Bank ownership and performance. Does politics matter?

This paper uses a new dataset to reassess the relationship between bank ownership and bank performance, providing separate estimations for developing and industrial countries. It finds that state-owned banks located in developing countries tend to have lower profitability and higher costs than their private counterparts, and that the opposite is true for foreign-owned banks. The paper finds no strong correlation between ownership and performance for banks located in industrial countries. Next, in order to test whether the differential in performance between public and private banks is driven by political considerations, the paper checks whether this differential widens during election years; it finds strong support for this hypothesis.     

Market power and reputational concerns in the ratings industry

This paper studies the incentives of rating agencies to reveal the information that they obtain about their client firms. In the model, rating agencies seek to maximize their reputation and protect their market power. They observe public information and obtain either precise or noisy private information about a firm. Reputational concerns dictate that a rating reflects private information when it is precise. However, when private information is noisy, two situations arise. In a monopoly, the rating agency may ignore private information and issue a rating that conforms to public information. Under some conditions, it may even become cautious and issue bad ratings ignoring both types of information. With competition, however, it has incentives to contradict public information as a way to pretend that it holds precise private information. Moreover, it may become more likely to issue good ratings in an attempt to protect market power.     

Do managers withhold bad news from credit rating agencies?

Research documents that managers, on average, withhold bad news and emphasize good news in their public disclosures. We ask whether the same is true in their private communications with credit rating agencies. We study how rating agencies anticipate and react to public information events as a function of their access to rated firms’ private information. We show that, in terms of ratings downgrades, rating agencies exhibit relatively more anticipation and less reaction to negative (compared to positive) public information events when they have more access to private information. Our results are strongest when firms are most optimistic in their public disclosures and are not due to rating agencies focusing their efforts on downside risk. Overall, we find consistent evidence that rated firms provide less optimistic information to rating agencies in their private communications and that this information is reflected in credit ratings.

     

Ownership and Production Costs: Choosing between Public Production and Contracting‐Out in the Case of Swedish Refuse Collection

Many comparisons of public and private firms use a public/private ownership dummy variable to capture cost differences. If, however, public and private firms use different production technologies, the dummy‐variable approach is misspecified. Data from public and private firms should not be pooled. Secondly, selectivity bias may arise, making it more difficult to identify cost differentials that actually exist. Thirdly, if data should be pooled, the resulting empirical model may be logically inconsistent. This paper compares public and private firms using the refuse collection costs of 170 firms in 115 Swedish municipalities. First, public production costs were 6 per cent lower than private production costs. Secondly, cost differences did not affect producer choice. It is crucial to adjust for selectivity. Data for private and public firms should not be pooled. The dummy‐variable model is misspecified.     

De facto power in a transition economy: The case of China

That firms actively influence public policy to advance private interests is taken for granted in most economies. In China, the activism of public actors in shaping private interests suggests that the public rather than private sector is more influential to the political economy. In this paper, we test the extent to which this is true in among Chinese provinces. We conduct a cluster quasi-experiment using the 2012 anti-corruption campaign. We find that the declining involvement of public actors in economic decisions during the campaign did not result into lower productivity in provinces with higher private sector participation, especially in unregulated industries and those not dominated by state-owned enterprises. De facto political power from 30-years of private wealth accumulation may have helped establish market-driven norms of economic behavior, strengthening the political economy against the vicissitudes of public actors.     

Overlapping tax revenue,soft budget,and rent seeking

This paper investigates how the soft-budget constraint with grants from the central government to local governments tends to internalize the vertical externality of local public investment by stimulating local expenditure when both the central and local governments impose taxes on the same economic activities financed by public investment. The model incorporates the local governments’ rent-seeking activities in a multi-government setting. The soft-budget constraint is welfare deteriorating because it stimulates rent-seeking activities, although a soft-budget game may attain the first-best level of public investment.     

Central Bank Transparency and the Crowding Out of Private Information in Financial Markets

We use an asset market model based on Diamond (1985) to demonstrate that increased central bank transparency may lead to crowding out of costly private information, which can result in a market that is less able to predict monetary policy. Consequently, for intermediate levels of public information precision, it is optimal for the central bank to actually disclose less than it knows. We show that such crowding out can occur, even in the likely scenario that public information is more precise than private information, under the plausible assumption that traders are nearly risk neutral. Central banks should be aware of possible adverse effects of transparency and take note if market participants reduce investment in information.     

Private communication among competitors and public disclosure

I study how private communication among competitors affects their public disclosures. Theory suggests that competing firms can use public disclosure to coordinate, and predicts less public disclosure when there is more private communication. Using data on strategic alliances, I predict and find that firms that enter strategic alliances with competitors reduce their public disclosure, and that the reduction is more pronounced for alliances that allow for more private communication.     

