraudulent firm”) on other firms with interlocking directors (the “interlocked firms”), focusing on the debtholder side. We argue that the revelation of a fraudulent firm's fraud can damage the reputation of the interlocked firms because corporate governance can propagate via director interlocks. Empirically, we find that the interlocked firms' cost of debt is higher and the loan covenants become stricter after the fraud cases of the fraudulent firms are revealed. Consistent with the corporate governance propagation explanation, our results are weaker (stronger) for interlocked firms that have better (worse) pre‐event corporate governance standards. Our findings suggest that corporate fraud of fraudulent firms can affect other firms through director‐interlocks beyond shareholder value.     

Prosecuting Insurance Fraud—A Case Study of the Massachusetts Experience in the 1990s

There is widespread agreement that insurance fraud is a major problem in the United States. There is little agreement, however, in what constitutes insurance fraud in the many articles and research papers published on the subject during the past ten years. The term ‘‘fraud’’ carries the connotation that the activity is illegal and, hence, that prosecution and conviction are potential outcomes of a specific fraud. Accepting that premise allows us to adopt the legal definition of fraud in the insurance context and to examine the experience of dealing with insurance fraud in terms of property‐liability insurance lines. Specifically, we examine ten years of data on referrals and disposals of incidents of suspected fraud as processed by the Insurance Fraud Bureau of Massachusetts to provide estimates of the distribution of types of people who perpetrate a variety of insurance frauds. We compile conviction rates, sentencing outcomes, and recidivism rates in detail to illuminate the law enforcement process and to gauge the deterrent effect of prosecuting insurance fraud in the criminal courts. The Massachusetts data lead us to conclude that the number of cases of convictable fraud is much smaller than the prevailing view of the extent of fraud; that the majority of guilty subjects have prior (noninsurance) criminal records; and that sentencing of subjects guilty of insurance fraud appears effective as both a general and specific deterrent for insurance fraud but ineffective as a specific deterrent for other crime types, as the recidivism rate appears no different from the general property criminal's recidivism rate.     

The consequences to managers for financial misrepresentation

We track the fortunes of all 2,206 individuals identified as responsible parties for all 788 Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and Department of Justice (DOJ) enforcement actions for financial misrepresentation from January 1, 1978 through September 30, 2006. Fully 93% lose their jobs by the end of the regulatory enforcement period. Most are explicitly fired. The likelihood of ouster increases with the cost of the misconduct to shareholders and the quality of the firm's governance. Culpable managers also bear substantial financial losses through restrictions on their future employment, their shareholdings in the firm, and SEC fines. A sizeable minority (28%) face criminal charges and penalties, including jail sentences that average 4.3 years. These results indicate that the individual perpetrators of financial misconduct face significant disciplinary action.     

Go before the whistle blows: an empirical analysis of director turnover and financial fraud

This study investigates whether outside directors are aware of financial fraud. Our analysis focuses on the abnormal turnover of these directors during the fraud committing period, before fraud is discovered and before lawsuits are filed. Our empirical analysis shows that, during the fraud committing period, outside directors in fraud firms exhibit an abnormal level of turnover. Examining the characteristics of outside directors and boards at these fraud firms, we find strong evidence that female directors, directors who have greater stock ownership in the firm, and directors with multiple directorships at other firms are more likely to depart fraud firms. We also find some evidence that board size, number of meetings, and fraction of financial experts are related to abnormal turnover in fraud firms during the fraud committing period. We show that abnormal director turnover is significantly higher for fraud that is considered more egregious (i.e., involving fictitious transactions and disclosure problems). Lastly, directors are more likely to depart fraud firms with more serious fraud, as proxied by higher ex-post settlement amounts and longer fraud duration.     

Using Nonfinancial Measures to Assess Fraud Risk

This study examines whether auditors can effectively use nonfinancial measures (NFMs) to assess the reasonableness of financial performance and, thereby, help detect financial statement fraud (hereafter, fraud). If auditors or other interested parties (e.g., directors, lenders, investors, or regulators) can identify NFMs (e.g., facilities growth) that are correlated with financial measures (e.g., revenue growth), inconsistent patterns between the NFMs and financial measures can be used to detect firms with high fraud risk. We find that the  difference  between financial and nonfinancial performance is significantly greater for firms that committed fraud than for their nonfraud competitors. We also find that this difference is a significant fraud indicator when included in a model containing variables that have previously been linked to the likelihood of fraud. Overall, our results provide empirical evidence suggesting that NFMs can be effectively used to assess fraud risk.     

The spillover effect of fraudulent financial reporting on peer firms' investments

We investigate how high-profile accounting frauds affect peer firms' investment. We document that peers react to the fraudulent reports by increasing investment during fraud periods. We show that this finding is not driven by frauds that have a higher ex ante likelihood of detection or by an association between fraud and investment booms. In addition, we find that peers’ investments increase in fraudulent earnings overstatements, and in industries with higher investor sentiment, lower cost of capital and higher private benefits of control. We also find evidence consistent with equity analysts potentially facilitating the spillover effect.     

