Did financing constraints cause investment stagnation in Japan after the 1990s?

Has investment by Japanese firms been affected by financing constraints since the collapse of the asset price bubble? This study answers the question while improving on the weaknesses of the models used in previous studies. It employs panel data for Japanese listed firms in four R&D-intensive industries. We divide our sample by firm size and examine three periods with different economic environments: the first half of the “two lost decades” from 1991 to 2000, the second half of the ‘two lost decades’ from 2001 to 2009, and the period following the ‘two lost decades’ from 2010 to 2016. We construct new investment functions based on the Euler equation by considering both physical and R&D investment factors to remove estimator bias, thus enabling us to determine whether firms face financing constraints accurately. The estimation results indicate that there were financing constraints on both R&D and physical investments by large listed firms from 1991 to 2000 and from 2010 to 2016. Conversely, the weak growth of both R&D and physical investments by small listed firms from 2010 to 2016 was not attributed to financing constraints but the lack of productive investment opportunities. Different policy measures are needed depending on whether the investment is stagnant due to financing constraints or the lack of investment opportunities.     

中国式卖空机制与高管减持——基于融资融券分步扩容的准自然实验

本文以我国的融资融券制度为背景,结合双重差分模型,研究卖空机制对上市公司高管减持行为的影响。研究发现,相对于非融券标的,可融券标的公司高管的月减持比例在允许卖空后下降22%,这种抑制作用在小规模、高盈余平滑度以及非国有公司中体现得更为明显。其次,成为可融券标的后,股价定价效率提高,高管减持收益显著下降。进一步地,本文将高管的减持行为分为定期性与投机性两类,发现卖空机制显著抑制了高管基于信息优势和股价偏差的投机性减持行为。     

Speculative bubbles in the S&P 500: Was the tech bubble confined to the tech sector?

This study tests for the presence of periodically, partially collapsing speculative bubbles in the sector indices of the S&P 500 using a regime-switching approach. We also employ an augmented model that includes trading volume as a technical indicator to improve the ability of the model to time bubble collapses and to better capture the temporal variations in returns. We find that well over half of the S&P 500 index by market capitalization and seven of its ten sector component indices exhibited at least some bubble-like behavior over our sample period. Thus the speculative bubble that grew in the 1990s and subsequently collapsed was surprisingly pervasive in the US equity market and it affected numerous sectors including financials and general industrials, rather than being confined to information technology, telecommunications and the media. In addition, we develop a joint model for cross-sectional contagion of bubbles across the sectors and we examine whether there is evidence for bubble spillovers.     

Trading volume in options and common stock around quarterly earnings announcements

This study examines trading in call and put options around quarterly earnings announcements and investigates whether the existence of these options affects the common stock trading volume response to these announcements. We find that the options trading volume reaction to earnings announcements is larger than the corresponding reaction in common stock. Consistent with the idea that options provide an alternative vehicle for trading on information, the existence of these options lowers the level of trading in common stock. Options also appear to offer investors an alternative method of taking short positions, as shown by the symmetric stock market trading volume reaction to good versus bad news for firms with listed options. In contrast, firms without listed options exhibit a larger trading volume response to good news than to bad news of similar magnitude.     

Trading on inside information: Evidence from the share-structure reform in China

We examine stock trading activities in days before Chinese listed firms made public announcement to start share-structure reform. There is significant evidence that, relative to a benchmark period, institutional investors bought more event firms’ shares in the last two trading days prior to announcement. Randomization tests show significant differences in institutional trading activities between event firms and matched control firms, which suggests that some institutions had inside information. Moreover, large trades account for a significant proportion of daily stock price changes in the last 2 days. The evidence is consistent with the prediction by Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992) that, when multiple informed investors acquire the same piece of information, they will trade aggressively. We also find that over the reform period, the median share value change of event firms is 6% higher than that of control firms. Our findings have important implications for enforcement of insider trading regulations in China.     

UNLISTED TRADING PRIVILEGES,LIQUIDITY, AND STOCK RETURNS

In this study we examine the effect of dual trading through unlisted trading privileges (UTPs) on liquidity and stock returns. Stocks with UTPs trade in a different market structure than stocks listed and traded only on the AMEX and NYSE. Differences in market structure may affect stock returns through liquidity services provided by the competing markets. The sample comprises 852 AMEX and NYSE firms that began unlisted trading on the Philadelphia, Pacific, Midwest, or Cincinnati exchanges between 1984 and 1988. The results show significantly positive abnormal returns around the SEC's announcement of a regional exchange's filing for UTPs. The results also suggest that increased competition improves trading liquidity. Only stocks with low liquidity before UTPs announcements experience significantly improved liquidity and positive stock returns.     

