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会计信息失真,一直困扰着全世界整个会计行业,成为会计界悬而不能决的难题之一。从轰动世界的美国安然公司虚报盈利的造假事件,到我国的多家上市公司因造假而带来的种种不良后果,充分揭示了如何防止、治理会计信息失真已成当前会计行业的燃眉之急。 相似文献
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自20世纪90年代以来,中国证券市场有多家上市公司因财务信息虚假披露或会计造假问题而遭受证监会严厉处罚,但这可能只是会计欺诈的冰山一角.美国的公司治理堪称一流,但美国的上市公司也出现了会计丑闻,世界通信公司、安然公司的会计造假案也轰动业界,震惊全球.…… 相似文献
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美国对会计治理的SOX法案 总被引:3,自引:0,他引:3
一、SOX法案(Sarbanes-Oxley Act)简介以安然事件的揭露为序幕,美国接二连三地发生了上市公司财务造假的案件。除了安然之外,世界通讯、施乐、默克、强生等一个个赫赫有名的公司突然成了会计造假的高手。一直被称为世界会计楷模的美国,突然变成了世界上会计造假严重的国度,整个华尔街也因此而一蹶不振。在这种背景之下,美国国内开始反思这一系列会计造假事件发生的原因,以及如何采取措施以防止类似事件的再次发生。终于在总结前段时间提出的治理会计造假对策的成果上,美国国会于2002年的7月26日以绝对多数票数通过了治理会计造… 相似文献
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美国自2001年底惊现安然公司会计造假事件后,2002年又相继出现了施乐公司、世通公司、默克制药公司等一系列重大会计造假事件。这一系列造假事件:一方面严重打击了投资者的信心和美国股市,对美国乃至全球经济造成极大破坏;另一方而美国相关机构积极应对,掀起了规范市场的风暴,对 相似文献
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2001年以来,美国爆发了一系列财务丑闻,导致安然、世通等”航空母舰”级跨国公司先后破产,具有90年历史的安达信会计师事务所也因此倒闭,它们的爆发犹如定时炸弹一样,产生的破坏力和影响力是惊人的。综观国内,近年一系列上市公司造假大案纷纷浮出水面,给广大投资者带来无法挽回的损失,更为严重的是,因上市公司和中介机构的会计造假行为,导致我国整个会计诚信体系遭到了严重的破坏。 相似文献
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为推进我国国民经济的健康稳定发展,我国正在逐步建设一个完善的社会主义市场经济体系。在新的历史条件下,市场经济越发展,会计工作越重要,对财会人员来说,我们又不得不面对一个沉重的话题:“会计造假”。一些企业的“会计造假”已造成了国有资产的大量流失。如“银广厦”、“蓝田股份”等上市公司“会计造假”事件的发生,不仅危及国家金融与税务征管,损害了国家利益,也直接损害了千万股民的利益。抵制“会计造假”行为必须引起全社会的高度重视,是认真加以解决的当务之急。有人说,“会计造假”古今中外早已司空见惯,君不见,美国安然公司也… 相似文献
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2001年安然公司的倒闭成了美国历史上最大的企业破产事件。事情虽已过去多年.但安然所使用的造假手段仍然具有很深刻的研究价值,其中鲜为人知的操作手段对我国证券监管机构和会计服务机构具有借鉴意义。 相似文献
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近年来,我国企业尤其是上市公司的会计造假案频发,虚假会计信息泛滥,有数十家上市公司屡教不改。出现这种现象的根源何在?对于会计造假现象,我们也许可以找出若干条原因,但事实证明了这样一个道理,即:不完善的公司治理是所有问题的重要根源,有缺陷的公司治理无法保证会计信息的高质量。从这个意义上来说,我国公司治理存在的制度性缺陷是导致会计造假的根源。 相似文献
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This paper studies bank learning through repeated interactions with borrowers from a new perspective. To understand learning by lending, we adapt a methodology from labor economics to analyze how loan contract terms evolve as banks acquire new information about borrowers. We construct “proxy” variables for this information using data from borrowers’ out-of-sample, future credit performance. Due to the timing of their construction, banks could not have used these variables directly to price loans. We nonetheless find that these proxies increasingly predict loan prices as relationships progress, even after controlling for possible omitted variable bias. Our methodology provides strong evidence that: (a) bank learning affects loan prices, and (b) relationship benefits are heterogeneous. In particular, higher quality borrowers face differentially lower spreads as their relationship with lenders develop – and banks learn about their quality – while lower quality borrowers see loan prices increase and their loan amounts fall. We further find suggestive evidence that banks incorporate CEO-specific information into loan prices. 相似文献
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Tanjim Hossain 《The Rand journal of economics》2008,39(2):509-529
We analyze a dynamic second‐price auction with an informed bidder and an uninformed bidder who, upon seeing a posted price, learns whether his valuation is above that price. In the essentially unique equilibrium, an informed bidder bids in the first period if her valuation is below some cutoff and bids only in the last period otherwise. An uninformed bidder bids in every period to optimally change the price unless the price is above his valuation or he is the high bidder. This model also provides a rationale behind the use of a secret reserve price in private‐value settings. 相似文献
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Javier Estrada 《实用企业财务杂志》2012,24(3):19-25
Everybody loves a growth story. But that does not make growth by itself a good investment thesis. Fast‐growing countries and their companies often produce low returns for investors, and slow‐growing ones sometimes produce high returns. In exploring this apparent paradox, this article argues that valuation plays a critical role. It matters not only how fast a country or company may grow, but also how much investors pay for that growth. Blinded by growth, investors often pay too much to participate in the prospective growth of both countries and companies; and as result, they earn low returns. This tendency to overpay for growth helps explain what the author describes as indisputable evidence that, over the long term, value investing beats growth investing. This article discusses growth from three different points of view. First, it looks into the relationship between general economic growth and equity returns. Second, it examines the relationship between corporate growth and equity returns. And finally, it compares value investing with growth investing. 相似文献
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Disinflationary episodes are a valuable source of information for economic agents trying to learn about the economy. In this paper, we are particularly interested in how policymakers can themselves learn by disinflating. The approach differs from the existing literature, which typically focuses on the learning of private agents during a disinflation. We build a model where both the policymaker and private agents learn, and ask what happens if the policymaker has to disinflate to satisfy a new central bank mandate specifying greater emphasis on inflation stabilization. In this case, our results show that inflation may fall dramatically before it gradually rises to its new long‐run level. The potential for inflation to undershoot its long‐run level during a disinflationary episode suggests that caution should be exercised when assessing the success of any change in the policymaker's mandate. 相似文献
