配股后业绩下滑与真实活动盈余管理的相关性研究

本文以我国1997-2009年成功实施配股的549家A股上市公司为样本,从真实活动盈余管理的角度,实证检验了公司为达到证监会的配股资格线,是否进行了盈余管理,以及此行为对公司配股后的经营业绩所产生的影响。研究结果表明,上市公司在配股前确实进行了真实活动盈余管理,且此行为与公司配股后的业绩显著负相关。     

上市公司再融资经营业绩研究

一、引言由于我国特殊的股权结构、融资监管体制,上市公司的融资行为具有更复杂的制度背景,这就使得上市公司的再融资行为具有不同的意义。国内上市公司的融资政策和融资行为,理论界还缺乏系统的研究,公司融资行为的研究更多围绕着再融资的盈余管理问题,对再融资上市公司本身的业绩也很少关注。因此,本文将对配股、增发上市公司的业绩进行深入研究,以期为研究上市公司股权再融资问题提供借鉴。     

上市公司股权再融资盈余管理行为的实证分析

本文运用横截面修正的Jones模型,对我国1997—2002年A股上市公司配股盈余管理行为作了实证分析。研究发现,配股前3个年度和配股当年存在系统的盈余管理行为,影响了上市公司资本配置效率,并导致配股后上市公司业绩出现下降。会计师对于盈余管理进行了必要的关注,说明融资后的审计意见报告具有一定的质量。     

股权再融资、盈余管理与资本配置效率

本文建立了一个模型来分析股权再融资过程中盈余管理产生的机理，分析了盈余管理与配股后运营业绩和股票长期收益的关系。研究表明：上市公司在配股过程中存在系统的盈余管理行为；上市公司配股后的经营业绩出现滑坡，配股前3个年度和配股当年的异常应计利润与配股后的经营业绩具有负相关关系；上市公司配股后的股票长期收益和异常收益下降，配股前3个年度和配股当年的异常应计利润与配股后的股票收益具有负相关关系。本文认为，上市公司配股过程中的盈余管理误导了投资者的决策，造成了股票价值的高估和资本配置效率的下降。     

股份支付并购中存在不同的盈余管理吗?——来自中国上市公司的经验证据

本文从收购方的视角,以2008~2010年在并购过程中采用股份支付方式的中国上市公司为样本,实证考察了中国上市公司在股份支付并购中的盈余管理机会主义行为以及对并购绩效的影响。研究结果发现:收购方在并购前半年存在显著正向应计盈余管理机会主义行为;在并购当期存在显著正向真实盈余管理机会主义行为;并购后一年公司业绩的下降程度受到应计盈余管理与真实盈余管理的交替影响;股份支付并购是促使公司管理层产生盈余管理的动机之一,并且对并购后一年绩效显著下降具有一定的解释力度。     

定向增发与上市公司长期业绩下滑

本文以2006-2009年我国A股市场上市公司定向增发事件为研究样本,从经营业绩的角度考察了上市公司定向增发后的长期业绩状况。本文的研究发现我国上市公司定向增发前的长期业绩呈上升趋势,在定向增发实施当年达到峰值,随后在增发后出现下滑趋势,特别是定向增发后一年内的下降幅度在统计上显著为负。本文从盈余管理假说、自由现金流假说和发行对象类别等角度检验了上市公司定向增发后长期经营业绩下滑的影响因素,发现上市公司定向增发前的盈余管理行为和自由现金流水平、定向增发后的过度投资以及大股东及其关联方的认购是造成定向增发后长期经营业绩下滑的重要原因。     

上市公司配股盈余管理之规范分析

配股融资历来受到上市公司的青睐。为达到中国证监会的ROE标准,上市公司通过各种手段进行利润调整,从而产生了配股盈余管理现象。配股盈余管理主要是上市公司在配股融资的过程中,为了达到政府有关的配股融资标准,在公认会计原则的约束下进行调节盈余的行为。它是在中国特有的融资环境中所产生的一种盈余管理行为。盈余管理在短期内有助于提高上市公司的股票价格,但长期上会导致股票价格的不稳定,从整个资本市场来看,融资盈余管理带来的是有限的资金资源没有合理的利用,甚至可能出现"劣币驱逐良币"的现象。     

