When Is a Treasury Security On‐the‐Run?

The literature contains two conflicting definitions of the on‐the‐run period for Treasury securities. We address the conflict by empirically examining the implications of the two definitions. We conclude that it is important that researchers clearly understand the implications of each definition. Our results suggest that on‐the‐run activity spans different auction calendar time in T‐notes and T‐bills.     

Is Gold a Hedge or a Safe Haven? An Analysis of Stocks,Bonds and Gold

Is gold a hedge, defined as a security that is uncorrelated with stocks or bonds on average, or is it a safe haven, defined as a security that is uncorrelated with stocks and bonds in a market crash? We study constant and time‐varying relations between U.S., U.K. and German stock and bond returns and gold returns to investigate gold as a hedge and a safe haven. We find that gold is a hedge against stocks on average and a safe haven in extreme stock market conditions. A portfolio analysis further shows that the safe haven property is short‐lived.     

Value versus growth: Australian evidence

The value‐growth effect is one of the most pervasive patterns in stock prices. In this study, the ability of four proxies for value‐growth, book‐to‐market, sales‐to‐price, earnings‐to‐price and cash‐flow‐to‐price to explain equity returns is analysed. The findings show that in aggregate, book‐to‐market best explains cross‐sectional variation in Australian equity returns, which in isolation suggests that it is the superior proxy for value‐growth. The analysis is taken further and the value‐growth effect is examined separately in positive and negative earnings firms. After segregating firms, it is found that in the negative earnings sample, book‐to‐market is the best value‐growth proxy and in the positive earnings sample, cash‐flow‐to‐price has the highest level of significance and is thus the superior value‐growth proxy. The economic significance of this result is telling, as the firms that report positive earnings are much larger than those that report negative earnings.     

Partial Price Adjustments and Equity Carve‐Outs

We examine the extent to which market‐adjusted ex date returns reflect public information for 271 equity carve‐outs in 1988–2006. Although prior studies focus on ex post determinants of equity carve‐out and initial public offering returns, our study is the first to explore ex ante predictors of equity carve‐out returns. We use three primary variables: filing range adjustments, the percentage of the offering used to retire subsidiary debt or to pay dividends, and the CBOE Volatility Index (VXO) to predict initial returns. We show that 11–35% of the variation in market‐adjusted equity carve‐out returns can be predicted using public information known prior to the offer date.     

Does the bond‐stock earnings yield differential model predict equity market corrections better than high P/E models?

We extend the literature on crash prediction models in three main ways. First, we explicitly relate crash prediction measures and asset pricing models. Second, we present a statistical significance test for crash prediction models. Finally, we propose a definition and a measure of robustness for these models. We apply our statistical test and measure the robustness of selected model specifications of the Price‐Earnings (P/E) ratio and Bond Stock Earning Yield Differential (BSEYD) measures. This analysis shows that the BSEYD and P/E ratios, were statistically significant robust predictors of corrections on the US equity market over the period 1964 to 2014.     

“Too‐Small‐To‐Survive” versus “Too‐Big‐To‐Fail” banks: The two sides of the same coin

In the recent crisis, the U.S. authorities bailed out numerous banks through TARP, whilst let many others to fail as going concern entities. Even though both interventions fully protect depositors, a bail out represents an implied subsidy to shareholders, which is not yet the case with closures where creditors are not subsidised. We investigate this non‐uniform policy, demonstrating that size and not performance is the decision variable that endogenously determines one threshold below which banks are treated as TSTS by regulators and another one above which are considered to be TBTF. We, hence, provide a pair of economic rather than regulatory cut‐offs for TBTF and TSTS banks. The shareholders and the other uninsured creditors of a distressed bank are not bailed out if the bank is considered to be TSTS. We further document that the less complex a bank is, the less likely is to be bailed out and, hence, to have all of its creditors protected.     

