Fiscal decentralization,equalization, and intra-provincial inequality in China

Using a nationwide county-level panel dataset for the years 1995–2009, this paper conducts the first analysis in the literature to examine the impacts of fiscal decentralization and fiscal equalization, both measured at the sub-provincial level, on intra-provincial inequality in China. While fiscal decentralization offers significant advantages regarding public expenditure efficiency, a potentially large disadvantage is that it may lead to increased regional inequality. In this paper, in line with our theoretical hypotheses, we find that while fiscal decentralization at the sub-provincial level in China leads to larger intra-provincial inequality, fiscal equalization efforts performed by provincial governments tend to mitigate the detrimental effect of fiscal decentralization on intra-provincial inequality. Our results also indicate that the quantitative effects of fiscal decentralization on regional inequality tend to be larger when they are measured from the expenditure side, which is consistent with the fact that expenditure decentralization is a much more meaningful measure of decentralization in China. Overall, we provide evidence on the potential inequality costs of using fiscal decentralization as a development strategy. At the same time, we emphasize the importance of implementing a fiscal equalization program to ensure the overall success of decentralization policy.     

对中国财政分权度的研究

以财政分权理论述评为基础,文章构建了支出法财政分权度衡量指标,计算并分析了中国总体和分省财政分权度.研究发现:中国总体财政分权度已接近或达到最优水平;东、西、中部财政分权度依次递减;财政分权地区差异较大,西部地区财政分权不均衡现象尤为严重;各地区财政分权度缓慢收敛.文章较客观完整地反映了我国财政分权状况,指明了我国未来财政分权化改革的方向在于局部分权程度的调整而非整体分权程度的扩大.     

财政分权、社会保障支出与城乡居民收入差距的实证分析

基于1998～2012年各省的面板数据,利用动态广义矩(GMM)和面板门槛模型实证分析财政分权、社会保障支出对城乡收入差距的影响,结果显示:由于中国城乡二元经济的特殊性,财政分权、人均社会保障支出与城乡居民收入差距均成正相关性.但社会保障支出对城乡收入差距的影响存在基于财政分权的双门槛效应,当财政分权水平较低时,社会保障支出的增加加剧了城乡收入差距;当财政分权高于一定水平时,社会保障支出有助于缩小城乡收入差距.     

Accounting practice,fiscal decentralization and corruption

In prior studies, accounting and decentralization corruption solutions have so far been analysed in isolation. In this article, we connect these two strands of literature on corruption. Understanding this connection is important because weak financial accounting and reporting systems can inhibit monitoring incentives and thus reduce decentralization benefits in countering corruption. We argue that the effectiveness of decentralization as an anti-corruption barrier is complemented by the quality of the accounting practice in a country. Using multiple sources of data, we find that decentralization has a positive and increasing effect on reducing corruption among countries with a high-quality accounting practice. In contrast, decentralization has a negative and decreasing effect on reducing corruption among countries with weak-quality accounting practices. These findings are robust to alternative measures of accounting, decentralization and corruption and to endogeneity tests. Our findings demonstrate the crucial information role of accounting in enhancing decentralization monitoring mechanisms and in thereby reducing corruption.     

财政合理分权与县乡财政解困

本文从财政分权的理论视角探讨当前的县乡财政困难问题,在阐明财政合理分权的若干基本原则的基础上指出,当前我国县乡财政困难的根源在于财政分权不合理的制度安排,而县乡财政解困的根本途径也必然是寻求各级政府间的财政合理分权.     

财政分权、政府干预行为与地区不良贷款——基于省级面板数据实证分析

基于我国2006-2015年31个省(市、自治区)的面板数据,使用动态面板模型的GMM估计,检验财政分权、政府干预行为对地区不良贷款的影响.结果发现:财政分权与地区不良贷款规模呈正相关,即财政分权水平较高的地区会导致不良贷款的增加;分权下政府干预行为对地区不良贷款的作用也存在显著差异,中部地区的政府干预行为会抑制不良贷款的增加,而东、西部地区的政府干预行为则相反.     

财政分权、空间效应与产业结构升级——基于SDM模型的经验研究

基于2000-2014年中国31个省级面板数据,运用空间杜宾模型分别考察财政收入分权和支出分权对产业结构升级的空间效应以及由此引致的策略性竞争效应,研究表明：财政分权等经济社会因素存在区域差异,这种差异导致产业结构升级在空间分布上具有显著的异质性特征。财政收入分权和支出分权对产业结构升级的影响呈现出非对称的空间溢出效应。一方面,财政收入分权对本地区产业结构升级的影响并不显著,而支出分权对本地区产业结构升级具有积极影响;另一方面,财政收入分权和支出分权对相邻地区产业结构升级均产生抑制效应,但较之于收入分权,支出分权的抑制效应更为明显。     

财政分权、贸易不平衡与区域间资本流动

本文基于经典的宏观经济理论及储蓄与投资相关关系检验法,采用空间面板模型,对中国的财政分权与贸易不平衡对区域间资本流动性的影响及分地区的资本流动性进行了研究.研究发现,在全国层面,财政分权的提高或贸易不平衡度的降低会促进区域间资本流动,在地区层面,环渤海、东南、西北、中部、西南和东北地区内的资本流动性依次减弱.总体上,为提高区域间资本流动性,政府应进一步财政分权,同时着力降低区域的贸易不平衡度.     

财政分权如何加剧了养老保险基金失衡?——基于收支二维视角的分析

基金失衡是当前养老保险制度改革面临的困境。本文从财政分权角度构建基金失衡的解释框架,并对其影响效果与作用机制进行实证检验。结果发现,财政分权显著加剧了养老保险基金的失衡风险,在经内生性与稳健性处理后,这一结果依然成立,且财政分权的影响效应主要通过征缴效率和提前退休两个机制实现。具体而言,财政分权诱发地方政府放松缴费监管,导致养老保险缴费收入遭受损失;财政分权引起地方政府降低退休审核,以致职工提前退休现象较为普遍,进而加大了基金支付需求;制度环境对财政分权的两种作用路径具有门槛效应,在基金相对富余、对财政补贴依赖度低以及总体法定费率较高时,财政分权的作用机制更加突显。本文验证了宏观经济体制对养老保险基金运行的影响,深化了对分权体制与养老保险制度关系的理解。     

中国式财政分权影响资本配置效率研究

高度集中的政治管理体制下的财政分权使得中国财政分权对地方政府行为所产生的激励与西方国家不同。使用2002～2009年数据,对中国财政分权与资本配置效率进行理论研究与实证分析,结果表明:财政分权程度的提高对资本配置效率产生了阻碍作用,中国式分权所引致的地方政府规模扩张等行为扭曲是导致财政分权与资本配置效率负相关的主要原因。为此,应改革政绩考核指标、完善税收体系、调整财权分配制度。