审计意见和年报披露会影响盈余质量吗?

本文使用沪深两市A股上市公司的面板数据,分析了审计意见和年报披露及时性与盈余质量的关系,认为二者与盈余质量之间存在显著的相关性:首先,年度财务报告被出具非标类型审计意见的上市公司,盈余质量较低;其次,年报披露越及时的公司,盈余质量越高。另外我们的研究结果还表明年报被出具非标审计意见的公司,会更晚披露财务报告,验证了变更年报预约披露日期(延迟披露)的公司则更容易被出具非标审计意见。     

中美上市公司年度报告披露准则比较研究

本文旨在比较分析中美上市公司年度报告披露准则，为我国修订年报准则提出建议。本文首先比较分析了中美年报准则要求披露的项目内容及其特点，在此基础上，结合我／国年报披露中存在的问题，建议在修订年报准则时借鉴美国制订年报准则的经验，并提出了几点具体改进措施。     

如何读上市公司年报

年报是上市公司信息披露的核心,也是了解上市公司基本面的最重要资料,它对所有投资者都是公开的,阅读和分析年报是投资的一项基本功.目前,沪深两地上市公司已达1600多家,年报披露由于及时性要求集中在一个较短的时间内公布,大量年报的"文山字海"令部分投资者无暇应付,对年报的阅读只是走马观花,一晃而过.此种阅读方式往往使投资者无法从年报中获取有价值的信息.那么应如何抓住年报的要点,有效地阅读上市公司年报呢?     

新疆上市公司会计信息披露的及时性分析

本文根据新疆2005-2007年的年报披露时滞和相关财务指标的数据分析发现:公司规模与年报时滞正相关,每股收益与年报时滞负相关,标准审计意见的年报披露更为及时.这个发现提示我们应对信息披露及时性不同的上市公司进行分类管理,以有效地选取重点监管对象,促进上市公司会计信息披露质量的提高.     

浅析我国上市公司年报披露及时性及相关建议

随着投资风险加剧,投资者越来越重视信息披露的及时性。本文以年报披露时滞作为年报披露及时性的度量,对2009-2011三年间沪深两市3541家A股上市公司年报披露及时性状况进行分析,发现我国上市公司年报披露存在"前松后紧""赶末班车"的滞后现象,并针对这一现象提出提高年报披露及时性的相关建议。     

年报风险信息披露与银行贷款利率

既有文献较少从银行视角关注年报风险信息披露的经济后果。银行更有能力解读年度风险信息,银行利益也更直接受到年报风险信息的影响,银行贷款利率更能体现年报风险信息披露的经济后果。本文基于2008-2017年单笔银行贷款利率数据的研究发现:总体上我国年报风险信息披露降低了银行贷款利率,说明我国年报风险信息披露更符合趋同观假说。中介效应检验发现:我国年报风险信息披露通过提高信息透明度,降低银行风险感知水平进而降低了银行贷款利率,即信息质量和风险是我国年报风险信息披露影响银行贷款利率的不完全中介。进一步分析发现:我国年报风险信息披露与银行贷款利率的负相关关系主要体现在货币政策紧缩组、非国有企业组以及公司治理水平较高组。本文首次研究银行贷款利率与年报风险信息披露的关系,有助于丰富风险信息披露文献和银行贷款文献。     

机构投资者与上市公司年报披露及时性的实证研究

我们运用Logit模型检验机构投资者持股量与上市公司年报披露时间差异之间的关系时发现,机构投资者促进了上市公司年报的及时披露。但是,机构投资者在促进上市公司年报及时披露的程度与整个证券市场环境相关。在证券市场整体牛市时,机构投资者似乎对上市公司年报披露是否提前并不产生影响,但是当股票市场整体处于熊市时,机构投资者对会计信息的需求愿望比较强烈,机构投资者持股量与上市公司提前披露年报显著正相关。这说明了机构投资者只是会计信息的外部使用者之一,机构投资者促进了上市公司年报及时披露,机构投资者没有降低信息披露的质量。     

会计信息披露时机与内幕交易——基于年报首季报披露时差与异常超额交易量的实证研究

考虑到资金成本、市场的系统性风险和被监管的可能性,内幕交易者最可能利用两个相隔时间很短的定期报告进行内幕交易。因为这种交易模式最隐蔽,最安全。同时,因承担了高成本和高风险,内幕交易需要巨额的交易量才能获得超额收益。本文正是利用内幕交易的这些特征,找到了极好的研究样本（年报亏损下年首季报盈利且年报首季报先后公布的样本）和控制样本（年报亏损下年首季报盈利但年报首季报同时披露的样本或者年报亏损下年首季报仍然亏损且年报首季报先后公布的样本）,通过异常的超额交易量验证了内幕交易的存在。本文研究表明,在信息披露监管政策中,不仅要考虑信息披露的及时性和充分性,还应考虑信息披露过程是否为内幕交易提供了可乘之机。     

