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次贷危机爆发以来,公司高管的巨额薪酬成为众矢之的。随着我国机构投资者的迅速崛起,市场对机构投资者改进上市公司治理寄予了厚望。我国的机构投资者能否对上市公司高管的薪酬激励和股权激励产生积极影响是本文关注的重点。本文选取2004~2008年度的上市公司作为样本,运用线性概率模型、Probit、Logit、Tobit以及OLS等回归方法对机构持股和上市公司高管薪酬激励,特别是股权激励的关系进行实证检验。实证结果表明中国的机构投资者并未有效限制高管股权激励和固定薪酬的增长,对于薪酬设计的改善作用也有待加强,机构股东积极主义在中国还有待加强。 相似文献
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近几年,IPO抑价受到了越来越多的学者的关注,它与证券市场的长期健康稳定发展密不可分。本文选取2010—2012年中国A股首次公开募股的上市公司为样本,采用最小二乘法进行回归分析,实证分析高管薪酬与IPO抑价之间的关系。分析结果表明,货币薪酬与IPO抑价之间不存在相关性,但管理者持股比例和股权激励比例则与IPO抑价之间呈现负相关的关系,上市公司管理者持股比例和股权激励比例越高,上市公司IPO首日价格变化越小。通过本文对高管薪酬与IPO抑价的研究,为我国上市公司优化高管薪酬体系设计具有重要的启示和意义。 相似文献
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管理层薪酬和持股激励效应的行业性差异分析--来自我国上市公司的实证证据 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
李玲 《中央财经大学学报》2006,(4):81-86
本文的研究以我国上市公司不同行业的实际数据为考察样本,运用实证分析方法验证我国上市公司不同类型行业管理层薪酬和持股与公司绩效之间的相关关系,分析结果表明:我国上市公司管理层薪酬和持股激励效应存在着较大的行业性差异,并提出不同行业企业应该根据自身特点和性质以及管理层薪酬和持股激励效应的大小,相机选择薪酬激励或股权激励,制定出详细周密、客观有效、切合实际的企业管理层激励方案,从而使其激励效应最大化。 相似文献
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周静 《江西金融职工大学学报》2008,(3):55-57
已有研究对有效的管理层激励有助于企业价值创造的基本结论能够达成共识,但对不同的激励方式所能产生的激励效果却结论不一。为克服采用单一财务指标度量企业价值造成的片面性缺点,采用修正后的托宾Q值作为衡量企业价值的指标,以2006年沪、深两市所有上市公司为研究对象,考察了薪酬激励和股权激励两种管理层激励方式对企业价值创造的贡献。结果表明管理层薪酬激励方式对提升企业价值能够起到明显的促进作用,而管理层持股无益于公司市场价值的增加。这意味着我国上市公司当前的股权激励机制主要依靠提高管理层的薪酬而得以实现,而管理层持股应继续得到监管政策的支持。 相似文献
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近年来我国上市公司高管薪酬增长迅速,其“天价薪酬”的合理性和透明性日益遭到中小股民及老百姓的质疑.同时随着股权分置改革的完成,如何规范实施高管薪酬成为我国上市公司需要解决的重要现实问题,固此.对高管薪酬进行实证分析和研究具有重要的现实意义。本文以2010年云南省在沪深两市的上市公司为样本数据,对上市公司高管薪酬进行了实证研究分析。结果发观、高管平均工资收入和高管薪酬差距与公司业绩存在正相关关系.独立董事平均薪酬以反高管持股比例与公司业绩不存在相关关系。 相似文献
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本文选取沪A股山东省33家上市公司作为主要研究对象,对公司高管薪酬、高管持股比率和国家(国家法人)持股的整体情况进行了分析,分别从高管薪酬、薪酬差距和高管持股的角度研究了这些因素与企业绩效的相关性,考察了企业规模与高管薪酬以及平均薪酬的相关性.在目前的薪酬体系下,山东省上市公司高管薪酬逐年增长.整体看来,这些公司中国家... 相似文献
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管理层激励与公司价值的实证研究 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
本文选取了沪深股市上市公司2006-2009年的非平衡面板数据,实证研究了薪酬激励与股权激励对公司价值的影响,实证结果表明:在一定的置信水平下,公司价值与薪酬激励呈显著正相关的关系,薪酬激励对企业价值的提升能够起到明显的促进作用.公司价值与股权激励也呈显著正相关的关系,这说明股权激励也能明显的促进企业价值的提升.本文说明了我国上市公司中对管理层实施股权激励和薪酬激励的有效性与必要性 相似文献
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金融机构高管薪酬激励通常被看成是公司制度的核心,因为与一般员工相比,高管人员的努力更难观察,而高管的道德风险对企业带来的危害也更大。当前金融机构高管的薪酬水平,不仅远远超出了社会平均收入水平,并且与员工的薪酬差距较大。应通过法规约束金融机构高管的薪酬水平并加强监管,应发挥国有股控股股东和股权董事的作用,审慎推进股权激励计划,厘清金融高管职务消费,细化信息披露制度,增强薪酬披露的完整性和透明度。 相似文献
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企业集团财务管控与上市公司现金持有水平研究 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
与现有基于上市公司单个企业的研究不同,本文以股改后2006—2009年沪深股市3958个A股上市公司为样本,考察了企业集团财务管控对上市公司现金持有水平的影响。实证发现集团控股上市公司现金持有水平较高,国有集团控股的更高。集团财务管控方式显著影响上市公司现金持有水平,集团选派CFO使之显著降低,拥有财务公司的集团选派CFO使之降幅更大,高达30%。财务公司对现金持有水平影响不显著,但按CFO选派、ERP、产权性质分组后发现,当集团选派CFO或上市公司有ERP财务系统或民营控股时,财务公司显著降低上市公司现金持有水平。上市公司ERP财务信息系统能够提升公司现金管理水平,提高其现金持有水平,而集团选派的CFO可能会通过财务公司和ERP配置现金,降低其控股上市公司现金持有水平。 相似文献
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虽然这些1.0版上市公司大多因中国资本市场特殊的制度红利而难以退市,但经过20年的荡涤只留下了两条继续前行的道路,一条路是不断地更换大股东直至寻找到适合的发展方向,另一条路是坚持自我发展,努力跟上时代的发展和市场的变迁。前者的著名代表为几经换手的延中实业(现方正科技),后者的著名代表则毫无疑问非深发展和万科莫属。前事不忘后事之师。在2010年全年新增347家上市公司的背景下,回溯1.0版上市公司艰难腾挪与凤凰涅磐之路,对于那些密如江中之鲫的拟上市公司而言,无疑是一个并不过时的长鸣警钟。 相似文献
