上市公司股权结构与现金持有水平关系的实证分析

从公司治理视角出发,以中国上市公司为样本,对股权结构与企业现金持有决策关系进行了理论与实证分析.结果表明,经理人员持股比例、流通A股比例与企业现金持有水平显著正相关;法人股比例、股权集中度与企业现金持有水平显著负相关;第一大股东持股比例与企业现金持有水平正相关,但不显著;国有股比例与企业现金持有水平负相关,但极不显著.     

产权性质、股权结构与现金持有量

现金作为企业流动性最强的资产,其持有量的大小直接影响着企业资产流动性的强弱以及盈利能力的大小.本文选取我国A股上市公司为样本,研究企业的产权性质、管理层持股比例以及流通A股比例对企业现金持有量的影响.研究表明,相对于国有企业,非国有企业现金持有水平较高;管理层持股比例与企业现金持有量正相关;流通A股比例与企业现金持有量负相关.     

公司治理结构与多元化投资——来自中国上市公司的经验证据

对2008年我国上市公司公司治理结构对多元化投资的影响进行实证研究后发现:股权集中度与多元化程度显著负相关;国有股比例和法人股比例与多元化程度负相关,但不显著。董事会规模、独立董事人数和两职合一状态与多元化投资不具有显著的相关性;董事会会议次数与多元化程度显著正相关;高级管理层持股比例与多元化程度相关性不显著;资产负债率与多元化程度正相关,但不显著。     

股权结构、公司治理与上市公司投资水平的实证研究

实证研究表明,在上市公司投资水平的决定因素中,资产负债率、资产规模、现金流都与投资显著正相关,但托宾Q并不显著,并且在方向上与预期相反;行业之间的投资行为存在差异;第一大股东持股比例与投资负相关;流通股比例与投资正相关但不显著,国有股比例和社会法人股比例都与投资负相关但只有国有股比例显著;高管持股比例和独董比例都与投资负相关,但同样不显著。     

控股股东控制、负债融资与企业投资

使用我国上市公司2000～2005年间非平衡面板数据,本文检验了控股股东控制下负债融资对企业投资的影响。研究表明：企业负债与投资规模显著负相关,但负债对国有控股公司投资水平抑制作用较弱;负债抑制了低成长公司的过度投资,而对于高成长公司,负债抑制了其正常投资;短期负债相比长期负债相机治理作用较强;银行借款对非国有控股企业投资支出抑制作用更强;企业投资与银行借款的负相关关系随着国有控股股东持股比例的增加而减弱,而非国有控股企业控股股东的持股比例变化不会对投资与银行借款之间的关系产生显著影响。     

流通服务业上市公司的董事会治理对公司价值影响的实证研究

本文研究发现:流通服务业上市公司的董事规模和董事变更幅度与公司价值存在显著的负相关关系;董事持股比例和董事会会议次数与公司价值存在显著的正相关关系;独立董事比例、董事会领导权结构、董事薪酬、董事教育水平对公司价值的影响不显著。这对于提升流通服务业上市公司的价值,促进流通业的又好又快发展具有重要理论与现实意义。     

我国民营上市公司董事会特征与现金持有水平关系的实证研究

董事会作为公司治理的核心,是影响企业现金持有水平的重要因素之一。文章以2008-2011年间民营上市公司为研究对象,对董事会特征与现金持有水平之间的关系进行了实证研究。结果发现:董事会规模、独立董事比例与现金持有水平存在不显著显著的负相关关系;董事会会议频次与现金持有水平存在显著负相关关系;两职合一、董事长持股比例、董事薪酬与现金持有水平存在不显著正相关关系。     

中国上市公司股权结构与投资多元化关系研究

20世纪70年代以来,股权结构在企业投资多元化中的作用问题一直是国外金融学与财务学领域相关学者探讨的热点问题。本文主要以中国的上市公司为样本,首先对股权结构与企业投资多元化的关系的有关理论进行分析和概括,本文认为:股权结构与企业投资多元化有着密切的联系,股权结构的变化是实现企业投资多元化的重要途径;另外本文结合中国上市公司中一股独大的这一特点,提出了相应的解决办法。     