Uninvited U.S. Investors? Economic Consequences of Involuntary Cross‐Listings

We study the economic consequences of a recent Securities and Exchange Commission securities regulation change that grants foreign firms trading on the U.S. over‐the‐counter (OTC) market an automatic exemption from the reporting requirements of the 1934 Securities Act. We document that the number of voluntary (sponsored) OTC cross‐listings did not increase following the regulation change, suggesting that it did not achieve its intended purpose of increasing voluntary OTC cross‐listings through a reduction in compliance costs. We do find that the design of the regulation allowed financial intermediaries to create an unprecedented number of involuntary (unsponsored) OTC ADRs: 1,700 unsponsored ADR programs for 920 firms were created for companies that had previously chosen not to cross‐list in the United States. Our difference‐in‐differences analysis based on a matched sample approach documents that foreign firms forced into the U.S. capital markets experience a significant decrease in firm value, and we further show that the decrease in firm value is related to an increase in U.S. litigation risk. We also find that depositary banks’ propensity to involuntarily cross‐list firms is positively related to banks’ expected fee revenue, and that banks chose firms that incur high costs when involuntarily cross‐listed. Our results provide evidence that securities regulation can be exploited for private gain and result in costly unintended consequences.     

Options trading volume and stock price response to earnings announcements

We examine the effect of options trading volume on the stock price response to earnings announcements over the period 1996–2007. Contrary to previous studies, we find no significant difference in the immediate stock price response to earnings information announcements in samples split between firms with listed options and firms without listed options. However, within the sample of firms with listed options stratified by options volume, we find that higher options trading volume reduces the immediate stock price response to earnings announcements. This conforms with evidence that stock prices of high options trading volume firms have anticipated and pre-empted some earnings information in the pre-announcement period. We also find that higher abnormal options trading volume around earnings announcements hastens the stock price adjustment to earnings news and reduces post-earnings announcement drift.     

Split Share Structure Reform,corporate governance,and the foreign share discount puzzle in China

We examine the impact of the Split Share Structure Reform on the well-known foreign share discount puzzle in China. Existing literature confirms that foreign investors are more concerned about insider expropriation because of their information disadvantage relative to domestic investors. The split share structure of the ownership of Chinese listed firms created a conflict of interests between state and private shareholders. Since, before the reform, state shareholders held restricted shares that denied them any wealth effect from share price movements, they had a limited incentive to work with private shareholders to ensure that managers maximized the stock market value of the firm. By abolishing the trading restrictions for state shareholders, this reform has increased the incentive alignment between state and private shareholders, encouraging them to monitor managers. If foreign investors’ concerns over the corporate governance implications of the split share structure at least partly contributed to their discounting of Chinese listed firms, then this discount should be reduced following the reform. Indeed, our evidence confirms this prediction, especially among Chinese listed firms with more state ownership or restricted shares. Our findings imply that this significant institutional reform of the Chinese stock market has benefitted minority investors.     

Corporate governance and market segmentation: evidence from the price difference between Chinese A and H shares

This paper empirically examines whether the price difference between Chinese A shares, which are traded in the domestic market, and their matching H shares, which are traded in the Hong Kong market, can be explained by firms’ corporate governance characteristics. We find that the A- to H-share price premiums are higher for firms in which the controlling shareholders and corporate insiders have greater potential to expropriate wealth from outside investors. This result is robust when we use a variety of corporate governance variables specific to listed Chinese companies to explain the A-share price premiums and when we control for differences between domestic and foreign investors in required returns, degree of speculative trading, liquidity, information, and demand elasticity. Our findings highlight the important role of corporate governance in explaining the price difference in segmented stock markets.     

Does volume help in predicting stock returns? An analysis of the Australian market

This paper presents an analysis of the relationship between trading volume and stock returns in the Australian market. We test this hypothesis by using data from a sample of firms listed on the Australian stock market for a period of 5 years from January 2001 to December 2005. We explore this relationship by focusing on the level of trading volume and thin trading in the market. Our results suggest that trading volume does seem to have some predictive power for high volume firms and in certain industries of the Australian market. However, for smaller firms, trading volume does not seem to have the same predictive power to explain stock returns in Australia.     