散户如何布局年报概念行情

沪深交易所已经公布上市公司2010年年报预约披露时间表。从时间安排上看:2011年1月19日开始公布第一份年报,截止时间是4月30日。从预约时间安排上看,深市中小板上市公司精华制药及沪市公司林海股份将于2011年1月19日率先披露年报,成为两市首批公布年报的公司。深市主板最先披露半年报的公司为华茂股份,预约时间为1月20日。创业板     

关于上市公司信息披露及时性的初探——以金融类上市机构为例

会计信息披露的及时性是上市公司信息质量的重要特征之一。其研究分为三个部分。首先,理论分析。信息披露的及时性对投资者和证券市场都有较大影响。其次,实证分析。通过对我国金融类上市公司信息披露及时性的现状实证分析,得出结论:年报披露时滞引起的反常收益差异显著。年报披露越及时,年报具有的信息含量越大,市场的反应也越大。及时性具有信息含量。最后,政策建议,针对信息披露的制度设计、渠道以及监管,提出了相应的政策建议。     

CFO驭变

从低调潜行到"首席忽悠",2012,看知名CFO如何演绎变"化"财道。天下武功,无坚不破,唯快不破。对公司理财而言,为企业创造价值,已成CFO共识,但在瞬息万变的商业环境中,唯有拥有应对变化的快速反映能力,才能真正赢。任何武功,都有自己的不足,防守的再好,也有破解方法,只要意识、攻、守、应机变化等速度远远高于对方,势必游刃有余。公司理财也是如此,现实工作中面临的种种困惑不仅仅要求CFO"武功"高强,要想轻松驾驭变"化",必须具有快速化解困惑的能力,才能发挥"武功"的威力。     

Management of operating cash flows before and after the scandals in the early 2000s: An examination of meeting or beating analyst cash flow forecasts*

We examine whether the stock market premium assigned to meeting or beating analyst estimates of cash flows from operations (hereafter, “CFO”) has changed after the publicized accounting scandals in the early 2000 s (“post-scandals period”). We also examine whether firms’ CFO management behavior associated with meeting or beating analyst CFO forecasts has changed after the scandals. We find that the market reward for firms that meet or just beat analyst CFO forecasts (“small beaters”) has increased in the post-scandals period, especially when the accuracy of CFO forecasts is relatively high. We also find that the extent of CFO management engaged in by small beaters has increased after the accounting scandals and that these firms appear to resort to the timing of CFO. Further, we find evidence that the “underpricing” of CFO is weaker in the post-scandals period that exhibits a greater extent of CFO management than before, suggesting that the reduction in the underpricing of CFO in the post-scandals period is at least partially due to CFO management. Overall, our findings suggest that firms responded to the rising importance of cash flow information after a series of accounting scandals by inflating reported CFO to a larger extent than they did before.     

The quality of street cash flow from operations

We provide empirical evidence on the quality of street cash flow from operations (CFO) as an alternative financial performance summary measure. We focus our investigation on the quality of the items analysts exclude in their determination of street CFO. Based on a sample of 8,518 firm-year observations over the 1993–2008 period, we find that the street CFO number is generally higher than the GAAP CFO number, indicating that analysts typically make CFO-increasing exclusions. Our inspection of hand-collected analyst reports reveals that, while some analysts make sophisticated exclusions of transitory cash items, many others ignore working capital and other accruals when adjusting forecasted earnings to arrive at their street CFO forecasts. We find that street CFO exclusions are negatively associated with future operating earnings, suggesting that these exclusions are not fully transitory or unimportant in forecasting future performance. Our results also indicate that street CFO exclusions are less transitory than the implicit accrual component of analysts’ street earnings exclusions. These results suggest that the average quality of analysts’ street CFO exclusions is quite low and that it is even lower than the quality of their implied accrual exclusions. Moreover, we find that investors perceive analysts’ CFO exclusions to be of such low quality to render street CFO measures less informative than GAAP CFO figures. Finally, we find that analyst conflicts of interest and (to some extent) the greater inherent volatility of firms’ CFO series contribute to the low-quality nature of analysts’ street CFO exclusions.     

The real effects of disclosure regulation: Evidence from mandatory CFO compensation disclosure

The 2006 SEC rule, by changing the definition of Named Executive Officers, mandates CFO compensation disclosure. Using this setting and a difference-in-differences research design, we study the real effects of CFO compensation disclosure regulation on CFO job performance. We hypothesize that the disclosure of CFO compensation information, by facilitating shareholder monitoring of the board in providing appropriate incentives to CFOs, leads to better CFO job performance in providing high-quality financial reports. The analyses support our prediction: the treatment firms, which start disclosing CFO compensation information under the 2006 rule, compared to the control firms, which already disclose CFO compensation before 2006, experience an improvement in CFO performance, as exhibited in decreases in accounting misstatements and unexplained audit fees. The results are more pronounced for firms with concentrated ownership, smaller compensation committees, and CFOs subject to weaker monitoring by audit committees. Overall, we provide evidence of a real effect resulting from mandatory CFO compensation disclosure.     