可转债融资对上市公司经营绩效的影响研究

本文选取2015-2019年间发行可转债的A股上市公司为研究对象,以总资产收益率为被解释变量,公司发行状态为解释变量,资产水平、营业收入同比增长率、每股收益增长率、资产负债率为控制变量建立多元线性回归模型,实证研究可转债融资对A股上市公司经营绩效的影响。研究结果表明:A股上市公司可转债融资与经营绩效显著负相关,且经营绩效与公司资产水平、营业收入同比增长率、每股收益增长率显著正相关,与资产负债率显著负相关。     

联合投资对IPO抑价的影响——来自创业板上市公司的经验证据

文章以2009年10月至2014年10月在创业板上市的公司为样本,通过建立多元线性回归模型,并采用Heckman两阶段模型解决内生性问题,考察了联合投资及其相关特质对被投资企业IPO抑价的影响。研究发现:联合投资比单一风险投资更能降低IPO抑价率,主导风投持股比例和声誉与IPO抑价率显著负相关,主导风投对被投资公司的投资时间与IPO抑价率负相关,但不显著。本文研究细化了风险投资相关研究,丰富了相关研究文献,同时验证了联合投资的"认证理论"在创业板发挥了显著作用,为企业引入风险投资策略选择提供了有益借鉴。     

中小板上市公司股权结构对融资偏好的影响研究

本文从代理成本和控制权收益角度分析了股权结构对融资偏好的影响,以2006年年底之前在中小企业板上市的102家公司2007至2009年的数据为样本进行了实证分析。研究结果表明,不同类型的股权结构对公司融资偏好的影响有着很大差异。法人股比例与股权融资率显著正相关,限售自然人持股比例和股权融资率呈负相关关系,国有股、高管持股比例、股权集中度、股权制衡度则对股权融资率影响不显著。中小板上市公司并未表现出主板上市公司＂偏好股权融资＂的特征,但高管持股比例过低、一股独大是中小板与主板上市公司的共性。我国中小板上市公司的高管持股比例需要提高,股权激励制度仍需进一步完善,股权集中度和股权制衡度应适度提高。     

Diversification and ownership concentration

If controlling shareholders can divert profits, equity ownership is more concentrated the higher the stock returns correlation. A higher returns correlation reduces the benefits of diversification, giving rise to both a higher investment by the controlling shareholder in the asset that he controls and a lower investment by the non-controlling shareholders. The empirical analysis supports the predictions of the model: equity ownership is more concentrated in countries where the stock returns correlation is higher; moreover the intensity of the relationship between the stock returns correlation and ownership concentration is amplified by poor investor protection.     

Shareholding structure and corporate performance of partially privatized firms: Evidence from listed Chinese companies

Equity ownership in a listed Chinese firm can have as many as five different classes: state-owned shares, legal-person (LP) shares, tradable A-shares, employee shares, and shares only available to foreign investors, a phenomenon that is unique to the Chinese equity market. In this paper, we investigate whether and how the corporate performance of listed Chinese firms is affected by their shareholding structure. The sample consists of all firms listed in the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE) from 1991 to 1996. It is found that firm performance is positively related to the proportion of LP shares but negatively related to the proportion of shares owned by the state. Additional analyses indicate that firm performance increases with the degree of relative dominance of LP shares over state shares. Moreover, for the subsample of firms that do not have both state and LP shares, the return on equity (ROE) of firms with LP shares but no state shares is higher than that of firms with state shares but no LP shares by 3.84%, and this difference is statistically significant. On the other hand, there is little evidence in support of a positive correlation between corporate performance and the proportion of tradable shares owned by either domestic or foreign investors. These findings suggest that the ownership structure composition and relative dominance by various classes of shareholders can affect the performance of state-owned enterprise (SOE)-transformed and listed firms.     

Ownership of Cross–Listed Equities: An Investigation of Turnover, Diversification, and Risk

Using data for a sample of Malaysian stocks that are traded in both Malaysia and Singapore, we show that the turnover rate (trading volume relative to shares held) is significantly higher in the foreign market than in the domestic market. We also find that ownership of cross–listed shares by foreign investors is not motivated by diversification benefits. Instead, we find that the proportion of a firm's shares held in Singapore is directly related to the firm's level of systematic risk.     