地方政府财政行为在提升上市公司业绩中的作用探析

本文详细分析了地方政府材政行为在提升上市公司业绩中的动机、手段和作用,发现为了在资本市场中 资源,地方政府积极参与了上市公司的盈余管理,对上市企业进行了大面积的税收优惠和财政补贴,不仅导致了税务竞争现象,还极大地扭曲了会计信息,如果没有地方政府的财政支持,近一半的已配股公司会得不到配股资格。     

A股发行公司IPO前盈余管理与IPO后经营业绩的实证研究

以2001～2005年期间在我国上交所和深交所A股市场上市的247家IPO公司为研究样本,研究IPO前盈余管理与IPO后经营业绩变化之间的关系。实证研究结果表明:IPO前的盈余管理对IPO后的经营业绩具有一定的预测性,IPO前的正向盈余管理程度越大,其IPO后的经营业绩下降幅度就越大,即IPO前正向盈余管理将会导致IPO后经营业绩下滑。     

股权分置改革、经理薪酬与会计业绩敏感度

本文选取了2002--2006年沪深交易所上市公司会计业绩指标、盈余管理指标与公司高管层年度薪酬数据，对股改前后中国上市公司会计业绩与经理薪酬之间的敏感度变化进行检验，并考察上市公司经理薪酬与盈余管理变量相关关系在股改前后的变化。结果发现，股改后经理行为对会计业绩敏感性增强，公司长期发展的会计业绩变量回归系数及显著性水平显著提高，公司治理机制得到改善。在对股改前后的分组数据进行整体回归后发现，非操纵性应计利润与操纵性应计利润对经理薪酬都存在显著正相关关系，并且股改后的显著性水平较股改前有所提高。净资产指标在经理薪酬契约中的显著性水平在股改后有所下降，公司所有者正在经历由账面价值最大化向市场价值最大化转变的过程。     

Earnings management,market discounts and the performance of private equity placements

Private equity placement data allow us to determine whether sophisticated investors can uncover the true value of firms. This can be done by defining sophisticated investors as those who meet the stringent participation requirements of the private equity market. Our results show private equity issuing firms overstate their earnings in the quarter preceding private equity placement announcements and that sophisticated investors do not ask for a fair discount when purchasing the shares of the private issuing firms. We also find evidence showing that the reversal of the effects of pre-issue earnings management is a significant determinant of the long-term performance of private issues. Results further show that post-issue stock performance and operating performance of firms using “aggressive” earnings management significantly underperform those using more “conservative” earnings management.     

股票增值权激励有效吗

股票增值权是上市公司对管理层实施激励的重要做法，在我国大型国有控股境外上市公司中普遍采用。本文以中国石化为研究对象，对实施股票增值权计划后的公司财务绩效、治理机制与管理层代理成本、股票市场反应等作了实证检验。本文认为，股票增值权计划对公司财务绩效提升、治理机制改善具有一定的积极正面效应；股票增值权在等待期结束后的开始行权年度激励效果最大；股票市场对股票增值权的行权存在着过度反应。最后本文提出了改进股票增值权激励的政策建议。     

How does competition affect real earnings management to meet or beat targets? Evidence from import tariff reductions

Targets provide incentives for earnings management, and a longstanding question is whether earnings management is undertaken opportunistically or to communicate private information about future firm value. To discriminate between these motivations, I follow analytical research showing that an increase in competition through a large decrease in tariffs disciplines managers and better aligns their interests with those of shareholders. Thus, if earnings management reflects managerial opportunism, then an increase in competition will decrease earnings management; and if it signals future performance expectations, then an increase in competition will increase earnings management. Consistent with earnings management indicating managerial opportunism, I show that an increase in competition decreases real earnings management to avoid reporting negative earnings or a negative change in earnings. In addition, by showing that the lessening of trade barriers through import tariff reductions reduces the use of real earnings management to meet or beat earnings targets, I provide evidence on the role of macroeconomic conditions as a determinant of earnings quality.     