The foreign corrupt practices act: How investors respond when violation severity and corresponding penalty (mis)match

The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) has become a major focus for corporations, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and the Department of Justice (DOJ), as indicated by the dramatic increase in the number of FCPA enforcement actions and the level of civil and criminal penalties. Prior regulatory practice shows that the SEC and the DOJ struggle not only to evaluate the severity of a company's FCPA violation, but also to establish the penalty amount. Given the difficulty in assessing penalties, the severity of a company's FCPA violation at times appears mismatched with the size of the penalty. Leveraging signaling theory, this study predicts and finds that when a company's FCPA violation severity and the size of the penalty imposed are mismatched, investors experience ambiguity in assessing the company's future prospects and, in effect, are more likely to give the company the benefit of the doubt. In this case, investors' company risk assessments are dampened, and they show a higher willingness to maintain their investment in the company. However, when the severity of the company's FCPA violation and the penalty amount match, investors are less likely to experience ambiguity, which leads to higher company risk assessments and a lower willingness to maintain their investment in the company. In addition, the combination of a more severe FCPA violation and high penalty amount results in the highest risk assessment and lowest willingness to maintain the investment. These results provide ethical and practical considerations that regulatory bodies should weigh in evaluating sanctions.     

Corporate Fraud and Business Conditions: Evidence from IPOs

We examine how a firm's incentive to commit fraud when going public varies with investor beliefs about industry business conditions. Fraud propensity increases with the level of investor beliefs about industry prospects but decreases when beliefs are extremely high. We find that two mechanisms are at work: monitoring by investors and short‐term executive compensation, both of which vary with investor beliefs about industry prospects. We also find that monitoring incentives of investors and underwriters differ. Our results are consistent with models of investor beliefs and corporate fraud, and suggest that regulators and auditors should be vigilant for fraud during booms.     

Corporate fraud culture: Re‐examining the corporate governance and performance relation

We analyse the corporate governance and performance relation, when conditioning on corporate fraud, for fraud firms during 2000 – 2007. Fraud firms are identified as either self‐ reported fraud events, or subject to regulatory investigation. We use the inverse Mills ratio procedure to account for firms' (unobservable) fraud culture in the dynamic system GMM model of the performance‐ governance relation. We find that corporate governance is an endogenously determined characteristic that has no causal impact on firm performance when conditioning on fraud. Fraud is a significant regulatory event but its overall economic impact at the firm level is highly variable.     

Why computer-mediated communication improves the effectiveness of fraud brainstorming

Current auditing standards require auditors to conduct a fraud brainstorming session aimed at considering ways in which the audit client's financial statements might be fraudulently misstated. Lynch et al. (2009) document that computer-mediated fraud brainstorming is significantly more effective than face-to-face brainstorming for generating relevant fraud risks. In this study, we code and analyze process-level data from the Lynch et al. (2009) study to understand the factors contributing to the greater effectiveness of electronic fraud brainstorming. Specifically, we conduct mediation analysis to discern the degree to which equality of participation and two measures of task focus contribute to greater fraud brainstorming effectiveness when using a computer-mediated communication system compared to traditional face-to-face brainstorming. We also examine participants' perceptions of ease of system use, satisfaction with the process, and satisfaction with the outcome. Overall, the results indicate that the primary reason for the greater effectiveness of electronic fraud brainstorming is the greater degree of task focus as revealed through the length of comments made when using computer-mediated fraud brainstorming. In an absolute sense, participants using electronic brainstorming felt that their brainstorming mode was easy to use and they were satisfied with the process and outcome. The primary contribution of this study is in enhancing our understanding of precisely why computer-mediated fraud brainstorming outperforms face-to-face fraud brainstorming.     

Do changes in audit actions and attitudes consistent with increased auditor scepticism deter aggressive earnings management? An experimental investigation

Audits are claimed to not only enhance the detection of fraud but also the deterrence of fraud. This study examines whether different audit procedures and attitudes conveyed to management deter aggressive earnings management that may be fraudulent, and whether such different procedures and attitudes conveyed influence managers’ perceptions about the ethicality of any anticipated earnings management. In an experiment with 171 senior corporate managers, we find that compared to the condition where the audit proceeds the same as last year, managers anticipate that there would be less earnings management when the nature of evidence collected has increased probative value; and when the auditor conveys a more sceptical attitude via more critical inquiry combined with either an increase in the evidence extent (increased sample size) or the nature of the evidence. However, this reduction in anticipated earnings management is not found with either the increased extent of evidence collected alone or more critical inquiry alone, suggesting that a combination of action and attitude changes compared to a change in either action alone or attitude alone better signals to managers the heightened scepticism that enhances the effectiveness of auditor deterrence. We also find, after controlling for the underlying ethical disposition of managers, that the different audit procedures and attitudes conveyed to management affect managers’ perceptions of the ethicality of anticipated earnings management. Interestingly, the conditions that engender greater earnings management also paradoxically increase managers’ perceived unethicality of the anticipated earnings management. Together these findings have implications for how different changes in audit approaches may result in differential managerial responses about their intention to commit fraud and its appropriateness. This study is one of the first papers to provide experimental empirical evidence that specific audit actions conveying heightened scepticism have significant influence on managerial judgments and behaviours with respect to committing aggressive earnings management.     

The real effects of corporate fraud: evidence from class action lawsuits

Using a sample of lawsuit firms from 1996 to 2009, this study examines whether fraud revelation through shareholder class action affects corporate financing and investment policies. We predict that revelation of fraud damages defendant firms' reputation and undermines credibility of their financial disclosure. As a result, such firms experience difficulty in financing and reduce investment accordingly. Consistent with our prediction, we find that fraud‐committing firms experience a decline in total financing (total investment) by 1.5 per cent (0.8 per cent) of total assets after fraud revelation. Difference‐in‐differences analyses reinforce our main findings. The impact is more pronounced for firms with lower inherent fraud incidence.