The Performance of State–Owned Enterprises Revisited

Many theoretical and empirical studies look at the ownership–performance relationship. So far, the literature in finance and in accounting mainly refers to the property rights, agency and public choice theories. Despite the fact that the results of these studies are more or less conclusive, it is usually considered that the private enterprise performs better than the state–owned enterprise. In this article, we argue that these studies suffer from one major limitation. They do not recognize that the goals of the state–owned enterprise are different from the ones espoused by the private firm. Using a sample of state–owned entreprises and private firms for the period 1976–1996, we present empirical evidence that the state–owned enterprises, when their main goal is to maximize profit, perform as well as the privately owned enterprises. Therefore, the alleged under–performance of the state–owned enterprises may only be the result of pursuing other goals while the poor quality of public managers may be another urban myth.     

Insurance market mechanisms and government interventions

The expansion of the State-as-insurer has played a major role in the long-term growth of the public sector, but we are probably reaching the turning point. Because of its manifold failures, the State-as-insurer is facing crisis all around the world, with exploding expenditures. This will probably induce a shift in the private–public frontier, which makes it much more important than in the past to regulate the insurance industry efficiently. Coming back to the failures of the State-as-insurer, we should underline the role played by this flawed hypothesis that sets market logic and private interest against public interest.     

A theoretical model of bank lending: Does ownership matter in times of crisis?

The present study investigates theoretically the lending responses of government-owned and private banks in the event of unexpected financial shocks. Our model predicts that public banks provide more loans to the real sector during times of crisis, compared to private banks which cut down on lending and increase liquidity holdings. We put forth three reasons for this heterogeneous behavior. First, the objective of public banks, in contrast to their private peers, is not only to maximize profits given risks, but also to stabilize and promote the recovery of the economy. Second, public banks may suffer less deposit withdrawals or avoid a bank run in a severe crisis, because the state has better access to additional funds making a recapitalization more likely. And finally, public banks may suffer less deposit withdrawals due to their higher credibility in promising a future recapitalization in the case of a severe crisis.     

Under weighting of Private Information by Top Analysts

It is conventionally perceived in the literature that weak analysts are likely to under weight their private information and strategically bias their announcements in the direction of the public beliefs to avoid scenarios where their private information turns out to be wrong, whereas strong analysts tend to adopt an opposite strategy of over weighting their private information and shifting their announcements away from the public beliefs in an attempt to stand out from the crowd. Analyzing a reporting game between two financial analysts, who are compensated based on their relative forecast accuracy, we demonstrate that it could be the other way around. An investigation of the equilibrium in our game suggests that, contrary to the common perception, analysts who benefit from information advantage may strategically choose to understate their exclusive private information and bias their announcements toward the public beliefs, while exhibiting the opposite behavior of overstating their private information when they estimate that their peers are likely to be equally informed.     

The use of Call Centres by local public administrations

European local public administrations (PA) are rapidly adopting information and communications technologies often with a view to offering e-commerce. Call Centres (CCs) feature prominently in the technology mix used by private sector e-commerce, but as a survey in this paper shows, CCs are less often used in public sector. This paper analyses the differences between private and public sector commerce and their implications for public sector e-commerce and its prospective use of CCs over the next ten years. It outlines the evolution of CC technologies and argues that current developments make the technology increasingly appropriate for the public sector. A model of e-commerce featuring connectivity, interactivity and agility is developed in the paper. From this it is concluded that many of the advantages from the use of CCs by PAs, are in system integration and process re-engineering — attributes positioned in terms of bridging technology and acting as a learning organisation. From this perspective, the paper concludes that CCs are likely to increasingly feature in the information and communications technology-mix for e-commerce delivery of PAs over the next ten years.     

ACHIEVING SOCIAL OBJECTIVES THROUGH PRIVATE TRANSFERS: A Review

Private interhousehold cash transfers are an important sourceof income in many developing countries. Among the countrieswhose experience is reviewed in the article, the proportionof all households receiving private transfers ranges from afifth to a half. The amounts received are large, particularlywhen compared with the incomes of the poorest households. Understanding more about these transfers is important for designingpolicy because, among other things, these remittances providesocial and economic benefits similar to those of public programs,such as unemployment insurance, pension support, educationalcredit, and health assistance. As such, private transfers maysupplement or overlap with public transfers, and, if privatedonors give less as public transfers increase, the effect ofpublic programs on beneficiaries would be less than originallyintended. Or the transfers may alter the distributional effectsof public programs: for again, if private donors give less aspublic transfers increase, they share in some of the benefitsof public programs.      