Management choice of buyback method: Australian evidence

This study investigates management choice of repurchase method for large Australian industrial companies from 1997 to 2007. We show that managers favour off‐market buybacks to distribute excess franking credits to shareholders when the buyback is larger and when the firm is generating more cash. On‐market buybacks are more likely when the firm is undervalued. These findings have implications for understanding how corporate managers approach the repurchase decision, the impact of taxes on corporate financial policy, and how transaction costs can influence the choice between an off‐market and an on‐market buyback.     

Has Finance Made the World Riskier?

Developments in the financial sector have led to an expansion in its ability to spread risks. The increase in the risk bearing capacity of economies, as well as in actual risk taking, has led to a range of financial transactions that hitherto were not possible, and has created much greater access to finance for firms and households. On net, this has made the world much better off. Concurrently, however, we have also seen the emergence of a whole range of intermediaries, whose size and appetite for risk may expand over the cycle. Not only can these intermediaries accentuate real fluctuations, they can also leave themselves exposed to certain small probability risks that their own collective behaviour makes more likely. As a result, under some conditions, economies may be more exposed to financial‐sector‐induced turmoil than in the past. The paper discusses the implications for monetary policy and prudential supervision. In particular, it suggests market‐friendly policies that would reduce the incentive of intermediary managers to take excessive risk.     

On the Publicity of Two‐Stage Spin‐Offs and Equity Carve‐Outs

We investigate the effect of pre‐offer publicity on ownership, pricing, and aftermarket performance for equity carve‐outs (ECOs) and two‐stage spin‐offs (COSOs). Contrary to ECOs, for COSOs the parent firm's shareholders end up with free shares in the subsidiary. As the value of large share blocks is likely to be negatively affected by the emergence of new blocks after the divestiture, we hypothesize that parent firms undertaking COSOs may conduct more pre‐offer publicity to attract more retail investors, keeping outside ownership diffuse and inflating aftermarket performance until the distribution of the free shares. We find empirical support for our hypotheses.     

The Role of U.S. Market on International Risk‐Return Tradeoff Relations

We study the intertemporal risk‐return tradeoff relations based on returns from 18 international markets. We find striking new empirical evidence that the inclusion of U.S. market returns significantly changes the estimated risk‐return tradeoff relations in international markets from mostly negative to predominantly positive. Our results are consistent with the lead‐lag effect between U.S. and international markets in the sense of Rapach, Strauss and Zhou.     

Fails‐to‐Deliver before and after the Implementation of Rule 203 and Rule 204

We study the determinants of fails‐to‐deliver in the period before and after the implementation of Rule 203 (elimination of option market maker exception from the locate and close‐out requirement) and Rule 204 (t+3 close‐out rule) in September 2008. We find a positive relation between short selling and fails‐to‐deliver that weakens after the implementation of these rules. Fails‐to‐deliver are higher for stocks with low institutional ownership, low book‐to‐market, small market capitalization, high turnover, and put option availability. The relation between short selling and these measures of borrowing costs is also weaker after the implementation of these rules.     

Investor Recognition and Post‐Acquisition Performance of Acquirers

The literature has documented a negative relation between investor recognition and expected returns. This negative relation is consistent with the prediction in Merton (1987, Journal of Finance 42, 483–510). This paper investigates whether the changes in investor recognition of acquirers around the time of the acquisitions can explain the post‐acquisition underperformance of acquirer stocks. Using a large sample of U.S. acquisitions from 1980 to 2010, this paper finds that investor recognition, proxied by the number of institutional investors and the number of common shareholders, increases significantly during acquisitions. Once the increases in investor recognition are controlled for, the “puzzling” long‐run underperformances of acquirers disappears.     

