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1.
Thomas H. Noe 《The Financial Review》2000,35(4):1-8
This study reviews papers from the Eastern Finance Association's Symposium on Corporate Finance, Incentives, and Strategy. I identify the common themes underlying these papers and place the studies in the broader context of contemporary academic finance research. Further, I discuss new directions for future research in corporate finance that are suggested in these studies. 相似文献
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上市公司进行财务决策时表现出许多异常行为,传统公司财务理论往往对此无法做出圆满解释。本文基于新崛起的行为公司财务理论,从一个新的视角进行了分析,结果发现:资本市场上投资者的非理性行为以及企业管理者自身的非理性行为都会导致企业财务政策的扭曲。 相似文献
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《新兴市场金融与贸易》2013,49(1):84-94
This paper explores stock repurchase and agency issues in an emerging market with special regulations. Using match samples, agency-related variables are investigated for pre- and postannouncement periods. Our empirical evidence demonstrates that stock repurchase is related to agency cost mitigation. Agency problems are also significantly related to the preannouncement undervaluation of stock repurchase, after controlling for the effects of growth opportunity and asymmetric information. Finally, a company with a higher ratio of expected repurchase or higher agency costs normally enjoys better market response upon announcement. 相似文献
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Benjamin C. Esty 《European Financial Management》2004,10(2):213-224
Despite the fact that more than $200 billion of capital investment was financed through project companies in 2001, an amount that grew at a compound annual rate of almost 20% during the 1990s, there has been very little academic research on project finance. The purpose of this article is to explain why project finance in general and why large projects in particular merit separate academic research and instruction. In short, there are significant opportunities to study the relationship among structural attributes (i.e., high leverage, contractual details, and concentrated equity ownership), managerial incentives, and asset values, as well as improve current practice in this rapidly growing field of finance. 相似文献
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Dividend Policy, Corporate Governance and the Managerial Entrenchment Hypothesis: An Empirical Analysis 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Jorge Farinha 《Journal of Business Finance & Accounting》2003,30(9-10):1173-1209
This paper analyses the agency explanation for the cross-sectional variation of corporate dividend policy in the UK by looking at the managerial entrenchment hypothesis drawn from the agency literature. Consistent with predictions, a significant U-shaped relationship between dividend payout ratios and insider ownership is observed for a large (exceeding 600 firms) sample of UK companies and two distinct periods. These results strongly suggest the possibility of managerial entrenchment when insider ownership reaches a threshold of around 30%. Evidence is also presented that non-beneficial holdings by insiders can lead to entrenchment in conjunction with shares held beneficially. 相似文献
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对中国上市公司债务期限影响因素的实证研究——基于面板数据的因子分析和回归分析 总被引:3,自引:0,他引:3
李湛 《广东金融学院学报》2009,24(2):94-105
国内外诸多学者已经开始从代理成本、税盾作用、信息不对称等角度来研究影响债务融资期限的各种因素。但综合各种因素来考察企业融资期限结构影响的研究却相对较弱。以中国546家A股的上市公司最近9年相关数据为样本,从企业规模、财务杠杆、债务税率、清算比率和资产期限等因素对企业融资期限结构的影响做因子分析和回归分析后,指出代理成本等理论对中国上市公司债务期限解释是有限的。 相似文献
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By using panel data from Korean listed firms, we find that unionized firms strategically hold less cash to enhance their bargaining power against labor unions. We also find that unionized firms are likely to reduce the marginal value of their cash holdings, thereby decreasing shareholder value from the agency theory perspective. This finding complements the agency theory argument that managers tend to waste corporate resources by hoarding cash, particularly when faced with increased information asymmetry and financial constraints. Overall, our results suggest that information-related financial constraints and agency problems are likely to co-exist in unionized firms. 相似文献
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We investigate if CEO characteristics determine the choice of Political Action Committee (PAC) contributions by firms and if such participation leads to better firm performance. Using a unique, hand‐collected database, we also focus on the identity of the politicians receiving PAC contributions to examine the impact of the value‐relevance of such contributions. Examining data on corporate contributions made to candidates seeking federal office during the 2002, 2004, and 2006 election cycles, we find that CEO dominance and interest alignment influence strategic choices of firms with regards to establishing PACs. Our analysis of value‐relevant contributions shows that firms prefer to donate to politicians representing the state of a firm's headquarters, validating the truth to the adage that all politics is local. However, these targeted political contributions do not have a discernible impact on firm performance. 相似文献
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以2007-2010年中国A股上市公司为研究样本,使用面板数据模型考察企业并购、高管特征与企业绩效之间的关系.买证表明:(1)并购事件对企业绩效有显著负影响;(2)如果高管持股,虽不是方向性的改变,但能部分改善并购事件对企业绩效负影响的程度;(3)如果高管对企业控制力强,非但不能缓解并购事件对企业绩效的显著负影响,反放大负影响的力度. 相似文献
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In this paper we investigate the effects of post-bid defence activity for a sample of takeover bids in the UK. We find that most of the defences investigated promote the interests of target managers by significantly lowering the probability of bid success. We also find that most of the defences promote the interests of shareholders by increasing wealth gains by an amount that varies between 9% and 14%. These results suggest that bid resistance is to the mutual benefit of the managers and shareholders of target firms. This conclusion is in line with recent developments in agency theory. 相似文献
