The Impact of Ambiguity on Managerial Investment and Cash Holdings

Standard finance theory suggests that managers invest in projects that, in expectation, produce returns that justify the use of capital. An underlying assumption is that managers have the information necessary to understand the distributional properties of the pay‐offs underlying the decision. This paper examines firm investment behavior when managers are likely to find it more challenging to develop expectations of pay‐offs, namely during periods of increased macroeconomic ambiguity. In particular, we examine how macroeconomic ambiguity – proxied by the variance premium (Drechsler, 2010 ) and the dispersion in forecasts of corporate profits from the Survey of Professional Forecasters (Anderson et al., 2009 ) – impacts managerial capital investment and cash holdings. Consistent with ambiguity theory, we find that macroeconomic ambiguity is negatively associated with capital investment and positively associated with cash holdings. These results are robust to alternative explanations related to risk, investor sentiment and economic conditions. Moreover, consistent with recent theoretical real options literature, we find that ambiguity reduces the value of investment opportunities, while risk increases the value of such opportunities. Overall, these findings provide initial empirical evidence on the economic distinction between ambiguity and risk with respect to managerial investment and cash holdings.     

Managerial ability and bank‐loan pricing

This paper examines the impact of borrowers’ managerial ability on lenders’ bank‐loan pricing and the channels through which managerial ability affects bank‐loan pricing. Using a large sample of US bank loans, we provide evidence that higher managerial ability is associated with lower bank‐loan prices. This effect is stronger in firms with high information risk, suggesting that an important channel for managerial ability to affect bank‐loan pricing is through improved financial disclosure to mitigate information asymmetry. The relationship is also stronger for firms with weak business fundamentals, implying that another channel is through improved business performance. Of these two mechanisms, path analysis suggests that the business‐fundamentals mechanism is the more important channel through which managerial ability affects bank‐loan pricing.     

Do U.S. Insurance Firms Offer the “Wrong” Incentives to Their Executives?

We examine the relation between executive compensation and market‐implied default risk for listed insurance firms from 1992 to 2007. Shareholders are expected to encourage managerial risk sharing through equity‐based incentive compensation. We find that long‐term incentives and other share‐based plans do not affect the default risk faced by firms. However, the extensive use of stock options leads to higher future default risk for insurance firms. We argue that this is because option‐based incentives induce managerial risk‐taking behavior, which seeks to maximize managerial payoff through equity volatility. This could be detrimental to the interests of shareholders, especially during a financial crisis.     

Cultural attributes and risk perception: the moderating role of different types of research and development

Drawing on the grid–group culture theory, this study examines hypotheses to explain how the cultural attributes of an organization influence professionals’ perceptions of risk in the context of research and development (R&D) activities. Specifically, we explore whether two dimensions of cultural attributes – the grid dimension and the group dimension – affect organizational commitment and risk perception. We also investigate whether the impact of the cultural attributes on risk perception is mediated by organizational commitment and whether different types of R&D activities – applied research and developmental research – serve as a moderating variable on the relationships among cultural attributes, organizational commitment, and risk perception. The partial least squares method was used to analyze data collected from full-time senior researchers with over five years of experience at a large technology institute. Our findings indicate that cultural attributes influence the risk perception of R&D professionals through the mediating function of organizational commitment. Further, we found that different types of R&D activities have moderating effects on the relationship between organizational commitment and risk perception.     

Optimism and the perceptions of new risks

While many risks, especially new ones, are not objectively quantifiable, individuals still form perceptions of risks using incomplete or unclear evidence about the true nature of those risks. In the case of well known risks, such as smoking, individuals perceive risks to be smaller for themselves than others, exhibiting ‘optimism bias’. Although existing evidence supports optimism bias occurring in the case of risks about which individuals are familiar, evidence does not yet exist to suggest that optimism bias applies for new risks. This paper addresses this question by examining the gap in perceptions of risks individuals have for themselves versus society and the environment, conceptualised as social and/or environmental optimism biases. We draw upon the 2002 UEA‐MORI Risk Survey to examine the existence of optimism bias and its effects on risk perceptions and acceptance regarding five science and technology‐related topics: climate change, mobile phones, radioactive waste, GM food and genetic testing. Our findings provide evidence of social and environmental optimism bias following similar patterns and optimism bias appearing greater for those risks bringing sizeable benefit to individuals (e.g. mobile phone radiation) rather than those more acutely affecting society or the environment (e.g. GM food or climate change). Social optimism bias is found to reduce risk perceptions for risks that have received large amounts of media attention, namely, climate change and GM food. On the other hand, optimism bias appears to increase risk perceptions about genetic testing.     

