浅谈利益相关者理论与国有商业银行的治理缺陷

“股东至上理论”和“利益相关者理论”是公司治理的两种基本理论,本文首先阐述了利益相关者参与商业银行治理的理论逻辑和现实必要性,并对股东至上逻辑下的国有银行治理存在的诸多缺陷进行剖析,据此初步提出对利益相关者进行治理的对策和建议。     

谈利益相关者理论及其时代意义

随着我国对国有企业以及私营企业现代化企业制度改革的不断深化,取得显著成效的同时,矛盾和弊端也日益凸现,"股东至上"的管理模式在公司治理机制中的缺陷和不足。而利益相关者理论的提出和基于利益相关者理论的公司治理的应用,为理论界研究和企业实际管理提供了宝贵的依据和改进方法。本文将就利益相关者理论在新时代背景下的意义,利益相关者理论的必然发展要求以及该理论尚存在的疑点做一简单的阐述与探讨。     

企业社会责任与财务管理变革——基于利益相关者理论的研究

面对全球性企业社会责任运动的强烈挑战,企业财务管理必将发生相应的变革。这不仅是一个现实选择的问题,而且是一个理论上有待研究并给予明确回答的问题。本文着重运用利益相关者理论,对这一问题进行了探讨,认为企业承担社会责任不是一种简单的利他主义,而是一种既利己也利他的最优抉择;企业财务管理变革必须在财务目标、财务治理、财务政策和财务评价等方面突破"股东至上"逻辑,建立起"利益相关者合作"财务管理模式。     

对利益相关者理论的再认识

利益相关者理论（Stakeholde Theary）产生于20世纪60年代，是在对以股东利益最大化为目标的“股东至上”公司治理实践的质疑中逐步发展起来的。现阶段，一种认为股东是企业所有者，股东享有企业剩余索取权与剩余控制权（Grossman ＆ Hart，1986；Hart ＆ Moore，1990），即股东中心理论（Stakeholde primacy Theary）；一种认为企业是利益相关者的企业，包括股东在内的所有利益相关者都应拥有企业所有权（Freeman，1984；Blaire，1995），即利益相关者理论。     

公司治理:股东至上还是利益相关者至上?

“股东至上”和“利益相关者至上”是两种争议的代表性治理观点。“股东至上”治理主义以股东价值最大化为公司治理目标,以“资本雇用劳动”、代理理论为理论基础,以股东单边治理为主。而“利益相关者至上”治理主义以利益相关者利益最大化为公司治理目标,以利益相关者理论为基础,倡导利益相关者共同治理。本文从企业所有权、理论基础、会计上从利润的计算和分配过程、利益获得的确定性和公司运营等五个方面剖析了两种治理观点之间的关系,说明这两种观点其实并不冲突,是相容的。上市公司的治理目标应该是满足其他利益相关者利益基础上的股东财富最大化。     

论企业财权配置——基于公司治理理论发展视角

传统的公司治理的委托代理理论框架下的“股东主权”治理论认为物质资本投入者应独享企业剩余索取权与剩余控制权, 关注的是股东利益保护。在该理论影响下, 公司财务治理也主要关注的是股东和经营者的企业内部财权配置, 以解决委托人如何选择或设计最优合同来克服代理问题。本文认为随着公司治理理论由委托代理理论向利益相关者共同治理理论的发展, 现代企业的每一个利益相关者都应有平等机会享有企业剩余索取权和剩余控制权, 企业的财权配置不仅仅是股东和经营者的企业内部财权配置, 而应扩展到包括外部利益相关者在内的外部财权配置, 以及为保证利益相关者财权配置实现的相机治理机制。     

利益相关者价值与企业业绩的相关性研究——基于我国上市公司数据的实证研究

<正>一、引言产生于20世纪60年代的利益相关者理论,是对以股东价值最大化为目标的传统公司治理理论的颠覆。近年来,越来越多的学者对利益相关者理论进行了深入的研究,利益相关者治理理念日益普及,公司治理的目标逐渐转向利益相关者财富最大化,利益相关者理论开始成为公司治理的主流理论。然而对于利益相关者理论实际应用情况的研究并不多见。利益相关者理念在实际是否被真正地应用于公司的治理之中,公司经营的成果是否与利益相关者价值相关,是股东价值还是利益相关者价值影响企业的业绩?这些问题的解决有助于进一步指导利益相关者理论的完善。因此,我们研究利益相关者理论在实际公司治理的情况,为利益相关者理论研究提供实际经验,对利益相关者理论的进一步完善具有十分重要的意义。     

浅谈利益相关者理论对我国公司治理的影响

随着传统的“股东至上”理论的内在缺陷越来越突出以及人力资本作用的加强,利益相关者理论越来越受到现代公司治理模式的青睐.本文在探析利益相关者理论的内涵及其对公司治理的影响,提出了完善我国公司治理结构的对策建议.     

