Stock repurchasing and corporate social responsibility

Stock repurchases are controversial. Researchers often view the positive association between free cash flow and the volume of the stock repurchases to be in the shareholders’ interest and the positive association between executive options and stock repurchases to be in the managers’ interest. Using firms’ corporate social responsibility (CSR) ratings as a measure of ethical culture—one that increases the cost of self-serving behavior for managers— we examine whether a firm’s CSR rating is related to its stock repurchase decisions. Although the baseline regression shows a positive association between CSR and repurchases, we find that CSR amplifies the positive association between free cash flow and stock repurchases and lessens the positive association between executive options and stock repurchases. These results indicate that ethical culture might play a role in repurchase decisions: it may encourage repurchases aligned with shareholders’ interests and discourage those primarily in managers’ interest. Furthermore, we also find that high CSR firms are associated with a greater completion rate of announced repurchase programs and receive more favorable stock market reaction to their repurchase announcements.     

The Wealth and Information Effects of Insurers' Open Market Stock Repurchase Announcements

This article examines the use of an increasingly popular method of cash disbursement in the insurance industry: stock repurchase programs. Using a sample of stock repurchase announcements between 1981 and 1997, we examine the motivation for stock repurchase, estimate the market reaction to the repurchase announcement, and evaluate the magnitude of the reaction as it relates to particular insurance industry and firm characteristics. We examine the abnormal returns around the announcement day and find a significant positive wealth effect associated with repurchase announcements—a result that is consistent with that of other studies of both nonfinancial and financial firms. However, we suspect that the nature of the insurance product and the highly regulated status of the insurance industry might serve to mitigate the magnitude of an announcement effect. In fact, we find that the effect for all insurers is smaller than that obtained in samples of industrial firms. Finally, we examine the relationships between the magnitude of the announcement effect and various firm characteristics and test the significance of information signaling and Jensen's free cash flow theories in the insurance setting.     

Open‐Market Stock Repurchases by Insurance Companies and Signaling

The signaling hypothesis of share repurchases implies that management uses repurchases to signal either that their firm's future operating performance will improve or that shares of their stock are simply underpriced by the market. This study examines which of the two interpretations can better explain open‐market share repurchase programs announced by insurance companies. We find no evidence that future‐operating performance of insurers improves following the repurchase announcement. In addition, changes in future operating performance cannot explain the announcement‐period abnormal return. Instead, the stock undervaluation prior to the repurchase announcement can significantly explain the announcement‐period abnormal return, particularly for life insurers. Overall, our results suggest that the positive market reaction to insurers’ open‐market share repurchase announcements is due to the stock undervaluation by the market, but not due to positive information content about future operating performance conveyed in the repurchase announcement.     

The impact of monetary policy decisions on stock returns: Evidence from Thailand

Although numerous studies have examined the effect of monetary policy on stock prices, empirical research in the international setting remains relatively scant. Therefore, this topic is reexamined in the context of Thailand. In a sample of 50 repurchase rate announcements of the Bank of Thailand during 2003–2009, our regression results suggest that the raw change in the repurchase rate has a negative effect on stock returns at the market level, which is inconsistent with the literature. Contrary to the results of numerous studies, we find that at the market level the expected change in the repurchase rate has a negative effect on stock returns and the unexpected change in the repurchase rate exhibits no effect on stock returns. However, the effect of the unexpected change in the repurchase rate on stock returns is evident at the firm level. Our findings also suggest that the stock market's response to the repurchase rate change is asymmetric. The unexpected change in the repurchase rate that is considered as good news has a negative effect on stock returns. Overall, the evidence lends support to the notion that the monetary policy announcements have a significant effect on stock prices and further adds to the debate on whether the creditability of the monetary authority may contribute to the stock market's response to the monetary policy actions.     

Open-Market Stock Repurchase and Stock Price Behavior When Management Values Real Investment

This paper provides a simple explanation of open‐market stock repurchases and the stock price behavior surrounding them. There is ex ante asymmetry of information with regard to the private benefits that corporate managers can attain from real investments. In our model, open‐market repurchase announcements reveal information about the managers' private benefits when real investment opportunities are unprofitable in terms of firm values. This study differs from previous studies in that we show that announcements of open‐market repurchase programs can be believable without the restriction that the announcements are commitments. Empirically, the model simultaneously predicts that a stock price will drop prior to an open‐market repurchase announcement and will rise in response to the announcement. These predictions are consistent with stylized facts.     