Managerial Ownership and Agency Conflicts: A Nonlinear Simultaneous Equation Analysis of Managerial Ownership, Risk Taking, Debt Policy, and Dividend Policy

This paper uses a nonlinear simultaneous equation methodology to examine how managerial ownership relates to risk taking, debt policy, and dividend policy. The results have implications for our understanding of agency costs. We find risk to be a significant and positive determinant of the level of managerial ownership while managerial ownership is also a significant and positive determinant of the level of risk. The result supports the argument that managerial ownership helps to resolve the agency conflicts between external stockholders and managers but at the expense of exacerbating the agency conflict between stockholders and bondholders. We further observe evidence of substitution-monitoring effects between managerial ownership and debt policy, between managerial ownership and dividend policy, and between managerial ownership and institutional ownership.     

Exchange Rates and the Conversion of Currency‐Specific Risk Premia

How do the risk factors that drive asset prices influence exchange rates? Are the parameters of asset price processes relevant for specifying exchange rate processes? Most international asset pricing models focus on the analysis of asset returns given exchange rate processes. Little work has been done on the analysis of exchange rates dependent on asset returns. This paper uses an international stochastic discount factor (SDF) framework to analyse the interplay between asset prices and exchange rates. So far, this approach has only been implemented in international term structure models. We find that exchange rates serve to convert currency‐specific discount factors and currency‐specific prices of risk – a result linked to the international arbitrage pricing theory (IAPT). Our empirical investigation of exchange rates and stock markets of four countries presents evidence for the conversion of currency‐specific risk premia by exchange rates.     

Bank Liquidity Creation and Risk‐Taking: Does Managerial Ability Matter?

This study investigates the impact of managerial ability on banks' liquidity creation and risk‐taking behavior. We find that higher ability managers create more liquidity and take more risk. During times of financial crisis, however, higher ability bank managers reduce liquidity creation as a way to de‐leverage their balance sheets. Our findings inform recent theoretical and empirical studies that investigate determinants of liquidity creation and risk by introducing managerial ability as a prominent antecedent of the banks' intermediation and risk‐transforming service. Moreover, this study has policy‐related implications, since managerial ability can be quantified as a key performance indicator for prudential supervision of banks and could help regulators to target intervention efforts more purposefully during times of crisis.     

Executive Compensation and the Maturity Structure of Corporate Debt

Executive compensation influences managerial risk preferences through executives' portfolio sensitivities to changes in stock prices (delta) and stock return volatility (vega). Large deltas discourage managerial risk‐taking, while large vegas encourage risk‐taking. Theory suggests that short‐maturity debt mitigates agency costs of debt by constraining managerial risk preferences. We posit and find evidence of a negative (positive) relation between CEO portfolio deltas (vegas) and short‐maturity debt. We also find that short‐maturity debt mitigates the influence of vega‐ and delta‐related incentives on bond yields. Overall, our empirical evidence shows that short‐term debt mitigates agency costs of debt arising from compensation risk.     

Prozac for depressed states? Effect of mood on local economic recessions

This paper examines whether people's mood and optimism affect economic activity. We consider two sets of exogenous proxies for optimism that are unrelated to the economic environment: (1) weather (average temperature and cloud cover) and (2) sports and political optimism. We show that economic recessions are weaker and expansions are stronger in the United States where local individuals are more optimistic. Further, local optimism has a stronger impact on state‐level business cycles of smaller states and regions with low levels of risk sharing. In contrast, the incremental effects of local optimism are weaker in states where people are younger, more educated and sophisticated, and socially more connected. States with larger concentration of minority and urban population also exhibit lower sensitivity to variations in mood and optimism. Alternative explanations based on the state's industrial composition, tax environment, migration, seasonal affective disorder (SAD), oil shocks, and direct economic impact of weather cannot explain these findings.     

The Relationship Among Managerial Sentiment,Corporate Investment,and Firm Value: Evidence from Taiwan

This study has two objectives: to examine the relationship between managerial sentiment and corporate investment and to examine the relationship between investment and firm value. We use a sample of Taiwanese firms and find that an optimal level of investment that maximizes a firm's value does exist and that it depends upon the quality of the investment opportunities. In addition, the empirical results show that when firms have valuable (nonvaluable) investment opportunities, managerial optimism (pessimism) makes overinvestment (underinvestment) more likely. Interestingly, the overinvestment (underinvestment) phenomenon for optimistic (pessimistic) managers differs significantly between valuable project and nonvaluable project firms.     

CEO Age,Risk Incentives,and Hedging Strategy

We test whether managerial preferences explain how firms hedge, using hand‐collected data on derivative portfolios in the oil and gas industry. How firms hedge involves choosing between linear contracts and put options, and deciding whether to finance these hedging positions with cash on hand or by selling call options. The likelihood of being a hedger increases with chief executive officer (CEO) age, and near‐retirement CEOs prefer linear hedging instruments. The predictions of the managerial risk incentives theory of hedging strategy, according to which managers with convex compensation schemes avoid hedging strategies that cap upside potential, find no support in the data.     

CEO optimism and forced turnover

We show theoretically that optimism can lead a risk-averse Chief Executive Officer (CEO) to choose the first-best investment level that maximizes shareholder value. Optimism below (above) the interior optimum leads the CEO to underinvest (overinvest). Hence, if boards of directors act in the interests of shareholders, CEOs with relatively low or high optimism face a higher probability of forced turnover than moderately optimistic CEOs face. Using a large sample of turnovers, we find strong empirical support for this prediction. The results are consistent with the view that there is an interior optimum level of managerial optimism that maximizes firm value.     

