Crises,contagion and cross-listings

We investigate whether cross-listing shares in the form of depositary receipts in overseas markets benefits investors in emerging market countries during periods of local financial crisis from 1994 to 2002. We regress cumulative abnormal returns for three windows surrounding the crisis events on the cross-listing status while controlling for cross-sectional differences in firm age, trading volume, foreign exposure, disclosure quality and corporate governance. Further, we examine cross-listing effects in countries popularly thought to experience contagious effects of these crises. We find that cross-listed firms react significantly less negatively than non-cross-listed firms, particularly in the aftermath of the crisis. The results on contagious cross-listing effects are however mixed. Our findings are consistent with predictions based on theories of market segmentation as well as differential disclosure/governance between developed and emerging markets. We do not find evidence that foreign investors “panic” during a currency crisis.     

Exchange Rate Exposure at the Firm and Industry Level

Previous work on the exposure of firms to exchange rate risk has primarily focused on U.S. firms and, surprisingly, found stock returns were not significantly affected by exchange‐rate fluctuations. The equity market premium for exposure to currency risk was also found to be insignificant. In this paper we examine the relation between Japanese stock returns and unanticipated exchange‐rate changes for 1,079 firms traded on the Tokyo stock exchange over the 1975–1995 period. Second, we investigate whether exchange‐rate risk is priced in the Japanese equity market using both unconditional and conditional multifactor asset pricing testing procedures. We find a significant relation between contemporaneous stock returns and unanticipated yen fluctuations. The exposure effect on multinationals and high‐exporting firms, however, is found to be greater in comparison to low‐exporting and domestic firms. Lagged‐exchange rate changes on firm value are found to be statistically insignificant implying that investors are able to assess the impact of exchange‐rate changes on firm value with no significant delay. The industry level analysis corroborates the cross‐sectional findings for Japanese firms in that they are sensitive to contemporaneous unexpected exchange‐rate fluctuations. The co‐movement between stock returns and changes in the foreign value of the yen is found to be positively associated with the degree of the firm's foreign economic involvement and inversely related to its size and debt to asset ratio. Asset pricing tests show that currency risk is priced. We find corroborating evidence in support of the view that currency exposure is time varying. Our results indicate that the foreign exchange‐rate risk premium is a significant component of Japanese stock returns. The combined evidence from the currency exposure and asset pricing analyses, suggests that currency risk is priced and, therefoe, has implications for corporate and portfolio managers.     

De facto exchange rate regimes and currency crises: Are pegged regimes with capital account liberalization really more prone to speculative attacks?

This paper empirically examines whether de facto exchange rate regimes affect the occurrence of currency crises in 84 countries over the 1980–2001 period by using the probit model. We employ the de facto classification of Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) that allows us to estimate the impact of relatively long-lived exchange rate regimes on currency crises with much greater precision. We find that pegged regimes significantly decrease the likelihood of currency crises compared with floating regimes. By using the combined data of exchange rate regimes and the existence of capital controls, we also find interesting evidence that pegged regimes with capital account liberalization significantly lower the likelihood of currency crises compared with other regimes. These results are robust to a wide variety of samples and models. From the standpoint of the macroeconomic policy trilemma, we can conjecture that pegged regimes with capital account liberalization are substantially less prone to speculative attacks because they can enhance greater credibility in their currencies by abandoning monetary policy autonomy.     

Foreign Exchange Exposure Elasticity and Financial Distress

Financially distressed firms have limited ability to manage exchange rate exposure over time which could cause their fundamental value to be sensitive to the cash flow volatility related to currency movements. Accordingly, we hypothesize that the likelihood and costs of financial distress help explain cross‐sectional variations in return sensitivity to currency movements. We find that the level of exchange rate exposure elasticity is related to proxies for the likelihood of financial distress, growth opportunities, and product uniqueness. Further, firms with a greater likelihood and higher costs of financial distress exhibit greater abnormal returns in response to large exchange rate shocks.     