CFO role and CFO compensation: An empirical analysis of their implications

Given concerns over CFO pay, especially incentives, and considering the tension between a CFO’s fiduciary responsibility and being a key member of the firm’s executive team, we examine the determinants and effects of CFO compensation amount, incentive intensity, and proximity to CEO compensation in a sample of European companies (FTE 500, 2005–2009). First, we focus on the CFO role as a determinant of CFO compensation. Like prior work, we proxy for CFO roles by using hand-collected public data on education and past professional experience, but we supplement these proxies with proprietary data to more directly capture the firm-specific nature of the CFO job in term of its similarity with that of the CEO. We thus argue how CFOs can have varied roles characterized by different levels of financial expertise and CEO-likeness, and document that it is this latter aspect that is associated with CFO compensation. Second, we study the effects of CFO compensation design on outcomes in the CFO’s realm related to financial reporting. We find that CFO financial expertise is positively associated with financial reporting quality, while a CFO’s pay long-term incentive intensity and a CFO’s incentive compensation proximity with the CEO are negatively associated with financial reporting quality. Overall, then, our results suggest that CFOs get rewarded for their CEO-likeness, and particularly for their being similar to the CEO in terms of tasks and decision making authority. But it is their financial expertise that is positively related to financial reporting quality. At the same time, using compensation that is more incentive intensive and more similar to that of the CEO appears to be potentially detrimental to the quality of financial reporting. These results are relevant for boards involved in selecting highly expert CFOs, and their compensation committees charged with defining subsequently effective incentive compensation plans for those CFOs.     

CFO Narcissism and Financial Reporting Quality

We investigate the effect of CFO narcissism, as measured by signature size, on financial reporting quality. Experimentally, we validate that narcissism predicts misreporting behavior, and that signature size predicts misreporting through its association with narcissism. Empirically, we examine notarized CFO signatures and find CFO narcissism is associated with more earnings management, less timely loss recognition, weaker internal control quality, and a higher probability of restatements. The results are consistent for within‐firm comparisons focusing on CFO changes and are robust to controlling for CFO overconfidence and CEO narcissism. The results highlight the importance of CFO characteristics in the domain of financial reporting decisions.     

CFO tenure,CFO board membership and accounting conservatism

We examine the influence of chief financial officer (CFO) tenure and CFO board membership on accounting conservatism among Australian listed companies. The study uses market-based (i.e., timeliness of earnings to news) and accounting-based (i.e., accrual-based loss recognition) measures of conservative accounting. The results show that while longer CFO tenure and CFO board membership increases accounting conservativism, this is not the case when CFOs become entrenched through long board-membership tenure. This entrenchment appears to lead to the use of aggressive accounting practices. Overall, the results indicate that CFO tenure and CFO board membership improve financial-reporting quality by increasing accounting conservatism in organizations, providing evidence of the importance of recognizing these two governance characteristics in policymaking and in regulation.     

Executive Turnover,Gender, And Earnings Management: An Exploratory Analysis

This paper examines the relationship between the Chief Financial Officer (CFO) turnover and earnings management. Based on cross‐sectional panel regressions on a three‐year sample of the Standard & Poor's (S&P) 1500 firms, the following findings are reported: (1) CFO turnover is accompanied by income‐decreasing earnings management; (2) discretionary accruals tend to become more negative when a male CFO is replaced by a female; (3) earnings management increases income if the outgoing CFO is a female and the incoming is a male and in the case of male–male CFO changes. Overall, these results indicate that the firms who hire a female CFO after a male tend to shift toward more conservative financial reporting practices.     

新浪的资本连环套

过去的一年中,新浪一系列令人眼花缭乱的资本运作赚足了业界的眼球。继推出＂毒丸＂计划成功阻击盛大袭击之后,在资本市场上沉寂了三年多的新浪终于再次出手。2008年12月22日新浪宣布,将合并分众旗下的户外数字广告业务,包括楼宇电视、框架广告以及卖场广告等业务相关的资产。而分众传媒将保留其互联网广告业务、影院广告业务以及传统户外广告牌业务。     

我国总会计师制度建设若干问题研究——基于相关政策与法规之间冲突性与不完善性的思考

总会计师制度是我国总会计师事业建立和发展的保障,但是长期以来总会计师制度在执行过程中存在"称谓不统一、职能不明确、权限不清晰、职责不到位、地位不靠前"等诸多问题。本文从现行总会计师政策与法规的冲突性、不完善性以及部分调查数据的角度分析总会计师制度在建设过程中存在的问题和原因,并针对这些问题提出了相应的政策建议。