Too big to fail: Measures,remedies, and consequences for efficiency and stability*

This paper evaluates whether reform efforts addressing “too big to fail” actually enhance the stability of the financial system, and whether trade‐offs exist between stability and efficiency. We also present and discuss various measures of bank size and complexity since such measures are essential for implementing appropriate corrective remedies. As we will show, there are no unambiguous measures of size or complexity that can fully capture a bank's contribution to systemic risk. Their effects on efficiency are also impossible to capture with certainty. While we recognize the need for additional research and empirical evidence, we do identify weaknesses and strengths of proposed and implemented reforms that could have consequences for bank stability and efficiency.     

An Analysis of Changes in Board Structure during Corporate Governance Reforms

This study examines the evolution of company board structure during a period of corporate governance reform. Using data over a time period following the publication of the Cadbury Report (1992) we present evidence of an increase in the independence of UK boards, as measured by an increased willingness to employ independent non‐executive directors, and to separate the positions of the CEO and the Chairman of the Board. In examining the determinants of these changes, we find that boards change more readily in response to changes in managerial control, equity issuance and corporate performance than changes in the firm‐specific operating environment of companies.     

Determinants of Investor Demand for Cross‐Listed Firms

By focusing on the decisions of investors to invest in cross‐listed stocks, this paper presents new evidence on why we observe striking differences in the percentage of trade in foreign markets for cross‐listed stocks. With a large sample of Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX) stocks cross‐listed in the U.S. and Canada, we document the effect of investor recognition and risk characteristics on the distribution of trading volume. Firms that are more visible to American investors are traded more heavily in the U.S. At the same time, firms that offer diverse risk characteristics are attractive to Americans. While investors understand the benefits of international diversification, as they are attracted to stocks that are different (e.g., the stock of small firms with few assets in the U.S.), they also seek stocks that provide them with high returns.     

Return Characteristics of State‐Owned and Non‐State‐Owned Chinese A Shares

This study examines and compares stock returns and volatilities between state‐owned (SO) and non‐state‐owned (NSO) firms on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges. Results vary significantly by exchange. Returns for both firm types, on both exchanges, exhibit negative skewness and high kurtosis inconsistent with a normal distribution. Returns display significant autocorrelation, even after the removal of lower‐order effects. Granger causality tests reveal that Shenzhen returns significantly lead Shanghai returns. Within both exchanges, SO firms lead NSO firms. Neither SO nor NSO firm shares are dominated in terms of second‐order stochastic dominance.     

A comparison of buy‐side and sell‐side analysts

There is very little research on the topic of buy-side analyst performance, and that which does exist yields mixed results. We use a large sample from both the buy-side and the sell-side and report several new results. First, while the contemporaneous returns to portfolios based on sell-side recommendations are positive, the returns for buy-side analysts, proxied by changes in institutional holdings, are negative. Second, the buy-side analysts' underperformance is accentuated when they trade against sell-side analysts' recommendations. Third, abnormal returns positively relate to both the portfolio size and the portfolio turnover of buy-side analysts' institutions, suggesting that large institutions employ superior analysts and that superior analysts frequently change their recommendations. Abnormal returns are also positively related to buy-side portfolios with stocks that have higher analyst coverage, greater institutional holding, and lower earnings forecast dispersion. Fourth, there is substantial persistence in buy-side performance, but even the top decile performs poorly. These findings suggest that sell-side analysts still outperform buy-side analysts despite the severe conflicts of interest documented in the literature.     

OTC Clearing Arrangements for Bank Systemic Risk Regulation: A Simulation Approach

Based on a simulation approach, this paper compares different over‐the‐counter (OTC) clearing models regarding their netting efficiency and loss‐concentration implications. The results indicate that the mandatory clearing of all standardized OTC derivatives by a Central Counterparty (CCP) propagated by regulators would significantly decrease systemic risk as compared to existing clearing arrangements only if the multilateral netting benefits of the CCP and loss mutualization are fully attained. Therefore, regulators have to ensure that there is a critical mass of asset classes under mandatory clearing, that broad market participation in the CCP is enabled, and that there is an appropriate client asset protection regime.