Exchange rate regimes,capital controls,and currency crises: Does the bipolar view hold?

This paper empirically examines the link between de facto exchange rate regimes and the incidence of currency crises in 84 countries from 1980 to 2001 using probit models. We employ the de facto classification of Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) that allows us to estimate the impact of relatively long-lived exchange rate regimes on currency crises with much greater precision. We find no evidence that, as the bipolar view argues, intermediate regimes have a significantly higher probability of currency crises than both hard pegs and free floats. Using the combined data of exchange rate regimes and the existence of capital controls, we also find that hard pegs with capital account liberalization have a significantly lower probability of currency crises than intermediate regimes with capital controls and free floats with capital controls. Hence, the bipolar view does not strictly hold in the sense that intermediate regimes are significantly more prone to currency crises than the two extreme regimes. However, the fact that hard pegs with capital account liberalization are substantially less prone to currency crises is worthy of note.     

Day and night returns of Chinese ADRs

Are the returns of Chinese American Depositary Receipts (ADR) more affected by the US market or their underlying home market? We separate Chinese ADR daily returns into day and night returns to investigate the different market effects on ADR pricing. We compare “homeless” ADRs to home-based or cross-listed ADRs to see if they are affected differently by market factors. We find the night returns of Chinese ADRs are significantly affected by their home market (either the Hong Kong market or mainland China market) daily returns and the US market night returns. The US day returns appear to be the most significant pricing factor for the day returns of Chinese ADRs. The homeless ADRs are more affected by the US market and less affected by their home market compared to the cross-listed ADRs.     

Exchange market pressure and absorption by international reserves: Emerging markets and fear of reserve loss during the 2008–2009 crisis

This paper evaluates how the global financial crisis emanating from the U.S. was transmitted to emerging markets. Our focus is on the extent that the crisis caused external market pressures (EMP), and whether the absorption of the shock was mainly through exchange rate depreciation or the loss of international reserves. Controlling for variety of factors associated with EMP, we find clear evidence that emerging markets with higher total foreign liabilities, including short- and long-term debt, equities, FDI and derivative products—had greater exposure and were much more vulnerable to the financial crisis. Countries with large balance sheet exposure – high external portfolio liabilities exceeding international reserves—absorbed the global shock by allowing greater exchange rate depreciation and comparatively less reserve loss. Despite the remarkable buildup of international reserves by emerging markets during the period prior to the financial crisis, countries relied primarily on exchange rate deprecation rather than reserve loss to absorb most of the exchange market pressure shock. This could reflect a deliberate choice (“fear of reserve loss”) or market actions that caused very rapid exchange rate adjustment, especially in emerging markets with open capital markets, overwhelming policy actions.     

Noise traders,exchange rate disconnect puzzle,and the Tobin tax

This paper proposes a framework to explain the “exchange rate disconnect puzzle”. Two types of foreign exchange traders, rational traders and noise traders are introduced into a sticky-price general-equilibrium model. The presence of noise traders creates deviations from the uncovered interest parity. Combined with local currency pricing and consumption-smoothing behavior, our model can help to explain the “disconnect puzzle”. The excess exchange rate volatility caused by noise traders can be reduced by the ‘Tobin tax’. However, the effect of the ‘Tobin tax’ depends on the market structure and the interaction between the Tobin tax and other trading costs.     

Regionality revisited: An examination of the direction of spread of currency crises

What determines the direction of spread of currency crises? We examine data on waves of currency crises in 1992, 1994, 1997, and 1998 to evaluate several hypotheses on the determinants of contagion. We simultaneously consider trade competition, financial links, and institutional similarity to the “ground zero” country as potential drivers of contagion. To overcome data limitations and account for model uncertainty, we utilize Bayesian methodologies hitherto unused in the empirical literature on contagion. In particular, we use the Bayesian averaging of binary models that allows us to take into account the uncertainty regarding the appropriate set of regressors.We find that institutional similarity to the ground zero country plays an important role in determining the direction of contagion in all the emerging market currency crises in our dataset. We thus provide persuasive evidence in favour of the “wake-up call” hypothesis for financial contagion. Trade and financial links may also play a role in determining the direction of contagion, but their importance varies amongst the crisis periods.     