The differential impact of corporate blockchain-development as conditioned by sentiment and financial desperation

This paper investigates how companies can utilise Twitter social media-derived sentiment as a method of generating short-term corporate value from statements based on initiated blockchain-development. Results indicate that investors were subjected to a very sophisticated form of asymmetric information designed to propel sentiment and market euphoria, that translates into increased access to leverage on the part of speculative firms. Technological-development firms are found to financially behave in a profoundly different fashion to reactionary-driven firms which have no background in ICT technological development, and who experience an estimated increased one-year probability of default of 170 bps. Rating agencies are found to have under-estimated the risk on-boarded by these speculative firms, failing to identify that they should be placed under an increased degree of scrutiny. Unfiltered market sentiment information, regulatory unpreparedness and mis-pricing by trusted market observers has resulted in a situation where investors and lenders have been compromised by direct exposure to an asset class becoming known for law-breaking activity, financial losses and frequent reputational damage.     

STRATEGIC DIRECTIONS IN INVESTMENT BANKING—A RETROSPECTIVE ANALYSIS

The last two decades of the 20th century were extraordinary ones for the investment banking industry. For most of this period, the value of financial services transactions grew at approximately twice the rate of the real economy, creating unprecedented boom times for investment banks. Several firms emerged among the world's most powerful financial service institutions. Yet these years also included one of the most destructive times that investment banks have ever endured. Dozens of firms disappeared—some failing outright, but most by merger into larger competitors, after failing to measure up to the expectations of regulators or of their shareholders. Certainly operating conditions changed greatly from the fairly simple, comparatively sleepy environment of the 1970s. The banking and S&L crisis created many opportunities for investment banks as financial assets migrated from the balance sheets of thrift organizations to the trading arenas of the marketplace. A merger and restructuring boom created additional opportunities for creating new client relationships and for dealmaking. The burgeoning fiscal deficit of the late 1980s also fostered a new emphasis on trading and principal investing. And there was a series of almost uninterrupted booms in one specialized product or another—REITs, junk bonds, emerging market securities, high tech and Internet stocks, among others. Deregulation and technology improvements broke down many regulatory and special barriers to competition and, by the end of the 1990s, wholesale financial markets had become fully globalized and highly competitive. This, of course, meant significant reductions in commissions and spreads, and in the value and exclusivity of banking relationships generally. This article examines the strategic choices of the major surviving investment banks and finds that those firms striving to be major global players have had to meet essential tests of gaining market share and market capitalization. To do this, the firms selected one (or more) of four basic approaches to achieve their goals. Several (Drexel Burnham, Salomon Bros., Bankers Trust) focused on growth through dominance of one or more key trading markets. Several others (Citigroup, JP Morgan Chase, UBS) were caught up in a strategy of growth through continuous acquisition. A few others opted for a show‐stopping “truly” strategic merger (Credit Suisse, Morgan Stanley‐Dean Witter). Only a handful (Goldman Sachs, Merrill Lynch) stuck to a simple strategy of steady internal growth. Those firms that came to dominate their markets through aggressive trading practices have now all disappeared or been folded into others—perhaps because their trading culture became too aggressive for their managers to contain. The multiple‐merger firms have continued to grow by acquiring the customers of their rivals and discarding excess personnel, but in so doing have become enormous organizations that are threatened by the mediocrity of conglomeration. To be successful following a truly strategic deal depends on the underlying strategy being a constant in a highly changeable marketplace—and if “bigger” indeed turns out to be “better,” then the devotees of steady internal growth may be in danger of falling behind. There are pros and cons to each approach, but the article makes the case that the ability to execute strategy is what really counts, and this is increasingly difficult in markets in which commanding market shares have already been established by a few top firms. The final question, however, is whether any of these approaches can be sustained indefinitely. As firms become more diversified across product lines to lower their volatility, they become less specialized and in time perhaps less effective at delivering the market's best and most recent ideas to clients. Such firms also presume that investors choose to own their stocks (they are all public now) because of their market capitalization, liquidity, and steady, market‐indexed growth. But, in fact, sophisticated institutional investors may prefer more specialized, less diversified, more exposed positions with greater upside potential. If so, the industry may find itself coming apart, with firms throwing off talent, divisions, and product lines in an effort to deconglomerate themselves back into something like the lean competitive machines that investment banks were when structured as small partnerships.     

