Losing it

"It's worse than I thought.... She's completely lost her mind," says Harry Beecham, the CEO of blue chip management consultancy Pierce and Company. The perplexed executive was in a hotel suite with his wife in Amsterdam, the latest stop on his regular trek to dozens of Pierce offices worldwide. In his hand was a sheaf of paper--the same message sent over and over again by his star employee and protégée Katharina Waldburg. The end of the world is coming, she warned. "Someone is going to die." Harry wouldn't have expected this sort of behavior from Katharina. After graduating with distinction from Oxford, she made a name for herself by single-handedly building Pierce's organizational behavior practice. At 27, she's poised to become the youngest partner ever elected at the firm. But Harry can't ignore the faxes in his hand. Or the stream-of-consciousness e-mails Katharina's been sending to one of the directors in Pierce's Berlin office--mostly gibberish but potentially disastrous to Katharina's reputation if they ever got out. Harry also can't dismiss reports from Roland Fuoroli, manager of the Berlin office, of a vicious verbal exchange Katharina had with him, or of an "over the top" lunch date Katharina had with one of Pierce's clients in which she was explaining the alphabet's role in the creation of the universe. Harry is planning to talk to Katharina when he gets to Berlin. What should he say? And will it be too late? Four commentators offer their advice in this fictional case study. They are Kay Redfield Jamison, a professor of psychiatry and a coauthor of Manic-Depressive Illness; David E. Meen, a former director at McKinsey & Company; Norman Pearlstine, the editor in chief at Time Incorporated; and Richard Primus, an assistant law professor at the University of Michigan.     

Keeping it real or keeping it simple? Ownership concentration measures compared

We analyze the distributional properties of ownership concentration measures and find that measures come from different underlying statistical distributions. Consistent with theory, some measures that are classified to represent a monitoring dimension have a positive influence on firm performance; other measures that are interpreted to represent a shareholder conflict dimension are negatively related to firm performance. However, other measures deviate from this pattern, and therefore, we cannot conclude that simple measures can replace complicated measures. Some measures are more suitable for analyzing the relationship between management and owners, whereas other measures are more suitable for analyzing the relationships among owners.     

Information technology investment governance: What is it and does it matter?

While the growth in the number of IT investments remains strong, research in the IT investment field is limited, resulting in suboptimal practical guidance on effectively governing IT investments. Based on resource-based theory, this paper reports the initial work involved in developing a construct named IT investment governance (ITIG), because it can be used to measure organizations' capability to govern their IT investments. This paper then empirically examines the association of ITIG and corporate performance. The preliminary result is a four-factor, 16-item instrument for assessing the ITIG construct. This method's factors are IT investment value governance, IT investment value monitoring, IT investment appraisals and IT investment project management. The impact of ITIG on corporate performance was demonstrated with a significant and positive relationship found to exist between the ITIG construct and corporate performance, thus supporting the effectiveness of the ITIG construct. Corporations with higher levels of ITIG capability are more likely to maximize the contribution of their IT investments to firm value.     

Is it the weather? Comment

This comment discusses some errors in a recent paper by Jacobsen and Marquering [Jacobsen, B., Marquering, W., 2008. Is it the weather? Journal of Banking and Finance 32 (4), 526–540], in which the authors challenge our previous finding that stock market returns exhibit seasonal patterns consistent with the influence of seasonal affective disorder on investor risk aversion. We find that we cannot replicate the authors’ findings, even after corresponding with them. Furthermore, we document several problems with their methodology, including misspecification of their economic model, misspecification of their econometric model, and use of inappropriate data. While we agree that seasonal affective disorder is not an explanation for all variation in equity markets, we do maintain that careful analysis leads to economically and statistically significant evidence of the effect we originally documented.     

Is it the weather? Response

Kamstra, Kramer and Levi (KKL) in their comment seem to miss the main point of our paper. Many things are correlated with the seasons so it is difficult to distinguish between them when we try to explain the well-known summer winter pattern in stock returns. Finding an isolated seasonal affective disorder (SAD) effect without proper control variables does not disprove our point but strengthens it. To sidestep all of the issues they raise and take our point to the extreme, we show using plain vanilla regressions that the seasonal stock market pattern they attribute to SAD can also be “explained” by variables like ice cream consumption or airline travel. The new variations of SAD variables (“onset” and “incidence”) KKL propose in their recent work for North America are even more problematic than the original SAD variables. We find that these new SAD proxies are not significant in countries where according to KKL they should be: Canada and the United States.     