Share repurchases as a potential tool to mislead investors

A rich literature argues that stock repurchases often serve as positive economic signals beneficial to investors. Yet due to their inherent flexibility, open-market repurchase programs have long been criticized as weak signals lacking commitment. We evaluate whether some managers potentially use buyback announcements to mislead investors. We focus on cases where managers were seemingly under heavy pressure to boost stock prices and might have announced a repurchase only to convey a false signal. For suspect cases, the immediate market reaction to a buyback announcement does not differ from that generally observed. However over longer horizons, suspect firms do not enjoy the improvement in economic performance otherwise observed. Suspect firms repurchase less stock. Further, managers in suspect firms have comparatively higher exposure to stock options, a potentially endogenous result suggesting greater sensitivity to both stock valuation and to future equity dilution. Overall, the results suggest only a limited number of managers may have used buybacks in a misleading way as “cheap talk.” Yet as theory also suggests, we find no long-run economic benefit to this behavior.     

The Wealth Effects of Repurchases on Bondholders

Prior research has documented positive abnormal stock returns around the announcements of repurchase programs; several explanations of these returns have been suggested, including signaling, free cash flow, and wealth redistributions. This study analyzes abnormal stock, bond, and firm returns around repurchase announcements to examine these hypotheses. We find evidence consistent with both signaling and wealth redistribution. The loss to bondholders is a function of the size of the repurchase, and the risk of the firm's debt. We also find that bond ratings are twice as likely to be downgraded as upgraded after the announcement of the repurchase program.     

USING EXCHANGE-TRADED EQUITY FLEX PUT OPTIONS IN CORPORATE STOCK REPURCHASE PROGRAMS

Casual evidence suggests that as many as 10% of the companies repurchasing their stock over the past decade have used the sale of puts on the company's stock as part of the repurchase program. This article describes a new instrument for such corporate stock buybacks recently introduced by the American Stock Exchange: Equity Flex puts on the issuer's stock. When and if the puts are exercised, the company's shares are retired—often on better terms and with better cash flow timing than the company could achieve with a conventional stock repurchase program.
To date, such stock repurchase programs have been conducted primarily using over-the-counter put options. The new Equity Flex puts promise to eliminate the relative advantages of OTC transactions and offer stock repurchasers better pricing and increased liquidity. Use of exchange markets can also help overcome any reluctance a financial officer might have to rely on prices offered by a single dealer.     

Accelerated share repurchases

Accelerated share repurchases (ASRs) are credible commitments by firms to repurchase shares immediately. Including an ASR in a repurchase program reduces the flexibility that firms have to alter an announced program in response to subsequent changes in the price and liquidity of its shares, unexpected shocks to cash flow and/or investment, etc. Thus, we investigate whether firms' decisions to include ASRs in their repurchase programs are associated with factors expected to influence the costs of lost flexibility and the benefits of enhanced credibility and immediacy. We find robust evidence consistent with the costs of lost flexibility and the benefits of credibility and immediacy being important determinants of ASR adoption. Additionally, we find that ASR announcements are associated with positive average abnormal stock returns.     

OPEN MARKET STOCK REPURCHASE PROGRAMS AND LIQUIDITY

In this paper I examine the behavior of bid and ask spreads and depths around announcements of open market stock repurchase programs. For a sample of 195 announcements from 1988 to 1990, I find statistically significant evidence of a small decline in spreads and no evidence of a shift in depths following the announcement date. Results are similar for a subsample of firms experiencing post-announcement declines in the number of shares outstanding. I conclude that open market repurchase programs as used recently do not adversely affect market liquidity.     

Actual Share Reacquisitions in Open-Market Repurchase Programs

Unlike Dutch auction repurchases and tender offers, open-market repurchase programs do not precommit firms to acquire a specified number of shares. In a sample of 450 programs from 1981 to 1990, firms on average acquire 74 to 82 percent of the shares announced as repurchase targets within three years of the repurchase announcement. We find that share repurchases are negatively related to prior stock price performance, suggesting that firms increase their purchasing depending on its degree of perceived undervaluation. In addition, repurchases are positively related to levels of cash flow, which is consistent with liquidity arguments.     

An Empirical Examination of the Stated Purposes of Issuer Tender Offers to Purchase Common Stock

This paper documents the purposes of issuer tender offers to repurchase stock, as stated in Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) disclosures, over the period 1994‐2006. We explore whether stated purposes relate to announcement period returns and find returns are significantly lower when repurchases replace dividends, distribute cash from unspecified sources, or occur subsequent to third‐party tender offers. Announcement period returns are significantly higher when repurchases are viewed by management as the best investment opportunity available or when they occur subsequent to previous repurchase programs. Finally, we find evidence in support of signaling theory and Jensen's (1986) agency cost of free cash flow theory.     

THE INTRA-INDUSTRY EFFECTS OF OPEN MARKET SHARE REPURCHASES: CONTAGION OR COMPETITIVE?