The impact of hedging on the market value of equity

We examine the annual stock performance of firms that disclose the use of derivatives to hedge over the period 1995 to 1999. We find that only 21.6% of publicly traded U.S. corporations in our sample hedged with derivative instruments over this period and their use is concentrated in the larger companies. Similar to other studies we find that when derivatives are used, interest rate and currency securities are used much more frequently than commodity products. Our sample of 1308 companies that hedge outperforms other securities by 4.3% per year on average over our sample period. This result is robust to several alternative methods of estimating abnormal returns. When we segment performance by the type of hedge used, however, we find that the over-performance is due entirely to larger firms that hedge currency. We find no abnormal returns for firms hedging either interest rates or commodities. The abnormal returns in firms hedging currency is robust to alternative models that seek to control for exchange rate fluctuations and global equity returns; however, we find no significant abnormal returns to currency hedgers when using an augmented model that controls for the role of intangible assets.     

The optimal currency basket under vertical trade

This paper explores the theory of optimal currency basket in a small open economy general equilibrium model with sticky prices. In contrast to existing literature, we focus on an economy with vertical trade, where the currencies in the basket may play different roles in invoicing trade flow. In a simple two-currency basket, one currency is used to invoice imported intermediate goods and is called “import currency”, while the other currency is used to invoice exported finished goods and is called “export currency”. We find that the optimal weights of the import currency and the export currency depends critically on the structure of vertical trade. Moreover, if a country decides to choose a single-currency peg, the choice of pegging currency also depends on how other competing economies respond to external exchange rate fluctuations.     

On the determinants of “small” and “large” foreign exchange market interventions: The case of the Japanese interventions in the 1990s

During the past 30 years, central banks have often intervened in foreign exchange markets, and the magnitude of their foreign exchange market interventions has varied widely. We develop a quantitative reaction function model that renders it possible to examine the determinants of “small” and “large” interventions. We apply the model to analyzing the intervention policy of the Japanese monetary authorities (JMA) in the yen/U.S. dollar market during the period from 1991 through 2001. To this end, we use recently released official data on the foreign exchange market interventions of the JMA. We find that the JMA tended to conduct large interventions when the yen/U.S. dollar exchange rate drifted away from an “implicit target exchange rate.”     

Are founding families less willing to bear risk? Evidence from the currency exposure and internationalization strategy of family firms

Although theory predicts that family firms should be less willing to bear risk than nonfamily firms, prior empirical papers have not found support for this prediction. In this paper, we focus on conditional currency risk because founding families can relatively easily influence their firms’ currency exposure. We find that family firms have relatively lower conditional currency exposure. This result holds for both descendant-led and nonfamily-led family firms. Consistent with purposeful actions of founding families, we find that exposure decreases with control-enhancing mechanisms, such as excess voting rights. The findings also support a wealth-preservation motive, evidenced by a finding that exposure declines with the number of family beneficiaries. Additional analysis suggests that family firms achieve the relatively lower risk by reducing internationalization depth and limiting exposure to riskier currencies.     

“Crises” in medical malpractice insurance: Evidence of excessive price-cutting in the preceding soft market

Prior work suggests that heterogeneous information or weak incentives for solvency could have caused some general liability insurers to charge low ex ante prices during the early 1980s and mid-to-late 1990s, putting downward pressure on other firms’ prices and plausibly aggravating subsequent periods of rapid premium growth. We analyse whether the 1994–1999 “soft” market in medical malpractice insurance led some firms to underprice, grow rapidly, and subsequently experience upward revisions in loss forecasts (“loss development”), which could have aggravated subsequent market “crises”. Consistent with the underpricing hypothesis, the results indicate a positive relation between loss development and premium growth among growing firms. Underpricing was likely more prevalent among non-specialist malpractice insurers.     