Coming through when it matters most

All teams would like to think they do their best work when the stakes are highest-when the company's future or their own rests on the outcome of their projects. But too often something else happens. In extensive studies of teams at professional service firms, Harvard Business School's Gardner has seen the same pattern emerge over and over: Teams become increasingly concerned with the risks of failure rather than the requirements of excellence. As a result, they revert to safe, standard approaches instead of delivering original solutions tailored to clients' needs. Gardner has a name for this phenomenon: the performance pressure paradox. Here's how it develops: As pressure mounts, team members start driving toward consensus in ways that shut out vital information. Without even realizing it, they give more weight to shared knowledge and dismiss specialized expertise, such as insights into the client's technologies, culture, and aspirations. The more generically inclined the team becomes, the more concerned the client grows, which turns up the pressure and pushes the team even further down the generic road. But forewarned is forearmed. By measuring each person's contribution deliberately, ruthlessly insisting that no one's contribution be marginalized, and framing new information within familiar contexts, teams can escape the performance pressure paradox and keep doing their best work when it matters most.     

What it means to work here

What distinguishes a company that has deeply engaged and committed employees from another one that doesn't? It's not a certain compensation scheme or talent-management practice. Instead, it's the ability to express to current and potential employees what makes the organization unique. Companies with highly engaged employees articulate their values and attributes through "signature experiences"--visible, distinctive elements of the work environment that send powerful messages about the organization's aspirations and about the skills, stamina, and commitment employees will need in order to succeed there. Whole Foods Market, for example, uses a team-based hiring and orientation process to convey to new employees the company's emphasis on collaboration and decentralization. At JetBlue, the reservation system is run by agents from their homes, a signature experience that boosts employees' satisfaction and productivity. Companies that successfully create and communicate signature experiences understand that not all workers want the same things. Indeed, employee preferences are an important but often overlooked factor in the war for talent. Firms that have engendered productive and engaged workforces address those preferences by following some general principles: They target potential employees as methodically as they target potential customers; they shape their signature experiences to address business needs; they identify and preserve their histories; they share stories--not just slogans--about life in the firm; they create processes consistent with their signature experiences; and they understand that they shouldn't try to be all things to all people. The best strategy for coming out ahead in the war for talent is not to scoop up everyone in sight but to attract the right people--those who are intrigued and excited by the environment the company offers and who will reward it with their loyalty.     

Getting it right the second time

Once a business performs a complex activity well, the parent organization often wants to replicate that success. But doing that is surprisingly difficult, and businesses nearly always fail when they try to reproduce a best practice. The reason? People approaching best-practice replication are overly optimistic and overconfident. They try to perfect an operation that's running nearly flawlessly, or they try to piece together different practices to create the perfect hybrid. Getting it right the second time (and all the times after that) involves adjusting for overconfidence in your own abilities and imposing strict discipline on the process and the organization. The authors studied numerous business settings to find out how organizational routines were successfully reproduced, and they identified five steps for successful replication. First, make sure you've got something that can be copied and that's worth copying. Some processes don't lend themselves to duplication; others can be copied but maybe shouldn't be. Second, work from a single template. It provides proof success, performance measurements, a tactical approach, and a reference for when problems arise. Third, copy the example exactly, and fourth, make changes only after you achieve acceptable results. The people who developed the template have probably already encountered many of the problems you want to "fix," so it's best to create a working system before you introduce changes. Fifth, don't throw away the template. If your copy doesn't work, you can use the template to identify and solve problems. Best-practice replication, while less glamorous than pure innovation, contributes enormously to the bottom line of most companies. The article's examples--Banc One, Rank Xerox, Intel, Starbucks, and Re/Max Israel--prove that exact copying is a non-trivial, challenging accomplishment.     

Learning in the thick of it

The U.S. Army's Opposing Force (OPFOR) is a 2,500-member brigade whose job is to help prepare soldiers for combat. Created to be the meanest, toughest foe that soldiers will ever face, OPFOR engages units-in-training in a variety of mock campaigns under a wide range of conditions. Every month, a fresh brigade of more than 4,000 soldiers takes on this standing enemy. OPFOR, which is stationed in the California desert, always has the home-court advantage. But the force being trained--called BLU FOR--is numerically and technologically superior. It possesses more resources and better, more available data. It is made up of experienced soldiers. And it knows just what to expect, because OPFOR shares its methods from previous campaigns with BLUFOR's commanders. In short, each BLUFOR brigade is given practically every edge. Yet OPFOR almost always wins. Underlying OPFOR's consistent success is the way it uses the after-action review (AAR), a method for extracting lessons from one event or project and applying them to others. AAR meetings became a popular business tool after Shell Oil began experimenting with them in 1998. Most corporate AARs, however, are faint echoes of the rigorous reviews performed by OPFOR. Companies tend to treat the process as a pro-forma wrap-up, drawing lessons from an action but rarely learning them. OPFOR's AARs, by contrast, generate raw material that is fed back into the execution cycle. And while OPFOR's reviews extract numerous lessons, the brigade does not consider a lesson to be learned until it is successfully applied and validated. It might not make sense for companies to adopt OPFOR's AAR processes in their entirety, but four fundamentals are mandatory: Lessons must benefit the team that extracts them. The AAR process must start atthe beginning of the activity. Lessons must link explicitly to future actions. And leaders must hold everyone, especially themselves, accountable for learning.     

