Value of Multinationality: Internalization, Managerial Self-interest, and Managerial Compensation

In this paper, we examine the impact of managerial self-interest on the value of multinationality. Since agency theory also suggests that a divergence between the interests of managers and shareholders can be aligned by effective managerial incentive, we also examine the effect of managerial compensation on the value of multinationality. Our results show that for high- Q (Tobin's Q > 1 ) firms, investors do not associate the spending of free cash flow on multinationality with the problem of overinvestments. For high- Q firms, it is also found that the value of multinationality can be enhanced by effective managerial incentives. For low- Q firms (Tobin's Q < 1 ), it is found that the concern of managerial self-interest overwhelms the benefits of internalization, making multinationality a value-decreasing event. For low- Q firms, managerial compensation is also ineffective in promoting value-enhancing foreign direct investments.     

Free Cash Flow, Golden Parachutes, and the Discipline of Takeover Activity

We conjecture that golden parachutes are initiated when the agency cost of free cash flow is most severe. We examine the relation between golden parachutes and investment levels in firms that have been successfully acquired. Our results support these three conclusions. First, target firms overinvest prior to an acquisition when golden parachutes are present. Second, the acquirers of targets with golden parachutes reduce investment subsequent to the takeover. Third, the reversal in capital investment by the combined firm is correlated with the magnitude of the target's pre-acquisition overinvestment. The latter findings indicate the takeover acts as a disciplining mechanism with the acquirer reversing the target overinvestment subsequent to the acquisition     

Managerial Private Benefits and Overinvestment

According to agency theory, we hypothesize that underpayment of top management motivates management to overinvest. Using a sample of Chinese-listed companies for the period 2005-10, we assess the effect of managerial compensation on overinvestment and the effect of overinvestment on managerial private benefits, including future compensation and perquisites, as well as on firm performance. We find that underpayment does motivate overinvestment, which increases managerial private benefits but not firm value.     

The Relationship Among Managerial Sentiment,Corporate Investment,and Firm Value: Evidence from Taiwan

This study has two objectives: to examine the relationship between managerial sentiment and corporate investment and to examine the relationship between investment and firm value. We use a sample of Taiwanese firms and find that an optimal level of investment that maximizes a firm's value does exist and that it depends upon the quality of the investment opportunities. In addition, the empirical results show that when firms have valuable (nonvaluable) investment opportunities, managerial optimism (pessimism) makes overinvestment (underinvestment) more likely. Interestingly, the overinvestment (underinvestment) phenomenon for optimistic (pessimistic) managers differs significantly between valuable project and nonvaluable project firms.     

Cross-Border Mergers and Acquisitions and the Role of Free Trade Agreements

This article investigates the impact of the formation of free trade agreements (FTAs) on cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&As). Using the comprehensive M&As dataset of Securities Data Company, we find that FTA relationship is associated with more bilateral cross-border M&As. Second, the cross-border M&As activities between a FTA country-pair do not increase faster than the acquiring country’s total foreign acquisitions, suggesting no evidence of investment diversion effect of FTA. Third, we find that existing FTA relationship with other countries positively affect cross-border M&As between a FTA country-pair. But these third-country FTA effects differ for acquiring country and target country when we look at the ratio of a country-pair’s FTA relative to the acquiring country’s total foreign M&As. Moreover, by exploring the detailed information on acquiring and target firms, we reveal that the effect of FTA differs for horizontal, vertical and conglomerate cross-border M&As. Our results are robust to various measures of M&As activities and econometric methods used.     

基于现金流模型的我国旅游业外汇风险暴露研究

汇率变动导致的国际市场需求变化会引起旅游业的外汇风险暴露。通过构建基于需求的经营性外汇风险暴露模型（经营性现金流模型）和旅游业加权汇率指数（TTWI）,采用2005—2011年国内上市旅游公司的数据,对我国旅游公司的经营性现金流进行实证分析。研究发现,有很大比例旅游公司的经营性活动暴露于外汇风险之下,其外汇风险暴露形式呈现出非线性、非对称和滞后性的特征。旅游公司在管理外汇风险暴露时,可通过投资于外币资产或使用外币负债在总现金流上分散汇率风险。     

Stock Repurchase and Agency Problems: New Evidence in Taiwan's Stock Market

This paper explores stock repurchase and agency issues in an emerging market with special regulations. Using match samples, agency-related variables are investigated for pre- and postannouncement periods. Our empirical evidence demonstrates that stock repurchase is related to agency cost mitigation. Agency problems are also significantly related to the preannouncement undervaluation of stock repurchase, after controlling for the effects of growth opportunity and asymmetric information. Finally, a company with a higher ratio of expected repurchase or higher agency costs normally enjoys better market response upon announcement.     

Forum Selection in International Business Contracts: Home Bias Portfolio Puzzle and Managerial Moral Hazard

We provide an economic analysis of forum selection in international business contracts. International business contracts or multi-state transactions within federally structured countries might be subject to more than one sovereign adjudication system. In case of conflict between the transacting parties, the appropriate tribunal must be identified. We examine the question of business firms' optimal choice of the forums to adjudicate future business disputes. We extend the investment model approach to litigation by applying a portfolio theory type analysis. We show that firms that prefer higher expected income and lower income volatility are better off diversifying the forums under which they litigate business disputes. This stands in contrast to real-world business practice that consistently shows a clear preference to selecting the home court and legal system to settle international business disputes. In a fraction of the cases, both parties gain by selecting a certain forum, because of specialization for example, and it becomes optimal to ignore diversification. In most cases, however, the relevant factors that affect forum selection are zero sum and priced ex ante, court bias, for example. Once priced, there is no incentive to disregard diversification. We hypothesize that, in addition to specialization, factors such as managerial moral hazard explain the real-world behavior of firms: managers are less likely to be blamed, ex post, for choosing the home court. We suggest that, as international barriers decline and international trade grows, firms will diversify the forums in which they adjudicate international business disputes.     

Corporate Acquisitions and the Operating Performance of Malaysian Companies

We report improvements in long run operating performance for a sample of Malaysian companies that made acquisitions over the period 1988–1992. As the sample selected consists of acquisitions of private target companies, the analysis allows us to focus on the possibility of changes arising from non-disciplinary sources. The reported improvements do not appear to have been achieved by sacrificing the long-term viability of the combined firms in pursuit of shortterm objectives. However, as the target companies in the current study were previously privately-owned businesses, researchers and policy makers should be wary before generalising from these results.