汇率风险对冲如何影响企业并购行为——基于自由现金流的视角

本文基于2001—2019年上市公司年报中关于外汇衍生品的使用信息,研究发现,使用外汇衍生品的上市公司相比未使用的公司发起并购的概率更低,但并购的市场和经营绩效有所提高。主要原因在于,中国上市公司进行并购通常以企业自有资金进行现金支付,外汇衍生品的使用大幅降低了公司出于预防性动机而持有的现金,从而降低了公司发起并购的概率。此外,进行汇率风险对冲可避免公司因持有大量自由现金流而发生的过度投资行为,从而提高了公司的投资效率。总体而言,使用外汇衍生品进行汇率风险对冲可使上市公司更注重并购质量而非并购数量,从而实现“少而精”的投资策略。本文研究对进一步厘清企业使用外汇衍生品的相关影响提供了一定参考。     

Do aggressive orders affect liquidity? An evidence from an emerging market

This paper investigates how aggressive orders affect spreads and trading activity measures on the stock market. Based on a sample of stocks listed on the Warsaw Stock Exchange this study finds that spreads and trading activity measures increase significantly when aggressive orders are executed, but quickly revert to initial levels. The reaction to these orders on the bid and ask side of the market is similar. The effect of aggressive orders differ depending on the size of the firms. Trading activity measures such as volumes or number of transactions increase stronger for bigger than for smaller stocks, while spreads increase more for smaller firms than for bigger ones. These findings enrich the understanding of liquidity dynamics especially on the emerging markets where liquidity is an important price formation factor.     

Do insiders trade on government subsidies?

We examine whether and how insiders trade on government subsidies, a major instrument through which the governments intervene in the economy. Using a novel dataset of government subsidies of Chinese listed firms, we find that net insider purchase increases significantly during the month of subsidy receipt. The effect of subsidies on insider trading is weaker in firms with a more transparent information environment and when subsidies are granted in a more predictable manner. In contrast, the effect is more pronounced for politically connected firms. Further analysis shows that the subsidy-trading relation may reflect both insiders’ informational advantage concerning subsidies and their superior ability to detect mispricing-related opportunities. Our findings provide new insights into the capital market consequences of government subsidies through the lens of insider trading.     

Information asymmetry, speculation and foreign trading activity: Emerging market evidence

This paper provides evidence on the relation between private-information-based trading and foreign trading activity on the Istanbul Stock Exchange (ISE). We use a recently developed model that utilizes information in volume-return dynamics of individual stocks and show that variables such as size and Tobin's Q explain the extent of speculative activity across firms traded on the ISE. We present evidence supporting the notion that foreign trading activity is associated with informed trading on the ISE. Implications of our findings for emerging markets research are also discussed.     

Public re-release of going-concern opinions and market reaction

This paper examines the market reaction to the public announcement of going-concern (GC) opinions through the news media. In the early 2000s, NASDAQ and AMEX required firms listed on their exchanges to publicly announce previously disclosed information, such as the issuance of a GC opinion, through a press release or the news media. We examine the stock market reaction to the re-release of GC opinions. We find significant abnormal stock return volatility and trading volume at the re-release of this information. Further, based on an analysis of intraday transactions, we find higher abnormal trading activity in small trades around the re-release of the GC opinion, but largely no changes in large trades during the same period. In this respect, the investors that initiate the small trades act as if they are surprised by the information contained in the press release of GC opinions. Such an action, in turn, can be viewed as evidence of a delayed response to the information in GC opinions by a section of investors.     

Information-based stock trading and managerial incentives: evidence from China's stock market

This paper uses stock price informativeness, or information-based stock trading, to help explain the pay–performance sensitivity (PPS) of chief executive officer (CEO) compensation in China's listed firms. We argue that higher stock price informativeness, which we measure by the probability of informed trading, helps and encourages shareholders to incentivize the top management team based on stock market performance. The regression results support our argument and show that a higher level of stock price informativeness is associated with higher CEO PPSs. Moreover, the impact of stock price informativeness on CEO incentives is stronger for privately controlled listed firms than it is for state-controlled listed firms. The results also hold when information asymmetry is approximated by the accuracy and dispersion of the earnings forecasts made by financial analysts.     

An examination of IPO secondary market returns

IPO stock prices increased approximately 2.3% on the first day of secondary market trading over the period 1993 through 2003. While these aftermarket returns are accentuated during 1999 and 2000, they persist after the bubble burst and even increase as a percentage of total underpricing. We explore several non-mutually exclusive hypotheses to explain our findings including price support, laddering, retail sentiment, and information asymmetry. Our results are most consistent with the view that higher secondary market returns accrue to IPOs with more information asymmetries possibly due to price and aggregate demand uncertainty.