Let's hear it for B players

In the much-heralded war for talent, it's hardly surprising that companies have invested a lot of time, money, and energy in hiring and retaining star performers. For most CEOs, recruiting stars is simply more fun; for one thing, the young A players they interview often remind them of themselves at the same age. For another, A players' brilliance and drive is infectious; you simply want to be in their company. Besides, in these troubled times, when businesses are so vulnerable, people who seem to have what it takes to turn around a company's performance are almost irresistible. But our understandable fascination with star performers can lure us into the dangerous trap of underestimating the vital importance of the supporting actors. It's true that A players can make enormous contributions to performance. Yet, as the authors have found, companies' long-term performance--even survival--depends far more on the unsung commitment and contributions of their B players. These capable, steady performers are the best supporting actors of the corporate world. Companies are routinely blinded to the important role B players serve in saving organizations from themselves. They counter-balance the ambitions of the company's high-performing visionaries, whose much-esteemed strengths, when carried to an extreme, can lead to reckless or volatile behavior. In this sense, B players act as a stabilizing force for charismatic A players who might otherwise destabilize the organization. Unfortunately, organizations rarely learn to value their B players in ways that are gratifying for either the company or these employees. As a result, they see their profits sinking without understanding why. This article will help you to rethink the role of your organization's B players. The authors show how you can mentor and nurture B players to ensure their continued participation in the company.     

Was it risk? Or was it fundamentals? Explaining excess currency returns with kernel smoothed regressions

This paper uses recently developed kernel smoothing regression procedures and uniform confidence bounds to investigate the forward premium anomaly. These new statistical methods estimate the local time-varying slope coefficient of the regression of spot returns on the lagged interest rate differential. Uniform confidence bands are used to test when uncovered interest parity is violated. The estimated betas in the forward premium smoothed regression are found to vary substantially over time and to be partially explicable in terms of lagged fundamentals and money growth volatilities arising from risk premium. Frequentist model averaging procedures indicate the relative importance of these variables in terms of explaining movements in the betas and hence the apparent causes of regimes where UIP fails.     

Anomalies: Is it the Economy?

There is still no consensus on whether small firm or value stock anomalies exist. We examine the last half of the 20th century and apply a six‐factor macroeconomic model to test for the presence of these abnormal returns. Using four proxies for value, we find that detecting this anomaly is sensitive to choice of proxy, the magnitude of the abnormal returns varies over time, and the anomaly does not persist through time. Additional tests provide evidence that abnormal returns for small, value‐oriented, and growth‐oriented firms differ significantly under restrictive versus expansive monetary policy regimes.     

Does it cost to be sustainable?

We investigate whether firms’ corporate social performance (CSP) ratings impact their performance (cost of capital) and risk. Using a proprietary CSP ratings database, we find no difference in the risk-adjusted performance of UK firms with high and low CSP ratings. Additionally, the firms do not differ in their amount of idiosyncratic risk. We find some evidence of high-ranked firms being larger. The empirical evidence therefore indicates that investors and managers are able to implement a CSP investment or business strategy without incurring any significant financial cost (or benefit) in terms of risk or return.     

长期投资是否过时

长期投资的概念永远不会过时 　　前两年,以高科技股票为主的美国纳斯达克股市非常活跃,一些网络股在短短几个月内上升到令人难以置信的地步,许多股民当时通过买进卖出网络股而赚了不少钱.因此,有人说,时代已经变了,不能再靠长期投资来赚钱了,想赚钱就要用买进卖出的方法.就是要看准了一个刚刚上市的高科技股,要立即买进,在它猛涨一段时间以后,又要不失时机地赶快脱手,赚他一大笔.一时间,这种说法甚嚣尘上,使无数的投资者毅然绝然地投身于纳斯达克市场. 　　……     

The growth crisis--and how to escape it

At a time when companies are poised to seize the growth opportunities of a rebounding economy, many of them, whether they know it or not, face a growth crisis. Even during the boom years of the past decade, only a small fraction of companies enjoyed consistent double-digit revenue growth. And those that did often achieved it through short-term measures--such as mergers and inflated price increases--that don't provide the foundation for growth over the long term. But there is a way out of this predicament. The authors claim that companies can achieve sustained growth by leveraging their "hidden assets," a wide array of underused, intangible capabilities and advantages that most established companies already hold. To date, much of the research on intangible assets has centered on intellectual property and brand recognition. But in this article, the authors uncover a host of other assets that can help spark growth. They identify four major categories of hidden assets: customer relationships, strategic real estate, networks, and information. And they illustrate each with an example of a company that has creatively used its hidden assets to produce new sources of revenue. Executives have spent years learning to create growth using products, facilities, and working capital. But they should really focus on mobilizing their hidden assets to serve their customers' higher-order needs--in other words, create offerings that make customers' lives easier, better, or less expensive. Making that shift in mind-set isn't easy, admit the authors, but companies that do it may not only create meaningful new value for their customers but also produce double-digit revenue and earnings growth for investors.