“利益相关者”理论与“受托人模式”的公司治理

“股东至上”理论与“委托人模式”公司治理的治理主体是股东,而“利益相关者”理论与“受托人模式”公司治理的治理主体则多元化;包括公司股东、管理层、员工、债权人、供应商及当地社区等。本文从“利益相关者”理论的基本原理出发,通过对股份公司控制权争夺机制的初步分析,推定“受托人模式”公司治理结构的合理性。     

会计目标定位的再思考——基于利益相关者理论

根据利益相关者理论,企业是利益相关者组成的企业,各个利益相关者向企业投入一定的专用性投资,就必定要分享相应的经营成果,这里的利益相关者不仅包括股东、债权人,还包括供应商、职工、政府等,企业只有充分关注相关者的利益要求,才能持续地发展。然而,现行的会计目标"受托责任观"和"决策有用观"均侧重于向股东提供会计信息,忽略了其他利益相关者对信息的需求。本文认为,基于利益相关者理论的考虑,企业的会计目标应定位于为各利益相关者提供信息。由此,本文对会计目标进行重新定位,提出了利益相关者"权益保护观"。     

THE SHAREHOLDER WEALTH EFFECTS OF CALPERS' FOCUS LIST

Shareholder activism can help to protect shareholder value by promoting sound corporate governance practices. As an active institutional investor, CalPERS takes its role in the corporate governance process very seriously. In addition to many other initiatives, CalPERS publishes each year a list of six to twelve public companies with poor corporate governance principles and poor financial performance—its well-known "Focus List"—in the hope that the managements of these companies will be motivated to improve their performance and increase shareholder value for CalPERS and their other equity owners.
In an attempt to assess the effectiveness of CalPERS' governance program, the authors examine the market impact of the Focus List and find that companies on the list experience positive excess stock returns of about 12% over the three months following release of the list. Moreover, this wealth effect is even greater for companies with a large, widely dispersed shareholder base, as might be expected given the relative inability of such shareholders to act collectively.     

行业差异、利益相关者治理机制与治理指数分析

有鉴于利益相关者的相关问题已成为现行公司治理框架中不可或缺的一部分,本文设置五个利益相关者治理评价指标,考察中国上市公司利益相关者参与公司治理和利益相关者权益的保护状况,并得出利益相关者治理指数.对上市公司利益相关者治理指数进行的行业分析表明:不同行业的上市公司和样本总体在利益相关者治理机制及其所涉及的五个具体方面均存在重要差异,这说明行业差异可能对上市公司利益相关者治理机制和治理水平存在重要的影响.     

Corporate Culture and the Problem of Executive Compensation

In this commentary on Bebchuk and Fried s Pay Without Performance , the former SEC Chairman begins by declaring, "I have problems with exorbitant executive pay precisely because I care about markets and private enterprise. These huge pay checks… undermine corporate governance and send a signal that boards are willing to spend shareholders' money lavishly and with too little oversight." The author calls for a number of regulatory reforms, including expensing of stock options, broader and more complete disclosure of compensation, greater independence of directors, and empowerment of shareholders. At the same time, he notes that corrective market forces are already at work in the form of companies like Institutional Shareholder Services that monitor corporate governance and decision-making.     

A stakeholder analysis of employee disclosures in annual reports

Little empirical research has identified what drives companies to voluntarily report employee‐related information. Ullmann's three‐dimensional stakeholder theory model is applied as a framework to analyse associations with corporate employee‐related disclosures. Measures are developed to estimate stakeholder power, strategic posture and economic performance associated with employee‐related disclosures. Results indicate that employee‐related disclosures increase with more employee share ownership, employee concentration, the quality of corporate governance, employee recognition in corporate mission statements, adverse publicity about employees and economic performance measured by profit per employee.     