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《Harvard business review》2004,82(1):27-37, 112
Like it or not, leaders need to manage the mood of their organizations. The most gifted leaders accomplish that by using a mysterious blend of psychological abilities known as emotional intelligence. They are self-aware and empathetic. They can read and regulate their own emotions while intuitively grasping how others feel and gauging their organization's emotional state. But where does emotional intelligence come from, and how do leaders learn to use it? In this article, 18 leaders and scholars (including business executives, leadership researchers, psychologists, an autism expert, and a symphony conductor) explore the nature and management of emotional intelligence--its sources, uses, and abuses. Their responses varied, but some common themes emerged: the importance of consciously--and conscientiously--honing one's skills, the double-edged nature of self-awareness, and the danger of letting any one emotional intelligence skill dominate. Among their observations: Psychology professor John Mayer, who co-developed the concept of emotional intelligence, warns managers not to be confused by popular definitions of the term, which suggest that if you have a certain set of personality traits then you automatically possess emotional intelligence. Neuropsychologist Elkhonon Goldberg agrees with professors Daniel Goleman and Robert Goffee that emotional intelligence can be learned--but only by people who already show an aptitude for it. Cult expert Janja Lalich points out that leaders can use their emotional intelligence skills for ill in the same way they can for good. "Sometimes the only difference is [the leader's] intent," she says. And business leaders Carol Bartz, William George, Sidney Harman, and Andrea jung (of Autodesk, Medtronic, Harman International, and Avon respectively) describe situations in which emotional intelligence traits such as self-awareness and empathy have helped them and their companies perform at a higher level. 相似文献
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Sull DN 《Harvard business review》2003,81(6):82-91, 137
What makes a great manager great? Despite differences in their personal attributes, successful managers all excel in the making, honoring, and remaking of commitments. Managerial commitments take many forms, from capital investments to personnel decisions to public statements, but each exerts both immediate and enduring influence on a company. A leader's commitments shape a business's identity, define its strengths and weaknesses, establish its opportunities and limitations, and set its direction. Executives can all too easily forget that commitments are extraordinarily powerful. Caught up in the present, managers often take actions that, while beneficial in the near term, impose lasting constraints on their operations and organizations. When market or competitive conditions change, they can find themselves unable to respond effectively. Managers who understand the nature and power of their commitments can wield them more effectively throughout a company's life cycle. Entrepreneurs can avoid taking actions that imprint a new venture with a dysfunctional character. Managers in established enterprises can buttress past commitments that retain their currency and learn to recognize when commitments have become roadblocks to needed changes. The manager can then replace those roadblocks with new, rejuvenating commitments. That doesn't mean you should try to anticipate all the long-run consequences of every commitment--and it certainly doesn't mean you should shy away from making commitments. But it does mean that before making important decisions about, say, operating processes or partnerships, you should always ask yourself: Is this a process or relationship that we can live with in the future? Am I locking us into a course that we'll come to regret? 相似文献
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McGrath RG 《Harvard business review》2011,89(4):76-83, 137
It's hardly news that business leaders work in increasingly uncertain environments, where failures are bound to be more common than successes. Yet if you ask executives how well, on a scale of one to 10, their organizations learn from failure, you'll often get a sheepish "Two-or maybe three" in response. Such organizations are missing a big opportunity: Failure may be inevitable but, if managed well, can be very useful. A certain amount of failure can help you keep your options open, find out what doesn't work, create the conditions to attract resources and attention, make room for new leaders, and develop intuition and skill. The key to reaping these benefits is to foster "intelligent failure" throughout your organization. McGrath describes several principles that can help you put intelligent failure to work. You should decide what success and failure would look like before you start a project. Document your initial assumptions, test and revise them as you go, and convert them into knowledge. Fail fast-the longer something takes, the less you'll learn-and fail cheaply, to contain your downside risk. Limit the number of uncertainties in new projects, and build a culture that tolerates, and sometimes even celebrates, failure. Finally, codify and share what you learn. These principles won't give you a means of avoiding all failures down the road-that's simply not realistic. They will help you use small losses to attain bigger wins over time. 相似文献