Executive compensation and corporate risk-taking: Evidence from private loan contracts

We examine how management stock options affect corporate risk taking. We exploit exogenous variation in stock option grants generated by FAS 123R and use loan spreads to infer risk taking. Using a difference-in-differences approach, we find that the spreads of loans taken by firms that did not expense options before FAS 123R (treated firms) significantly decrease after FAS 123R relative to firms that either did not issue stock options or voluntarily expensed stock options before 123R (control firms). We also find that the effect is stronger for firms with high agency conflicts associated with risk-shifting. Furthermore, loans taken by the treated firms are less likely to contain collateral requirements and are less likely to have covenants restricting capital investment post FAS 123R.     

CEO risk-taking incentives and relative performance evaluation

This paper examines how changes in CEO risk-taking incentives are associated with changes in the use of relative performance evaluation (RPE) in CEO contracts. Using a shock to the accounting for executive stock options (FAS 123R), I confirm that risk-taking incentives and option grants declined following FAS 123R using a within-firm design, but not a within-CEO-firm design. Decreased risk-taking incentives lead executives to invest in projects with lower systematic risk and can result in reduced incentives to hedge exposure to systematic risk in CEO compensation contracts via RPE. However, CEO relative risk aversion increases with decreases in risk-taking incentives, potentially increasing incentives to protect CEO wealth from systematic performance via RPE. Testing these competing predictions, I find modest evidence consistent with reduced RPE surrounding FAS 123R, suggesting that when CEO risk-taking incentives are reduced, so are incentives to shield CEO pay from systematic performance.     

Executive compensation and corporate risk management

We provide the first evidence on the effects of executive compensation on corporate risk management for insurers. Our unique data set allows the construction of a new, more complete measure of corporate risk management behavior. Specifically, we include hedging-driven usage of not only derivatives but also insurance. To address potential endogeneity, we utilize a difference-in-differences approach, based on the implementation of FAS 123R that required firms to expense stock-based compensation at fair value. We find that the decline in the convexity of executive compensation following FAS 123R led firms to significantly increase corporate risk management, primarily through increased demand for insurance.     

Managerial incentives,options, and cost-structure choices

This study explores the relationship between changes in managerial risk-taking incentives and adjustments of firms’ cost structures, particularly the operating leverage (fixed-to-variable cost ratio). We find managers reduce operating leverage by substituting fixed costs with variable costs, mainly in the selling, general, and administrative (SG&A) and research and development (R&D) cost components, in response to reductions in option-based compensation following the issuance of FAS 123R. Managers facing a decrease in risk-taking incentives adjust operating leverage downward because high operating leverage intensifies the downside potential of earnings. Overall, we present compelling evidence that managers adjust the cost structure of their firms in response to a reduction in risk-taking incentives.     

Robust stock option plans

The main purpose of this paper is to address the issue of robustness of stock option plans, which is essential for reliable accounting valuations. The introduction of the accounting standards SFAS 123R and IFRS 2 for executive stock options has led to an important change. As companies are now forced to value their stock options at grant date for accounting purposes, the robustness of prices against the choice of certain valuation models and input parameters has become a very important issue. We address this issue by first analyzing certain building blocks of existing stock option plans with regard to their robustness properties. Based on our analysis, we then show how robustness of stock option plans can be achieved. The resulting stock option plans are both transparent in structure and reasonable in respect to the incentives they provide in order to increase shareholder value. We therefore conclude that stock options can be reliably expensed, if the corresponding plans are properly designed.     

Disclosure versus recognition: the case of expensing stock options

The SFAS 123R comment process generated over 6,500 comment letters, most of which were against the standard’s enactment. This outpouring of emotion indicates that many believe that disclosure versus recognition matters. Our paper provides evidence for the debate whether managers’ discretion, motivation, and accuracy of stock option estimates differ under the recognition and disclosure reporting regimes. We compare firms that are mandatorily forced to recognize stock options expense with those voluntarily choosing to do so. First we find that mandatory firms (versus voluntary) with more intensive stock option granting tend to understate option estimates, especially in the post SFAS123R period. Our results suggest that a higher recognition cost motivates firms for doing so. Second, we find that mandatory firms with lower future operating risk have better accuracy in the post SFAS123R period, as compared to themselves in the pre SFAS123R period and voluntary firms in the post SFAS123 period. Our results support the notion that the informativeness of option estimates explains the level of accuracy. The findings of this paper add to the debate on the benefits of recognizing stock option expenses.     