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《China Journal of Accounting Research》2021,14(3):257-274
This paper examines the effects of CFO narcissism on audit fees in China. Using the size of CFO signatures in annual audit reports to measure individual narcissism, we find that CFO narcissism is associated with higher audit fees. We find empirical evidence that CFO narcissism significantly increases the audit fees of listed companies, and this effect is stronger in state-owned enterprises. This paper also explores the mediating effects of financial information and the engagement of prestigious Big-4 and Big-10 firms. The results show that companies with narcissistic CFOs have lower quality financial information and prefer more prestigious firms, which leads to higher audit fees. This research highlights the importance of CFO narcissism in corporate performance and provides new evidence that will be useful for listed companies that plan to hire senior executives. 相似文献
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Ariela Caglio Andrea Dossi Wim A. Van der Stede 《Journal of Accounting and Public Policy》2018,37(4):265-281
Given concerns over CFO pay, especially incentives, and considering the tension between a CFO’s fiduciary responsibility and being a key member of the firm’s executive team, we examine the determinants and effects of CFO compensation amount, incentive intensity, and proximity to CEO compensation in a sample of European companies (FTE 500, 2005–2009). First, we focus on the CFO role as a determinant of CFO compensation. Like prior work, we proxy for CFO roles by using hand-collected public data on education and past professional experience, but we supplement these proxies with proprietary data to more directly capture the firm-specific nature of the CFO job in term of its similarity with that of the CEO. We thus argue how CFOs can have varied roles characterized by different levels of financial expertise and CEO-likeness, and document that it is this latter aspect that is associated with CFO compensation. Second, we study the effects of CFO compensation design on outcomes in the CFO’s realm related to financial reporting. We find that CFO financial expertise is positively associated with financial reporting quality, while a CFO’s pay long-term incentive intensity and a CFO’s incentive compensation proximity with the CEO are negatively associated with financial reporting quality. Overall, then, our results suggest that CFOs get rewarded for their CEO-likeness, and particularly for their being similar to the CEO in terms of tasks and decision making authority. But it is their financial expertise that is positively related to financial reporting quality. At the same time, using compensation that is more incentive intensive and more similar to that of the CEO appears to be potentially detrimental to the quality of financial reporting. These results are relevant for boards involved in selecting highly expert CFOs, and their compensation committees charged with defining subsequently effective incentive compensation plans for those CFOs. 相似文献