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We examine the link between the monitoring capacity of the board and corporate performance of UK listed firms. We also investigate how firms use the flexibility offered by the voluntary governance regime to make governance choices. We find a strong positive association between the board governance index we construct and firm operating performance. Our results imply that adherence to the board‐related recommendations of the UK Corporate Governance Code strengthens the board's monitoring capacity, potentially helping mitigate agency problems, but that investors do not value it correspondingly. Moreover, in contrast to prior UK findings suggesting efficient adoption of Code recommendations, we find that firms at times use the Code flexibility opportunistically, aiming to decrease the monitoring capacity of the board, which is followed by subsequent underperformance. This finding questions the effectiveness of the voluntary approach to governance regulation followed in the UK and in many countries around the world. 相似文献
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This paper presents evidence on the financial policies of firms strongly engaged in research and development activities. By referring to the under-investment paradox, the asset substitution problem, the asset specificity proposition and the information asymmetry literature, we postulate that R&D-intensive firms should adopt specific financial policies. In conformity with our hypotheses, empirical results based on a sample of R&D-intensive and non-R&D firms in four major industrialized countries (Europe, the UK, Japan and the US) show that R&D-intensive firms exhibit significant lower debt and dividend payment levels, but shorter debt maturities and higher cash levels than non-R&D ones. 相似文献
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This paper uses a nonlinear simultaneous equation methodology to examine how managerial ownership relates to risk taking, debt policy, and dividend policy. The results have implications for our understanding of agency costs. We find risk to be a significant and positive determinant of the level of managerial ownership while managerial ownership is also a significant and positive determinant of the level of risk. The result supports the argument that managerial ownership helps to resolve the agency conflicts between external stockholders and managers but at the expense of exacerbating the agency conflict between stockholders and bondholders. We further observe evidence of substitution-monitoring effects between managerial ownership and debt policy, between managerial ownership and dividend policy, and between managerial ownership and institutional ownership. 相似文献
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互联网金融让大众可以在信息相对对称中自由、平等地获取金融服务,逐步实现金融的普惠性。从互联网金融和普惠金融的基本特征和理念出发,分析互联网金融与普惠金融之间的区别与联系,找出互联网金融与普惠金融的结合点,提出互联网金融背景下普惠金融发展的建议。 相似文献
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Information Uncertainty and Expected Returns 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
This study examines the role of information uncertainty (IU) in predicting cross-sectional stock returns. We define IU in terms of “value ambiguity,” or the precision with which firm value can be estimated by knowledgeable investors at reasonable cost. Using several different proxies for IU, we show that (1) on average, high-IU firms earn lower future returns (the “mean” effect), and (2) price and earnings momentum effects are much stronger among high-IU firms (the “interaction” effect). These findings are consistent with analytical models in which high IU exacerbates investor overconfidence and limits rational arbitrage.This revised version was published online in August 2005 with a corrected cover date. 相似文献
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This paper empirically investigates the relationship between managerial entrenchment and agency costs for a large sample of UK firms over the period 1999–2005. To measure managerial entrenchment, we use detailed information on ownership and board structures and managerial compensation. We develop a managerial entrenchment index, which captures the extent to which managers have the ability and incentives to expropriate wealth from shareholders. Our findings, which are based on a dynamic panel data analysis, show that there is a strong negative relationship between managerial entrenchment and our inverse proxy for agency costs, namely asset turnover ratio. There is also evidence that short‐term debt and dividend payments work as effective corporate governance devices for UK firms. Finally, our findings reveal that agency costs are persistent over time. The results are robust to a number of alternative specifications, including varying measures of managerial entrenchment and agency costs. 相似文献
19.
This paper investigates the impact of M&As on bidder (CEO and other) executive compensation employing a unique sample of 100 completed bids in the UK over the 1998–2001 period. Our findings indicate that less independent and larger boards award CEOs significantly higher bonuses and salary following M&A completion both for the full sample and for the UK and US sub‐samples. UK CEOs and executives are rewarded more for the effort exerted in accomplishing intra ‐ industry or large mergers than for diversifying or small mergers and their cash pay is unaffected by other measures of their managerial skill or performance. US bidders are rewarded at higher levels than their UK counterparts and their remuneration is related only to measures of CEO dominance over the board of directors. Overall our findings offer support for the managerial power rather than the agency theory perspective on managerial compensation. 相似文献
20.
Yu-Hong Liu;I-Ming Jiang;Hung-Chieh Huang; 《The Financial Review》2024,59(4):1003-1026
This study investigates how information uncertainty influences managers' decisions and compensation. It reveals varying financial choices under uncertainty levels. Initially, information uncertainty results in debtholders undervaluing debt in comparison to situations without such uncertainty. Consequently, they consistently estimate a default threshold that is lower than the threshold managers choose to maximize their value. Low uncertainty prompts overinvestment, heightening agency issues. Increased uncertainty leads debt holders to reduce the capital they are willing to lend to companies for investment. To invest early, funds must be injected or costs incurred. Information uncertainty can ease agency conflicts, shifting decisions from overinvestment to underinvestment. Managerial compensation matters: higher fixed salaries curb overinvestment, while increased reservation income exacerbates it. 相似文献