Motivating high‐impact innovation: Evidence from managerial compensation contracts

We investigate the relationship between Chief Executive Officer (CEO) compensation and firm innovation and find that long‐term incentives in the form of options, especially unvested options, and protection from managerial termination in the form of golden parachutes are positively related to corporate innovation, and particularly to high‐impact, exploratory (new knowledge creation) invention. Conversely, non‐equity pay has a detrimental effect on the input, output and impact of innovation. Tests using the passage of an option expensing regulation (FAS 123R) as an exogenous shock to option compensation suggest a causal interpretation for the link between long‐term pay incentives, patents and citations. Furthermore, we find that the decline in option pay following the implementation of FAS 123R has led to a significant reduction in exploratory innovation and therefore had a detrimental effect on innovation output. Overall, our findings support the idea that compensation contracts that protect from early project failure and incentivize long‐term commitment are more suitable for inducing high‐impact corporate innovation.     

Does Accounting Treatment of Share‐based Payments Impact Performance Measures for Banks?

This paper identifies, evaluates and analyses the resulting impact of mandatory expensing of share‐based compensation (SBC) under IFRS2/FASB123R on a set of widely used performance measures in the EU and US banking industry. The paper shows that the accounting treatment of SBC schemes, following the mandatory adoption of IFRS2/FAS123R, has a statistically significant negative impact on the selected performance measures over the period 2004–11. The impact also seems to be material, yet modest, for US banks and only for large and high‐growth EU banks, indicating that earlier public concerns and criticisms of the implementation of IFRS2/FAS123R are largely unsubstantiated. The findings also show that banks continue to use SBC, but there is a reduction, albeit insignificant, in the recognised SBC expense over the period 2009–11. That is, earlier public concerns that firms would curtail employing SBC in their employees’ compensation schemes to avoid the effect of SBC expense recognition on their financial ratios came to light after the first option life‐cycle in the post‐adoption period was over. The findings also show a marked movement towards using cash‐settled‐based payments, possibly due to their manipulative accounting treatment, a potentially interesting issue for related accounting research and accounting standard setters.     

Stock option grant vesting terms: economic and financial reporting determinants

Option grant vesting terms are a contractual provision that is shaped by accounting standards and other economic factors. We examine the effect of accounting standards, specifically SFAS 123(R), on the vesting terms of stock option grants while also modeling other economic determinants of this contract feature. We document significant variation in stock option grant vesting periods and patterns suggesting that firms actively choose vesting terms. Consistent with financial reporting incentives influencing contract design, we find that firms simultaneously lengthen vesting periods and alter vesting patterns after the adoption of SFAS 123(R). The changes in vesting patterns are consistent with firms trying to defer recognition of the option expense, while limiting the incremental risk imposed on the CEO. In addition, we find that vesting schedules are longer in growth firms where lengthening the executive’s investment horizon is more important and that firms with more powerful CEOs and weaker governance grant options with shorter vesting periods.     

BACKDATING AND DIRECTOR INCENTIVES: MONEY OR REPUTATION?

We investigate how director incentives affect the occurrence of firms' backdating employee stock options. Directors with more wealth tied up in stock options may pursue activities that lead to personal gain, such as option backdating, which potentially increases the option recipient's compensation. We document a positive and significant association between director option compensation and the likelihood that firms backdate stock options. Our results question the effectiveness of director option compensation in aligning the interests with those of shareholders and help to explain the recent decline in the use of director option grants by many firms.     

Good for managers,bad for society? Causal evidence on the association between risk-taking incentives and corporate social responsibility

Using FAS 123R as an exogenous shock to stock options, I provide evidence that equity-based risk-taking incentives discourage corporate social responsibility (CSR). This finding suggests that compensation incentives can motivate managers not to pursue CSR strategies because CSR reduces firms’ risk and provides insurance-like benefits. Firms with a greater demand for CSR's risk reduction are more sensitive to changes in risk-taking incentives. I triangulate my results by confirming that CSR weaknesses are positively related to subsequent stock return volatility. Overall, using a robust empirical design, I find that risk-taking incentives are a determinant of firms’ CSR.     

The impact of performance-based compensation on misreporting

This paper examines the effect of CEO compensation contracts on misreporting. We find that the sensitivity of the CEO's option portfolio to stock price is significantly positively related to the propensity to misreport. We do not find that the sensitivity of other components of CEO compensation, i.e., equity, restricted stock, long-term incentive payouts, and salary plus bonus have any significant impact on the propensity to misreport. Relative to other components of compensation, stock options are associated with stronger incentives to misreport because convexity in CEO wealth introduced by stock options limits the downside risk on detection of the misreporting.     