Firm-level effects of asymmetric intervention in foreign exchange markets: Evidence from the Swiss currency floor

In January 2015, the Swiss National Bank (SNB) abandoned the Swiss franc's exchange rate floor against the Euro. This paper is the first to study the firm-level effects of this asymmetric type of central bank intervention in foreign exchange markets. Using weekly stock returns for a sample of Swiss non-financial firms, I find significant reductions in total stock return volatility as well as market risk following the introduction of the currency floor. Accounting for the asymmetric nature of the intervention, I show that the enforcement of this policy solely manifests in a significant reduction of incremental EUR/CHF exchange rate risk exposures of exporting firms, while importing firms experience reductions in proportion to the market portfolio only. Thus, the asymmetric policy design is reflected in asymmetric responses of firm-level currency exposures. All effects, however, do not depend on the extent of business activity in the Eurozone. The overall results suggest that the currency floor was successful in supporting the performance of the Swiss economy by effectively reducing stock return sensitivities to market fluctuations and EUR/CHF exchange rate volatility.     

Evaluating foreign exchange market intervention: Self-selection,counterfactuals and average treatment effects

Estimating the effect of official foreign exchange market intervention is complicated by the fact that intervention at any point entails a “self-selection” choice made by the authorities and that no counterfactual is observed. To address these issues, we estimate the “counterfactual” exchange rate movement in the absence of intervention by introducing the method of propensity-score matching to estimate the “average treatment effect” (ATE) of intervention. To derive the propensity scores we estimate central bank intervention reaction functions. We estimate the ATE for daily official intervention in Japan over the January 1999–March 2004 period. This sample encompasses a remarkable variation in intervention frequencies as well as unprecedented frequent intervention towards the latter part of the period. We find that only sporadic and relatively infrequent intervention is effective.     

Realizing the volatility impacts of sovereign credit ratings information on equity and currency markets: Evidence from the Asian Financial Crisis

We examine the effects of different types of sovereign rating announcements on realized stock and currency market volatilities and cross-asset correlations around periods of financial crises. Using intraday market data and sovereign ratings data for nine sample countries in the Asia-Pacific region over 1997–2001, we find that currency and stock markets react somewhat heterogeneously to various rating announcements and that stock markets are more responsive to rating news than currency markets. We find new evidence that ratings events have significant and asymmetric impacts on intraday market data and that national market attributes influence rating impacts during financial crises.     

Modeling time variation and asymmetry in foreign exchange exposure

Many recent studies suggest that exchange rate exposure is unstable over time and exhibits asymmetric behavior during currency appreciations and depreciations. This paper proposes a dynamic framework for the study of such questions and our empirical findings show that exchange rate exposure of U.S. stocks is time varying. Using decile and sector portfolios, we find asymmetric exposure to be pervasive across the decile portfolios as well as the financial and industrial sectors. Moreover, the response of return variance to past innovations is asymmetric for the majority of cases. The dynamic exchange rate exposure parameters are found to be mean-reverting with low persistence, generally ranging from 1 to less than 2 days. The average time-varying exposure is statistically significant for the size-based and sector-based portfolios. Lastly, the variability in the time-varying exposure is smaller (larger) for the largest (smallest) firms and for industrial (technology) firms.     

Analyzing determinants of bond yield spreads with Bayesian Model Averaging

This paper analyzes determinants of country default risk in emerging markets, reflected by sovereign yield spreads. The results reported so far in the literature are heterogeneous with respect to significant explanatory variables. This could indicate a high degree of uncertainty about the “true” regression model. We use Bayesian Model Averaging as the model selection method in order to find the variables which are most likely to determine credit risk. We document that total debt, history of recent default, currency depreciation, and growth rate of foreign currency reserves as well as market sentiments are the key drivers of yield spreads.