Global Drivers of and Local Resistance to French Shareholder Activism

Shareholder activism in France has made significant advances during the past 25 years even as it continues to face formidable sources of local resistance. But if the list of corporate governance improvements since 1989 described by the authors might lead one to conclude that France now has minority shareholder protection and shareholder activism comparable to those of the U.S. or U.K., powerful local interests, including much of French management, labor, and government, continue to mount effective resistance to such forces for change. The French government still works closely with French business elites and unions to manage both individual companies and the general economy. And government officials continue to speak publicly of “protecting” French firms from “illegitimate” foreign shareholders. Accordingly, the authors characterize French corporate governance as a “hybrid” model of shareholder activism, one that incorporates the perspectives and interests of the classic French stakeholder model as well as an emerging shareholder value movement. Although foreign institutional investors have increased their shareholdings in French companies and promoted “best practice” governance rules, particularly with respect to voting rights, local forces will continue to resist aggressive shareholder activism. Such a hybrid model makes the outcomes of shareholder activism less predictable, a risk that foreign investors and companies often respond to by seeking alliances with local proxy advisers and investor associations to gain “legitimacy.”     

从企业产权制度建设上推进企业治理结构的完善

公司治理结构从某种意义上可以说是公司法人产权制度的组织形式,公司法人产权的有效安排是公司治理结构有效性的基本前提。由于我国的企业改革基本上是沿着各种形式的委托－－代理思路展开的,现代企业制度的一个基本特征,即区别于通常所说的古典企业的突出特点,恰在于产权方面的委托－－代理,因而考察我国现代企业制度建设,把企业法人产权与企业治理结构统一起来加以分析,便有着重要的理论意义和实践价值。     

我国上市公司控制权形态及治理规则多样化研究——以银行类上市公司为视角

主流理论认为,我国上市公司股权结构呈现一股独大特别是国有股一股独大的控制权形态,我国上市公司治理理论研究及规则设计多围绕此种股权结构和控制权形态展开。笔者以我国银行类上市公司为视角进行研究,得出我国上市公司已经不能以一股独大型的控制权形态来概括的结论,相应的,公司治理理论及规则制定也应该围绕多样化的股权结构和控制权形态展开。     

控制权的来源与本质:拓展、融合及深化

针对已有文献的认识不足,文章运用卢克斯的社会学权力分析成果,对控制权的主要来源及其权力本质进行了拓展性分析,形成了一个内含权力、权利与权威的融合性认识。在中国文化传统和控制性股东安排相互作用下,中国上市公司的实际控制权会逐步向企业家个人集中,并形成典型意义上的企业家控制权。这一认识应有助于深刻理解上市公司企业文化、公司治理的型塑过程,打开理论研究中通常被忽视的企业决策"黑箱",丰富现有的财务、会计理论,推动相关研究进入企业家特征与公司财务决策、会计信息质量、内部控制与公司价值等更加微观却更加核心的领域,进而架起企业家研究与财务、会计研究之间非常有趣但至今仍被漠视的理论桥梁。     

Corporate social responsibility and earnings forecasting unbiasedness

We investigate the relationship between corporate social responsibility (CSR) and I/B/E/S analysts’ earnings per share (EPS) forecasts using a large sample of US firms for 1992–2011. Based on literature findings, we decompose the CSR effect into four factors: accounting opacity, corporate governance, stakeholder risk, and overinvestment. We find that all of them significantly affect both the absolute forecast error on EPS and its standard deviation controlling for forecast horizon; number of analysts and forecasts; and year, industry, and broker house effects. Consistently with our ex ante hypotheses, overinvestment, stakeholder risk, and accounting opacity have a positive effect, increasing both dependent variables, while corporate governance quality has a negative effect. A crucial aspect of our findings is that high CSR quality in terms of the four factors (i.e., accounting transparency, high corporate governance quality, stakeholder risk mitigation, and absence of overinvestment) contributes to making earnings forecasts unbiased as unbiasedness is generally met in the subsample of the Top CSR quality companies and markedly violated in the subsample of the Bottom CSR companies. We also document that overinvestment and stakeholder risk are sufficient to produce this effect.     

Dividend Payouts and Corporate Governance Quality: An Empirical Investigation

Motivated by agency theory, we investigate how a firm's overall quality of corporate governance affects its dividend policy. Using a large sample of firms with governance data from The Institutional Shareholder Services, we find that firms with stronger governance exhibit a higher propensity to pay dividends, and, similarly, dividend payers tend to pay larger dividends. The results are consistent with the notion that shareholders of firms with better governance quality are able to force managers to disgorge more cash through dividends, thereby reducing what is left for expropriation by opportunistic managers. We employ the two‐stage least squares approach to cope with possible endogeneity and still obtain consistent results. Our results are important as they show that corporate governance quality does have a palpable impact on critical corporate decisions such as dividend policy.