The mediated effect of SAS No. 99 and Sarbanes–Oxley officer certification on jurors’ evaluation of auditor liability

This study experimentally examines the impact of implementing Statement on Auditing Standard (SAS) No. 99, Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit and the financial statement and internal control certification requirement by key corporate officers under the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX). The study investigates the prediction that the new regulations affect jurors’ assessment of guilt for failing to discover fraud, and also whether the regulations affect jurors’ perceptions of the appropriateness of auditors’ actions regarding fraud detection and of auditors’ and officers’ responsibility for the fraudulent financial statements. The study tests whether these perceptions mediate the association between the regulations and mock jurors’ guilt assessments. Results show that jurors assess auditors as less guilty under SAS No. 99 and in the presence of the officer certification requirement. SAS No. 99 decreases guilt assessments indirectly through jurors’ perception that auditors acted more appropriately under the new standard. Although jurors did view auditors as more responsible under SAS No. 99, their responsibility perceptions had no effect on guilt assessments. An additional finding is that the officer certification requirement has an indirect effect on guilt assessments via jurors’ perceptions of the officers’ responsibility for the fraudulent financial statements.     

基于GONE理论的上市公司财务报告舞弊识别研究

本文基于GONE理论,剖析了财务报告舞弊诱因的影响机理和舞弊行为的决策权衡机理,并选取2006～2009年因财务舞弊受处罚的上市公司为样本,实证分析了贪婪、机会、需要和暴露四因素与财务报告舞弊的关系,结果发现:在控制了一系列因素以后,管理层的风险偏好和剩余索取权引发的个体贪婪程度越高,治理结构不完善制造的舞弊机会越多,增发配股引发的组织需要程度越高,舞弊的可能性越大;审计意见类型和会计师事务所变更代表的发现机制越完善,暴露的可能性越大,舞弊的可能性越小。     

The Market's Valuation of Fraudulently Reported Earnings

This study examines the market valuation of accounting earnings during the period before it is publicly revealed that the earnings are fraudulent. Using both cross‐sectional and time‐series valuation models, we first find that the market accords less weight to earnings when the accounting numbers are fraudulent. We also show that the market better anticipates the presence of fraud when there is information in the public domain indicating a high ex‐ante risk of fraud. Our findings suggest that investors are able to accurately assess the probability of fraud and that such assessments affect the market's valuation of earnings even before it is publicly announced that fraud has occurred.     

The Dempster‐Shafer Theory: An Introduction and Fraud Risk Assessment Illustration

This article introduces the Dempster‐Shafer theory (DS theory) of belief functions for managing uncertainties, specifically in the auditing and information systems domains. The use of DS theory is illustrated by deriving a fraud risk assessment formula for a simplified version of a model developed by Srivastava et al. (2007). In this formulation, fraud risk is the normalised product of four risks: risk that management has incentives to commit fraud; risk that management has opportunities to commit fraud; risk that management has an attitude to rationalise committing fraud; and risk that an auditor's special procedures will fail to detect fraud. The article demonstrates how to use such a model to plan for a financial audit where management fraud risk is assessed to be high. In addition, it discusses whether audit planning is better served by an integrated audit/fraud risk assessment as now suggested in SAS 107 (AICPA 2006a, see also ASA 200 in AUASB 2007) or by the approach illustrated here where a parallel, but separate, assessment is made of audit risk and fraud risk.     

上市公司舞弊性财务报告及其防范与监管——基于中国证券监督委员会处罚公告的分析

舞弊性财务报告是全世界经济社会和会计职业界关注的重大问题。我国目前也面临其挑战。本文以中国证券监督委员会2002—2006年处罚公告中涉及的上市公司舞弊性财务报告为依据,对我国上市公司舞弊性财务报告的主要类型、手段等进行了统计分析。分析发现,舞弊公司表外舞弊严重,所占比重大;同时存在多种舞弊类型,典型的是虚假利润表和虚假披露;虚构销售业务、虚增资产、隐瞒对外担保分别成为虚假利润表、虚假资产负债表和虚假披露的最主要舞弊手段;舞弊公司同时采用多种舞弊方法,且舞弊行为持续年限在两年以上,最长的达9年。本文最后提出了相应的防范与监管建议。     

Batten Down The Hatches! U. S. Accounting Scandals and Lessons for Australia

This paper warns the Australian accounting profession about the threat of fallout similar to that experienced in the US following major accounting scandals. This US fallout has included a significant loss of public faith in the accounting profession, reduced autonomy for auditors with the formation of the Public Companies Accounting Oversight Board, and the stringent Sarbanes-Oxley Act. The Australian accounting profession must maintain high-quality auditing and corporate financial reporting or risk greater regulatory intrusions and additional threats to its relatively high levels of autonomy.     

Regulation of accountancy and the power of capital: some observations

In response to Briloff’s study of the regulation of fraudulent financial reporting in the USA, this paper examines the regulation of financial reporting and auditing in the UK. In common with Briloff, it reports that little effective regulatory action is taken against auditing firms implicated in audit failures and/or the publication of “defective" financial statements. Seemingly, as major fraction of international capital, auditing firms have colonised and captured the state to shield themselves from regulatory action.     

基于财务报表审计的会计舞弊揭示机制研究

目前企业会计信息失真主要因会计舞弊引起,CPA能否有效揭示重大会计舞弊已经直接影响到CPA行业的生存价值。中注协因此发布了大量的新准则,试图借鉴国外先进的审计技术,将风险导向审计理念引入到我国的审计实践中来,以提高CPA揭示会计舞弊的能力。但CPA不能有效揭示重大会计舞弊主要的不是技术问题,本文在借鉴国外经验的基础上,分析我国CPA不能有效揭示会计舞弊的原因,提出应将CPA审计和政府审计相结合,共同揭示企业会计舞弊。     

Conservatism,SEC investigation,and fraud

We present evidence on the relationship between firms that have engaged in fraudulent financial reporting and accounting conservatism. We empirically investigate the extent to which US firms identified by the SEC in their Enforcement Releases demonstrate higher levels of conditional conservatism in order to mitigate information asymmetry and agency problems. Specifically, by assessing the timing of changes in the litigation risk environment for fraud firms, we document how differences in heightened legal liability guide changes in conservative accounting behavior. Compared to a matched non-fraud control sample, we document that fraud firms have significantly lower levels of accounting conservatism in the pre-fraud period. Consistent with changes in potential legal liability, we find an increase in accounting conservatism for fraud firms during the SEC investigation period. Subsequently, during the public discovery of fraud, any increases in accounting conservatism are marginal and appear to converge back to lower levels compared to the SEC investigation period. Overall, our findings suggest more temporary changes in conservative reporting in the short-term for fraud firms. We also document that increased levels of accounting conservatism for fraud firms are not due solely to the passage of the SOX Act. Our findings aid in explaining fraud firms’ incentives and opportunities for accounting conservatism and lend support for why standard setters, regulators and auditors should continue to monitor and re-evaluate conservatism’s short-term effects that are conditioned on changes in a firm’s risk environment.     

The impact of SEC investigations and accounting and auditing enforcement releases on firms’ cost of equity capital

I study the impact of an SEC investigation (as captured by accounting and auditing enforcement releases) on a firm’s cost of equity capital. AAERs are often used in accounting literature as a proxy for fraudulent financial reporting. Fraudulent financial reporting should lead to an increase in cost of equity capital as a firm’s future cash flows become less certain. Overall, this study provides evidence of changes in cost of equity capital for firms targeted by an SEC AAER on the date the investigation is first made public.