Option trading and individual investor performance

This paper examines the impact of option trading on individual investor performance. The results show that most investors incur substantial losses on their option investments, which are much larger than the losses from equity trading. We attribute the detrimental impact of option trading on investor performance to poor market timing that results from overreaction to past stock market returns. High trading costs further contribute to the poor returns on option investments. Gambling and entertainment appear to be the most important motivations for trading options while hedging motives only play a minor role. We also provide strong evidence of performance persistence among option traders.     

Equity‐Based Incentives,Risk Aversion,and Merger‐Related Risk‐Taking Behavior

We find that post‐merger equity risk is negatively related to the sensitivity of CEO wealth to stock return volatility (vega), but is concentrated in CEOs with high proportions of options and options that are more in‐the‐money. The probability of industrial diversification also increases in vega. Additional tests show that the decline in post‐merger equity risk results in a significant decrease in shareholder wealth. This decrease is concentrated among firms with CEOs having the highest delta and the highest delta and vega. Our results suggest that the increased convexity provided by option‐based compensation does not necessarily increase risk‐taking behavior by CEOs.     

The option to quit: The effect of employee stock options on turnover

We show that in the years following a large broad-based employee stock option (BBSO) grant, employee turnover falls at the granting firm. We find evidence consistent with a causal relation by exploiting unexpected changes in the value of unvested options. A large fraction of the reduction in turnover appears to be temporary with turnover increasing in the third year following the year of the adoption of the BBSO plan. The increase three years post-grant is equal in magnitude to the cumulative decrease in turnover over the three prior years, suggesting that long-vesting BBSO plans delay, instead of prevent, turnover.     

Hidden liquidity: An analysis of order exposure strategies in electronic stock markets

Many stock exchanges choose to reduce market transparency by allowing traders to hide some or all of their order size. We study the costs and benefits of order exposure and test hypotheses regarding hidden order usage using a sample of Euronext-Paris stocks, where hidden orders represent 44% of the sample order volume. Our results support the hypothesis that hidden orders are associated with a decreased probability of full execution and increased average time to completion, and fail to support the alternate hypothesis that order exposure causes defensive traders to withdraw from the market. However, exposing rather than hiding order size increases average execution costs. We assess the extent to which non-displayed size is truly hidden and document that the presence and magnitude of hidden orders can be predicted to a significant, but imperfect, degree based on observable order attributes, firm characteristics, and market conditions. Overall, the results indicate that the option to hide order size is valuable, in particular, to patient traders.     

American GARCH employee stock option valuation

We implement a flexible simulation-based approach for the fair value of employee stock option (ESO) that accounts for the vesting period, departure risk and voluntary suboptimal early exercise. We introduce GARCH effects on the underlying asset and we analyze the price bias with respect to the constant volatility case. We also perform a sensitivity analysis with respect to changes in several ESO characteristics. We compare this valuation with FAS 123 method revealing a FAS overvaluation. Finally, we value a real ESO plan providing the confidence intervals for the estimated ESO prices.     

Do option markets undo restrictions on short sales? Evidence from the 2008 short-sale ban

The effectiveness of any sanction depends on the costs of avoiding its restrictions. We examine whether bearish option strategies were substitutes for short sales during the September 2008 short-sale ban. We find a significant diminution in option volumes and a significant increase in option bid-ask spreads for banned stock relative to unbanned stock during the ban period. Apparent violations of the put-call parity bound became significantly more frequent for banned stocks during the ban period. We conclude that the ban acted as an effective restriction on trading in options.     

Option trading: Information or differences of opinion?

This paper investigates the motive of option trading. We show that option trading is mostly driven by differences of opinion, a finding different from the current literature that attempts to attribute option trading to information asymmetry. Our conclusion is based on three pieces of empirical evidence. First, option trading around earnings announcements is speculative in nature and mostly dominated by small, retail investors. Second, around earnings announcements, the pre-announcement abnormal turnovers of options seem to predict the post-announcement abnormal stock returns. However, once we control for the pre-announcement stock returns, the predictability completely disappears, implying that option traders simply take cues from the stock market and turn around to speculate in the options market. Third, cross-section and time-series regressions reveal that option trading is also significantly explained by differences of opinion. While informed trading is present in stocks, it is not detected in options.     

Costs of broad-based stock option plans

We generate estimates of the costs of broad-based stock option programs under varying assumptions about why firms use these pay schemes. We show that, if accounting considerations alone drive option grants, a typical firm in our sample incurs between 50 cents and one dollar of real costs in order to increase reported pre-tax net income by one dollar. This cost is reduced, but is still quite substantial, if accounting leads firms to grant options rather than restricted stock. We also show that, if option grants are efficient, the patterns in our data are consistent with firms using these grants to attract and retain employees.