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Operating cash flow (CFO) asymmetric timeliness occurs when CFO reflects bad news more quickly than good news. We examine the presence and determinants of CFO asymmetric timeliness in Australia, where substantial differences in reporting requirements of cash flow components, in characteristics of listed companies and in the degree of conservative financial reporting produce contrasting findings to those in the United States. We find supportive evidence for the novel ‘sticky cost behaviour’ explanation and also the product-pricing strategy, but not the life cycle hypothesis. These findings are useful for investors and analysts concerned with forecasting the future values of companies. 相似文献
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Mohammad Badrul Muttakin Arifur Khan George Tanewski 《Journal of Contemporary Accounting and Economics》2019,15(3):100165
We examine the influence of chief financial officer (CFO) tenure and CFO board membership on accounting conservatism among Australian listed companies. The study uses market-based (i.e., timeliness of earnings to news) and accounting-based (i.e., accrual-based loss recognition) measures of conservative accounting. The results show that while longer CFO tenure and CFO board membership increases accounting conservativism, this is not the case when CFOs become entrenched through long board-membership tenure. This entrenchment appears to lead to the use of aggressive accounting practices. Overall, the results indicate that CFO tenure and CFO board membership improve financial-reporting quality by increasing accounting conservatism in organizations, providing evidence of the importance of recognizing these two governance characteristics in policymaking and in regulation. 相似文献
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基于高层梯队理论和社会网络理论,以2008-2015年我国A股上市公司为样本,实证考察CFO背景特征对公司内部控制质量的影响。研究发现:CFO的年龄越大、任期越长,内部控制质量越低;CFO的学历越高,内部控制质量越高;女性CFO较男性CFO在内部控制建设方面存在相对劣势;CFO外部兼职有助于提升内部控制质量。进一步研究发现:在国有企业和非国有企业中,CFO背景特征对内部控制质量的影响存在显著的差异。 相似文献
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We analyze 228 executive compensation contracts voluntarily disclosed by Chinese listed firms and find that central-government-controlled companies disclose more information in executive compensation contracts than local-government-controlled and non-government-controlled companies. Cash-based payments are the main form of executive compensation, whereas equity-based payments are seldom used by Chinese listed companies. On average, there are no significant differences in the value of basic salaries and performance-based compensation in executive compensation contracts. But, compared with their counterparts in non-government-controlled companies, executives in government-controlled companies are given more incentive compensation. Accounting earnings are typically used in executive compensation contracts, with few firms using stock returns to evaluate their executives. However, the use of non-financial measures has increased significantly since 2007. 相似文献