监管者识别盈余管理的实证研究

将盈余管理细分为应计盈余管理、线上真实盈余管理和线下真实盈余管理,基于我国特有的配股管制变迁环境,考察监管者识别盈余管理的能力及其变化。研究发现,监管者对上市公司盈余管理具有一定的识别能力,但是会受到管制环境变迁的影响,存在管制效应和演进效应。具体而言,在审核配股资格过程中,监管者能识别线下真实盈余管理,但是,在管制环境变迁后,由于线下真实盈余管理被纳入管制范围,监管者不再对其进行关注,而是关注应计盈余管理,并能识别。在线上真实盈余管理方面,由于其隐蔽性强,监管者并没有表现出显著的识别能力。     

Why do pro forma and Street earnings not reflect changes in GAAP? Evidence from SFAS 123R

This study examines how key market participants??managers and analysts??responded to SFAS 123R??s controversial requirement that firms recognize stock-based compensation expense. Despite mandated recognition of the expense, some firms?? managers exclude it from pro forma earnings and some firms?? analysts exclude it from Street earnings. We find evidence consistent with managers opportunistically excluding the expense to increase earnings, smooth earnings, and meet earnings benchmarks but no evidence that these exclusions result in an earnings measure that better predicts future firm performance. In contrast, we find that analysts exclude the expense from earnings forecasts when exclusion increases earnings?? predictive ability for future performance and that opportunism generally does not explain exclusion by analysts incremental to exclusion by managers. Thus our findings indicate that opportunism is the primary explanation for exclusion of the expense from pro forma earnings and predictive ability is the primary explanation for exclusion from Street earnings. Our findings suggest the controversy surrounding the recognition of stock-based compensation expense may be attributable to cross-sectional variation in the relevance of the expense for equity valuation, as well as to differing incentives of market participants.     

风险投资、联合差异和创业板IPO公司会计信息质量

基于新兴市场的制度背景,本文以2009—2011在创业板上市的IPO公司为样本,综合动态分析了风险投资和风险投资联合差异对IPO前和锁定期结束当年的盈余管理的影响。研究发现,风险投资的参与影响了IPO公司的盈余管理,具体表现在风险投资的参与降低IPO前的盈余管理,以实现在锁定期结束当年的盈余反转,从而获得更高的股份减持收益。实证结果支持风险投资IPO行为的道德风险假设。在此基础上,研究还发现,在我国当期环境下,风险投资联合的差异增加了IPO前的盈余程度,却同时降低了锁定期结束当年的盈余管理程度,这说明风险投资联合并没有恶化风险投资的盈余管理,相反起到了抑制的作用。     

Debt Covenants and Accounting Conservatism

Using a sample of over 5,000 debt issues, I test whether firms with more extensive use of covenants in their public debt contracts exhibit timelier recognition of economic losses in accounting earnings. Covenants govern the transfer of decision-making and control rights from shareholders to bondholders when a company approaches financial distress and thereby limit managers' abilities to expropriate bondholder wealth. Covenants are expected to constrain managerial opportunism, however, only if the accounting system recognizes economic losses in earnings in a timely fashion. Thus, the demand for timely loss recognition should increase with a contract's reliance on covenants. Consistent with this conjecture, I find evidence that reliance on covenants in public debt contracts is positively associated with the degree of timely loss recognition. I also find evidence that the presence of prior private debt mitigates this relationship.     

A game of accounting numbers in asset pricing: Evidence from the privatization of state-owned enterprises

This study examines a public policy issue: whether government officials engage in earnings management to collude with private investors in the privatization of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). We find that the managers of listed Chinese SOEs, who are de facto bureaucrats, employ income-decreasing earnings management to reduce the price of shares to be sold to private investors. We also find that more aggressive income-decreasing earnings management is associated with a lower CEO turnover rate in the year following the privatization. These findings highlight the need to consider the opportunism of government agents when accounting information is used in redistribution of state assets.     

The Timing and Subsequent Performance of Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange

Companies that have listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange by means of a public offering between 1980 and 1991 have subsequently performed poorly. This long run post issue performance is remarkably consistent with the South African evidence for seasoned rights issuing companies and the international evidence for both initial public offerings (IPOs) and seasoned equity offerings (SEOs). Over the four years post issue, the newly listed companies earned an average return of 18.0% as opposed to 81.5% for a size-matched sample of seasoned companies. This study adds to the increasing body of international evidence suggesting the IPO under performance 'puzzle' referred to by Ibbotson (1975), Loughran and Ritter (1995) and Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1995) is not simply sample or country specific.