We examine the extent to which announcements of open market share repurchase programs affect the valuation of competing firms in the same industry. On average, although firms announcing open market share repurchase programs experience a significantly positive stock price reaction at announcement, portfolios of rival firms in the same industry experience a significant and contemporaneous negative stock price reaction. This suggests that perceived changes in the competitive positions of the repurchasing firms occur at the expense of rival firms and dominate any signals of favorable industry conditions. Thus, the competitive intra-industry effects of open market repurchases outweigh any contagion effects. In addition, cross-sectional tests indicate that these competitive effects are more pronounced in industries characterized by a lower degree of competition and less correlation between the stock returns of the repurchasing firm and its rivals.     

Payout policy,taxes, and the relation between returns and the bid–ask spread

Recent evidence demonstrates that corporate payout policy has shifted from the nearly exclusive use of dividend payout to the inclusion of stock repurchase, primarily through open markets. This trend has been attributed to the tax advantages associated with repurchase relative to dividends. In this paper, we introduce personal taxation and stock repurchase to reexamine the relation between returns and the bid–ask spread. Our model provides insight into the nature of this relation. Tests performed using NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ data provide empirical support of our theoretical conclusions. We conclude that the firm’s choice of payout policy influences the relation between returns and spreads.     

Why do convertible issuers simultaneously repurchase stock? An arbitrage-based explanation

Over recent years, a substantial fraction of US convertible bond issues have been combined with a stock repurchase. This paper explores the motivations for these combined transactions. We argue that convertible debt issuers repurchase their stock to facilitate arbitrage-related short selling. In line with this prediction, we show that convertibles combined with a stock repurchase are associated with lower offering discounts, lower stock price pressure, higher expected hedging demand, and lower issue-date short selling than uncombined issues. We also find that convertible arbitrage strategies explain both the size and the speed of execution of the stock repurchases.     

The Stock Market Reaction to Significant Tender Offer Repurchases of Stock: Size and Purpose Perspective

This paper uses event methodology to examine the impact of common stock repurchases on the repurchasing firm's common stock returns, including examination of various subsamples to test the effects of size and purpose of repurchase. Although the market reacts positively to general repurchase announcements, it reacts negatively to those repurchases used to fend off takeover attempts and does not react at all to stock repurchases for employee stock option plan (ESOP) purposes.     

The Relative Signalling Power of Dutch-Auction and Fixed-Price Self-Tender Offers and Open-Market Share Repurchases

We compare three forms of common stock repurchases. Dutch-auction self-tender offers and open-market share repurchase programs are weaker signals of stock undervaluation than fixed-price self-tender offers. The price increase from buyback announcements is greater when insider wealth is at risk, greater following negative net-of-market stock returns, and unrelated to prior market returns. Buyback announcement returns are also increasing in the fraction of shares sought, which is consistent with both signalling and an upward-sloping supply curve for stock.     

A MICROSTRUCTURE ANALYSIS OF THE LIQUIDITY IMPACT OF OPEN MARKET REPURCHASES

We examine the liquidity impact of Canadian open market repurchases and find that spreads are smaller and depths greater during repurchase programs (as compared to the prerepurchase period) and on repurchase days (as compared to nonrepurchase days). We examine the types of orders used by repurchasing companies and find that all repurchase orders are limit orders and more than 70% of these unambiguously add liquidity to the limit order book. The improved liquidity is consistent with U.S. research but different from results from other markets. We attribute the difference to an uptick restriction that limits the aggressiveness of North American repurchases.     

Availability,recency, and sophistication in the repurchasing behavior of retail investors

When determining a stock to buy, Strahilevitz et al. (2011) demonstrate that individual investors often repurchase a stock previously traded for a profit as a learning process. When evaluating a decision, people use the most available information that comes to mind. We posit that the most recently sold stocks are the most salient. Our analysis reveals that the presence of another more recently sold stock decreases a household’s propensity to repurchase a different stock by 23%. This recency effect dominates the impact of prior profitability on the repurchasing decision. The repurchase activity of investors appears to be sub-optimal, partially due to commission costs and under-diversification of portfolios, which is magnified for households repurchasing at higher frequencies. More sophisticated investors demonstrate less of this behavior.     

Stock Repurchase and Agency Problems: New Evidence in Taiwan's Stock Market

This paper explores stock repurchase and agency issues in an emerging market with special regulations. Using match samples, agency-related variables are investigated for pre- and postannouncement periods. Our empirical evidence demonstrates that stock repurchase is related to agency cost mitigation. Agency problems are also significantly related to the preannouncement undervaluation of stock repurchase, after controlling for the effects of growth opportunity and asymmetric information. Finally, a company with a higher ratio of expected repurchase or higher agency costs normally enjoys better market response upon announcement.