市场化进程、股权结构特征与亏损逆转程度——基于2003~2011年中国亏损上市公司的经验证据

以股权结构特征对上市公司亏损逆转程度的影响进行理论分析,选取中国证券市场上2003~2011年发生亏损的1508家公司年样本进行实证研究,其结果表明：上市公司的股权结构特征对其亏损逆转程度会产生一定的影响。其中,国有股比例对上市公司的亏损逆转程度产生显著的正面影响,管理层持股与否对上市公司的亏损逆转程度产生显著的负面影响,第一大股东持股比例和控制权市场并没有对亏损上市公司的亏损逆转程度产生明显的影响。进一步的研究还表明,市场化进程会对股权结构特征与亏损逆转程度之间的相关程度产生影响,即在市场化进程较慢的地区,上市公司的股权结构特征对其亏损逆转程度的影响较强;反之,在市场化进程较快的地区,上市公司的股权结构特征对其亏损逆转程度的影响较弱。     

关于股改前后现金股利影响因素的实证研究

对股改前后影响现金股利水平的公司治理变量研究表明,虽然股改矫正了现金股利与增长机会之间的关系,使股改后当存在增长机会时,公司会减少现金股利的发放,但是我国上市公司的现金股利尚未呈现出全流通资本市场上作为降低控股股东与中小股东代理成本工具的现金股利政策应有的特征,突出表现在股改前后影响上市公司现金股利支付水平的股权结构变量并未发生变化,股改前后都存在股权集中度、第一大股东持股比例及第二到第十大股东持股比例与每股现金股利呈显著正相关、而流通(非限售)股比例与每股现金股利呈显著负相关的关系。     

State ownership and firm performance: Empirical evidence from Chinese listed companies

While the relationship between state ownership and firm performance has been widely researched, the empirical evidence has provided mixed results. This study applies panel data regression techniques to 10,639 firm-year observations of non-financial Chinese listed firms during 2003–2010 to examine the relationship between state ownership and firm performance. The results show that state ownership has a U-shaped relationship with firm performance. The Split Share Structure Reform in 2005–2006 played a positive role in enhancing the relationship between state ownership and firm profitability ratios. Although state ownership decreased significantly after 2006, it remains high in strategically important industry sectors such as the oil, natural gas and mining sector and the publishing, broadcasting and media sector. The findings reveal that a higher level of state ownership is superior to a dispersed ownership structure due to the benefits of government support and political connections. The Split Share Structure Reform made previously non-tradable shares legally tradable, improving corporate governance and reducing the negative effect of non-tradable state shares.     

我国上市公司资本结构影响股权代理成本的实证分析

公司资本结构是公司治理结构的重要方面,它对公司代理成本有着直接的影响。本文对1990—2003年上市公司资本结构影响股权代理成本的实证分析表明,经营者持股比例与股权代理成本呈显著负相关;负债融资比例、法人股比例和第一大股东持股比例与股权代理成本呈不显著负相关;国家股比例和流通股比例与股权代理成本呈较显著正相关。这些研究结论表明,资本结构对股东、经营者和债权人之间的契约关系有着直接的影响,完善资本结构是完善我国上市公司治理结构从而降低代理成本的重要途径之一。     

Determinants of ownership structure: An empirical study of the Korean conglomerates

This study characterizes the ownership structure of multifirm conglomerates in terms of two dimensions; the degree of direct ownership and the amount of family stake. The determinants of the two dimensions are investigated simultaneously using the seemingly unrelated regression model. The results show that the conglomerates with a higher leverage and the bigger proportion of nonmanufacturing businesses tend to have a direct ownership. On the other hand, the conglomerates with a bigger size and a larger proportion of nonvoting shares tend to have a pyramidal ownership. As for the family stake, conglomerates with focused business lines tend to have a larger family stake. However, conglomerates that use more nonvoting shares and have more listed firms tend to have a lower family stake. The empirical results can be interpreted as a rational response of the market participants to the business environment that looks like ‘financing without governance.’