Risks and the financing of PPP: Perspectives from the financiers

Public private partnerships (PPP) are an established model for most governments internationally to provide infrastructure-based services, using private finance. Typically the public authority will sign a contract with a special purpose vehicle (SPV), which, because of the holistic nature of PPP, in turn sub-contracts the finance, design, construction, maintenance and soft services to companies that are often related to its shareholders. Thus there is a considerable network of linked organisations that together procure and provide the PPP project.While there is an increasing body of research that examines these PPP projects, much of it is interview or case study based so that the evidence is drawn from a small number of interviews or cases in specific sectors. It also focuses on the public sector procurer and the private sector contractor in the network of organisations. Although it has been recognised that the perceptions of the financiers may vary from those of other key PPP players there is much less research that focuses on the financiers.In this paper we report the results of a postal questionnaire survey, administered to 109 providers of senior debt and equity, from which the response rate was just less than 40%. We supplement these findings with a small number of illustrative quotes from interviewees, where the cited quote represents a commonly held view. We used SPSS and Nvivo to analyse the data.The findings show that when assessing PPPs financiers perceive a very wide range of risks as important, and that it is important to them that many of these risks are either insured or allocated to sub-contractors. When considering participating in PPPs, financiers agree that working with familiar partners on familiar projects and in familiar sectors is important, which may raise barriers to entry and undermine competitive processes.     

Regulating a model

We study a situation in which a regulator relies on risk models that banks produce in order to regulate them. A bank can generate more than one model and choose which models to reveal to the regulator. The regulator can find out the other models by monitoring the bank, but in equilibrium, monitoring induces the bank to produce less information. We show that a high level of monitoring is desirable when the bank’s private gain from producing more information is either sufficiently high or sufficiently low. When public models are more precise, banks produce more information, but the regulator may end up monitoring more.     

Measuring the Effect of Federal Research Funding on Private Donations at Research Universities: Is Federal Research Funding More than a Substitute for Private Donations?

The nature of federal research funding has changed in the United States over the last 30 years. In part, federal research funding has changed in the distribution of funding across disciplines and across universities. Federal funding to universities with historically low levels of funding has also experienced greater growth than those universities with historically high levels of funding. In addition, universities have become more involved in the political process with respect to the allocation of funding for higher education. As the nature of government funding changes, this paper questions its effect on private donations to research and non-research universities. The general presumption of much of the existing theoretical work is that government and private funding for charitable goods are substitutes. Limited evidence exists to suggest, in some circumstances, there may be a positive correlation between these two sources of funding. Potentially, because the government undertakes the expense to gather information about the research universities, and engages in such activities as peer-review of research proposals, the government through its grant awards may provide a signal of quality of research or other information to donors that is less noisy than that available to private donors. Similarly, there may be other types of spillover effects from research funding to private donations. In this case, a change in government grants has both a positive and negative effect on private donations, suggesting a positive correlation between private and public donations if the effect from the dissemination of information is greater than the substitution effect of government grants. I examine data for private and public universities in the United States to measure the relationship between private and public donations under a fixed-effects OLS regression. I explore issues of bias from endogeneity or omitted variables and report the results from a two stage least squares regression in which I use a set of measures that affect federal research funding but not private donations. Regardless of the specification, the results suggest private and public donations are positively correlated for research universities and negatively correlated for non-research institutions. On average, increasing federal research funding by one dollar increases private donations by 65 cents at research universities, decreases private donations by 9 cents at universities whose highest degree granted is a masters, and decreases private donations by 45 cents at liberal arts colleges.     

寻租、R&D投资与公司业绩——基于民营上市公司的经验证据

本文手工搜集了2005-2009年中国民营上市公司R&D投资及高管政治联系的数据,从寻租行为与R&D投资活动的竞争性视角,实证研究了两者对公司业绩的影响趋势。本文结果表明,R&D投资持续、稳定地对公司业绩具有显著地提升作用,而寻租行为虽然短期对公司业绩有利,但却显著地损害了公司未来的业绩。本文研究结果表明,R&D投资,而非寻租,才是公司持续性业绩增长的关键。     

Public Versus Private Insurance with Dual Theory: A Political Economy Argument

This paper analyzes the political support for public insurance in the presence of a private insurance alternative. The public insurance is compulsory and offers a uniform insurance policy. The private insurance is voluntary and can offer different insurance policies. Adopting Yaari's [Econometrica, 55, 95–115, 1987] dual theory to expected utility (i.e., risk aversion without diminishing marginal utility of income), we show that adverse selection on the private insurance market may lead a majority of individuals to prefer public insurance over private insurance, even if the median risk is below the average risk (so that the median actually subsidizes high-risk individuals). We also show that risk aversion makes public insurance more attractive and that the dual theory is less favourable to a mixed insurance system than the expected utility framework. Lastly, we demonstrate how the use of genetic tests may threaten the political viability of public insurance.     

Assessing the Efficiency of an Insurance Provider—A Measurement Error Approach

The purpose of this paper is to compare the cost efficiency of private and public property insurance providers in Switzerland. The most commonly used measure for this kind of exercise is the claims-premium ratio. We argue that this measure may give strongly biased results. We develop a simple model to test whether the elasticity of premiums with respect to claims is less than unity. We address the fact that premium income is relatively stable across time, while claims are not, using estimation techniques that correct for measurement error. We develop tools to cope with heteroskedasticity in such measurement errors and apply the model to a data set on 19 firms in housing insurance markets in Switzerland. We show that the public insurance providers are about 20% more cost efficient than their private counterparts.JEL Classification No.: C21, D21, L84