Socialism and Intrafirm Asset Allocation

We rely on a survey of Swiss firms to document deviation from first‐best for reasons of internal ‘fairness’ when allocating resources. This ‘socialist’ practice is more widespread in smaller than in larger firms. It ignores the reputation and past performance of the managers who apply for funding, but takes into account their hierarchical position and their past use of resources. Socialism is only partially explained by concerns about empire building and managerial optimism, and it is not meant to benefit shareholders.     

Does managerial ownership influence corporate social responsibility (CSR)? The role of economic policy uncertainty

To explore the drivers of corporate social responsibility (CSR), we investigate how managerial ownership influences CSR in the presence of economic policy uncertainty. Our results demonstrate that, when facing more economic policy uncertainty (EPU), firms with larger managerial ownership invest significantly more in CSR. This is in agreement with the risk mitigation hypothesis, where CSR offers insurance‐like protection against adverse events. When economic policy uncertainty is not considered, however, we find that managers with higher ownership stakes invest significantly less in CSR, suggesting that CSR is driven by the agency conflict. As managers own more equity, they are subject to greater costs of CSR. Additional analyses confirm the results, including dynamic GMM, propensity score matching and instrumental‐variable analysis.     

Predictors of unrealistic optimism: a study of Norwegian risk takers

In areas of voluntary risk behaviour, as with other kinds of risk, people tend to be overly optimistic regarding not being injured. A study of risk perception and causal explanations of injury assessments was conducted on 199 respondents from three different sub‐groups in Norway; skydivers (n?=?88), fire fighters (n?=?73) and soldiers (n?=?38). Unrealistic optimism was studied by means of four demographic variables: the background of the subject (sub‐sample), gender, age, and education. In addition, three predictors of unrealistic optimism were taken into account—safety attitudes, control, and anxiety. These predictors were included in an Analysis of Linear Structural Relationship (LISREL) analysis. The results showed that optimism differed between the sub‐groups, and that different factors influenced risk perception depending on the group and depending on whether the assessment was of oneself or of others. These findings offers additional information that will help explain the inconsistent findings in the current literature of unrealistic optimism. Of the predictors investigated, safety attitudes were found to be the most important, which may be because respondents preoccupied with safety are more aware of potential dangers and thereby less optimistic.     

Bidder CEO and Other Executive Compensation in UK M&As

This paper investigates the impact of M&As on bidder (CEO and other) executive compensation employing a unique sample of 100 completed bids in the UK over the 1998–2001 period. Our findings indicate that less independent and larger boards award CEOs significantly higher bonuses and salary following M&A completion both for the full sample and for the UK and US sub‐samples. UK CEOs and executives are rewarded more for the effort exerted in accomplishing intra ‐ industry or large mergers than for diversifying or small mergers and their cash pay is unaffected by other measures of their managerial skill or performance. US bidders are rewarded at higher levels than their UK counterparts and their remuneration is related only to measures of CEO dominance over the board of directors. Overall our findings offer support for the managerial power rather than the agency theory perspective on managerial compensation.     

Investor sentiment,executive compensation,and corporate investment

We develop a model that predicts corporate investment level increases with investors’ optimism and that the relationship between investment level and executive compensation depends on investor sentiment and other parameters. The empirical test shows that optimism is significantly and positively related to the level of investment and that executive compensation is insignificantly related to the level of investment. The managerial share ownership is positively related to the level of investment, conditional on the degree of optimism. The empirical results suggest that executives make investment decisions that not only cater to investor sentiment but also reflect their own interest in the company.     

Past managerial guidance and returns to variance trading around earnings announcements

I investigate the relationship between past managerial guidance and realized variance risk premiums (VRPs) – i.e., the difference between implied and realized variance – in equity options around earnings announcements. I find that implied variances are lower before earnings announcements but VRPs are higher when firms provide guidance. I also find higher option-implied jump risk when firms issue surprising guidance. Further tests suggest a portion of the higher VRPs are due to changes in perceived higher-order risks, but traders also underreact to the precision of information in short-term guidance. These results are attenuated for firms with a better information environment.     

How do auditors perceive CEO's risk‐taking incentives?

Prior literature documents that executive compensation influences managerial risk preferences through executives’ portfolio sensitivities to changes in stock prices (delta) and stock‐return volatility (vega). Large deltas discourage managerial risk‐taking, while large vegas encourage risk‐taking. Theory suggests that auditors charge higher audit fees when standard audit procedures do not allow auditors to reduce audit risk including the risk arising from higher business risk. We posit and find evidence of a negative (positive) relation between CEO portfolio deltas (vegas) and audit fees. We also find a negative relation between CEO portfolio deltas and the issuance of going‐concern audit opinions (GCO).